In the Matter of the Commissions of Inquiry Act 1888 & 2005 and

In the Matter of an Inquiry into the retirement of the former Commissioner of Police convened by a Commission issued by HM Government of Gibraltar on the 4th February 2022 in Legal Notice No 34 of 2022 ("the Inquiry")

Gibraltar Garrison Library 2 Library Ramp Gibraltar

Wednesday 25 October 2023

Before

SIR CHARLES PETER LAWFORD OPENSHAW, DL Commissioner of the Inquiry

Maurice Turnock: Secretary to the Inquiry

Julian Santos: Counsel to the Inquiry, 5RB Chambers Hope Williams: Junior Counsel to the Inquiry, 5RB Chambers Charles Simpson: Solicitor to the Inquiry, Triay Lawyers, Gibraltar Sebastian Triay: Solicitor to the Inquiry, Triay Lawyers, Gibraltar

Lawyers representing Mr Ian McGrail, Former Commissioner of Police:

Adam Wagner, Doughty Street Chambers Stephanie Davin, Doughty Street Chambers Charles Gomez, Charles A. Gomez & Co, Gibraltar Daniel Benyunes, Charles A. Gomez & Co, Gibraltar

Lawyers representing The Hon. Fabian Picardo KC MP, Chief Minister, Nicholas Pyle OBE, Deputy Governor of Gibraltar, and Michael Llamas CMG KC, Attorney General for Gibraltar:

Sir Peter Caruana KC, Peter Caruana & Co, Gibraltar Chris Allan, Peter Caruana & Co, Gibraltar Philip Dumas, Peter Caruana & Co, Gibraltar

Lawyers representing Dr Joseph Britto, Head of the Gibraltar Police Authority:

James Neish KC, TSN, Gibraltar Shane Danino, TSN, Gibraltar

Lawyers representing current members of Gibraltar Police:

Nicholas Cruz, Cruzlaw, Gibraltar Arcelia Hernandez Cordero, Cruzlaw, Gibraltar

Lawyers representing Gibraltar Police Federation:

Gilbert Licudi KC, Hassans, Gibraltar Charles Bonfante, Hassans, Gibraltar

Lawyers representing John Perez, Thomas Cornelio, and Caine Sanchez:

Ben Cooper KC, Doughty Street Chambers, Ellis Sareen, Foundry Chambers Callum Smith, Phillips, Gibraltar

Lawyers representing Paul Richardson, Former Superintendent of Gibraltar Police:

Patrick Gibbs KC, Three Raymond Buildings

PROCEEDINGS-DAY 5

Transcript of Epiq Europe Limited Lower Ground, 20 Furnival Street, London, EC4A 1JS Tel No: 020 7404 1400 Email: casemanagers@epiqglobal.com (Official Shorthand Writers to the Court)

1	(Wednesday 25 October, 2023)	1	submissions fairly quickly. Of course, as
2	(10.03 a.m.)	2	counsel will know, but it is just as well I spell
3	THE COMMISSIONER: Well, good	3	out to the public, there have been very
4	morning, everyone and welcome. One or	4	extensive skeleton arguments, which of
5	two new faces. Mr Gibbs, nice to see you. I	5	course I have read and with which I am
6	have not quite got to grips with who is on	6	entirely familiar. And although each of you
7	screen. Mr Wagner is. Should I be able to	7	may wish to speak briefly to them, you really
8	see him? Yes, good morning to you, can you	8	need not go through them all because I have
9	hear me all right?	9	them plainly in mind. So, as I say, with that
10	MR WAGNER: Good morning. Yes, I can	10	introduction I will ask Mr Santos to introduce
11	hear you.	11	this part of the inquiry.
12	THE COMMISSIONER: Excellent, okay	12	MR SANTOS: Thank you and good
13	and is Mr Cooper on screen as well?	13	morning, sir. I appear with my junior, Hope
14	MR COOPER: Good morning. Yes, I can	14	Williams, as counsel to the inquiry and with
15	hear you as well. Thank you very much.	15	Charles Simpson, solicitor to the inquiry and
16	THE COMMISSIONER: We cannot	16	Sebastian Triay. As is customary I would
17	actually see you at the moment.	17	like to thank, first of all, the Garrison
18	MR COOPER: Yes, I was informed that it	18	Library, and Maurice Turnock, secretary to
19	was an audio only meeting.	19	the inquiry for making all the arrangements
20	THE COMMISSIONER: Oh, okay, that is	20	necessary for today's preliminary hearing.
21	absolutely fine. Thank you. Well, welcome	21	And I would also like to thank the team at
22	to the fifth preliminary hearing, which	22	Triay for their hard work in getting
23	actually, amazingly enough we have	23	everything in order today and in previous
24	managed to start on time. We have set out	24	weeks. Just to run through the agenda for
25	the business in the agenda. I am hoping to	25	today and tomorrow, first we have, as you
	Page 1		Page 3
	101		
1	dispose or to deal with the open business	1	have said, submissions on the discontinuance
2	today, leaving tomorrow to deal with the	2	of the prosecution. Second, we have
2 3	today, leaving tomorrow to deal with the applications by the government parties and	2 3	of the prosecution. Second, we have proposed amendments to the provisional list
2 3 4	today, leaving tomorrow to deal with the applications by the government parties and by the RGP for various restriction orders	2 3 4	of the prosecution. Second, we have proposed amendments to the provisional list of issues. Third, there are a number of
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$\begin{array}{c} 2\\ 3\\ 4\\ 5\\ 6\\ 7\\ 8\\ 9\\ 10\\ 11\\ 12\\ 13\\ 14\\ 15\\ 16\\ 17\\ 18\\ 19\\ 20\\ 21\\ 22\\ \end{array}$	today, leaving tomorrow to deal with the applications by the government parties and by the RGP for various restriction orders which, obviously, I will have to hear in private. So far as the open business is concerned the first item is dealing with a point which Mr Wagner very sensibly raised in advance, and that is to say whether he can ask the Attorney General why he gave notice that he was discontinuing the criminal proceedings. That issue raises a number of quite knotty problems, which seems to me much better decided or at any rate canvassed in advance of the main hearing rather than waiting for the hearing itself when it would become a serious distraction. And the inquiry team have identified a number of questions which seem to arise on which we sought submissions; those questions have been uploaded onto the inquiry website. And now I will ask Mr Santos, counsel to the inquiry, to introduce this part of the hearing.	$\begin{array}{c} 2\\ 3\\ 4\\ 5\\ 6\\ 7\\ 8\\ 9\\ 10\\ 11\\ 12\\ 13\\ 14\\ 15\\ 16\\ 17\\ 18\\ 19\\ 20\\ 21\\ 22\\ 23\\ \end{array}$	of the prosecution. Second, we have proposed amendments to the provisional list of issues. Third, there are a number of procedural matters which we will need to address in progressing towards a main inquiry hearing, including witness categorisation, provisional dates for the main inquiry hearing and dates for the agreed facts process. Fourth, we have an agenda item for any other issue or matter in respect of which anyone is given notice, although nobody so far has raised any such issue in advance of this hearing. And then finally we have the applications for restriction orders or ROA's as we have referred to them in written submissions. The plan is to deal with those last given that there has already been a determination that they will need to be heard in private. It is likely that we will not get to those until later today or perhaps tomorrow and I have agreed with Mr Cruz, counsel for the RGP that the RGP application will
$\begin{array}{c} 2\\ 3\\ 4\\ 5\\ 6\\ 7\\ 8\\ 9\\ 10\\ 11\\ 12\\ 13\\ 14\\ 15\\ 16\\ 17\\ 18\\ 19\\ 20\\ 21\\ 22\\ 23\\ \end{array}$	today, leaving tomorrow to deal with the applications by the government parties and by the RGP for various restriction orders which, obviously, I will have to hear in private. So far as the open business is concerned the first item is dealing with a point which Mr Wagner very sensibly raised in advance, and that is to say whether he can ask the Attorney General why he gave notice that he was discontinuing the criminal proceedings. That issue raises a number of quite knotty problems, which seems to me much better decided or at any rate canvassed in advance of the main hearing rather than waiting for the hearing itself when it would become a serious distraction. And the inquiry team have identified a number of questions which seem to arise on which we sought submissions; those questions have been uploaded onto the inquiry website. And now I will ask Mr Santos, counsel to the	$\begin{array}{c} 2\\ 3\\ 4\\ 5\\ 6\\ 7\\ 8\\ 9\\ 10\\ 11\\ 12\\ 13\\ 14\\ 15\\ 16\\ 17\\ 18\\ 19\\ 20\\ 21\\ 22\\ \end{array}$	of the prosecution. Second, we have proposed amendments to the provisional list of issues. Third, there are a number of procedural matters which we will need to address in progressing towards a main inquiry hearing, including witness categorisation, provisional dates for the main inquiry hearing and dates for the agreed facts process. Fourth, we have an agenda item for any other issue or matter in respect of which anyone is given notice, although nobody so far has raised any such issue in advance of this hearing. And then finally we have the applications for restriction orders or ROA's as we have referred to them in written submissions. The plan is to deal with those last given that there has already been a determination that they will need to be heard in private. It is likely that we will not get to those until later today or perhaps tomorrow and I have agreed with Mr Cruz, counsel for

Page 4

1 (Pages 1 to 4)

1	So, turning to the first item for consideration	1	"Attorney General shall have power in any
2	today, that is the discontinuance of the	2	case in which he considers it desirable to do
3	prosecution against Thomas Cornelio, John	3	so to discontinue at any stage before
4	Perez and Caine Sanchez, which is the	4	judgment is delivered any such criminal
5	background to issue five of the provisional	5	proceedings instituted or undertaken by
6	list of issues, which concerns the	6	himself or any other person or authority."
7	investigation into the alleged hacking and or	7	In relation to the exercise of that power,
8	sabotage of the national security centralised	8	subsection (4) provides that that power is
9	intelligence system or NSCIS and alleged	9	"vested in him to the exclusion of any other
10	conspiracy to defraud, and that RGP's	10	person or authority". And subsection (5)
11	handling of the same, including but not	11	provides that in the exercise of his powers
12	limited to the RGP's execution of search	12	under section 59, he shall "not be subject to
12	warrants or intended execution of search	12	the direction or control of any other person or
		13	
14	warrants as part of that investigation on 12		authority".
15	May 2020.	15	It is interesting to note that section 59 of the
16	There are seven questions which we raised	16	Constitution, does not use the words, "nolle
17	for discussion at this hearing, and I propose	17	prosequi", which are more often associated
18	to address them in two blocks, the first block	18	with the equivalent prerogative power to
19	being questions one to three and the second,	19	discontinue proceedings, which the Attorney
20	questions four to seven. For each block I	20	General enjoys in England. However, it also
21	will address the questions first, with core	21	relevant to note that the words, "nolle
22	participants to follow after and I can then	22	prosequi", do appear in section 223 of
23	respond to any points made at the end.	23	Criminal Procedure and Evidence Act 2011,
24	So, the first block is questions one to three.	24	which states that in any criminal case at any
25	And just so everybody has them firmly in	25	stage before the verdict or judgments, the
	D 5		D 7
	Page 5		Page 7
1	mind the questions are once what was the	1	
1			Attorney General may enter a polle prosequi
	mind, the questions are, one: what was the	$\begin{vmatrix} 1 \\ 2 \end{vmatrix}$	Attorney General may enter a nolle prosequi,
2	legal basis on which the prosecution was	2	either by stating in court or by informing the
2 3	legal basis on which the prosecution was discontinued? (a) section 59 of the Gibraltar	2 3	either by stating in court or by informing the court in writing that the Crown intends that
2 3 4	legal basis on which the prosecution was discontinued? (a) section 59 of the Gibraltar Constitution, (b) section 223 of the Criminal	2 3 4	either by stating in court or by informing the court in writing that the Crown intends that the proceedings are not to continue. That
2 3 4 5	legal basis on which the prosecution was discontinued? (a) section 59 of the Gibraltar Constitution, (b) section 223 of the Criminal Procedure and Evidence Act, (c) both or (d)	2 3 4 5	either by stating in court or by informing the court in writing that the Crown intends that the proceedings are not to continue. That provision appears to complement section 59
2 3 4 5 6	legal basis on which the prosecution was discontinued? (a) section 59 of the Gibraltar Constitution, (b) section 223 of the Criminal Procedure and Evidence Act, (c) both or (d) some other basis?	2 3 4 5 6	either by stating in court or by informing the court in writing that the Crown intends that the proceedings are not to continue. That provision appears to complement section 59 of the Constitution and lay down a procedure
2 3 4 5 6 7	legal basis on which the prosecution was discontinued? (a) section 59 of the Gibraltar Constitution, (b) section 223 of the Criminal Procedure and Evidence Act, (c) both or (d) some other basis? Question two is: in the factual context of the	2 3 4 5 6 7	either by stating in court or by informing the court in writing that the Crown intends that the proceedings are not to continue. That provision appears to complement section 59 of the Constitution and lay down a procedure for the exercise of the section 59 power. And
2 3 4 5 6 7 8	legal basis on which the prosecution was discontinued? (a) section 59 of the Gibraltar Constitution, (b) section 223 of the Criminal Procedure and Evidence Act, (c) both or (d) some other basis? Question two is: in the factual context of the inquiry is it relevant to ask why the Attorney	2 3 4 5 6 7 8	either by stating in court or by informing the court in writing that the Crown intends that the proceedings are not to continue. That provision appears to complement section 59 of the Constitution and lay down a procedure for the exercise of the section 59 power. And it is clear from the Chief Justice's judgment
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2 (Pages 5 to 8)

		1	
1	at the very least, you are not in a position to	1	but that scenario now appears unlikely given
2	determine whether the reasons for the	2	the Attorney General's evidence in his
3	discontinuance are relevant without first	3	second affidavit, which I have already
4	having evidence of the reasons. And it is	4	referred to. Whatever the position, we must
5	right to note that the Attorney General has	5	confess some scepticism as to the practical
6	already stated in an affidavit on oath that the	6	benefits to be derived from learning the
7	decision to discontinue was based on matters	7	reasons for the discontinuance. It is difficult
8	that were brought to his attention over a year	8	to see how the inquiry would ascertain
9	after the events of May/June 2020 with	9	whether any reasons given were, in fact
10	which this inquiry is concerned. That is at	10	genuine, other than by testing those reasons
10	paragraph 47 of his second affidavit. If the	11	with reference to the material which we
12	inquiry were to accept that evidence, then it	12	already have and which we are already going
13	would tend to rule out that the Attorney	13	to examine in order to determine the
13	General's reasons for discontinuing were the	13	pertinent question at the heart of this inquiry
15	same as those which Mr McGrail contends	15	and its terms of reference, namely, what were
16	were operative in May/June 2020. However,	16	the reasons and circumstances leading to Mr
17	were operative in Way/suite 2020. However, we accept Mr McGrail's submission that the	17	McGrail's retirement. In other words,
17	inquiry cannot simply accept the Attorney	18	learning the reasons given by the Attorney
18	General's evidence unchallenged. Of course,	10	General for the discontinuance is unlikely
20	if the Attorney General were to give evidence	20	significantly to advance the evidential picture
20	of reasons which were entirely irrelevant to	20	
21		$\begin{vmatrix} 21\\22 \end{vmatrix}$	of the inquiry's progress in determining the reasons and circumstances leading to Mr
	the events of May/June 2020, then this would tend to undermine Mr McGrail's claim in his		•
23 24		23 24	McGrail's retirement. Despite those
	second affidavit at paragraph 19 that the	24	reservations, however, we consider there is
25	events post his resignation chime with the	25	still some value in asking the question, even
	Page 9		Page 11
1	Attenuero Conoralla statemente ta Mu MaCusil	1	: f l
1	Attorney General's statements to Mr McGrail	1	if only to either rule out or confirm whether
2	that he would defend the Chief Minister to	2	the reason is, in fact, the same as what was
2 3	that he would defend the Chief Minister to the death. The Attorney General's case is	2 3	the reason is, in fact, the same as what was motivating the government parties' actions in
2 3 4	that he would defend the Chief Minister to the death. The Attorney General's case is that, in any event that statement was a	2 3 4	the reason is, in fact, the same as what was motivating the government parties' actions in May/June 2020, particularly given that the
2 3 4 5	that he would defend the Chief Minister to the death. The Attorney General's case is that, in any event that statement was a reference to the office of the Chief Minister	2 3 4 5	the reason is, in fact, the same as what was motivating the government parties' actions in May/June 2020, particularly given that the response would be on oath. So, at this stage,
2 3 4 5 6	that he would defend the Chief Minister to the death. The Attorney General's case is that, in any event that statement was a reference to the office of the Chief Minister and not Mr Picardo, personally. We do not	2 3 4 5 6	the reason is, in fact, the same as what was motivating the government parties' actions in May/June 2020, particularly given that the response would be on oath. So, at this stage, I will give way to any core participant who
2 3 4 5 6 7	that he would defend the Chief Minister to the death. The Attorney General's case is that, in any event that statement was a reference to the office of the Chief Minister and not Mr Picardo, personally. We do not accept the submission advanced that the	2 3 4 5 6 7	the reason is, in fact, the same as what was motivating the government parties' actions in May/June 2020, particularly given that the response would be on oath. So, at this stage, I will give way to any core participant who wishes to address questions one to three
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2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9	that he would defend the Chief Minister to the death. The Attorney General's case is that, in any event that statement was a reference to the office of the Chief Minister and not Mr Picardo, personally. We do not accept the submission advanced that the discontinuance cannot be regarded as a subsequent manifestation of the Attorney	2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9	the reason is, in fact, the same as what was motivating the government parties' actions in May/June 2020, particularly given that the response would be on oath. So, at this stage, I will give way to any core participant who wishes to address questions one to three before we turn to four to seven. THE COMMISSIONER: Perhaps I could
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3 (Pages 9 to 12)

1	Chief Minister triggered and then directed	1	going to deal with the reasons later, but on
2	the events which forced Mr McGrail to take	2	relevance
3	early retirement. And that you also submit	3	MR WAGNER: Yes. Well, I am not making
4	that in the investigation of Operation Delhi,	4	a point on relevance. I am just saying that in
5	the Chief Minister himself was, as you put it,	5	terms of the reasons why Mr McGrail
6	"potentially implicated". Those are your	6	proposes that there may have been an
7	words and a senior civil servant, Caine	7	underlying motive, which is relevant to the
8	Sanchez, and the Chief Minister's close	8	questions in this inquiry, partly are due to
9	friend, mentor and business associate, as you	9	what Mr Azopardi said, which was that he
-			considered there was a political public
10	put it, Mr Levy, were key suspects.	10 11	1 1
11	Therefore, it is your case that the Chief		interest in the discontinuance. And that is,
12	Minister's motive in removing Mr McGrail	12	again, it just militates towards the possibility,
13	was to protect him, the Chief Minister, from	13	and I do not put it more than that, the
14	personal and political danger presented to	14	possibility that these are very relevant issues
15	him and to his government. And you allege	15	to this inquiry, and I agree with Mr Santos
16	that the Attorney General played, as you put	16	that, without asking the question and without
17	it, "a key enabling role and was at all	17	requesting documents the inquiry cannot
18	material times acting under the instruction of	18	decide it one way or the other, whether it is,
19	the Chief Minister". Therefore, you submit	19	in fact, relevant.
20	that if the real reasons for discontinuing the	20	THE COMMISSIONER: Okay. I know Sir
21	prosecution were to protect the political	21	Peter, that you do not agree with this point on
22	reputation of the Chief Minister and the	22	relevance. I will come to you in a moment.
23	government from the fall out of the	23	Does anybody else want to say anything in
24	impending trial, and if the Chief Minister and	24	support of relevance? I know I have read
25	the Attorney General were driven by the	25	your point Mr Gibbs and I have, more or less,
	D 42		D 45
	Page 13		Page 15
			0
1	same motives in discontinuing the trial as	1	
1	same motives in discontinuing the trial as	1	I think, summarised your incredibly
2	they had been in engineering his retirement,	2	I think, summarised your incredibly complicated question. Is it at paragraph five
2 3	they had been in engineering his retirement, then the one is plainly relevant to the other.	2 3	I think, summarised your incredibly complicated question. Is it at paragraph five in your
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2 3 4 5	they had been in engineering his retirement, then the one is plainly relevant to the other. That, I think, in essence is what you are saying?	2 3 4 5	I think, summarised your incredibly complicated question. Is it at paragraph five in your MR GIBBS: It may well be. THE COMMISSIONER: Yes, well, I have
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4 (Pages 13 to 16)

1	evidence as a whole.	1 s	simply too much dot joinder going on there.
2	THE COMMISSIONER: Yes, thank you.		Evidence has got to be forensic. It cannot
3	Yes, now, Sir Peter, you do not agree with		just sound in an echoey room to be
4	relevance. I had better just give you the		prejudicial. It has to be forensically relevant
5	opportunity - obviously, I have read your	-	of the issue under inquiry.
6	skeleton argument. I understand what you		So, I would make that submission and
7	are saying, but you are perfectly entitled to		therefore, just to encapsulate that in a
8	say it, briefly, in public, so that everybody		nutshell, the Attorney General's motives,
9	understands your position.		even if they were as improper as is being
10	SIR PETER CARUANA: No, I have no		suggested, do not, in fact, chime with his
11	intention of visiting anything that I have		statement a year earlier that he would defend
12	written in my skeleton argument following		the Chief Minister to the death. He might
12	your indication that you have read it, but I do		well have wanted to do that. He may even
13	want to respond to the propositions put by		have wanted to do that a year later when he
15	my learned friends, Mr Santos and Mr		entered the nolle, but that says nothing about
15	•		the motivation of the Chief Minister, still less
	Wagner and Mr Gibbs, I think. So, I would		
17	submit on behalf of the Attorney General that		about Mr Pyle, about why they wanted to
18	actually, the points that are made are		bring about the cessor of Mr McGrail as
19	forensically speaking a complete non		Commissioner of Police. Even if those
20	sequitur. In other words, if the Attorney		motives on their part had been to protect
21	General had indeed exercised his power to		themselves from what they thought might
22	enter the nolle for the sole purpose of		transpire, there is just not, in my respectful
23	protecting his friend, the Chief Minister, and		submission a sufficient forensic common
24	his friend, Mr Levy, that would simply be		basis for that. And then, sir, Mr Santos says
25	forensic about something which is not within	25 t	that there also remains a theoretical
	Page 17		Page 19
	0		8
1	the scope of this inquiry, which is that the	1 1	possibility that the Attorney General gives
1 2	the scope of this inquiry, which is that the Attorney General had exercised his power		possibility that the Attorney General gives evidence, that the reasons for the nolle are
		2 0	
2	Attorney General had exercised his power	2 e 3 t	evidence, that the reasons for the nolle are
2 3	Attorney General had exercised his power improperly and unlawfully. This is not an	2 c 3 t 4 y	evidence, that the reasons for the nolle are the very same reasons which McGrail says is
2 3 4	Attorney General had exercised his power improperly and unlawfully. This is not an inquiry into the propriety of the exercise of	2 0 3 1 4 7 5 7	evidence, that the reasons for the nolle are the very same reasons which McGrail says is what motivated the government parties.
2 3 4 5	Attorney General had exercised his power improperly and unlawfully. This is not an inquiry into the propriety of the exercise of his powers via the Attorney General. It is	2 c 3 t 4 y 5 c 6 a	evidence, that the reasons for the nolle are the very same reasons which McGrail says is what motivated the government parties. Well, I suppose, sir, we could speculate
2 3 4 5 6	Attorney General had exercised his power improperly and unlawfully. This is not an inquiry into the propriety of the exercise of his powers via the Attorney General. It is forensically a non sequitur to try and join the	2 6 3 1 4 7 5 7 6 a 7 a	evidence, that the reasons for the nolle are the very same reasons which McGrail says is what motivated the government parties. Well, I suppose, sir, we could speculate about everything and if speculation and bold
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5 (Pages 17 to 20)

1	nevertheless, have had that as their motive	1	Smokes and mirrors is not a proper basis for
2	and all that evidence remains open and fully	2	the establishment of relevance. The second
3	available, that they should nevertheless have	3	point, sir, is this: I then went on to say that
	•		-
4	used that as a motive on the part of the	4	the Attorney General, in respect of the
5	Attorney General for entering the nolle and	5	submission by my learned friend that he
6	as a part of the Chief Minister of the	6	might give evidence that the reasons for nolle
7	THE COMMISSIONER: Sir Peter, I will	7	were the very same as those that Mr McGrail
8	just pause you there. Has there been some	8	attributes to him, I had just finished telling
9	technical break in the signal?	9	you, sir, that it would be very odd indeed if
10	SIR PETER CARUANA: I have heard a	10	that were the case, given that neither the
11	beep. I do not know what that means.	11	Attorney General, nor the Chief Minister
12	THE COMMISSIONER: I think, Sir Peter,	12	alleged to be obsessed with self-preservation
13	the best thing to do is just to sit here until the	13	on that score, have taken any steps to bring
14	problem is solved.	14	about that self-preservation or try to bring
15	MR SANTOS: I am informed that it might	15	about that very same self-preservation in the
	•		context of the record and issues in this
16	take 10 minutes - five minutes. So, in your	16	
17	hands, sir, whether you prefer to retire for	17	inquiry where it is - where their self-
18	five minutes or just wait.	18	preservation would be as much at stake, if it
19	THE COMMISSIONER: Yes, but five	19	were real, as it would be in the circumstances
20	minutes never is five minutes. By the time	20	that they are attributing to them, namely the
21	we have all adjourned, it is quarter of an	21	events and the nolle. It would also be
22	hour. So, we will sit out five minutes.	22	unlikely for the fact that it would be most
23	(10.30)	23	unusual not to say perverse to think that an
24	(A short adjournment (technical issues)	24	Attorney General that is willing to share in
25	(10.33)	25	full his reason with you, sir, the
	(1002)		
	Page 21		Page 23
1	~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~	1	
1	(Technical issues discussed, not transcribed)	1	Commissioner and your legal team, but not
2	(Technical issues discussed, not transcribed) (10.39)	2	Commissioner and your legal team, but not more widely, could possibly have reasons of
2 3	(Technical issues discussed, not transcribed) (10.39) THE COMMISSIONER: Are you back with	2 3	Commissioner and your legal team, but not more widely, could possibly have reasons of the sort speculatively attributable to.
2 3 4	(Technical issues discussed, not transcribed) (10.39) THE COMMISSIONER: Are you back with us, Mr Wagner?	2 3 4	Commissioner and your legal team, but not more widely, could possibly have reasons of the sort speculatively attributable to. Thirdly, we hear much about the possibility
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6 (Pages 21 to 24)

		1	
1	face value because they are who they are. But	1	next paragraph, 16, to say, and I with respect
2	I would submit that to treat the sworn	2	to him say making little sense because it
3	evidence of a serving Attorney General with	3	appears to be contradictory, that nevertheless
4	scepticism, without any evidence whatsoever	4	it is worth asking if only to rule out or
5	to justify that scepticism is wholly	5	confirm the scenario posited about whether
6	inappropriate and not a sufficient basis for	6	the Attorney General might give
7	the question - the answers that have been	7	contradictory evidence. It seems wholly
8	given to this question by either of my learned	8	inappropriate, sir, to construct a scenario
9	friend Mr Santos or my other two learned	9	whereby it is worth asking a question to
10	friends. Of course, my learned friend, and I	10	which you know you are not entitled in law
11	agree with him to that extent - Mr Santos	11	to receive an answer and then at the same
12	rightly expressed his scepticism as to the	12	time say that it is forensically relevant what
12	practical benefit to be derived by the inquiry	13	the answer might be. Everybody in this room
13	from learning the reasons for the nolle. If he	14	knows what the answer is. On instructions I
14	disclosed them, they would not be accepted	14	said it at PH4. The Attorney General,
15	by anybody. These are parties that are	15	because of the nature of the public interest at
10	willing to make the serious allegations	17	stake here that he has sought to protect by
17		18	entering the nolle, will not answer anybody's
18	against the Attorney General that I have just described as "inappropriate" without any	10	
20	evidence whatsoever. Why would such	20	question in relation to his reasons for the
		20	nolle unless ordered to do so by a court of
21	people be minded to accept at face value any		final recourse. That is the Attorney
22	reason that he gave in answer to this	22	General's answer. It is not going to change
23	question? They would simply continue to	23	and there is no point building edifices on the
24	have the same degree in my learned friend's	24	speculative possibility that it might. Whilst I
25	case - not necessary counsel for the inquiry -	25	entirely respect your decision, sir, not to
	Page 25		Page 27
			- 8
1	but certainly in the case of Mr McGrail and	1	receive the information about the reasons in
2	others, they would continue to have the same	2	circumstances where you are constrained
2 3	others, they would continue to have the same degree of unfounded not scepticism, disbelief	2 3	circumstances where you are constrained about the use that you can make of it.
2 3 4	others, they would continue to have the same degree of unfounded not scepticism, disbelief as they profess now without evidence. Of	2 3 4	circumstances where you are constrained about the use that you can make of it. Nevertheless if, to any extent, you considered
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7 (Pages 25 to 28)

1	the opposition's statement in Parliament after	1	anybody else has, but we certainly think he is
2	he had the reasons for the Attorney General	2	a relevant witness.
3	entering the nolle confidentially explained to	3	THE COMMISSIONER: I do not have the
4	him. I suppose it is forensic but the leader of	4	statement in front of me. What does he say
5	the opposition, the Chief Minister's political	5	at paragraphs 18 and 19?
6	nemesis, would, if he thought that the reasons	6	MR CRUZ: Well, paragraph 18 is -
7	that had been given to him were the ones that	7	THE COMMISSIONER: I do really need to
8	Mr McGrail attributes to him, would have	8	have copies of documents that anyone is
9	called the Chief Minister out. It is not	9	going to refer to.
10	enough for Mr Wagner to say that he made a	10	MR CRUZ: Yes. I -
11	reference to political public interest. Of	11	THE COMMISSIONER: I do not want to
12	course he made reference to political public	12	take your copy because then you cannot read
13	interest. Most public interests are political.	13	it.
14	The word "political" does not imply even the	14	MR CRUZ: I would just say that paragraph
15	concept of "party political". A party political	15	18 I will summarise it, is - Okay, I will
16	interest indeed would, by definition, not be a	16	read it out. This is reference to a meeting
17	public interest. So when the leader of the	17	that took place on 7 April.
18	opposition speaks of political public interest,	18	THE COMMISSIONER: Yes. I am familiar
19	he is speaking of a political public interest of	19	with 7 April meeting.
20	Gibraltar which is exactly what was	20	MR CRUZ: It actually does You know,
21	explained to him, and he accepted without	21	there are initial dates and that is one of the
22	the need to call out any impropriety or any	22	reasons why we would wish to call him, but
23	sense of insufficiency. Thank you, sir, for the	23	he talks here I am going to Do I need to
24	opportunity.	24	put 16 in? Yes, probably. 17 as well: "It is
25	MR SANTOS: Mr Cruz wishes to make	25	probably true to say the atmosphere at the
25	Witt Drift (100). With Cruz Wishes to make	23	producty the to say the autosphere at the
	Page 29		Page 31
	1		
1	submissions as well.	1	meeting was subdued and tense. It was
2	THE COMMISSIONER: Yes, do by all	2	evident to me at discussions ensured that
2 3	THE COMMISSIONER: Yes, do by all means.	2 3	evident to me at discussions ensured that there had been significant developments in
2 3 4	THE COMMISSIONER: Yes, do by all means. MR CRUZ: Apologies. I should have stood	2 3 4	evident to me at discussions ensured that there had been significant developments in the intervening period since 7 April." So it is
2 3 4 5	THE COMMISSIONER: Yes, do by all means. MR CRUZ: Apologies. I should have stood up straight after my learned friend Mr Gibbs	2 3 4 5	evident to me at discussions ensured that there had been significant developments in the intervening period since 7 April." So it is a meeting subsequently actually on 13 May I
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8 (Pages 29 to 32)

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1	Richardson then one of the other RGP police	1	as it sounds taken out of context as he has
2	delegation, said the police had attended	2	done, is not forensic of the point that he is
3	Hassans in plain clothes with discretion and	3	suggesting in my respectful submission.
4	acted professionally throughout. I recall	4	THE COMMISSIONER: Okay.
5	some discussion between those present about	5	MR SANTOS: Sir, two very brief points just
6	a conversation or text of emails between	6	to respond to my learned friend Mr Caruana.
7	them or some of them regarding the handling	7	The inquiry's role is to ask the relevant
8			parties, look at the relevant documents and
	of the investigation, including in connection		-
9	with Mr Levy. I recall the Attorney General	9	follow leads. That is the inquiry's inquisitive
10	saying that in the conduct investigation and	10	role. It is not pure speculation, and to be fair
11	the charges were ultimately a matter for the	11	factual basis has been put forward by Mr
12	Royal Gibraltar Police, or words to that	12	McGrail's counsel for the suspicion that is
13	effect, as one had done during the meeting of	13	advanced. What we are saying in our
14	7 April. At one point the Attorney General	14	submissions is that we cannot definitively
15	asked for time to speak alone with Mr	15	assess relevance until we have the evidence,
16	McGrail. The rest of us made our way out	16	and we do consider that there is a sufficient
17	and conversed in the corridor until Mr	17	basis for asking the question in our
18	McGrail emerged from the office and left	18	inquisitive role. It is not a case of treating
19	with his colleagues. Shortly after the	19	the Attorney General's evidence with
20	meeting I recall the Attorney General raising	20	scepticism but similarly we cannot merely
21	briefly with me the applicable test or	21	accept it at face value. The fact that the
22	threshold for a nolle prosequi. The	22	Attorney General's answer is stated in
23	conversation was of an academic nature and	23	submissions by his counsel does not, in my
24	to the best of my recollection it was against	24	submission, mean that we should not ask the
25	the background of protecting jurisdiction and	25	question and let him decline to do so whilst
23	the suckground of protecting jurisdiction and	25	question and let min deenne to do so whilst
	Page 33		Page 35
1	the office of the Chief Minister." So, sir, the	1	stating his basis for refusing to do so, and
2	reason we say this is because in the dot	2	these things have to be done in a proper and
2 3	reason we say this is because in the dot joining we say that evidence might be	2 3	these things have to be done in a proper and formal manner. That is all I intend to say on
2 3 4	reason we say this is because in the dot joining we say that evidence might be relevant and it is a point that we have taken	2 3 4	these things have to be done in a proper and formal manner. That is all I intend to say on that.
2 3 4 5	reason we say this is because in the dot joining we say that evidence might be relevant and it is a point that we have taken in relation to witness categorisation and it is	2 3 4 5	these things have to be done in a proper and formal manner. That is all I intend to say on that. In terms of the comments of Keith Azopardi,
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1	inferences from a failure by the Attorney	1	you all such books, papers and writings as to
2	General to answer the question? Question 7:	2	you may appear necessary for arriving at the
3	is the inquiry either bound by or alternatively	3	truth of all matters to be inquired by you.
4	required to afford persuasive weight to the	4	Section $8(2)$ states that every person
5	judgment of the Chief Justice in R v Cornelio	5	summoned shall attend before you and shall
6	and others. I might take question 7 first, at	6	answer all such questions as may be put by
7	least in a technical sense. The inquiry is not	7	you touching the matters to be inquired into
8	a court of law and is not subject to a system	8	by you and shall produce all books, papers
9	of precedent, so it is not subject to a system	9	and writings required and in his custody or
10	-	10	under his control according to the tenor of
	speaking, bound by decisions of law courts. The inquiry's primary function is to establish	10	6
11		11	the summons issued by the inquiry. So, section 12 of the 1888 Act makes it an
12	the facts relating to its terms of reference,		
13	and its role does not include determining	13	offence for a person summoned as a witness
14	civil rights and obligations or criminal	14	to refuse a question asked or to produce
15	liability. Nevertheless, in fulfilling its fact-	15	Sorry, let me do that again. Section 12
16	finding role, the inquiry must abide by	16	makes it an offence for a person summoned
17	Gibraltar law and our role as counsel to the	17	as a witness to refuse to answer a question
18	inquiry is to advice you, sir, and ensure that	18	asked or produce documents required by you.
19	the inquiry complies with the law and its	19	Therefore, assuming that you consider the
20	terms of reference. It is not open to the	20	reasons for the discontinuance to be relevant
21	inquiry to disregard applicable local law. Part	21	or potentially relevant, then the inquiry could
22	of what the inquiry is doing today is	22	exercise that power to require evidence and
23	ascertaining the applicable law as a precursor	23	documents from the Attorney General as to
24	to its evidence-gathering process with the	24	the reasons for the discontinuance. The
25	assistance of submissions from all	25	question then becomes whether or not the
		1	
	Page 37		Page 39
	Page 37		Page 39
1	Page 37 participants. So, in relation to the Cornelio	1	Page 39 Attorney General is entitled or required to
1 2		1 2	
	participants. So, in relation to the Cornelio		Attorney General is entitled or required to
2	participants. So, in relation to the Cornelio case, our submission is that it must be	2	Attorney General is entitled or required to decline to answer, despite the language of section 8 and 12 of the 1888 Act. Now, a
2 3	participants. So, in relation to the Cornelio case, our submission is that it must be followed if it is applicable to the present scenario and I will explain shortly why we do	2 3	Attorney General is entitled or required to decline to answer, despite the language of section 8 and 12 of the 1888 Act. Now, a point that is not in dispute between the
2 3 4	participants. So, in relation to the Cornelio case, our submission is that it must be followed if it is applicable to the present	2 3 4	Attorney General is entitled or required to decline to answer, despite the language of section 8 and 12 of the 1888 Act. Now, a
2 3 4 5	participants. So, in relation to the Cornelio case, our submission is that it must be followed if it is applicable to the present scenario and I will explain shortly why we do not consider that it should be distinguished, even though it is recognised that it was	2 3 4 5	Attorney General is entitled or required to decline to answer, despite the language of section 8 and 12 of the 1888 Act. Now, a point that is not in dispute between the participants is that the discontinuance itself is
2 3 4 5 6	participants. So, in relation to the Cornelio case, our submission is that it must be followed if it is applicable to the present scenario and I will explain shortly why we do not consider that it should be distinguished, even though it is recognised that it was decided in a different contexts. Now, turning	2 3 4 5 6	Attorney General is entitled or required to decline to answer, despite the language of section 8 and 12 of the 1888 Act. Now, a point that is not in dispute between the participants is that the discontinuance itself is amenable to judicial review. Section 83 of the Constitution makes clear that the courts
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$\begin{array}{c} 2\\ 3\\ 4\\ 5\\ 6\\ 7\\ 8\\ 9\\ 10\\ 11\\ 12\\ 13\\ 14\\ 15\\ 16\\ 17\\ 18\\ 19\\ 20\\ 21\\ \end{array}$	participants. So, in relation to the Cornelio case, our submission is that it must be followed if it is applicable to the present scenario and I will explain shortly why we do not consider that it should be distinguished, even though it is recognised that it was decided in a different contexts. Now, turning to question 4, all core participants appear to agree that if the inquiry considers the reasons for the discontinuance to be relevant or potentially relevant to the terms of reference, there is no impediment to the inquiry asking the question 5, namely whether if the inquiry seeks evidence or documents from the Attorney General in relation to the discontinuance under section 8 of the 1888 Commissions of Inquiry Act, the Attorney General is entitled or even required to decline to answer the question. Section 8(1) of the 1888 Act provides that you, sir, may require	$ \begin{array}{c} 2\\3\\4\\5\\6\\7\\8\\9\\10\\11\\12\\13\\14\\15\\16\\17\\18\\19\\20\\21\end{array} $	Attorney General is entitled or required to decline to answer, despite the language of section 8 and 12 of the 1888 Act. Now, a point that is not in dispute between the participants is that the discontinuance itself is amenable to judicial review. Section 83 of the Constitution makes clear that the courts cannot be precluded from exercising jurisdiction over any other functions provided for which would include the Attorney General's statutory power to discontinue under section 59. However, whether the power is amenable to judicial review on the one hand and whether the Attorney General must give reasons for exercising the power to a court or to the inquiry on the other are two different questions. In fact, in the case of Mohit the Privy Council held that in the context of a judicial review of a power which was materially identical to section 59, albeit
$\begin{array}{c} 2\\ 3\\ 4\\ 5\\ 6\\ 7\\ 8\\ 9\\ 10\\ 11\\ 12\\ 13\\ 14\\ 15\\ 16\\ 17\\ 18\\ 19\\ 20\\ 21\\ 22\\ \end{array}$	participants. So, in relation to the Cornelio case, our submission is that it must be followed if it is applicable to the present scenario and I will explain shortly why we do not consider that it should be distinguished, even though it is recognised that it was decided in a different contexts. Now, turning to question 4, all core participants appear to agree that if the inquiry considers the reasons for the discontinuance to be relevant or potentially relevant to the terms of reference, there is no impediment to the inquiry asking the question. The more contentious question is question 5, namely whether if the inquiry seeks evidence or documents from the Attorney General in relation to the discontinuance under section 8 of the 1888 Commissions of Inquiry Act, the Attorney General is entitled or even required to decline to answer the question. Section 8(1) of the 1888 Act provides that you, sir, may require the attendance before you of any person	$ \begin{array}{c} 2\\3\\4\\5\\6\\7\\8\\9\\10\\11\\12\\13\\14\\15\\16\\17\\18\\19\\20\\21\\22\end{array} $	Attorney General is entitled or required to decline to answer, despite the language of section 8 and 12 of the 1888 Act. Now, a point that is not in dispute between the participants is that the discontinuance itself is amenable to judicial review. Section 83 of the Constitution makes clear that the courts cannot be precluded from exercising jurisdiction over any other functions provided for which would include the Attorney General's statutory power to discontinue under section 59. However, whether the power is amenable to judicial review on the one hand and whether the Attorney General must give reasons for exercising the power to a court or to the inquiry on the other are two different questions. In fact, in the case of Mohit the Privy Council held that in the context of a judicial review of a power which was materially identical to section 59, albeit equivalent wording in the Mauritius
$\begin{array}{c} 2\\ 3\\ 4\\ 5\\ 6\\ 7\\ 8\\ 9\\ 10\\ 11\\ 12\\ 13\\ 14\\ 15\\ 16\\ 17\\ 18\\ 19\\ 20\\ 21\\ \end{array}$	participants. So, in relation to the Cornelio case, our submission is that it must be followed if it is applicable to the present scenario and I will explain shortly why we do not consider that it should be distinguished, even though it is recognised that it was decided in a different contexts. Now, turning to question 4, all core participants appear to agree that if the inquiry considers the reasons for the discontinuance to be relevant or potentially relevant to the terms of reference, there is no impediment to the inquiry asking the question 5, namely whether if the inquiry seeks evidence or documents from the Attorney General in relation to the discontinuance under section 8 of the 1888 Commissions of Inquiry Act, the Attorney General is entitled or even required to decline to answer the question. Section 8(1) of the 1888 Act provides that you, sir, may require	$ \begin{array}{c} 2\\3\\4\\5\\6\\7\\8\\9\\10\\11\\12\\13\\14\\15\\16\\17\\18\\19\\20\\21\end{array} $	Attorney General is entitled or required to decline to answer, despite the language of section 8 and 12 of the 1888 Act. Now, a point that is not in dispute between the participants is that the discontinuance itself is amenable to judicial review. Section 83 of the Constitution makes clear that the courts cannot be precluded from exercising jurisdiction over any other functions provided for which would include the Attorney General's statutory power to discontinue under section 59. However, whether the power is amenable to judicial review on the one hand and whether the Attorney General must give reasons for exercising the power to a court or to the inquiry on the other are two different questions. In fact, in the case of Mohit the Privy Council held that in the context of a judicial review of a power which was materially identical to section 59, albeit

Mauritius would not be required to give

Page 38

and may require that person to bring before

Page 40

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10 (Pages 37 to 40)

1	reasons during those proceedings. Can I	1	Parliament. Yet it has been common ground
2	please read out paragraphs 20-22 of that	2	for some years that decisions of the English
3	judgment which can be found in tab 12 of the	3	DPP are in principle reviewable, and the
4	electronic authorities bundle and tab 9 of the	4	same view has been taken, for very much the
5	hard copy of the consolidated bundle?	5	same reasons, under the Constitution of
6	Paragraph 20 read as follows: 'In R v Panel	6	Ireland'. And then, moving forward, lines
7	on Take-overs and Mergers, Ex p Datafin	7	down, 'There is here nothing to displace the
8	PLC [1987] QB 815, 847, Lloyd LJ observed	8	ordinary assumption that a public officer
9	that "If the source of power is a statute, or	9	exercising statutory functions is amenable to
10	subordinate legislation under a statute, then	10	judicial review on grounds such as those
10	clearly the body in question will be subject to	10	listed in Matalulu.' The Privy Council then
11	judicial review. It is unnecessary to discuss	12	stated as follows, as to the evidence which
12	what exceptions there may be to this rule,	12	the DPP would be required to give, at
13	which now represents the ordinary if not the	13	paragraph 22, starting on the fifth line, 'That
14	invariable rule. Thus the Board should	14	
15		15	evidence', before the Supreme Court, 'will include any reasons the DPP may choose to
10	approach the present issue on the assumption that the powers conferred on the DPP by	17	give. But it is for the DPP to decide whether
17		17	•
18	section 72(3) of the Constitution are subject to judicial review, whatever the standard of		those reasons should be given and, if reasons are given, how full those reasons should be.
20	review may be, unless there is some	19 20	6
20		20	The English authorities cited above show that
21	compelling reason to infer that such an assumption is excluded. What compelling	21	there is in the ordinary way no legal
	1 1 0		obligation on the DPP to give reasons and no
23	reason is there in a case such as this? The	23	legal rule, if reasons are given, governing
24	DPP cannot, in the opinion of the Board, rely	24	their form or content. This is a matter for the
25	on the immunity enjoyed, at any rate in the	25	judgment of the DPP, to be exercised in the
	Page 41		Page 43
1	nost by the English Attempty Conservative	1	light of all relevant singuration and which
1	past, by the English Attorney General when	1	light of all relevant circumstances, which
2	exercising the prerogative power to enter a	2	may include any reasons already given. The
2 3	exercising the prerogative power to enter a nolle prosequi since he is not the Attorney	2 3	may include any reasons already given. The Supreme Court must then decide on all the
2 3 4	exercising the prerogative power to enter a nolle prosequi since he is not the Attorney General, he is not (like the Attorney General)	2 3 4	may include any reasons already given. The Supreme Court must then decide on all the material before it, drawing such inferences as
2 3 4 5	exercising the prerogative power to enter a nolle prosequi since he is not the Attorney General, he is not (like the Attorney General) answerable to Parliament, he has no	2 3 4 5	may include any reasons already given. The Supreme Court must then decide on all the material before it, drawing such inferences as it considers proper, whether the appellant has
2 3 4 5 6	exercising the prerogative power to enter a nolle prosequi since he is not the Attorney General, he is not (like the Attorney General) answerable to Parliament, he has no prerogative power, his power derives from	2 3 4 5 6	may include any reasons already given. The Supreme Court must then decide on all the material before it, drawing such inferences as it considers proper, whether the appellant has established his entitlement to relief.' Now
2 3 4 5 6 7	exercising the prerogative power to enter a nolle prosequi since he is not the Attorney General, he is not (like the Attorney General) answerable to Parliament, he has no prerogative power, his power derives from the Constitution and the Constitution does	2 3 4 5 6 7	may include any reasons already given. The Supreme Court must then decide on all the material before it, drawing such inferences as it considers proper, whether the appellant has established his entitlement to relief.' Now here, of course, we are not concerned with a
2 3 4 5 6 7 8	exercising the prerogative power to enter a nolle prosequi since he is not the Attorney General, he is not (like the Attorney General) answerable to Parliament, he has no prerogative power, his power derives from the Constitution and the Constitution does not use the language of nolle prosequi. The	2 3 4 5 6 7 8	may include any reasons already given. The Supreme Court must then decide on all the material before it, drawing such inferences as it considers proper, whether the appellant has established his entitlement to relief.' Now here, of course, we are not concerned with a judicial review, but rather the Inquiry's
2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9	exercising the prerogative power to enter a nolle prosequi since he is not the Attorney General, he is not (like the Attorney General) answerable to Parliament, he has no prerogative power, his power derives from the Constitution and the Constitution does not use the language of nolle prosequi. The power expressly conferred on the Procureur	2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9	may include any reasons already given. The Supreme Court must then decide on all the material before it, drawing such inferences as it considers proper, whether the appellant has established his entitlement to relief.' Now here, of course, we are not concerned with a judicial review, but rather the Inquiry's power to require evidence, under section 8 of
2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10	exercising the prerogative power to enter a nolle prosequi since he is not the Attorney General, he is not (like the Attorney General) answerable to Parliament, he has no prerogative power, his power derives from the Constitution and the Constitution does not use the language of nolle prosequi. The power expressly conferred on the Procureur General to enter a nolle prosequi has never,	2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10	may include any reasons already given. The Supreme Court must then decide on all the material before it, drawing such inferences as it considers proper, whether the appellant has established his entitlement to relief.' Now here, of course, we are not concerned with a judicial review, but rather the Inquiry's power to require evidence, under section 8 of the 1888 Act. It is important to bear in mind,
2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11	exercising the prerogative power to enter a nolle prosequi since he is not the Attorney General, he is not (like the Attorney General) answerable to Parliament, he has no prerogative power, his power derives from the Constitution and the Constitution does not use the language of nolle prosequi. The power expressly conferred on the Procureur General to enter a nolle prosequi has never, by that name, been conferred on the DPP.	2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11	may include any reasons already given. The Supreme Court must then decide on all the material before it, drawing such inferences as it considers proper, whether the appellant has established his entitlement to relief.' Now here, of course, we are not concerned with a judicial review, but rather the Inquiry's power to require evidence, under section 8 of the 1888 Act. It is important to bear in mind, at all times, that the Inquiry is not a court,
2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12	exercising the prerogative power to enter a nolle prosequi since he is not the Attorney General, he is not (like the Attorney General) answerable to Parliament, he has no prerogative power, his power derives from the Constitution and the Constitution does not use the language of nolle prosequi. The power expressly conferred on the Procureur General to enter a nolle prosequi has never, by that name, been conferred on the DPP. (The Attorney General of England and Wales	2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12	may include any reasons already given. The Supreme Court must then decide on all the material before it, drawing such inferences as it considers proper, whether the appellant has established his entitlement to relief.' Now here, of course, we are not concerned with a judicial review, but rather the Inquiry's power to require evidence, under section 8 of the 1888 Act. It is important to bear in mind, at all times, that the Inquiry is not a court, and derives its powers from that statute.
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2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15	exercising the prerogative power to enter a nolle prosequi since he is not the Attorney General, he is not (like the Attorney General) answerable to Parliament, he has no prerogative power, his power derives from the Constitution and the Constitution does not use the language of nolle prosequi. The power expressly conferred on the Procureur General to enter a nolle prosequi has never, by that name, been conferred on the DPP. (The Attorney General of England and Wales in practice exercises his power very infrequently: twice in the past 5 years, in each case because of the defendant's ill	2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15	may include any reasons already given. The Supreme Court must then decide on all the material before it, drawing such inferences as it considers proper, whether the appellant has established his entitlement to relief.' Now here, of course, we are not concerned with a judicial review, but rather the Inquiry's power to require evidence, under section 8 of the 1888 Act. It is important to bear in mind, at all times, that the Inquiry is not a court, and derives its powers from that statute. Those powers cannot override the provisions of section 59 of the Constitution. On the contrary, as is required by section 2 of Annex
$ \begin{array}{c} 2\\ 3\\ 4\\ 5\\ 6\\ 7\\ 8\\ 9\\ 10\\ 11\\ 12\\ 13\\ 14\\ 15\\ 16\\ \end{array} $	exercising the prerogative power to enter a nolle prosequi since he is not the Attorney General, he is not (like the Attorney General) answerable to Parliament, he has no prerogative power, his power derives from the Constitution and the Constitution does not use the language of nolle prosequi. The power expressly conferred on the Procureur General to enter a nolle prosequi has never, by that name, been conferred on the DPP. (The Attorney General of England and Wales in practice exercises his power very infrequently: twice in the past 5 years, in each case because of the defendant's ill health). It has been pointed out that the	2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16	may include any reasons already given. The Supreme Court must then decide on all the material before it, drawing such inferences as it considers proper, whether the appellant has established his entitlement to relief.' Now here, of course, we are not concerned with a judicial review, but rather the Inquiry's power to require evidence, under section 8 of the 1888 Act. It is important to bear in mind, at all times, that the Inquiry is not a court, and derives its powers from that statute. Those powers cannot override the provisions of section 59 of the Constitution. On the contrary, as is required by section 2 of Annex 2 of the Constitution, the 1888 Act must be
$ \begin{array}{c} 2\\ 3\\ 4\\ 5\\ 6\\ 7\\ 8\\ 9\\ 10\\ 11\\ 12\\ 13\\ 14\\ 15\\ 16\\ 17\\ \end{array} $	exercising the prerogative power to enter a nolle prosequi since he is not the Attorney General, he is not (like the Attorney General) answerable to Parliament, he has no prerogative power, his power derives from the Constitution and the Constitution does not use the language of nolle prosequi. The power expressly conferred on the Procureur General to enter a nolle prosequi has never, by that name, been conferred on the DPP. (The Attorney General of England and Wales in practice exercises his power very infrequently: twice in the past 5 years, in each case because of the defendant's ill health). It has been pointed out that the English DPP, unlike his Mauritian	$ \begin{array}{c} 2\\ 3\\ 4\\ 5\\ 6\\ 7\\ 8\\ 9\\ 10\\ 11\\ 12\\ 13\\ 14\\ 15\\ 16\\ 17\\ \end{array} $	may include any reasons already given. The Supreme Court must then decide on all the material before it, drawing such inferences as it considers proper, whether the appellant has established his entitlement to relief.' Now here, of course, we are not concerned with a judicial review, but rather the Inquiry's power to require evidence, under section 8 of the 1888 Act. It is important to bear in mind, at all times, that the Inquiry is not a court, and derives its powers from that statute. Those powers cannot override the provisions of section 59 of the Constitution. On the contrary, as is required by section 2 of Annex 2 of the Constitution, the 1888 Act must be read with 'such modifications, adaptations,
$ \begin{array}{c} 2\\ 3\\ 4\\ 5\\ 6\\ 7\\ 8\\ 9\\ 10\\ 11\\ 12\\ 13\\ 14\\ 15\\ 16\\ 17\\ 18\\ \end{array} $	exercising the prerogative power to enter a nolle prosequi since he is not the Attorney General, he is not (like the Attorney General) answerable to Parliament, he has no prerogative power, his power derives from the Constitution and the Constitution does not use the language of nolle prosequi. The power expressly conferred on the Procureur General to enter a nolle prosequi has never, by that name, been conferred on the DPP. (The Attorney General of England and Wales in practice exercises his power very infrequently: twice in the past 5 years, in each case because of the defendant's ill health). It has been pointed out that the English DPP, unlike his Mauritian counterpart, discharges his functions under	2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18	may include any reasons already given. The Supreme Court must then decide on all the material before it, drawing such inferences as it considers proper, whether the appellant has established his entitlement to relief.' Now here, of course, we are not concerned with a judicial review, but rather the Inquiry's power to require evidence, under section 8 of the 1888 Act. It is important to bear in mind, at all times, that the Inquiry is not a court, and derives its powers from that statute. Those powers cannot override the provisions of section 59 of the Constitution. On the contrary, as is required by section 2 of Annex 2 of the Constitution, the 1888 Act must be read with 'such modifications, adaptations, qualifications and exceptions as may be
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$\begin{array}{c} 2\\ 3\\ 4\\ 5\\ 6\\ 7\\ 8\\ 9\\ 10\\ 11\\ 12\\ 13\\ 14\\ 15\\ 16\\ 17\\ 18\\ 19\\ 20\\ 21\\ 22\\ 23\\ 24\\ \end{array}$	exercising the prerogative power to enter a nolle prosequi since he is not the Attorney General, he is not (like the Attorney General) answerable to Parliament, he has no prerogative power, his power derives from the Constitution and the Constitution does not use the language of nolle prosequi. The power expressly conferred on the Procureur General to enter a nolle prosequi has never, by that name, been conferred on the DPP. (The Attorney General of England and Wales in practice exercises his power very infrequently: twice in the past 5 years, in each case because of the defendant's ill health). It has been pointed out that the English DPP, unlike his Mauritian counterpart, discharges his functions under the superintendence of the Attorney General (Prosecution of Offences Act 1985, s 3(1)), but this fact, if of any significance, would tend to weigh against rather than for the reviewability of his decisions, as providing a potential safeguard against abuse through the	$\begin{array}{c} 2\\ 3\\ 4\\ 5\\ 6\\ 7\\ 8\\ 9\\ 10\\ 11\\ 12\\ 13\\ 14\\ 15\\ 16\\ 17\\ 18\\ 19\\ 20\\ 21\\ 22\\ 23\\ 24\\ \end{array}$	may include any reasons already given. The Supreme Court must then decide on all the material before it, drawing such inferences as it considers proper, whether the appellant has established his entitlement to relief.' Now here, of course, we are not concerned with a judicial review, but rather the Inquiry's power to require evidence, under section 8 of the 1888 Act. It is important to bear in mind, at all times, that the Inquiry is not a court, and derives its powers from that statute. Those powers cannot override the provisions of section 59 of the Constitution. On the contrary, as is required by section 2 of Annex 2 of the Constitution, the 1888 Act must be read with 'such modifications, adaptations, qualifications and exceptions as may be necessary, to bring them into conformity with the Constitution.' And similarly, section 32 of Annex 1 states that 'Subject to this Constitution, the Legislature may make laws for the peace, order and good government of Gibraltar.' This confirms that the
$\begin{array}{c} 2\\ 3\\ 4\\ 5\\ 6\\ 7\\ 8\\ 9\\ 10\\ 11\\ 12\\ 13\\ 14\\ 15\\ 16\\ 17\\ 18\\ 19\\ 20\\ 21\\ 22\\ 23\\ \end{array}$	exercising the prerogative power to enter a nolle prosequi since he is not the Attorney General, he is not (like the Attorney General) answerable to Parliament, he has no prerogative power, his power derives from the Constitution and the Constitution does not use the language of nolle prosequi. The power expressly conferred on the Procureur General to enter a nolle prosequi has never, by that name, been conferred on the DPP. (The Attorney General of England and Wales in practice exercises his power very infrequently: twice in the past 5 years, in each case because of the defendant's ill health). It has been pointed out that the English DPP, unlike his Mauritian counterpart, discharges his functions under the superintendence of the Attorney General (Prosecution of Offences Act 1985, s 3(1)), but this fact, if of any significance, would tend to weigh against rather than for the reviewability of his decisions, as providing a	$\begin{array}{c} 2\\ 3\\ 4\\ 5\\ 6\\ 7\\ 8\\ 9\\ 10\\ 11\\ 12\\ 13\\ 14\\ 15\\ 16\\ 17\\ 18\\ 19\\ 20\\ 21\\ 22\\ 23\\ \end{array}$	may include any reasons already given. The Supreme Court must then decide on all the material before it, drawing such inferences as it considers proper, whether the appellant has established his entitlement to relief.' Now here, of course, we are not concerned with a judicial review, but rather the Inquiry's power to require evidence, under section 8 of the 1888 Act. It is important to bear in mind, at all times, that the Inquiry is not a court, and derives its powers from that statute. Those powers cannot override the provisions of section 59 of the Constitution. On the contrary, as is required by section 2 of Annex 2 of the Constitution, the 1888 Act must be read with 'such modifications, adaptations, qualifications and exceptions as may be necessary, to bring them into conformity with the Constitution.' And similarly, section 32 of Annex 1 states that 'Subject to this Constitution, the Legislature may make laws for the peace, order and good government of

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11 (Pages 41 to 44)

1	Gibraltar, and other legislation must be read	1	give the defendant any indication of his
2	subject to it. I have already mentioned	2	reasons". Section 223 is silent as to the
3	subsections 59.(4) and 59.(5) of the	3	requirement if any as to the giving of
4	Constitution, and section 83 of the	4	reasons. Reading these provisions which are
5	Constitution makes clear that subsection 5	5	found in the same Part of the same Act, in
6	does not preclude judicial review of the	6	my judgment it is clear that HMAG has no
7	exercise of that power, but section 83 only	7	obligation to give reasons when entering a
8	preserves the courts' jurisdiction, and does	8	nolle prosequi. I am fortified in that view by
9	not refer to the authority of other public	9	the Privy Council decision in Mohit v DPP of
10	bodies such as the Inquiry. So, there is at	10	Mauritius [2006] 1 W.L.R. 3343. The
11	least an argument that the effect of	11	appellant tried, on several occasions, to bring
12	subsections (4) and/or (5) is that the Inquiry	12	a private prosecution against a senior
12	cannot require the Attorney General to give	13	politician in Mauritius on a charge of
13	reasons for the discontinuance, because the	14	harbouring a criminal. On each occasion the
14	power to discontinue is vested in him alone,	14	Director of Public Prosecutions, in exercise
15	to the exclusion of any other authority,	15	of his powers under section $72(3)(c)$ of the
10	including the Inquiry - which is not, as I say,	17	Constitution of Mauritius, filed a nolle
17	a court of law. We have summarised - we	18	
			prosequi and brought the proceedings to an
19 20	have summarised - the - the core participants'	19 20	end. The appellant applied to the Supreme
20 21	respective positions in our written	20	Court of Mauritius for leave to apply for judicial review of one of the DPP's decisions
	submissions, and I do not propose to go into		
22	them here, but the key decision, in our	22	to file the nolle prosequi. The Supreme
23	submission, is that of the Chief Justice in R v	23	Court dismissed various applications, holding
24	Cornelio and Others, which is a costs	24	that the DPP's decisions to file a nolle
25	application brought by the three defendants	25	prosequi or not to prosecute were not
	Page 45		Page 47
	0		0
1	in the Operation Delhi proceedings, who are	1	amenable to judicial review. The Privy
1 2	in the Operation Delhi proceedings, who are core participants in this inquiry, and are		amenable to judicial review. The Privy Council held that the exercise by the
	core participants in this inquiry, and are	1 2 3	Council held that the exercise by the
2	core participants in this inquiry, and are represented by Mr Cooper and Mr Sareen	2	
2 3	core participants in this inquiry, and are represented by Mr Cooper and Mr Sareen today. In R v Cornelio, the Chief Justice	2 3	Council held that the exercise by the Mauritius DPP of his powers under section 72(3)(c) of the Mauritius Constitution (which
2 3 4	core participants in this inquiry, and are represented by Mr Cooper and Mr Sareen	2 3 4	Council held that the exercise by the Mauritius DPP of his powers under section 72(3)(c) of the Mauritius Constitution (which is in identical terms to the powers vested in
2 3 4 5	core participants in this inquiry, and are represented by Mr Cooper and Mr Sareen today. In R v Cornelio, the Chief Justice referred to Mohit, and consistent with that	2 3 4 5	Council held that the exercise by the Mauritius DPP of his powers under section 72(3)(c) of the Mauritius Constitution (which is in identical terms to the powers vested in HMAG by virtue of section 59(2)(c) of our
2 3 4 5 6	core participants in this inquiry, and are represented by Mr Cooper and Mr Sareen today. In R v Cornelio, the Chief Justice referred to Mohit, and consistent with that concluded that the Attorney General may be asked to give reasons, if he chooses, but he is	2 3 4 5 6	Council held that the exercise by the Mauritius DPP of his powers under section 72(3)(c) of the Mauritius Constitution (which is in identical terms to the powers vested in HMAG by virtue of section 59(2)(c) of our Constitution) was amenable to judicial
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12 (Pages 45 to 48)

1	right should not be subverted, even by asking	1	discontinuance, the Supreme Court of
2	the DPP about his knowledge of the reasons.	2	Mauritius must decide on all the material
3	Those conclusions appear to emanate from	3	before it, and I repeat the phrase, 'drawing
4	the Chief Justice's interpretation of section	4	such inferences as it considers proper'. And
5	59 itself, following the Privy Council's	5	in Cornelio, as I have just said, the Chief
	u		-
6	reasoning in Mohit. That interpretation	6	Justice agreed that, at such stages all the
7	would mean that the Attorney General has a	7	evidential material falls to be considered, it
8	right, not to give reasons for exercise of his	8	may be proper to draw inferences from the
9	constitutional power, and neither section 8	9	failure to provide the reasons. So, we submit
10	nor 12 of the 1888 Act can override that.	10	that the entitlement to draw inferences is not
11	Indeed, as I say, they must be read in	11	limited to a court of law exercising its
12	accordance with that interpretation of section	12	judicial review jurisdiction, that would be
13	59, with modifications of necessary, as I said	13	inconsistent with the Chief Justice's
14	earlier. In those circumstances, we consider	14	judgment in Cornelio, which was not a
15	that the - that requiring the Attorney General	15	judicial review. There appears to us no
16	to provide reasons at this inquiry, would run	16	principle reason, why this should not extend
17	contrary to the Chief Justice's interpretation	17	to a public inquiry, and we also submit that
18	of section 59 in Cornelio, and we do not	18	there is no limit on what inferences may be
19	believe that Cornelio should be	19	drawn, from a failure to provide the reasons.
20	distinguished, either on the basis that its	20	The inquiry can draw such inferences as it
21	application should be restricted because it	21	may deem appropriate in the circumstances.
22	was made in cost proceedings - indeed, given	22	The government party seek to rely on
23	section 83 of the Constitution, if anything	23	statements by Viscount Dilhorn in Gouriet, in
24	there is more of a case for a court to be able	24	support of their position that inferences
25	to compel the attorney general to give	25	cannot be drawn, but I would make three
25	to compet the attorney general to give	23	
	Page 49		Page 51
1	reasons than an inquiry. There are also	1	points on Gouriet. First, that did not relate to
2	similarities between the cost proceedings in	2	a refusal to give reason for a nolle prosequi.
	similarities between the cost proceedings in Cornelio and the inquiry. Neither was a	2 3	a refusal to give reason for a nolle prosequi. Second, as we have already heard from the
2 3 4	similarities between the cost proceedings in Cornelio and the inquiry. Neither was a judicial review of the decision to discontinue,	2 3 4	a refusal to give reason for a nolle prosequi. Second, as we have already heard from the Privy Council decision in Mohit, the
2 3	similarities between the cost proceedings in Cornelio and the inquiry. Neither was a judicial review of the decision to discontinue, as in Mohit. Both would involve asking	2 3 4 5	a refusal to give reason for a nolle prosequi. Second, as we have already heard from the Privy Council decision in Mohit, the Attorney General in England, and the power
2 3 4 5 6	similarities between the cost proceedings in Cornelio and the inquiry. Neither was a judicial review of the decision to discontinue, as in Mohit. Both would involve asking questions of the Attorney General about the	2 3 4 5 6	a refusal to give reason for a nolle prosequi. Second, as we have already heard from the Privy Council decision in Mohit, the Attorney General in England, and the power being exercised by the Attorney General in
2 3 4 5	similarities between the cost proceedings in Cornelio and the inquiry. Neither was a judicial review of the decision to discontinue, as in Mohit. Both would involve asking questions of the Attorney General about the discontinuance, in circumstances where the	2 3 4 5	a refusal to give reason for a nolle prosequi. Second, as we have already heard from the Privy Council decision in Mohit, the Attorney General in England, and the power being exercised by the Attorney General in England is a very different in nature. The
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$\begin{array}{c} 2\\ 3\\ 4\\ 5\\ 6\\ 7\\ 8\\ 9\\ 10\\ 11\\ 12\\ 13\\ 14\\ 15\\ 16\\ 17\\ 18\\ 19\\ 20\\ 21\\ 22\\ 23\\ 24\\ \end{array}$	similarities between the cost proceedings in Cornelio and the inquiry. Neither was a judicial review of the decision to discontinue, as in Mohit. Both would involve asking questions of the Attorney General about the discontinuance, in circumstances where the reasons are relevant to the specific issues. However, in neither Cornelio nor this inquiry is the discontinuance itself the subject of a review, or even the primary focus. Now, turning finally to question six, by the same token we would recommend compliance with the Chief Justice's reasoning, that where the Attorney General refuses to provide reasons, the inquiry is able to draw any inferences that it may consider appropriate. As we say in our written submissions, it is difficult to see how a court could effectively judicially review an exercise of section 59 if it were not given reasons, and if it were also unable to draw inferences from a refusal to give those reasons. This is supported by Mohit and Cornelio. In Mohit, Lord Bingham held that,	$\begin{array}{c} 2\\ 3\\ 4\\ 5\\ 6\\ 7\\ 8\\ 9\\ 10\\ 11\\ 12\\ 13\\ 14\\ 15\\ 16\\ 17\\ 18\\ 19\\ 20\\ 21\\ 22\\ 23\\ 24\\ \end{array}$	a refusal to give reason for a nolle prosequi. Second, as we have already heard from the Privy Council decision in Mohit, the Attorney General in England, and the power being exercised by the Attorney General in England is a very different in nature. The Attorney General is not a creature of statute, and exercises royal prerogative powers. And Gouriet, of course, was decided at the time when the exercise of royal prerogative powers was deemed to be off limits for judicial review, which is no longer the case. Third, and finally, our reading of Viscount Dilhorn's statements in Gouriet is, that they amount to a conclusion that it was not appropriate, in the particular circumstances of that case, to draw inferences, rather than being a statement of principle that it was never appropriate to do so. Of course, it is an entirely separate question of fact, whether in the circumstances of this inquiry, it would be proper to draw inferences, from a refusal to answer the relevant question by the Attorney
$\begin{array}{c} 2\\ 3\\ 4\\ 5\\ 6\\ 7\\ 8\\ 9\\ 10\\ 11\\ 12\\ 13\\ 14\\ 15\\ 16\\ 17\\ 18\\ 19\\ 20\\ 21\\ 22\\ 23\\ \end{array}$	similarities between the cost proceedings in Cornelio and the inquiry. Neither was a judicial review of the decision to discontinue, as in Mohit. Both would involve asking questions of the Attorney General about the discontinuance, in circumstances where the reasons are relevant to the specific issues. However, in neither Cornelio nor this inquiry is the discontinuance itself the subject of a review, or even the primary focus. Now, turning finally to question six, by the same token we would recommend compliance with the Chief Justice's reasoning, that where the Attorney General refuses to provide reasons, the inquiry is able to draw any inferences that it may consider appropriate. As we say in our written submissions, it is difficult to see how a court could effectively judicially review an exercise of section 59 if it were not given reasons, and if it were also unable to draw inferences from a refusal to give those reasons. This is supported by Mohit and	$\begin{array}{c} 2\\ 3\\ 4\\ 5\\ 6\\ 7\\ 8\\ 9\\ 10\\ 11\\ 12\\ 13\\ 14\\ 15\\ 16\\ 17\\ 18\\ 19\\ 20\\ 21\\ 22\\ 23\\ \end{array}$	a refusal to give reason for a nolle prosequi. Second, as we have already heard from the Privy Council decision in Mohit, the Attorney General in England, and the power being exercised by the Attorney General in England is a very different in nature. The Attorney General is not a creature of statute, and exercises royal prerogative powers. And Gouriet, of course, was decided at the time when the exercise of royal prerogative powers was deemed to be off limits for judicial review, which is no longer the case. Third, and finally, our reading of Viscount Dilhorn's statements in Gouriet is, that they amount to a conclusion that it was not appropriate, in the particular circumstances of that case, to draw inferences, rather than being a statement of principle that it was never appropriate to do so. Of course, it is an entirely separate question of fact, whether in the circumstances of this inquiry, it would be proper to draw inferences, from a refusal to

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13 (Pages 49 to 52)

1	matter for your consideration in due course,	1	topic in the report. Now, one could see how
2	once the question has been put, the refusal	2	that would work, if you were to accept the
3	received and the main inquiry hearing has	3	reasons given as being valid, but we have to
4	been has taken place, with all relevant	4	leave room for the possibility that you do not
5	evidence being heard, examined and	5	accept the validity or genuineness of the
6	challenged as necessary. We have indicated	6	reasons given, and in those circumstances
7	in the skeleton argument, that there are three	7	you and the inquiry would be placed in a
8	considerations which are relevant, and could	8	very difficult position, of being unable to
9	be argued to militate against drawing an	9	give your full and frank views in an open
10	adverse inference in this inquiry. First, there	10	manner. As we said in our submissions, we
11	is, as my learned friend Mr Caruana - Sir	11	would be more open to consider this offer if,
12	Peter Caruana - has stated, there is the	12	for example, it were extended to including all
13	Attorney General's evidence already, in his	13	core participants within the confidentiality
14	second affidavit, at paragraph 47, that his	14	ring, so that the reason could at least be
15	decision on the nolle was based on matters	15	addressed in a confidential section of the
16	that were brought to his attention over a year	16	report for core participants, but that is not the
17	after the events of May-June 2020, which if	17	offer that has been made to date. In
18	accepted would appear to rule out the case	18	summary, therefore, while recognising that
19	advanced by Mr McGrail, which is that the	19	there are viable arguments on either side of
20	reasons were the same as those which	20	this debate, we consider it appropriate for the
20	motivated the government party's actions in	20	inquiry to apply the Chief Justice's
21	May-June 2020. Second, the government	21	interpretation of section 59 of the
22	party submit that it is the Attorney General's	23	Constitution in Cornelio. Meaning that,
23	judgment that providing the reasons for this	23	firstly, the Attorney General can be asked to
24	discontinuance would visit serious prejudice	24	disclose the reasons for the discontinuance,
23	discontinuance would visit serious prejudice	23	disclose the reasons for the discontinuance,
	Page 53		Page 55
		1	
1	on a vital public interest of Gibraltar.	1	and documents relating to that. Secondly, the
2	Obviously, that would need to be	2	Attorney General can choose to provide these
2 3	Obviously, that would need to be underpinned by evidence under oath, but if	2 3	Attorney General can choose to provide these reasons, but is also entitled to decline to give
2 3 4	Obviously, that would need to be underpinned by evidence under oath, but if the inquiry were satisfied that the Attorney	2 3 4	Attorney General can choose to provide these reasons, but is also entitled to decline to give any reasons. And, finally, that the inquiry
2 3 4 5	Obviously, that would need to be underpinned by evidence under oath, but if the inquiry were satisfied that the Attorney General was refusing to answer the question,	2 3 4 5	Attorney General can choose to provide these reasons, but is also entitled to decline to give any reasons. And, finally, that the inquiry can draw any inferences that it deems
2 3 4 5 6	Obviously, that would need to be underpinned by evidence under oath, but if the inquiry were satisfied that the Attorney General was refusing to answer the question, as he is entitled to do, because he fairly	2 3 4 5 6	Attorney General can choose to provide these reasons, but is also entitled to decline to give any reasons. And, finally, that the inquiry can draw any inferences that it deems appropriate, from a refusal to do so in
2 3 4 5 6 7	Obviously, that would need to be underpinned by evidence under oath, but if the inquiry were satisfied that the Attorney General was refusing to answer the question, as he is entitled to do, because he fairly considered himself bound to do so in the	2 3 4 5 6 7	Attorney General can choose to provide these reasons, but is also entitled to decline to give any reasons. And, finally, that the inquiry can draw any inferences that it deems appropriate, from a refusal to do so in appropriate circumstances. Now I will give
2 3 4 5 6 7 8	Obviously, that would need to be underpinned by evidence under oath, but if the inquiry were satisfied that the Attorney General was refusing to answer the question, as he is entitled to do, because he fairly considered himself bound to do so in the public interest, then in my submission it is	2 3 4 5 6 7 8	Attorney General can choose to provide these reasons, but is also entitled to decline to give any reasons. And, finally, that the inquiry can draw any inferences that it deems appropriate, from a refusal to do so in appropriate circumstances. Now I will give way to any core participant who may wish to
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14 (Pages 53 to 56)

1	the inquiry, here, is to what extent, if any, are	1	we had a discussion around this, and made
2	sections 8 and 10 of the Commissions of	2	submissions around this, relating to legal
3	Inquiry Act, limited by section 59 of the	3	professional privilege, earlier in one of the
4	Constitution. That is - that is the proper	4	earlier preliminary hearings, and you ruled,
5	question that we are examining today - to	5	Commissioner, that there was an inroad to
6	what extent are sections 8 and 10 limited by	6	sections 8 and 10 which was legal
7	section 59 of the Constitution. Because,	7	professional privilege, and the reason for that
8	section 8 and 10 are, on their face, very	8	was that all Gibraltar legislation is subject to
9	broad powers. And I will just - I know my	9	the Constitution, and must be interpreted in
10	learned friend, counsel for the Inquiry, has	10	concordance with the Constitution, and that
11	read out those powers, but I just want to refer	11	is entirely orthodox constitutional principle
12	to two lines in them. So, I am on page 4 of	12	in Gibraltar, arising from Annex 2, paragraph
12	the authorities bundle, if that assists, and it is	12	2 of the Constitution, which I do not need to
13	8.(2) 'Every such person shall attend before	13	take you to. But, it is very straightforward,
14	the commissioners and shall answer all such	14	that the Commissions of Inquiry Act, which
16	questions as may be put by the	15	predated the Constitution, must be read as if
		17	
17	commissioners touching the matters to be inquired into by them, and shall produce all	17	it applies to the Constitution, even if that
18			means reading it in a way which seems to
19	books, papers and writings required by them,	19 20	contradict the plain language of the text. It is
20	and in his custody or under his control,	20	a strong interpretative principle, in line with
21	according to the tenor of the summons'. So	21	section 3 of the Human Rights Acts, the way
22	it is - that is a power, on its face, which is	22	that - that that requires interpretation of
23	only limited by relevance, because that is the	23	statutes in accordance with human rights law.
24	language, 'touching the matters to be	24	And so, that qualification for legal privilege
25	inquired into by them'. And, I should also	25	must be read into sections 8 and 10, and I do
	Page 57		Page 59
	1 486 57		1 486 57
1	point out, in all of my submissions I am	1	not at all try and undermine that - that
	point out, in all of my submissions I am referring also to the requirement to provide	1 2	
1 2 3	point out, in all of my submissions I am referring also to the requirement to provide documents, because this is not - has not been		conclusion. Why would there be a carve-out
2	referring also to the requirement to provide documents, because this is not - has not been	2	
2 3	referring also to the requirement to provide	2 3	conclusion. Why would there be a carve-out for section 59, because that is the - that is
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$\begin{array}{c} 2\\ 3\\ 4\\ 5\\ 6\\ 7\\ 8\\ 9\\ 10\\ 11\\ 12\\ 13\\ 14\\ 15\\ 16\\ 17\\ 18\\ 19\\ 20\\ 21\\ 22\\ \end{array}$	referring also to the requirement to provide documents, because this is not - has not been addressed extensively in submissions, but in this matter it may be of importance. It is not just about whether the Attorney General can be asked the question, it is also about whether, if he has documents in his custody or control, or indeed if others have documents in their custody or control, which might cast light on what the reasons were behind the nolle prosequi, or the discontinuance, or may even show what the - what the discussions were around that, leading up to it, then those are also relevant, and should be provided under the terms of section 8, anyway. So that section 8 is very broad, and only limited by relevance. Section 10, 'no person shall be excused from answering any question put to him by the commissioners on the ground of any privilege, or on the ground that the answer to such question will tend to incriminate such	$\begin{array}{c} 2\\ 3\\ 4\\ 5\\ 6\\ 7\\ 8\\ 9\\ 10\\ 11\\ 12\\ 13\\ 14\\ 15\\ 16\\ 17\\ 18\\ 19\\ 20\\ 21\\ 22\\ \end{array}$	conclusion. Why would there be a carve-out for section 59, because that is the - that is really what is being argued here. My first point is, there is nothing expressly, in section 59, about whether or not the Attorney General has to provide reasons. Indeed, it does not - it does not say anything about reasons at all, it is silent on that point. In Cornelio, Chief Justice Dudley inferred into the Constitution, the right not to provide reasons, from the subordinate legislation - which is the CPEA - not from the Constitution itself. And, in fact, he inferred into the relevance section of CPEA, the right to not provide reasons, from a different part of the CPEA. And that was, in my submission, in its own context, and I will come to that - why it is in its own context - in a moment, but it does not take away from the fact the Constitution says nothing at all about reasons. In my submission, if there were an
$\begin{array}{c} 2\\ 3\\ 4\\ 5\\ 6\\ 7\\ 8\\ 9\\ 10\\ 11\\ 12\\ 13\\ 14\\ 15\\ 16\\ 17\\ 18\\ 19\\ 20\\ 21\\ 22\\ 23\\ \end{array}$	referring also to the requirement to provide documents, because this is not - has not been addressed extensively in submissions, but in this matter it may be of importance. It is not just about whether the Attorney General can be asked the question, it is also about whether, if he has documents in his custody or control, or indeed if others have documents in their custody or control, which might cast light on what the reasons were behind the nolle prosequi, or the discontinuance, or may even show what the - what the discussions were around that, leading up to it, then those are also relevant, and should be provided under the terms of section 8, anyway. So that section 8 is very broad, and only limited by relevance. Section 10, 'no person shall be excused from answering any question put to him by the commissioners on the ground that the answer to such question will tend to incriminate such person', and again that is very broad, 'on the	$\begin{array}{c} 2\\ 3\\ 4\\ 5\\ 6\\ 7\\ 8\\ 9\\ 10\\ 11\\ 12\\ 13\\ 14\\ 15\\ 16\\ 17\\ 18\\ 19\\ 20\\ 21\\ 22\\ 23\\ \end{array}$	conclusion. Why would there be a carve-out for section 59, because that is the - that is really what is being argued here. My first point is, there is nothing expressly, in section 59, about whether or not the Attorney General has to provide reasons. Indeed, it does not - it does not say anything about reasons at all, it is silent on that point. In Cornelio, Chief Justice Dudley inferred into the Constitution, the right not to provide reasons, from the subordinate legislation - which is the CPEA - not from the Constitution itself. And, in fact, he inferred into the relevance section of CPEA, the right to not provide reasons, from a different part of the CPEA. And that was, in my submission, in its own context, and I will come to that - why it is in its own context - in a moment, but it does not take away from the fact the Constitution says nothing at all about reasons. In my submission, if there were an absolute right to silence - which is what the
$\begin{array}{c} 2\\ 3\\ 4\\ 5\\ 6\\ 7\\ 8\\ 9\\ 10\\ 11\\ 12\\ 13\\ 14\\ 15\\ 16\\ 17\\ 18\\ 19\\ 20\\ 21\\ 22\\ 23\\ 24\\ \end{array}$	referring also to the requirement to provide documents, because this is not - has not been addressed extensively in submissions, but in this matter it may be of importance. It is not just about whether the Attorney General can be asked the question, it is also about whether, if he has documents in his custody or control, or indeed if others have documents in their custody or control, which might cast light on what the reasons were behind the nolle prosequi, or the discontinuance, or may even show what the - what the discussions were around that, leading up to it, then those are also relevant, and should be provided under the terms of section 8, anyway. So that section 8 is very broad, and only limited by relevance. Section 10, 'no person shall be excused from answering any question put to him by the commissioners on the ground of any privilege, or on the ground that the answer to such question will tend to incriminate such	$\begin{array}{c} 2\\ 3\\ 4\\ 5\\ 6\\ 7\\ 8\\ 9\\ 10\\ 11\\ 12\\ 13\\ 14\\ 15\\ 16\\ 17\\ 18\\ 19\\ 20\\ 21\\ 22\\ 23\\ 24\\ \end{array}$	conclusion. Why would there be a carve-out for section 59, because that is the - that is really what is being argued here. My first point is, there is nothing expressly, in section 59, about whether or not the Attorney General has to provide reasons. Indeed, it does not - it does not say anything about reasons at all, it is silent on that point. In Cornelio, Chief Justice Dudley inferred into the Constitution, the right not to provide reasons, from the subordinate legislation - which is the CPEA - not from the Constitution itself. And, in fact, he inferred into the relevance section of CPEA, the right to not provide reasons, from a different part of the CPEA. And that was, in my submission, in its own context, and I will come to that - why it is in its own context - in a moment, but it does not take away from the fact the Constitution says nothing at all about reasons. In my submission, if there were an absolute right to silence - which is what the government is contending for, and indeed

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15 (Pages 57 to 60)

		1	
1	submission really - really comes down to -	1	the public interest to reveal the reasons for
2	Constitution would have to be very clear on	2	exercising his section 59 power to
3	that. Because it would, for example, prevent	3	a commission of inquiry, for example, if
4	a commission of inquiry being set up, which	4	there was a national security reason why that
5	could investigate thoroughly whether a	5	information was so sensitive it could not
6	discontinuance was corrupt, or in some other	6	even be revealed to the chair of public
	way outside the power granted by section 59.		inquiry. There may be a diplomatic relations
7 °	In my submission, and with respect, we have		
8	•	8	point. In that respect the inroad into sections
9	been considering the power through the	9	8 and 10 arises not from some kind of
10	wrong end of the telescope, and this may be	10	constitutional analogue to the prerogative
11	because the term nolle prosequi is not used in	11	power but through the usual public interest
12	the Constitution, retains some of the	12	immunity procedure and we all accept, and
13	implications which arise entirely from its	13	you have determined, commissioner, that
14	basis in the prerogative power, in England	14	applies in this inquiry and is inferentially
15	and Wales. But of course, in Gibraltar - and	15	a qualification to sections 8 and 10. And it is
16	indeed in other, similar, British Overseas	16	how the government, in fact any public
17	Territories such as that considered in Mohit -	17	authority, can preserve the public interest
18	it is not a prerogative power, it is a statutory	18	whilst still interacting and providing
19	power, under the Constitution, which is	19	assistance to the public inquiry. By making
20	reviewable in judicial review. But, that does	20	a public interest immunity application
21	not - that is not the end of the story, because	21	supported by a certificate in the usual way
22	you still have to consider, in my respectful	22	which sets out why they consider public
23	submission, why there might be some kind of	23	interest in not revealing the reason for
24	inroad to sections 8 and 10, arising from the	24	a discontinuance either prevents that being
25	power to discontinue proceedings. And, my	25	revealed at all even to the inquiry or requires
	Page 61		Page 63
1	submission is, there is an inroad, and in that	1	that it not be disclosed to other CPs and/or to
1 2	submission is, there is an inroad, and in that respect I do agree with - with the	1 2	that it not be disclosed to other CPs and/or to the public.
2	respect I do agree with - with the	2	the public.
2 3	respect I do agree with - with the government's position - that there is some	2 3	the public. In my submission, that is the proper way
2 3 4	respect I do agree with - with the government's position - that there is some kind of an inroad - but I do - but I - in my	2 3 4	the public. In my submission, that is the proper way legally of understanding how sections 59 and
2 3 4 5	respect I do agree with - with the government's position - that there is some kind of an inroad - but I do - but I - in my submission it does not arise for the same	2 3 4 5	the public. In my submission, that is the proper way legally of understanding how sections 59 and 8 and 10 of the sorry, 59 of the
2 3 4 5 6	respect I do agree with - with the government's position - that there is some kind of an inroad - but I do - but I - in my submission it does not arise for the same reason that inroad for the prerogative power	2 3 4 5 6	the public. In my submission, that is the proper way legally of understanding how sections 59 and 8 and 10 of the sorry, 59 of the Constitution and 8 and 10 of the
2 3 4 5 6 7	respect I do agree with - with the government's position - that there is some kind of an inroad - but I do - but I - in my submission it does not arise for the same reason that inroad for the prerogative power would arise, it arises from the requirement	2 3 4 5 6 7	the public. In my submission, that is the proper way legally of understanding how sections 59 and 8 and 10 of the sorry, 59 of the Constitution and 8 and 10 of the Commissions of Inquiry Act interact, that
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16 (Pages 61 to 64)

1	he does not have to reveal those reasons and,	1	commissioner, and not the Attorney
2	as is said in the case law, that is in fact a duty	2	General's.
3	in the public interest context, not a right.	3	THE COMMISSIONER: Yes, thank you. I
4	You may agree with that, commissioner.	4	understand your argument entirely. Does
5	You may agree in part and decide that there	5	anyone want to speak in support of that
6	had to be some sort of restrictions from that	6	proposition before I think you essentially
7	information being revealed publicly. But, in	7	agree with that.
8	my submission, there is no reason in law and	8	MR GIBBS: I do. I adopt and commend the
9	it does not flow from Mohit or from Cornelio	9	submissions that have just been made on
10	that the public interest immunity procedure is	10	public interest immunity and the proper
11	somehow disapplied just in relation to this	11	process distinct from that which has
12	one power in the Constitution.	12	presently been under discussion and in
12	Just to finish off on Cornelio, Cornelio is of	13	writing. I have other submissions to make on
13	course not about public inquiries. It does not	13	the subject but I do not want to make them
15	refer to sections 8 and 10 of the	15	out of order.
16	Commissions of Inquiry Act, which are very	16	THE COMMISSIONER: Sorry, just identify
17	broad powers. It has nothing to do with this	17	the other submissions.
18	context and it is not as if Chief Justice	18	MR GIBBS: Yes. Without wanting to repeat
18	Dudley did not know about this inquiry or	18	what my learned friend has just said, dealing
20	did not understand there was a difference. Of	20	perhaps with the Chief Justice's judgment
20	course he did and he refers to it at the end.	20	and the propositions that I know you will
21	But he was not asked to consider sections 8	21	
			have, but just in headline. The conclusion of
23	and 10 or how they interact. And with	23	the Chief Justice is that the Attorney General
24	respect, Cornelio, the reasoning in Cornelio,	24	has no obligations to give reasons when
25	is limited to a single sentence at paragraph 23	25	entering a nolle prosequi and it is founded, to
	Page 65		Page 67
1	about the subversion of the relevant statutory	1	state the obvious, explicitly upon
	about the subversion of the relevant statutory provisions and that sentence actually focuses	1 2	state the obvious, explicitly upon a construction of section 233 and 223 of the
2	provisions and that sentence actually focuses	2	a construction of section 233 and 223 of the
2 3	provisions and that sentence actually focuses only on a scenario where reasons it sought		a construction of section 233 and 223 of the 2011 Act. It is not founded upon
2 3 4	provisions and that sentence actually focuses only on a scenario where reasons it sought indirectly via the DPP, and Cornelio is not	2 3 4	a construction of section 233 and 223 of the 2011 Act. It is not founded upon an interpretation of the Constitution. It is the
2 3 4 5	provisions and that sentence actually focuses only on a scenario where reasons it sought indirectly via the DPP, and Cornelio is not even in the context of a judicial review.	2 3 4 5	a construction of section 233 and 223 of the 2011 Act. It is not founded upon an interpretation of the Constitution. It is the gap between those two sections from which
2 3 4	provisions and that sentence actually focuses only on a scenario where reasons it sought indirectly via the DPP, and Cornelio is not even in the context of a judicial review. In my submission, your task and your	2 3 4	a construction of section 233 and 223 of the 2011 Act. It is not founded upon an interpretation of the Constitution. It is the
2 3 4 5 6 7	provisions and that sentence actually focuses only on a scenario where reasons it sought indirectly via the DPP, and Cornelio is not even in the context of a judicial review. In my submission, your task and your statutory duties are very different to that of	2 3 4 5 6 7	a construction of section 233 and 223 of the 2011 Act. It is not founded upon an interpretation of the Constitution. It is the gap between those two sections from which the Chief THE COMMISSIONER: Those two sections
2 3 4 5 6 7 8	provisions and that sentence actually focuses only on a scenario where reasons it sought indirectly via the DPP, and Cornelio is not even in the context of a judicial review. In my submission, your task and your statutory duties are very different to that of the Supreme Court in the costs jurisdiction	2 3 4 5 6 7 8	a construction of section 233 and 223 of the 2011 Act. It is not founded upon an interpretation of the Constitution. It is the gap between those two sections from which the Chief THE COMMISSIONER: Those two sections will certainly provide the procedure. But
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17 (Pages 65 to 68)

1	spelt out in the way in which my learned	1	an eye on the public interest as well", then
2	friend Mr Santos has read to you, he derived	2	two things are banging up against each other
3	it, he says, in support of comfort from the	3	and one will not override the other and you
4	way in which the matter had been dealt with	4	have a process in place for deciding how to
5	in Mohit. In Mohit you may find a stronger	5	resolve that, which is exactly, in my
6	and more powerful and in this case more	6	submission, the process which Mr Wagner
7	direct authority for a relevant proposition,	7	has just adverted to.
8	which is whether a statutory Attorney	8	Because your power, again without being
9	General's statutory power to discontinue is	9	overly repetitious, is a power of absolute
10	amenable to judicial review.	10	discretion. It is a power which is very
11	THE COMMISSIONER: Which it is.	11	powerfully worded. I do not suggest that you
12	MR GIBBS: Which it is, yes, everyone	12	are going to be leaning on section 12 in order
13	agrees about that. But plainly you are not	13	to commit to custody the Attorney General
14	considering a question of judicial review.	14	and I note, having raised the issue in my
15	You are performing a completely different, in	15	written submissions, as it were, against
16	my submission, responsibility and	16	myself, that that power is contingent in
17	a completely different one from that which	17	section 12 upon the person, the witness,
18	the Chief Justice was performing when he	18	refusing to do something which he or she is
19 20	was examining the effect of an application	19 20	legally required to do, which may beg the
20 21	under section 59 of the 2011 Act, in respect of which of course other sections of that	20	very question then that you are now primarily considering, whether he can be legally
21	same 2011 Act were bound to weigh very	21	required to answer the questions.
22	heavily with him. And your responsibility,	22	Because we have taken questions 4 to 7 all
23 24	and forgive me sounding a bit pompous, is	23	together, I could submit to you about
24 25	one that predates the Constitution. It is not	25	inference now, or it may be that you will
23	one that predates the Constitution. It is not	23	interence now, or it may be that you will
	Page 69		Page 71
			0
1	avarassly overruled or amended or varied by	1	
1	expressly overruled or amended or varied by	1	come back to that later, but if you would like
2	the Constitution, although, for the reasons	2	come back to that later, but if you would like to hear from me about that now, then
2 3	the Constitution, although, for the reasons already given in the Constitution, it must be	2 3	come back to that later, but if you would like to hear from me about that now, then THE COMMISSIONER: No, I will come
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2 3 4 5	the Constitution, although, for the reasons already given in the Constitution, it must be interpreted in a way that does not conflict with the Constitution. But it is	2 3 4 5	come back to that later, but if you would like to hear from me about that now, then THE COMMISSIONER: No, I will come back to you on it. MR GIBBS: Thank you very much.
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18 (Pages 69 to 72)

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1	about the proposal that you hear evidence in	1	that is helpful. I had not appreciated that.
2	some hybrid process from which some core	2	Thank you for pointing that out.
3	participants are excluded	3	SIR PETER CARUANA: If I may just, just
4	THE COMMISSIONER: No, that is the	4	before
5	inferences.	5	MR CRUZ: No doubt Mr Caruana will
6	MR GIBBS: So we will deal with all of that	6	respond. It is just two points really we make
7	later.	7	very quickly. One is, it is in our
8	THE COMMISSIONER: Yes, I will come	8	submissions, but I think the duty to answer
9	back to you.	9	questions relates also to the timing. So what
10	MR GIBBS: Thank you very much.	10	we have said is that if the public interest that
11	THE COMMISSIONER: Yes.	11	fuelled the decision to discontinue remains
12	MR SAREEN: Forgive me for rising, for the	12	extant, relevant, at the time of the hearing of
13	Op Delhi defendants, Ellis Sareen.	13	the inquiry, then of course it is our position,
14	THE COMMISSIONER: Yes.	14	aligned with those of the government parties
15	MR SAREEN: Can I just clarify the nature	15	if there is no obligation to answer that, absent
16	of the application before the Chief Justice?	16	what I would call the sort of subsection 5
17	Of course it was our application and we little	17	circumstances. In other words, were there to
18	expected it to reverberate so far. But it was	18	be evidence of direct or indirect control or
19	an application for the court to use its	19	something of that nature, then of course that
20	common law powers, not its statutory	20	power would be unlawful under section 59.
21	powers. The context was a statutory	21	But absent that evidence, and we are not
22	application for costs. The application for	22	suggesting that exists, but absent that
23	disclosure was for exercise of that common	23	evidence then the position is that you can
24	law power. It is in paragraph 24 of the Chief	24	withhold the answer, if at the time you are
25	Justice's judgment on that point. I take that	25	asked the question the landscape is
	Page 73		Page 75
	0		0
1	point after what Mr Gibbs said about it.	1	unchanged. If that landscape has changed
1 2	point after what Mr Gibbs said about it. THE COMMISSIONER: Right.	1 2	unchanged. If that landscape has changed then the position is different and I just want
2	THE COMMISSIONER: Right. MR SAREEN: It feeds in perhaps into the point that Mr Wagner was making, which I	2	then the position is different and I just want to make that distinction because it may be that between now and the actual hearing
2 3	THE COMMISSIONER: Right. MR SAREEN: It feeds in perhaps into the point that Mr Wagner was making, which I could summarise as inquiries are rather	2 3 4 5	then the position is different and I just want to make that distinction because it may be that between now and the actual hearing inquiry, you know in other words, public
2 3 4	THE COMMISSIONER: Right. MR SAREEN: It feeds in perhaps into the point that Mr Wagner was making, which I could summarise as inquiries are rather different because of course whilst the inquiry	2 3 4	then the position is different and I just want to make that distinction because it may be that between now and the actual hearing inquiry, you know in other words, public interest does not carry on in perpetuity, it is
2 3 4 5	THE COMMISSIONER: Right. MR SAREEN: It feeds in perhaps into the point that Mr Wagner was making, which I could summarise as inquiries are rather different because of course whilst the inquiry has some fairly fearsome powers under	2 3 4 5	then the position is different and I just want to make that distinction because it may be that between now and the actual hearing inquiry, you know in other words, public interest does not carry on in perpetuity, it is not something that carries on indefinitely,
2 3 4 5 6	THE COMMISSIONER: Right. MR SAREEN: It feeds in perhaps into the point that Mr Wagner was making, which I could summarise as inquiries are rather different because of course whilst the inquiry has some fairly fearsome powers under section 8, the Commission of Inquiries Act,	2 3 4 5 6	then the position is different and I just want to make that distinction because it may be that between now and the actual hearing inquiry, you know in other words, public interest does not carry on in perpetuity, it is not something that carries on indefinitely, and that should be a relevant factor when the
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19 (Pages 73 to 76)

1	friends Mr Wagner and Mr Gibbs make	1	novel and wrong because the Constitution
2	an interesting attempt to overcome the very	2	says the contrary. It says all laws should be
3	considerable, and I would submit,	3	read
4	insuperable constitutional and legal obstacles	4	THE COMMISSIONER: I have the point.
5	in their path, but I do not believe that they are	5	SIR PETER CARUANA: And that takes me
6	entitled to succeed. I suppose the short	6	straight into Mr Wagner's first point, and I
7	answer is that particularly my learned friend	7	will start if I may with Mr Wagner and then,
8	Mr Wagner is conflating the procedures for	8	when I have finished with these submissions
9	obtaining a decision from a court on the basis	9	we have just heard before the break, your
10	of a public interest immunity certificate with	10	Lordship can tell me whether he wants me to
11	the legal rule that an attorney general that	11	go on to other issues or like Mr Gibbs to hold
12	exercises power to enter a discontinuance	12	back on other issues such as inference.
13	may not be required to give his reasons. And	13	Section 8 to 10 of the Act, as I have just said,
14	the short answer is simply to remind my	14	are completely subservient to the
15	learned friends that in neither Mohit nor	15	Constitution.
16	indeed in Cornelio where that principle was	16	THE COMMISSIONER: I have got that
17	applied, namely thou shalt not oblige him to	17	point.
18	give his reasons, in neither case was there	18	SIR PETER CARUANA: And the idea that
19	a public interest immunity certificate or any	19	sections 8 and 10 for any reason, including
20	other kind of certificate. So the deployment	20	that one, might somehow endow this
20	and application of the principle	20	tribunal, this inquiry, with more powers than
21	THE COMMISSIONER: Yes, but they were	21	the Supreme Court Act, the Senior Courts
22	not dealing with the 1888 Act.	22	Act, which is incorporated into Gibraltar by
23 24	SIR PETER CARUANA: My Lord, the	23	reference, section 15 of the Supreme Court
24 25	1888 Act, I will come to that in the longer	24	Act, or indeed the Civil Procedure Rules,
23	1888 Act, 1 will come to that in the longer	23	Act, or indeed the Civil Procedure Rules,
	Page 77		Page 79
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1	version of the answer, but the 1888 Act is	1	give a High Court judge when he is
1 2		1 2	
	version of the answer, but the 1888 Act is		give a High Court judge when he is
2	version of the answer, but the 1888 Act is neither here nor there. The 1888 Act has to	2	give a High Court judge when he is exercising his jurisdiction in judicial review
2 3	version of the answer, but the 1888 Act is neither here nor there. The 1888 Act has to be read and interpreted and applied, despite	2 3	give a High Court judge when he is exercising his jurisdiction in judicial review is, in my view, a completely unrealistic and
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20 (Pages 77 to 80)

1	here it is statutory. That did not stop the	1	10 is again trumped by the Constitution so
2	Privy Council in Mohit deciding that,	2	the reference in section 10 to privilege and
3	nevertheless, the rule of non-giving of	3	privilege not being a shield, is simply it is
4	reasons continues to apply even to, if I can	4	not relevant to the question of the Attorney
5	call it, a constitutional or statutory attorney	5	General's right not to be forced to go for
6	general and, therefore, the rule in Mohit and	6	reasons which is not a matter of any privilege
7	Cornelio that the Attorney General cannot be	7	on his part, it is a rule of law.
8	obliged to give his reasons has to be	8	So, my Lord, on that basis there is absolutely
9	anchored in the interpretation of section 59 of	9	and I agree with CTI, there is no case for
10	the Constitution which everybody agrees is	10	somehow making space for an obligation to
11	the power that the chief justice that the	11	disclose reasons based on anything in the Act
12	Attorney General will exercise.	12	which is subservient to the Constitution and
13	THE COMMISSIONER: You have made	13	you would have to, first, decide that neither
14	that point before. I do understand the point	14	the Constitution nor the rulings in Mohit and
15	very clearly.	15	Cornelio applied.
16	SIR PETER CARUANA: Good, my Lord, I	16	Now, my Lord, sir, rather, the issue now is
17	shall then move on. If I can just it has	17	whether I go on to respond to some of the
18	become less necessary for me to make it	18	things said or whether we leave it for a while
19	given the very last intervention made on	19	and other things, yes. I am conscious that
20	behalf of Mr Cornelio, Perez and Sanchez,	20	my learned friend, Mr Gibbs
21	but my learned friend Mr Wagner's	21	THE COMMISSIONER: We will hear from
22	invocation of the fact that actually his	22	Mr Gibbs.
23	aspirations are to root out documents that	23	SIR PETER CARUANA: First?
24	might show the reason ignores the fact, as we	24	THE COMMISSIONER: Yes.
25	have just been helpfully reminded, that the	25	MR SANTOS: My Lord, if there is nobody
20	have just been helpfully ferninded, that the	23	Wite Briteros. My Lora, it there is hooday
	Page 81		Page 83
1	decision of the Chief Justice was precisely	1	else who wants to address the questions that
2	about that, it was precisely about not	2	we are dealing with, then I propose to
	about that, it was precisely about not ordering disclosure of documents that	2 3	we are dealing with, then I propose to respond and then if anybody wishes to make
2 3 4	about that, it was precisely about not ordering disclosure of documents that disclosed the reasons. It was in the context	2 3 4	we are dealing with, then I propose to respond and then if anybody wishes to make brief responses because I know that this is
2 3 4 5	about that, it was precisely about not ordering disclosure of documents that disclosed the reasons. It was in the context of a costs application but as my learned	2 3 4 5	we are dealing with, then I propose to respond and then if anybody wishes to make brief responses because I know that this is covered
2 3 4 5 6	about that, it was precisely about not ordering disclosure of documents that disclosed the reasons. It was in the context of a costs application but as my learned friend has just said, the ruling that we are all	2 3 4 5 6	we are dealing with, then I propose to respond and then if anybody wishes to make brief responses because I know that this is covered THE COMMISSIONER: What about the
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21 (Pages 81 to 84)

Page 84

1	documents and I agree with that and the	1	There is also, as I said, section 59(5) of the
2	prima facie relevance of documents but	2	Constitution which, by way of reminder,
3	ultimately I would temper that by saying that	3	states that in the exercise of the powers
4	if there is a right not to answer that question	4	conferred upon him by those subsections, the
5	then it is difficult to see how we can require	5	Attorney General shall not be subject to the
6	disclosure of documents which would	6	direction or control of any other person or
7	provide information	7	authority. The court's supervisory judicial
8	THE COMMISSIONER: Which would	8	review role is preserved by section 83, but
9	reveal the very reasons he is entitled not to	9	other than that, no person or authority,
10	give.	10	including this inquiry, can direct or control
11	MR SANTOS: Precisely but in principle, of	11	the exercise of that power. That would
12	course, there is the power to seek documents.	12	include, in my submission, direction by this
13	Now, turning to the more thorny question, as	13	inquiry to provide the reasons because of the
14	Mr Wagner rightly recognises, in a judgment	14	chief justice's determination that the section
15	of the Supreme Court of Gibraltar in relation	15	59 power contains an inherent right to refuse
16	to the very same discontinuance that we are	16	to give reasons.
17	dealing with today, the Chief Justice inferred	17	I have also been I am grateful to my team
18	into the Constitution that is inherent in the	18	for pointing out to me that the 1969
19	section 59 pack itself the right not to provide	19	Constitution which predated this constitution
20	reasons and if that right is embedded in the	20	was in materially identical terms in relation
20	constitutional power as interpreted by the	20	to these powers, so that is what I propose to
22	chief justice, then how can it be said that	22	make in relation to those points and I
23	sections 8, 10 and 12 would override that	23	SIR PETER CARUANA: Can you just wait
24	constitutional that right within the	23	a second and
25	constitutional power. Sections 223 and 232	25	MR SANTOS: Yes, I do not intend to say
25	constitutional power. Sections 225 and 252	23	with or it (100). Tes, I do not intend to suy
	Page 85		Page 87
1	lay out the procedure for the exercise of that	1	anything further but I know that Mr Wagner
2	power but the Chief Justice interpreted the	2	wants to come back and I am happy to give
2 3	power but the Chief Justice interpreted the constitutional power based on those	2 3	wants to come back and I am happy to give way to Mr Wagner.
2 3 4	power but the Chief Justice interpreted the constitutional power based on those provisions, his conclusion was as to the	2 3 4	wants to come back and I am happy to give way to Mr Wagner. SIR PETER CARUANA: My Lord, can I
2 3 4 5	power but the Chief Justice interpreted the constitutional power based on those provisions, his conclusion was as to the content, the inherent content of the section 59	2 3 4 5	wants to come back and I am happy to give way to Mr Wagner. SIR PETER CARUANA: My Lord, can I just say, and I should have cited authority for
2 3 4 5 6	power but the Chief Justice interpreted the constitutional power based on those provisions, his conclusion was as to the content, the inherent content of the section 59 power.	2 3 4 5 6	wants to come back and I am happy to give way to Mr Wagner. SIR PETER CARUANA: My Lord, can I just say, and I should have cited authority for my proposition that the new just dealing
2 3 4 5 6 7	power but the Chief Justice interpreted the constitutional power based on those provisions, his conclusion was as to the content, the inherent content of the section 59 power. As to the PII procedure proposed by Mr	2 3 4 5 6 7	wants to come back and I am happy to give way to Mr Wagner. SIR PETER CARUANA: My Lord, can I just say, and I should have cited authority for my proposition that the new just dealing with Mr Gibbs' point about the Act predating
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1	who wants to, before we move on to other	1	Inquiry Act and, therefore, there has to be
2	things.	2	some sort of resolution between those
3	THE COMMISSIONER: Okay, Mr Wagner,	3	statutes. That is a much more straight
4	it is all yours to respond.	4	forward task for you, Commissioner, than it
5	MR WAGNER: Thank you. The only short	5	is if it derives from the Constitution itself
6	point I wanted to make was that it has been	6	which I say is silent on that point.
7	referred repeatedly in the context of Quelia	7	The other point I would make is that the
8	that was a finding, there was a constitutional	8	Mr Caruana says that it is a rule of law that
			•
9	right to silence or to not give reasons in this	9	there is a right not to give reasons but, in my
10	context but my reading, with respect, of	10	submission, it cannot possibly be a rule of
11	section of paragraph 21 of that judgment	11	law arising from the Constitution because the
12	is that the chief justice was deriving that right	12	Constitution not only does it not explicitly
13	from sections 223 and 222 of the CPEA. It	13	provide for that rule, it does not even imply
14	does not refer to a constitutional right. He	14	that rule. I mean, there are lots of parts of the
15	says he refers to those provisions and then	15	Constitution which do not say anything about
16	he says, "Reading these provisions which are	16	reasons but it cannot follow that just because
17	found in the same part of the same Act, in my	17	a power exists without a requirement to give
18	judgment, it is clear that the Attorney	18	reasons, that it then becomes impossible for a
19	General has no obligation to give reasons	19	Commission of Inquiry to ask the question
20	when entering the nolle prosequi," and he	20	and require answers as to those reasons. It
21	uses the term "nolle prosequi" which is of	21	would make a mockery of the power of the
22	course the term used only in the CPEA. It is	22	Commission of Inquiry to inquire as it sees
23	not used in the Constitution. There is no	23	fit, so those are my submissions in response.
24	mention of the term nolle prosequi in the	24	THE COMMISSIONER: Thank you.
25	Constitution and then he says, "I am fortified	25	MR SAREEN: Forgive me, may I make one
	Page 89		Page 91
		1	
1	in that view by the Privy Council's decision	1	further clarification about the Cornelio
1	in that view by the Privy Council's decision in Mohit " and then he refers to and he	1	further clarification about the Cornelio
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2 3	in Mohit," and then he refers to and he quotes from that decision and then says, "It	2 3	application? THE COMMISSIONER: Yes.
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23 (Pages 89 to 92)

1	inferences. Even if the Attorney General	1	power if you were not able to draw any
2	cannot be asked questions and if you cannot	2	inferences
3	commit him for contempt for a refusal to do	3	THE COMMISSIONER: No, I am not
4	so, you can, in my submission, certainly	4	saying that. I am just reluctant presently to
5	draw inferences from what he chooses to say	5	draw an adverse inference from the Attorney
6	and what he chooses not to say and the	6	General exercising his legal power.
7	context, as I have already submitted	7	MR WAGNER: Yes, and, in my submission,
8	THE COMMISSIONER: Well, draw	8	I would not put it as strongly as that, with
9	inferences from all the circumstances.	9	respect, because there is the difference
10	MR GIBBS: Absolutely.	10	and I will go back to the public interest
11	THE COMMISSIONER: If he is entitled not	11	immunity point which is that in the public
12	to answer the question, it seems to me that I	12	interest immunity context there may be a
13	cannot draw an adverse inference from the	13	duty not to provide certain evidence in
14	fact that he has exercised a legal right not to	14	disclosure arising from the public interest.
15	answer questions but the fact that he has not	15	That is the classic interpretation of public
16	answered questions is but one of the relevant	16	interest immunity.
17	circumstances from which I can draw an	17	Now, were there to be a duty, then I agree
18	inference.	18	that you would it would not be fair to
19	MR GIBBS: That is exactly my submission	19	make an adverse inference because the
20	in the same way as it will be in judicial	20	Attorney General would have no choice.
21	review proceedings, whereas the Supreme	21	THE COMMISSIONER: Right.
22	Court said in Mohit that the director in	22	MR WAGNER: If there is a right which is
23	Mauritius could not be ordered but he could -	23	something different it still is a choice by the
24	- but inferences could be drawn from what he	24	Attorney General whether or not to make the
25	chose to say and what he did not choose to	25	disclosure or not or whether to make a public
	Page 93		Page 95
	0		0
1	say in the same way that in any judicial	1	interest immunity application because that is
2	review proceedings, where someone does not	2	the route that is the answer for any public
2 3	review proceedings, where someone does not give an answer when they could give an	2 3	the route that is the answer for any public authority who considers there is a public
2 3 4	review proceedings, where someone does not give an answer when they could give an answer, even if they are not required to give	2 3 4	the route that is the answer for any public authority who considers there is a public interest it has access to or control over
2 3 4 5	review proceedings, where someone does not give an answer when they could give an answer, even if they are not required to give an answer, there may be an inference to be	2 3 4 5	the route that is the answer for any public authority who considers there is a public interest it has access to or control over information or documents which it would not
2 3 4 5 6	review proceedings, where someone does not give an answer when they could give an answer, even if they are not required to give an answer, there may be an inference to be drawn	2 3 4 5 6	the route that is the answer for any public authority who considers there is a public interest it has access to or control over information or documents which it would not be in the public interest to disclose or to
2 3 4 5 6 7	review proceedings, where someone does not give an answer when they could give an answer, even if they are not required to give an answer, there may be an inference to be drawn THE COMMISSIONER: Yes	2 3 4 5 6 7	the route that is the answer for any public authority who considers there is a public interest it has access to or control over information or documents which it would not be in the public interest to disclose or to disseminate to the public. The option
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1	anidan a landin ann 42 4ha daoisian 42	1	information in the commutation of the target have in
1	evidence leading up to the decision to discontinue the proceedings which strongly	1 2	inferences in the very terms that you have, in my respectful submission, correctly
2 3	implied or even proved that there was a	3	summarised come in.
4	political or some sort of improper reasoning	4	The inferences that you, sir, are free to draw
5	which was leading up to that decision or	5	from the material, which is what from the
6	which was leading into the decision, then you	6	material the other material, if I can call it
7	may, Commissioner, naturally draw an	7	that, other than the reasons goes in the case
8	adverse inference from the refusal to provide	8	of the judge in Mohit and in the case of the
9	the reasons under oath or in documentary	9	chief justice in Cornelio, to draw inferences
10	form to you.	10	which help him make the decisions that he
11	In my submission, that would be a perfectly	11	has to make, "Do I award Mr Cornelio and
12	proper inference to draw and not outside of	12	Mr Perez and Mr Sanchez their costs, or
13	your powers but where there was of	13	don't I," and in Mohit, "Do I accede to the
14	course if there was a duty not to provide that	14	judicial review and remit the decision back to
15	document, if the AG was left with no choice,	15	the decision maker on the grounds that it was
16	you would not be able to do that and those	16	irrational, illegally made by the Mauritian
17	are my submissions on that point.	17	DPP?" Those tasks remain.
18	THE COMMISSIONER: Yes, thank you.	18	What neither Mohit nor the Chief Justice in
19	Now, you want to	19	Cornelio said was that it was that
20	SIR PETER CARUANA: My Lord, some of	20	inferences could be drawn about what the
21	what has been said sir, some of what has	21	reasons were because that would just be a
22	been said both by yourself and by Mr	22	trap for the Attorney General but of course
23	Wagner actually reduces what I have to say	23	you can draw inferences about any
24	on this subject which has been helpful.	24	inferences you want that helps as the court
25	First of all, let me say that I do not feel any	25	can, as to or what view of the facts you
	Page 97		Page 99
1	great need to disagree with very much of	1	have in relation to the issues under inquiry
1	great need to disagree with very much of what Mr Wagner has just said and the issue is	1	have in relation to the issues under inquiry. What neither the court in Mohit nor the court
2	what Mr Wagner has just said and the issue is	2	What neither the court in Mohit nor the court
	what Mr Wagner has just said and the issue is this then, I think the starting point for my	2 3	What neither the court in Mohit nor the court in Cornelio nor this inquiry can do is draw
2 3 4	what Mr Wagner has just said and the issue is this then, I think the starting point for my submission is that there is no legal way in	2 3 4	What neither the court in Mohit nor the court in Cornelio nor this inquiry can do is draw inferences, adverse or otherwise, about what
2 3	what Mr Wagner has just said and the issue is this then, I think the starting point for my	2 3	What neither the court in Mohit nor the court in Cornelio nor this inquiry can do is draw
2 3 4 5	what Mr Wagner has just said and the issue is this then, I think the starting point for my submission is that there is no legal way in which he can legally be obliged to give his	2 3 4 5	What neither the court in Mohit nor the court in Cornelio nor this inquiry can do is draw inferences, adverse or otherwise, about what may have been the Attorney General's
2 3 4 5 6	what Mr Wagner has just said and the issue is this then, I think the starting point for my submission is that there is no legal way in which he can legally be obliged to give his reasons and now we are discussing whether	2 3 4 5 6	What neither the court in Mohit nor the court in Cornelio nor this inquiry can do is draw inferences, adverse or otherwise, about what may have been the Attorney General's reasons and that is, I think, the distinction
2 3 4 5 6 7	what Mr Wagner has just said and the issue is this then, I think the starting point for my submission is that there is no legal way in which he can legally be obliged to give his reasons and now we are discussing whether there can be inferences but the question that	2 3 4 5 6 7	What neither the court in Mohit nor the court in Cornelio nor this inquiry can do is draw inferences, adverse or otherwise, about what may have been the Attorney General's reasons and that is, I think, the distinction that allows us all to land in the same place.
2 3 4 5 6 7 8	what Mr Wagner has just said and the issue is this then, I think the starting point for my submission is that there is no legal way in which he can legally be obliged to give his reasons and now we are discussing whether there can be inferences but the question that we are dancing around and which, I think,	2 3 4 5 6 7 8	What neither the court in Mohit nor the court in Cornelio nor this inquiry can do is draw inferences, adverse or otherwise, about what may have been the Attorney General's reasons and that is, I think, the distinction that allows us all to land in the same place. THE COMMISSIONER: Why not?
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1	simply that the reasons for which I exercise	1	stray into Mr Wagner's public interest
2	my right cannot be adjudicated against me to	2	immunity territory - which is not where we
3	defeat the very right that the law gave me not	3	are in this matter - an application on PII
4	to articulate those reasons.	4	might be made ex-parte to a judge, and the
5	But other inferences about other things, about	5	other parties to the proceedings may never
6	whether you think the Attorney General's	6	hear the reasons why a PII certificate has
7	decision was lawful - or in the case of a JR	7	succeeded in front of the judge. So a judge
8	at least, we are going to come to whether	8	that has had an ex-parte without notice PII
9	those powers are extrapolatable to an inquiry	9	application and that has made a decision on it
10	- but in the case of a court exercising judicial	10	could not then walk out into his courtroom
10	review the court in Mohit could easily come	10	and draw inferences to the contrary on the
11	to the conclusion, without speculating about	12	
12		12	basis that the ex-parte applicant had refused
	what the Attorney General's reasons was,	1	to give his reasons openly. Because
14	that it was unlawful, for example did not	14	inferences are necessarily something that you
15	follow the right procedure, did not have the	15	do when you do not have access to direct
16	power to do so, any of the grounds of	16	evidence, and, sir, with respect, you do have.
17	irrationality. He might even, on a balance of	17	THE COMMISSIONER: Let us just think
18	probabilities, the Chief Justice, say: "I cannot	18	this through. Let us assume for the moment
19	hear the reasons but nevertheless I think Mr	19	that I was to take up or the inquiry team were
20	Cornelio, Mr Sanchez and Mr Perez should	20	to take up the invitation you make on behalf
21	have their costs because on the balance of	21	of Attorney General to give the reasons to me
22	probabilities," which is all he has to do, "the	22	in private, your application is predicated, is it
23	rest of the evidence, I draw inferences that	23	not, on the basis that (a) the Attorney General
24	there is something here which I think is	24	will give a truthful account of the reasons,
25	unfair to them."	25	and secondly that I will accept them. Just
	D 404		D 402
	Page 101		Page 103
1	So the distinction that I am drawing is this	1	following that through, that being so, I
1 2	So the distinction that I am drawing is this fine distinction between things that you may	1 2	following that through, that being so, I suppose I could hear the reasons, accept them
2	fine distinction between things that you may	2	suppose I could hear the reasons, accept them
2 3	fine distinction between things that you may infer for the purposes of discharging your	2 3	suppose I could hear the reasons, accept them and come back and tell everybody else that I
2 3 4	fine distinction between things that you may infer for the purposes of discharging your task and not drawing inferences as to the	2 3 4	suppose I could hear the reasons, accept them and come back and tell everybody else that I have heard the reasons and they seem to me
2 3 4 5	fine distinction between things that you may infer for the purposes of discharging your task and not drawing inferences as to the reasons themselves, in other words what	2 3 4 5	suppose I could hear the reasons, accept them and come back and tell everybody else that I have heard the reasons and they seem to me to be good reasons, and that shuts down this
2 3 4 5 6	fine distinction between things that you may infer for the purposes of discharging your task and not drawing inferences as to the reasons themselves, in other words what were the reasons and what were not the	2 3 4 5 6	suppose I could hear the reasons, accept them and come back and tell everybody else that I have heard the reasons and they seem to me to be good reasons, and that shuts down this line of inquiry.
2 3 4 5 6 7	fine distinction between things that you may infer for the purposes of discharging your task and not drawing inferences as to the reasons themselves, in other words what were the reasons and what were not the reasons	2 3 4 5 6 7	suppose I could hear the reasons, accept them and come back and tell everybody else that I have heard the reasons and they seem to me to be good reasons, and that shuts down this line of inquiry. SIR PETER CARUANA: Correct, sir.
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2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9	fine distinction between things that you may infer for the purposes of discharging your task and not drawing inferences as to the reasons themselves, in other words what were the reasons and what were not the reasons THE COMMISSIONER: Once I have determined, or if I determine that the reasons	2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9	suppose I could hear the reasons, accept them and come back and tell everybody else that I have heard the reasons and they seem to me to be good reasons, and that shuts down this line of inquiry. SIR PETER CARUANA: Correct, sir. THE COMMISSIONER: But what happens if (a) if I am not sure of the reasons or, far
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1	procedure were followed, that is not the	1	not know. Sir, you would have to ask my
2	conclusion to which you would come.	2	learned friends directly whether their clients
3	THE COMMISSIONER: Yes, I appreciate	3	would accept you to be shown the reasons
4	that. That is why I say your whole	4	confidentially, and if you came to the
5	application is predicated on the truth being	5	conclusion that there was no reason for you
6	told and the reasons being accepted.	6	to doubt their authenticity and genuineness,
7	SIR PETER CARUANA: Yes. So to answer	7	and also that you thought that they were
8	your question, sir, to answer your question	8	sufficient, then you would simply say that
9	directly, if you were not minded to accept the	9	and they would accept it, and if you were not
10	Attorney General's reasons, it would be a	10	able to say that, that the reasons would
11	precondition of the Attorney General	11	remain private, and then you could act as you
12	agreeing to share them with you that in those	12	pleased in any other respect. I do not know if
13	circumstances his reasons remained private	13	Mr Wagner wants to pick up the gauntlet
14	····	14	now, later or not at all. I just do not want to -
15	THE COMMISSIONER: Yes.	15	-
16	SIR PETER CARUANA: You could not in	16	MR WAGNER: I am very happy to pick up
17	any circumstances share what those reasons	17	the gauntlet now, if that assists, and I will not
18	were, and then you are free to criticise them	18	be long.
19	as much as you want in your report, so long	19	THE COMMISSIONER: Yes, carry on, go
20	as that criticism does not include airing the	20	ahead.
20	reasons. That is the Attorney General's	20	MR WAGNER: We are, with respect,
21	position, and this is not about the Attorney	22	mixing up two things which are separate.
22	General protecting himself, he does not	23	The first is the reasons that were given for
23	THE COMMISSIONER: No, I understand	23	the discontinuance, and the second is the
24	that. But it seems to me that the course that	25	justification from the Attorney General why
23	that. But it seems to me that the course that	25	Justification from the Automety General why
	Page 105		Page 107
1	you have put forward, and it is a sensible	1	public interest
2	idea to ventilate it but I think it has this	2	THE COMMISSIONER: I am not confusing
	idea to ventilate it but I think it has this problem: I think it just may cause	2 3	THE COMMISSIONER: I am not confusing the two points, Mr Wagner.
2 3 4	idea to ventilate it but I think it has this problem: I think it just may cause SIR PETER CARUANA: Well	2 3 4	THE COMMISSIONER: I am not confusing the two points, Mr Wagner. MR WAGNER: Sorry?
2 3 4 5	idea to ventilate it but I think it has this problem: I think it just may cause SIR PETER CARUANA: Well THE COMMISSIONER: Anyway, even if I	2 3 4 5	THE COMMISSIONER: I am not confusing the two points, Mr Wagner. MR WAGNER: Sorry? THE COMMISSIONER: I am not confusing
2 3 4 5 6	idea to ventilate it but I think it has this problem: I think it just may cause SIR PETER CARUANA: Well THE COMMISSIONER: Anyway, even if I accept the offer and hear the reasons and	2 3 4 5 6	THE COMMISSIONER: I am not confusing the two points, Mr Wagner. MR WAGNER: Sorry? THE COMMISSIONER: I am not confusing the two points.
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27 (Pages 105 to 108)

1	accept that ruling because that would be a	1	There is no difficulty whatsoever in the
2	ruling by you on the evidence, and how could	2	Attorney General and others, the only
3	he not accept it - unless it was unreasonable,	3	problem is that it is the Attorney General's
4	and I do not suggest it would be. However,	4	information and I think he would be the
5	there is a very big difference between the	5	correct issuer of the certificate, but I think
6	Attorney General approaching you with	6	people of the highest constitutional order
7	evidence and saying: "Please accept that my	7	who are aware of this would line up to issue
		8	-
8	evidence is true," and you reached a		such a public interest immunity certificate,
9	conclusion: "Yes, I rule the evidence is true,"	9	and that short circuits the process and that
10	without it being challenged, without it being	10	might make the procedure more attractive to
11	considered by the other CPS, without it being	11	you, sir, then I can certainly
12	put up to scrutiny, then in my submission -	12	THE COMMISSIONER: I am not inviting
13	and I do not think, Commissioner, this is	13	you to do
14	what you are proposing either	14	SIR PETER CARUANA: No, not now, I
15	THE COMMISSIONER: No, it is not.	15	understand, but it offers a possible way
16	MR WAGNER: Mr McGrail would not	16	forward to you, sir, to consider in slower
17	accept that.	17	order in due course. I am grateful to Mr
18	THE COMMISSIONER: I thought I had	18	Wagner for that clarification.
19	made very clear that the procedure that Sir	19	THE COMMISSIONER: You probably do
20	Peter Caruana has suggested has precisely	20	not want to add anything, but I am not
21	that flaw in it.	21	stopping you if you want to.
22	MR WAGNER: Exactly. So it is the	22	MR GIBBS: No, I can take a hint.
23	difference between accepting the reasons	23	THE COMMISSIONER: Okay. Have we
24	why the material is too sensitive to disclose	24	covered these points now?
25	onwards	25	MR SANTOS: I think we have and I do not
23	onwards	20	
	Page 109		Page 111
1	THE COMMISSIONER: Yes.	1	think that we are going to reach a sensible
1 2	MR WAGNER: versus accepting the	2	conclusion on that final point today. I think
		2 3	
2	MR WAGNER: versus accepting the	2	conclusion on that final point today. I think
2 3	MR WAGNER: versus accepting the underlying reasons themselves.	2 3	conclusion on that final point today. I think it is something that we can continue
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1	THE COMMISSIONER: Yes. Amendments	1	with him, and I have not had a chance to
2	to the provisional list of issues?	2	raise this with everybody else, but we can
3	MR SANTOS: Yes, that is correct. the	3	address that by, rather than saying "any
4	inquiry has proposed three amendments to	4	complaint", saying "complaints, if any, made
5	the provisional list of issues which the parties	5	by the Gibraltar Police Federation", and I
6	have had an opportunity to address in their	6	think that should make it clear that there is no
7	submissions. Two of them I think are	7	presupposition on the inquiry's part that there
8	uncontroversial; two of them I think are	8	were, in fact, complaints made. But again,
9	uncontroversial, although if anyone has	9	anyone who objects to that, please do say so
10	anything to say about them they are perfectly	10	once I give way.
11	welcome to do so. First, the inquiry has	11	Now, the other two points to cover are that
12	proposed an amendment to issue 1.1 to make	12	the amendment that we propose would
12	clear that the UK Ministry of Defence	13	include a specific reference to the difficult
14	employee who was removed from an aircraft	14	relationship between Mr McGrail and the
15	during the Air Force incident had previously	15	GPF. This has been mentioned by several
16	been arrested by the UK Service police but	16	witnesses, namely Mr Pyle in his first
17	was not under arrest at the time of the Air	17	affidavit, who refers to the fractured and
18	Force incident.	18	hostile relationship; the Chief Minister in his
19	THE COMMISSIONER: Because he had	19	first affidavit which refers to the very
20	been de-arrested.	20	difficult relationship; and Mr McGrail's third
20	MR SANTOS: Correct, that is our	20	affidavit which also refers to the very
22	understanding from the documents we have	22	difficult relationship. So there does not
22	seen. Second, the inquiry has proposed an	23	appear to be a factual dispute that the
23 24	amendment to issue five to clarify that the	24	relationship was difficult, and Mr Pyle in
25	RGP did not actually execute the search	25	paragraph 23.3 of his affidavit specifically
23	KOT the not actually execute the search	25	paragraph 23.5 of his antidavit specificany
	Page 113		Page 115
1		1	
1	warrants on 12 May 2020 but stated that they intended to execute them if the subjects did	1	relies on the difficult relationship and the
2			
2		2	tensions that arose as a result of that, together
3	not cooperate. Again, that is based on our	3	with the alleged complaint of bullying by Mr
4	not cooperate. Again, that is based on our reading of the documents. The third	3 4	with the alleged complaint of bullying by Mr McGrail as part of the reasons for his loss of
4 5	not cooperate. Again, that is based on our reading of the documents. The third proposed amendment, and it may be that this	3 4 5	with the alleged complaint of bullying by Mr McGrail as part of the reasons for his loss of confidence in Mr McGrail. He does concede
4 5 6	not cooperate. Again, that is based on our reading of the documents. The third proposed amendment, and it may be that this one requires a bit more attention, is to issue	3 4 5 6	with the alleged complaint of bullying by Mr McGrail as part of the reasons for his loss of confidence in Mr McGrail. He does concede that this was a concern of a lesser order of
4 5 6 7	not cooperate. Again, that is based on our reading of the documents. The third proposed amendment, and it may be that this one requires a bit more attention, is to issue six, which presently reads: "Any complaint	3 4 5 6 7	with the alleged complaint of bullying by Mr McGrail as part of the reasons for his loss of confidence in Mr McGrail. He does concede that this was a concern of a lesser order of gravity, but we do think, given his reliance
4 5 6 7 8	not cooperate. Again, that is based on our reading of the documents. The third proposed amendment, and it may be that this one requires a bit more attention, is to issue six, which presently reads: "Any complaint made by the Gibraltar Police Federation	3 4 5 6 7 8	with the alleged complaint of bullying by Mr McGrail as part of the reasons for his loss of confidence in Mr McGrail. He does concede that this was a concern of a lesser order of gravity, but we do think, given his reliance on it, that it should feature in issue six, albeit
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1	relationship between Mr McGrail and the	1	the avoidance of doubt that, in fact, the
2	Federation, and any allegations of bullying or	2	inquiry's focus will be limited to the matters
3	intimidation by Mr McGrail discussed by the	3	which were within their knowledge at the
4	Gibraltar Police Authority." So the draft	4	time. That is really all I propose to say on
5	wording will only include the difficult	5	issue six, and I invite anybody to make any
6	relationship and allegations of bullying and	6	points they wish to make on that.
7	intimidation to the extent they were the	7	THE COMMISSIONER: You have
8	subject of complaints to the GPA and, as a	8	discussed that with Mr Wagner, have you?
9	result, this amendment is not carte blanche	9	MR SANTOS: I have raised that with Mr
10	for exploration of the relationship between	10	Wagner, but I am certainly happy for him to
11	Mr McGrail and the GPF if these matters	11	address
12	were not known or reported to the GPA, nor	12	THE COMMISSIONER: Yes, okay.
13	allegations of bullying if similarly they were	13	MR WAGNER: Just to say we agree to the
14	not raised at that level. We have also	14	amended wording, as counsel for the inquiry
15	considered whether, so as to expressly curtail	15	has just set out.
16	the scope of that amendment, words should	16	THE COMMISSIONER: Excellent. Thank
17	be added along the lines of: "insofar as	17	you.
18	these practices were known to the Chief	18	MR NEISH: I agree as well, sir.
19	Minister or to the Governor at the time", but	19	THE COMMISSIONER: Excellent. Thank
20	we consider that those words would be	20	you.
21	superfluous for two reasons. The first is that	21	MR LICUDI: This is the first time I rise in
22	we have emphasised previously that, in	22	this inquiry. I act for the Federation together
23	relation to other issues, the introduction	23	with my learned friend Charles Bonfante.
24	wording to the provisional list of issues has	24	We have no issue in principle with the
25	the effect of confining the facts identified to	25	proposed wording but it does appear that the
	Page 117		Page 119
	1 age 11/		1 age 117
1	the extent relevant by the inquiry, so by way	1	first proposed amendment which starts with
1 2	the extent relevant by the inquiry, so by way of reminder the wording states: "What were	1 2	first proposed amendment which starts with the words "the difficult relationship" and
2	of reminder the wording states: "What were	2	the words "the difficult relationship" and
2 3	of reminder the wording states: "What were the relevant facts which the Commissioner	2 3	the words "the difficult relationship" and now starts with the words "any complaints"
2 3 4	of reminder the wording states: "What were the relevant facts which the Commissioner will seek to ascertain only to the extent that	2 3 4	the words "the difficult relationship" and now starts with the words "any complaints" are possibly different in substance.
2 3 4 5	of reminder the wording states: "What were the relevant facts which the Commissioner will seek to ascertain only to the extent that he considers necessary and appropriate to	2 3 4 5	the words "the difficult relationship" and now starts with the words "any complaints" are possibly different in substance. THE COMMISSIONER: It is now "the
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2 3 4 5 6 7	of reminder the wording states: "What were the relevant facts which the Commissioner will seek to ascertain only to the extent that he considers necessary and appropriate to address the matter under inquiry." The other point that I was going to make is	2 3 4 5 6 7	the words "the difficult relationship" and now starts with the words "any complaints" are possibly different in substance. THE COMMISSIONER: It is now "the complaints, if any". MR LICUDI: Yes, it is "the complaints, if any", and then it says "including as to the difficult relationship" So the difficult
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30 (Pages 117 to 120)

1	the inquiry wishes to inquire about, or only	1	reason why I do not think that this is as big a
2	the matter of the complaints, including	2	restriction as perhaps my learned friends fear
3	complaints as to the difficult relationship.	3	is that the method through which Mr Pyle
4	SIR PETER CARUANA: That was entirely	4	learned of the difficult relationship and
5	- my learned friend Mr Licudi has articulated	5	which I think is actually acknowledged in his
6	exactly the submission that I was going to	6	affidavit, is via the GPA, and so I think it is
7	make, in the sense precisely that this	7	important that we read the relevant
8	amendment actually does not achieve the	8	paragraphs just so that we can look at them in
9	objectives that my learned friend has	9	context. 23.1 says: "Mr McGrail's
10	described to the tribunal, because you are	10	management style resulted in a fractured
11	still limited to complaints. So unless they	11	almost hostile relationship between him and
12	were the subject of a complaint, any	12	the Gibraltar Police Federation, the
13	deterioration or any adverse aspect of the	13	representative body of rank and file and more
14	relationship becomes out of issue, becomes	13	junior officers in the RGP and in poor morale
15	irrelevant.	15	within the RGP." Now, we have shortened
16	Now, the original formulation was that there	16	that to "a difficult relationship". 23.2 says:
17	was both complaints and - I am not going to	17	"The resulting tensions between RGP
18	repeat what my learned friend	18	leadership and the Police Federation
19	THE COMMISSIONER: Just let me turn up	19	culminated in formal complaints from the
20	the original drafting.	20	Federation to the GPA about Mr McGrail.
20	SIR PETER CARUANA: And, of course,	20	The GPA regularly spoke at its meetings
21	this drafting problem which actually negates	21	about the allegations of bullying and
22	the purposes that my learned friend says he	22	intimidation by Mr McGrail as evidence of
23 24	wants to achieve, is exactly the reason why	23	this" and he gives evidence of an email
24 25		24	from the Federation chairman to the GPA
23	the amendment is acceptable to Mr Wagner,	23	from the redefation chairman to the OFA
	Page 121		Page 123
	0		0
1	because he has argued always, in fairness to	1	which states: "It is no secret we have had
1 2	because he has argued always, in fairness to him, that this issue should be narrowed rather	1 2	which states: "It is no secret we have had numerous issues with Mr McGrail due to his
2	him, that this issue should be narrowed rather	2	numerous issues with Mr McGrail due to his
2 3	him, that this issue should be narrowed rather than widened, and that is exactly what it	2 3	numerous issues with Mr McGrail due to his management style and lack of respect." Then
2 3 4	him, that this issue should be narrowed rather than widened, and that is exactly what it does. In other words, the question of the	2 3 4	numerous issues with Mr McGrail due to his management style and lack of respect." Then at 23.3 Mr Pyle says: "While this issue,
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2 3 4 5 6	him, that this issue should be narrowed rather than widened, and that is exactly what it does. In other words, the question of the quality of the relationship between Mr McGrail and the Federation only becomes	2 3 4 5 6	numerous issues with Mr McGrail due to his management style and lack of respect." Then at 23.3 Mr Pyle says: "While this issue, grouping it all together, was a concern of a lesser order of gravity, it nevertheless fitted
2 3 4 5 6 7	him, that this issue should be narrowed rather than widened, and that is exactly what it does. In other words, the question of the quality of the relationship between Mr McGrail and the Federation only becomes relevant to the extent that it was the subject	2 3 4 5 6 7	numerous issues with Mr McGrail due to his management style and lack of respect." Then at 23.3 Mr Pyle says: "While this issue, grouping it all together, was a concern of a lesser order of gravity, it nevertheless fitted into the pattern of behaviours by Mr McGrail
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$\begin{array}{c} 2\\ 3\\ 4\\ 5\\ 6\\ 7\\ 8\\ 9\\ 10\\ 11\\ 12\\ 13\\ 14\\ 15\\ 16\\ 17\\ 18\\ 19\\ 20\\ 21\\ 22\\ \end{array}$	him, that this issue should be narrowed rather than widened, and that is exactly what it does. In other words, the question of the quality of the relationship between Mr McGrail and the Federation only becomes relevant to the extent that it was the subject matter of a complaint. That is the effect of the language in 35 my learned friend now articulates, whereas he has explained on his feet a few moments ago and in his skeleton arguments that actually what he wanted to achieve is a duality of relevance, either a complaint or evidence about the bad relationship, but not only one if the other is also present. MR SANTOS: Just to clarify, I do not disagree with my learned friends Mr Licudi or Sir Peter Caruana. That is a proposal that I have made in response to the submissions of Mr Wagner, but the important thing to bear in mind about this is that it comes from	$\begin{array}{c} 2\\ 3\\ 4\\ 5\\ 6\\ 7\\ 8\\ 9\\ 10\\ 11\\ 12\\ 13\\ 14\\ 15\\ 16\\ 17\\ 18\\ 19\\ 20\\ 21\\ 22\\ \end{array}$	numerous issues with Mr McGrail due to his management style and lack of respect." Then at 23.3 Mr Pyle says: "While this issue, grouping it all together, was a concern of a lesser order of gravity, it nevertheless fitted into the pattern of behaviours by Mr McGrail which was already causing me concern and causing me to begin to lose confidence in him." Taking that all together, what we get is a suggestion or evidence by Mr Pyle that through his role at the GPA he became aware of the difficult relationship and the allegations of bullying and intimidation, and those two together formed the basis for his, or were part of the basis for his loss of confidence, so qualifying the introduction of the difficult relationship with reference to the complaints being made to the GPA, in my view, having read the totality of that section, does not actually reduce or exclude anything
$\begin{array}{c} 2\\ 3\\ 4\\ 5\\ 6\\ 7\\ 8\\ 9\\ 10\\ 11\\ 12\\ 13\\ 14\\ 15\\ 16\\ 17\\ 18\\ 19\\ 20\\ 21\\ 22\\ 23\\ \end{array}$	him, that this issue should be narrowed rather than widened, and that is exactly what it does. In other words, the question of the quality of the relationship between Mr McGrail and the Federation only becomes relevant to the extent that it was the subject matter of a complaint. That is the effect of the language in 35 my learned friend now articulates, whereas he has explained on his feet a few moments ago and in his skeleton arguments that actually what he wanted to achieve is a duality of relevance, either a complaint or evidence about the bad relationship, but not only one if the other is also present. MR SANTOS: Just to clarify, I do not disagree with my learned friends Mr Licudi or Sir Peter Caruana. That is a proposal that I have made in response to the submissions of Mr Wagner, but the important thing to bear in mind about this is that it comes from the Pyle affidavit, which I am trying to bring	$\begin{array}{c} 2\\ 3\\ 4\\ 5\\ 6\\ 7\\ 8\\ 9\\ 10\\ 11\\ 12\\ 13\\ 14\\ 15\\ 16\\ 17\\ 18\\ 19\\ 20\\ 21\\ 22\\ 23\\ \end{array}$	numerous issues with Mr McGrail due to his management style and lack of respect." Then at 23.3 Mr Pyle says: "While this issue, grouping it all together, was a concern of a lesser order of gravity, it nevertheless fitted into the pattern of behaviours by Mr McGrail which was already causing me concern and causing me to begin to lose confidence in him." Taking that all together, what we get is a suggestion or evidence by Mr Pyle that through his role at the GPA he became aware of the difficult relationship and the allegations of bullying and intimidation, and those two together formed the basis for his, or were part of the basis for his loss of confidence, so qualifying the introduction of the difficult relationship with reference to the complaints being made to the GPA, in my view, having read the totality of that section, does not actually reduce or exclude anything which would otherwise be concluded, but I

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25 October 2023

1	SIR PETER CARUANA: Well, it does not	1	often heard numerous anecdotal stories of
2	exclude anything that is the current language	2	bad practice and behaviours." That simply
3	of issue six. I agree with that. In other	3	could not really hold water as a basis for the
4	words, the current language of issue six,	4	loss of confidence. Even he is distancing
5	unamended, certainly allows complaints and	5	himself from it.
6	non-complaint - certainly complaints - but	6	THE COMMISSIONER: He says so.
7			MR SANTOS: So we are left with what he
	the issue now, and it is entirely really a	7	
8	matter for the inquiry what interest it wants	8	learned of through the GPA. Now, I suppose
9	to have in these issues, it is not really for us;	9	that the point could be made that there may
10	I would point out however that the evidence	10	not have been a specific complaint that
11	of Mr Pyle - and you are right in saying that	11	related to that, and to allow room for that
12	he only uses this to refer to when he started	12	perhaps may be the word needs to be
13	to have issues in his mind with Mr McGrail -	13	changed from "complaints" to "discussion"
14	is not limited to complaint - paragraph 23.4	14	with reference to the difficult relationship
15	is about him having heard similar numerous	15	only. But in my submission what the
16	anecdotal stories of bad practice and	16	evidence calls for is for it to be limited to
17	behaviour from other sources. I am not	17	anything that arose within the GPA, and that
18	making the case for the widening of issue six.	18	is an important qualification, because
19	Mr Pyle can give his evidence on when he	19	otherwise we are getting into a very wide
20	started to have issues in his mind, whether or	20	THE COMMISSIONER: That is what Mr
21	not this is an issue in the list of issues. So the	21	Wagner cautions against.
22	extent, if any, to which this remains on the	22	SIR PETER CARUANA: Sir, with respect,
23	list of issues and, if it does, in what terms is	23	if my learned friend is now going to justify
24	not a matter in which I, carrying Mr Pyle's	24	his position on the basis that Mr Pyle's
25	brief, feel that I have any stake in	25	evidence could not be correct because this
25	oner, reer that I have any stake in	25	evidence could not be contest because tins
	Page 125		Page 127
1	machinating for one outcome or the other.	1	could not have operated on his mind, then he
2	But if my learned friend Mr Santos wants to	2	does make a mistake in the amendment to the
3	achieve the things that he said in his	3	issue - one that I did not think I had. There
4	presentation of this amendment he wants to	4	is nothing in paragraph 23.2 that makes the
5	achieve, then I think it is perfectly clear that	5	evidence that he is giving ex post facto the
6	his language does not achieve it. But it is not	6	events of May 2020. The fact that he refers
7	up to me, it is up to yourself and him to	7	to, as evidence of this, an email dated June
8	decide whether they want to achieve it or not.	8	does not mean that what precedes it was not
9	MR SANTOS: I respectfully disagree,	9	occurring before that, and therefore it is not
10	because there is no suggestion in that	10	necessarily ex post facto. But if my learned
11	affidavit that there is any other method	11	friend is going to insinuate that this is
12	through which Mr Pyle became aware of	12	somehow a smoking gun in Mr Pyle's hands
12	these issues.	13	because actually none of this could possibly
13		13	
14	THE COMMISSIONER: Because it was all through complaints	14	be true because it is all ex post facto and therefore could not have operated on his
	through complaints.		therefore could not have operated on his
16	MR SANTOS: It was all through the GPA.	16	mind, then I do have an interest in this as an
17	That is what he says in his evidence. 23.4	17	issue.
18	ends with him saying: "These were rumours	18	MR SANTOS: I think it is important that I
19	and anecdotal and therefore despite some of	19	clarify. I was drawing a distinction between
20	the sources being credible, were not things	20	the content of 23.1 to 23.3, which are all
21	on which I felt it was possible to act. They	21	things he learned through the GPA and which
22	nevertheless contributed to my growing sense	22	he says were already causing him concern
23	of unease." And we took the view, having	23	and causing him to begin to lose confidence
24	read that paragraph, that actually what is	24	in him. I am accepting that at face value and
25	included in that paragraph is references to "I	25	I am not questioning it at this stage. What I
			D (00
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32 (Pages 125 to 128)

1	propose to leave outside the remit of issue	1	is talking about two different issues. One is
2	six, and the drafting is an attempt to do so, is	2	the issue of the difficult relationship and then
3	23.4 which is a reference, separate as I	3	that issue culminates in complaint or
4	interpret it, to numerous anecdotal stories of	4	complaints. But there is a slight difference in
5	bad practice which Mr Pyle fairly recognises	5	how we interpret what Mr Pyle says, but we
6	were rumours and anecdotal and therefore	6	leave it entirely in your hands, of course.
7	not things on which I felt it was possible to	7	THE COMMISSIONER: We are in danger
8	act. Given his candid recognition of that, I	8	of giving this point far too much attention. I am very happy with the amended wording.
9 10	fail to see why this inquiry should embark on	9 10	MR WAGNER: I did not just catch,
10 11	an exploration of those matters. Everything else in that section, 23, emanates from Mr	10	Commissioner, what you said.
12	Pyle's participation in the GPA and therefore	11	THE COMMISSIONER: I think that the
12	whether we term it "complaints" or	12	latest form of drafting is entirely satisfactory
14	"discussion of the GPA", that is a matter that	13	and sets out the position very clearly and
15	I am willing to explore, but ultimately it has	15	does not let in a general raft of evidence
16	to be limited to what came to him through the	16	about the difficult relationship. It is only
17	GPA.	17	insofar as it resulted in complaints made to or
18	THE COMMISSIONER: "Complaint" is	18	in the Gibraltar Police Federation of which
19	fine. "Complaint" does not mean a formal	19	Mr Pyle was aware.
20	complaint.	20	MR WAGNER: In that case I do not think I
21	MR SANTOS: Not necessarily, no.	21	need to address you at all on the point.
22	SIR PETER CARUANA: He does say	22	THE COMMISSIONER: No.
23	"culminated in complaints". Culmination is	23	MR WAGNER: Unless you want me to.
24	very different to the process. Nothing in 23.2	24	THE COMMISSIONER: No, I do not. I am
25	excludes the possibility that he was hearing	25	happy with that. Thank you very much.
	Page 129		Page 131
1	this in the pub or in his office or in the street.	1	SIR PETER CARUANA: Are we excluding
1 2	this in the pub or in his office or in the street. The fact that it culminated, he says, in formal		SIR PETER CARUANA: Are we excluding as relevant any evidence of difficulty of
	The fact that it culminated, he says, in formal	1 2 3	SIR PETER CARUANA: Are we excluding as relevant any evidence of difficulty of relationship, only a complaints arrangement?
2	The fact that it culminated, he says, in formal complaint does not mean that that is the	2	as relevant any evidence of difficulty of
2 3	The fact that it culminated, he says, in formal	2 3	as relevant any evidence of difficulty of relationship, only a complaints arrangement?
2 3 4	The fact that it culminated, he says, in formal complaint does not mean that that is the origin of his understanding and whatever else	2 3 4	as relevant any evidence of difficulty of relationship, only a complaints arrangement? THE COMMISSIONER: Sorry?
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33 (Pages 129 to 132)

Page 132

		1	
1	for the information, other than what is in	1	helpful to explore this issue with at least one
2	23.4.	2	member of the GPA other than Dr Britto
3	THE COMMISSIONER: Let us move on.	3	himself, given that he was personally heavily
4	MR SANTOS: Let us move on.	4	- heavily involved in the events, before Mr
5	MR SANTOS: Let us move to item five,	5	McGrail's retirement - shortly before
6	progress towards the main inquiry hearing.	6	McGrail's retirement. Separately, the RGP
7	There are three issues to be addressed under	7	and Mr Richardson have submitted that Mr
8	this item. First, we have witness	8	De Vincenzi should be elevated to category
9	categorisations; secondly, we have	9	one. Mr De Vincenzi attended a key meeting
10	•	10	
	provisional dates for the main inquiry	10	with the Attorney General and members of
11	hearing; and, third, we have the agreed facts	12	the RGP on the 7th of April 2020, which Mr
12	process.		Cruz has already referred to, and that is
13	Now, as to the witness list, the inquiry	13	directly relevant to issue 5.2, namely whether
14	invited the parties to make submissions on	14	the execution of the warrants was - or
15	the categorisation of witnesses, which we	15	intended execution of the warrants - was
16	covered extensively at the previous hearing.	16	contrary to an agreement or understanding
17	At paragraph 23 of our skeleton for that	17	with the AG and/or the DPP. Mr De
18	hearing, we place the witnesses into three	18	Vincenzi has given evidence of his
19	categories. Category one, being witnesses	19	recollection of that conversation, which is as
20	who we recommended will give evidence,	20	I say, squarely relevant to that issue, and
21	category two, who we recognise may need to	21	having considered that evidence we agree
22	but currently recommend should not do so,	22	that Mr - and would recommend that Mr De
23	and category three, witnesses who we	23	Vincenzi should be elevated to that category.
24	recommended should not give oral evidence.	24	So, I would invite submissions on both of
25	We - since PH4, and this was always	25	those opposing new witnesses.
	Page 133		Page 135
		i	
1	something that was to be kept under review -	1	THE COMMISSIONER · Well I do not
1	something that was to be kept under review -	1	THE COMMISSIONER: Well, I do not suppose anyone disagrees with that No
2	we have received submissions that two	2	suppose anyone disagrees with that. No.
2 3	we have received submissions that two witnesses should be elevated to category one.	2 3	suppose anyone disagrees with that. No. MR SANTOS: Very well. In that case, I
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$\begin{array}{c} 2\\ 3\\ 4\\ 5\\ 6\\ 7\\ 8\\ 9\\ 10\\ 11\\ 12\\ 13\\ 14\\ 15\\ 16\\ 17\\ 18\\ 19\\ 20\\ 21\\ 22\\ 23\\ \end{array}$	we have received submissions that two witnesses should be elevated to category one. First, the GPA have proposed that Mr Lavarello be elevated to category one, and we agree with that proposal for two reasons. First, for the reason provided by the GPA, which is that there is a conflict of evidence as to whether Mr Pyle stated that he would not support either candidate for Commissioner of Police - ie Mr McGrail or Mr Ullger at the time - although this is a fairly peripheral point we would say, we consider that it could be explored succinctly in oral evidence, and therefore would agree to doing so. And then, secondly, we consider that Mr Lavarello could provide important evidence on issue 6, which - where the key issue is whether complaints about Mr McGrail were discussed at the GPA meetings. Now, various GPA members have given evidence that no such complaints of intimidation and bullying were discussed, while - and whilst it would not be	$ \begin{array}{c} 2\\3\\4\\5\\6\\7\\8\\9\\10\\11\\12\\13\\14\\15\\16\\17\\18\\19\\20\\21\\22\\23\end{array} $	suppose anyone disagrees with that. No. MR SANTOS: Very well. In that case, I will move on to provisional dates for the main inquiry hearing. The solicitor to the Inquiry liaised with each of the core participants, as to their availability in February to March 2024, but it became clear that a number of the legal teams would not be available for a four-week hearing during that window. Accordingly, we have now proposed the window of 8th of April to the 9th of May 2024, which is also a four-week window, with allowances made - made for reading days - four reading days, including a bank holiday and - and Passover. We - we asked core participants to raise any issues that they have with those dates, and so far none have suggested that they cause difficulty. Mr McGrail's team confirmed to us last night that they were available for those dates proposed. In a moment, I will invite parties to raise any objections, but I

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1	this inquiry hearing as soon as possible. At	1	MR CRUZ: Yes, that - that is - for us that is
2	the time that the October hearing was	$\begin{vmatrix} 2 \\ 2 \end{vmatrix}$	the most material one. I will [inaudible].
3	postponed, due to the live criminal	3	THE COMMISSIONER: No, no that is -
4	investigation, preparations were already very	4	well we can accommodate problems like that
5	far advanced, and significant progress has	5	quite easily.
6	already - ought to be made since, so we	6 7	MR CRUZ: I am grateful.
7	consider that a date in the early part of '24 - 2024, is achievable. Although, obviously, I		SIR PETER CARUANA: Yes. The days are
8		8	fine. We have asked, just to - for you to bear it in mind, Julian, I have a trial that will start
9 10	have to say that that is still subject to any updates from the RGPS as to the progress of	10	
10 11	that criminal investigation, which gave rise to	10	on the 12th of May, so try to resist anyone encouraging you to - to push it forward by a
11	the postponement in the first place.	12	week, if you can
12	THE COMMISSIONER: Well we cannot	12	MR SANTOS: Noted.
13	put the inquiry off forever because of	13	THE COMMISSIONER: I think you will
14	ongoing criminal investigations, I have put	15	find that it goes quicker than people are
16	them off in - in March.	16	expecting. That is usually the result when I
17	MR SANTOS: Yes	17	try cases.
18	THE COMMISSIONER: That was plenty -	18	MR SANTOS: I think - I think we - I think
19	was plenty of time.	19	we mentioned a potential spillover, but -
20	MR SANTOS: Yes, so we would - we invite	20	anyway, we - we - I am grateful for that
21	parties to be as accommodating as possible	21	indication
22	regarding those dates, and as we stated in our	22	THE COMMISSIONER: Yes.
23	submissions, we accept that counsel may not	23	MR SANTOS: as I say, we will work
24	be available on every single day in that	24	around other commitments.
25	window, but we are willing to make	25	THE COMMISSIONER: Well, I think it is
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1	arrangements to prevent prejudice to clients	1	quite important that we - we work on the
2	of those counsel and adjust the witness sheet.	2	basis that there will not be a spillover.
3	THE COMMISSIONER: Yes, and we will -	3	MR SANTOS: Yes, yes. Turning to the
4	we will accommodate Mr Wagner over	4	agreed facts process, at PH4 there was
5	Passover.	5	agreement that it would be highly beneficial,
6	MR SANTOS: Yes. So, I would invite	6	for us to seek agreement on certain facts.
7	submissions on those dates, if anyone has	7	THE COMMISSIONER: Yes, well, many of
8	any objections.	8	these - well indeed, I think nearly all these
9	THE COMMISSIONER: Yes.	9	topics, cry out for widespread agreement.
10	MR CRUZ: Sir, thank you. There is just	10	MR SANTOS: Yes, and - and I think
11	one, that is sort of material - is material. One	11	everybody agreed, and the process was
12	of our - our witnesses, Mr Wyan, who is	12	commenced, but ultimately paused when the
13	obviously, I think, a reasonably important	13	main inquiry hearing was postponed.
14	witness on - on issue five	14	THE COMMISSIONER: Well I can
15	THE COMMISSIONER: Yes.	15	understand that entirely. Mr Wagner very
16 17	MR CRUZ: is - is not available between	16	kindly undertook - I gather the operation is
17	the 15th of April and the 10th of May. No,	17 18	work in hand, but you are making progress?
18 19	that does not necessarily mean that between the 8th of April and the 15th of April there	18	MR WAGNER: Yes. I mean, I actually
20	the 8th of April and the 15th of April, there cannot be an accommodation, but it is a	20	have a draft ready. THE COMMISSIONER: Right.
20	substantial chunk.	20	MR WAGNER: But it - but it is - it was - I
21	THE COMMISSIONER: No - no well we	21	paused work on it before- just after the
22	will deal with it before - before he goes.	22	inquiry was adjourned.
23	MR SANTOS: Yes, and we will make sure	23	THE COMMISSIONER: Well, I understand
25	that we deal with him, as and when	25	that.
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		1	
1	MR WAGNER: And it needs to be the	1	take a view as to whether it is capable of
2	later documents need to be incorporated, but	2	determination.
3	it is - I - the timetable set out by Mr Santos is	3	THE COMMISSIONER: So - so that - that
4	definitely workable from my end.	4	concludes the open business?
5	THE COMMISSIONER: Okay, that is very	5	MR SANTOS: Yes, subject to anything
6	helpful.	6	anybody wishes to say.
7	MR SANTOS: Yes. Thank you, Mr Wagner.	7	THE COMMISSIONER: Well, we have all
8	But one point which I wanted to add, which	8	set aside time today, and I would encourage
9	my learned friend Mr Neish proposed to me	9	and urge the participants to stay around, in an
10	this morning, and which I think is not a bad	10	attempt to refine and define the issues, that
11	suggestion, is that once we have been	11	we might be able to make progress with
12	through the process of Mr Wagner	12	tomorrow.
12	circulating first drafts and all CPs having the	12	MR SANTOS: Yes. Yes, well I would ask
13	opportunity to come back on those, that there	13	everybody to stay in touch, including Mr
14	should be a facilitated discussion between	14	
		1	Wagner, and I - similarly, in relation to
16 17	CPs on the issues, to try and narrow down the facts compating that the Solicitor to the	16	tomorrow's hearing, we do not have any
17	the facts - something that the Solicitor to the	17	issue with facilitating a call in order to try
18	Inquiry has already confirmed that he is	18	and narrow down matters between the
19 20	happy to organise and host - so that these	19	parties, so that tomorrow's arguments can be
20	issues can be narrowed down before the	20	dealt with focusing on the real points of
21	inquiry then starts the process of - of looking	21	disagreement.
22	at them itself. We can work that into the	22	THE COMMISSIONER: Correct, correct.
23	timetable and make proposals, probably once	23	Okay, well there is probably nothing more
24	we have Mr Wagner's drafts. So that is -	24	that I can achieve here, so might as well
25	again, I invite submissions, I - we set out a	25	adjourn.
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1	timetable in the skeleton argument, if anyone	1	MR SANTOS: Thank you sir.
2	has any issue with that then feel free to form		
3	submissions now.		
4	THE COMMISSIONER: Okay.		
5	MR SANTOS: Well, in that case, the only		
6	other point which we made in our skeleton		
7	argument was that the Delhi defendants	2	(14.28)
8	requested directions in relation to RGP		
9	evidence that was served on core participants		
10	on 13 October, and any further restriction		
11	order applications, we recommended 7		
12	December as a longstop date for any		
13	outstanding applications for restriction orders	3	(The hearing adjourned until 10 a.m. on
14	or responsive witness statements. So, we -		(The heating aujourned until 10 a.m. on
15	but then again, we anticipate that the process		
16	of - that we are going to go through		
17	tomorrow may inform that, and hopefully		
18	may shorten that process. Well that - that is		
19	the last thing that I intend to say, and the		
20	other - the only other item for today is 'any	4	Thursday, 26 October 2023)
21	other business'. We might as well take that		
22	today - nobody has given notice, but if		
23	someone wants to give notice for something		
24	that we can realistically deal with either now		
25	or tomorrow, feel free to do so, and we will		
	. ,		
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