| 1 | (Monday, 8 April 2024) | 1 | on Friday, and in the circumstances I need |
|--|--|--|---|
| 2 | THE CHAIRMAN: Well, good morning | 2 | not say any more about that. Quite how, if at |
| 3 | everyone and welcome at last to the main | 3 | all, the new Act will otherwise impact upon |
| 4 | hearing of this Inquiry. Mr Ian McGrail | 4 | the Inquiry remains to be seen, but it is |
| 5 | retired as the Commissioner of Police on 9 | 5 | important that I make abundantly clear that |
| 6 | June 2020. The sequence of events which | 6 | nothing in the new Act affects my resolve |
| 7 | led to him doing so, and whether he did so | 7 | (and indeed, my duty under the law) to find |
| 8 | voluntarily or not, gave rise to widespread | 8 | and report on the facts, which I am |
| 9 | public concern. The Governor set up a | 9 | determined to do, assisted as I am by the |
| 10 | public inquiry to examine these matters, and | 10 | small but loyal, hard working and dedicated |
| 11 | accordingly I was appointed Commissioner, | 11 | Inquiry team. The next step is to hear |
| 12 | as it then was, to inquire into "the reasons | 12 | counsel's submissions in public, which |
| 13 | and circumstances leading to Mr Ian McGrail | 13 | supplement their written submissions. The |
| 14 | ceasing to be Commissioner of Police in June | 14 | oral submissions will be transcribed and |
| 15 | 2020 by taking early retirement." The public | 15 | uploaded to the website, probably that same |
| 16 | want to know what happened; they want the | 16 | evening; the written submissions will be |
| 17 | facts. The experience of public inquiries in | 17 | uploaded to the Inquiry website as soon as |
| 18 | the United Kingdom, and indeed here in | 18 | we can effect the redactions made necessary |
| 19 | Gibraltar, gained over the last hundred years | 19 | by the late service of the Restriction Notice. |
| 20 | and more is that an independent inquiry | 20 | I recognise that inquiries are expensive, and I |
| 21 | finding the facts after a transparent and | 21 | have a duty to keep costs to the minimum |
| 22 | public examination of all the relevant | 22 | necessary to find the truth. I have therefore |
| 23 | evidence and information will help to | 23 | set strict timetables for submissions and for |
| 24 | maintain or to restore public confidence, or at | 24 | questioning of witnesses, which I will apply |
| 25 | least will be the soundest foundation for | 25 | subject to any overriding counterargument. |
| 23 | least will be the soundest foundation for | 23 | subject to any overriding counterargument. |
| | Page 1 | | Page 3 |
| | | | |
| 1 | informed public debate on the best way | 1 | We will keep regular hours: I will try to start |
| 2 | forward. All inquiries, including this one, are | 2 | at ten o'clock prompt, we will rise for lunch |
| 3 | subject to the law as enacted by Parliament. | 3 | at or about one o'clock, with a mid-morning |
| 4 | This Inquiry was set up under the | 4 | break of ten minutes or so to assist the |
| 5 | Commissions of Inquiry Act 1888; it is now | 5 | transcribers, not to allow for an extended |
| 6 | governed by the Inquiries Act 2024, by | 6 | coffee break. We will start again at about |
| 7 | which I am bound. Section 19 of the new | 7 | two o'clock and rise as convenient at about |
| 8 | Act gave the Government the power to | 8 | half past four, with another short break in the |
| 9 | impose a Restriction Notice, which they have | 9 | afternoon for the transcribers. The |
| 10 | now done. The Notice is directed at only a | 10 | proceedings are now being livestreamed by |
| 11 | relatively few documents among the many | 11 | the GBC, which is subject to a protocol |
| 12 | thousands of documents which have been | 12 | which can be read on the Inquiry website. It |
| 13 | disclosed to us, and I am confident that the | 13 | would be time-consuming to read it in its |
| 14 | Inquiry can properly proceed, since I will | 14 | entirety, but livestreaming is subject to a ten- |
| 15 | hear and consider the restricted material, but | 15 | minute time delay so that we can prevent the |
| 16 | I must now do so in private, and when | 16 | livestreaming of anything that should not |
| 17 | | | |
| | making findings upon it and when I report | 17 | have been said or which should not be |
| 18 | making findings upon it and when I report upon it I must now do so in private. That is | 17 18 | have been said or which should not be broadcast. If any information subject to the |
| 18 19 | upon it I must now do so in private. That is the consequence of the Restriction Notice | 18 19 | broadcast. If any information subject to the Restriction Notice is inadvertently revealed |
| 18 19 20 | upon it I must now do so in private. That is the consequence of the Restriction Notice made by the Government which I must | 18 19 20 | broadcast. If any information subject to the Restriction Notice is inadvertently revealed the livestream will be paused, and the public |
| 18 19 20 21 | upon it I must now do so in private. That is the consequence of the Restriction Notice made by the Government which I must follow, but I think that the number of | 18 19 20 21 | broadcast. If any information subject to the Restriction Notice is inadvertently revealed the livestream will be paused, and the public will be asked to leave the room briefly so that |
| 18 19 20 21 22 | upon it I must now do so in private. That is the consequence of the Restriction Notice made by the Government which I must follow, but I think that the number of redactions which will be necessary to the | 18 19 20 21 22 | broadcast. If any information subject to the Restriction Notice is inadvertently revealed the livestream will be paused, and the public will be asked to leave the room briefly so that I can consider how to proceed. I draw |
| 18 19 20 21 22 23 | upon it I must now do so in private. That is the consequence of the Restriction Notice made by the Government which I must follow, but I think that the number of redactions which will be necessary to the final report will be relatively few. I welcome | 18 19 20 21 22 23 | broadcast. If any information subject to the Restriction Notice is inadvertently revealed the livestream will be paused, and the public will be asked to leave the room briefly so that I can consider how to proceed. I draw attention to the prohibition of recording or |
| 18 19 20 21 22 23 24 | upon it I must now do so in private. That is the consequence of the Restriction Notice made by the Government which I must follow, but I think that the number of redactions which will be necessary to the final report will be relatively few. I welcome the minor clarification issued this morning to | 18 19 20 21 22 23 24 | broadcast. If any information subject to the Restriction Notice is inadvertently revealed the livestream will be paused, and the public will be asked to leave the room briefly so that I can consider how to proceed. I draw attention to the prohibition of recording or making onward transmission of the |
| 18 19 20 21 22 23 | upon it I must now do so in private. That is the consequence of the Restriction Notice made by the Government which I must follow, but I think that the number of redactions which will be necessary to the final report will be relatively few. I welcome | 18 19 20 21 22 23 | broadcast. If any information subject to the Restriction Notice is inadvertently revealed the livestream will be paused, and the public will be asked to leave the room briefly so that I can consider how to proceed. I draw attention to the prohibition of recording or |
| 18 19 20 21 22 23 24 | upon it I must now do so in private. That is the consequence of the Restriction Notice made by the Government which I must follow, but I think that the number of redactions which will be necessary to the final report will be relatively few. I welcome the minor clarification issued this morning to the press release issued by the Government | 18 19 20 21 22 23 24 | broadcast. If any information subject to the Restriction Notice is inadvertently revealed the livestream will be paused, and the public will be asked to leave the room briefly so that I can consider how to proceed. I draw attention to the prohibition of recording or making onward transmission of the livestream, so except as has been specifically |
| 18 19 20 21 22 23 24 | upon it I must now do so in private. That is the consequence of the Restriction Notice made by the Government which I must follow, but I think that the number of redactions which will be necessary to the final report will be relatively few. I welcome the minor clarification issued this morning to | 18 19 20 21 22 23 24 | broadcast. If any information subject to the Restriction Notice is inadvertently revealed the livestream will be paused, and the public will be asked to leave the room briefly so that I can consider how to proceed. I draw attention to the prohibition of recording or making onward transmission of the |

| 1 | authorised no one can take screenshots, still | 1 | wrote to the interim Governor, His |
|--|--|--|---|
| 2 | less to post them on social media. I should | 2 | Excellency Nick Pyle, applying for early |
| 3 | also make clear that breaches of the protocol | 3 | retirement from his post. That application |
| 4 | can be treated as a contempt of court, and | 4 | was approved later that day by Mr Pyle, and |
| 5 | deliberate breaches almost certainly will be. | 5 | you as Chairman are tasked with inquiring |
| 6 | Mobiles and other electronic devices are not | 6 | into the reasons and circumstances leading to |
| 7 | to be used in the public gallery otherwise | 7 | Mr McGrail's decision to take early |
| 8 | than with express prior permission which I | 8 | retirement and leaving his post. One might |
| 9 | have granted. For the rest of today Mr | 9 | have thought that the answer to that question |
| 10 | Santos, Counsel to the Inquiry, will outline | 10 | that you are required to inquire into was |
| 11 | some of the issues into which we shall be | 11 | simple enough, but experience has proved |
| 12 | inquiring and give a brief account of the | 12 | that it is anything but, with participants in |
| 13 | procedures we will follow. For various | 13 | this Inquiry having having fiercely different |
| 14 | reasons I have changed the order of speeches | 14 | views as to what those reasons and |
| 15 | on Tuesday and Wednesday, with the result | 15 | circumstances are. In fact, you are faced |
| 16 | that now on Wednesday morning Ms | 16 | with at least two competing accounts as to |
| 17 | Gallagher KC will give her opening oral | 17 | why Mr McGrail applied for early |
| 18 | submissions on behalf of Mr McGrail, which | 18 | retirement: one from Mr McGrail himself |
| 19 | will finish by lunchtime. In the afternoon Sir | 19 | and another from the Government Parties, the |
| 20 | Peter Caruana KC will give his opening oral | 20 | Chief Minister, the then interim Governor |
| 21 | submissions on behalf of the Government | 21 | and the Attorney General. Mr McGrail's |
| 22 | | 22 | account, in its briefest form, is that he fell |
| | Parties, which will finish by half past four. | 23 | |
| 23 | Tomorrow morning, Tuesday, there will be | 23 | victim to the abuse of government power to |
| 24 | submissions by the other core participants, | l | protect powerful figures in Gibraltar from a |
| 25 | which I aim to limit to an hour each, | 25 | criminal investigation. The interim Governor |
| | Page 5 | | Page 7 |
| | | | |
| | | | 1 1 61 1 03 51 1 1 1 3 5 |
| 1 | although they may think that some need not | 1 | and the Chief Minister's account is that Mr |
| 2 | speak for that length of time to supplement | 2 | McGrail chose to retire knowing that the |
| 2 3 | speak for that length of time to supplement their written submissions; what matters is | 2 3 | McGrail chose to retire knowing that the Governor was about to call for his |
| 2 3 4 | speak for that length of time to supplement their written submissions; what matters is that those submissions finish within the day. | 2 3 4 | McGrail chose to retire knowing that the Governor was about to call for his resignation if he did not do so, because Mr |
| 2 3 4 5 | speak for that length of time to supplement their written submissions; what matters is that those submissions finish within the day. We start hearing the evidence on Thursday at | 2 3 4 5 | McGrail chose to retire knowing that the Governor was about to call for his resignation if he did not do so, because Mr McGrail had lost the confidence of both the |
| 2 3 4 5 6 | speak for that length of time to supplement their written submissions; what matters is that those submissions finish within the day. We start hearing the evidence on Thursday at ten o'clock; we have published a timetable of | 2 3 4 5 6 | McGrail chose to retire knowing that the Governor was about to call for his resignation if he did not do so, because Mr McGrail had lost the confidence of both the interim Governor and the Chief Minister and |
| 2 3 4 5 6 7 | speak for that length of time to supplement their written submissions; what matters is that those submissions finish within the day. We start hearing the evidence on Thursday at ten o'clock; we have published a timetable of the witnesses which I will keep under review. | 2 3 4 5 6 7 | McGrail chose to retire knowing that the Governor was about to call for his resignation if he did not do so, because Mr McGrail had lost the confidence of both the interim Governor and the Chief Minister and therefore could not realistically continue in |
| 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 | speak for that length of time to supplement their written submissions; what matters is that those submissions finish within the day. We start hearing the evidence on Thursday at ten o'clock; we have published a timetable of the witnesses which I will keep under review. We will not sit on various public holidays, | 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 | McGrail chose to retire knowing that the Governor was about to call for his resignation if he did not do so, because Mr McGrail had lost the confidence of both the interim Governor and the Chief Minister and therefore could not realistically continue in his position. The Attorney General supports |
| 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 | speak for that length of time to supplement their written submissions; what matters is that those submissions finish within the day. We start hearing the evidence on Thursday at ten o'clock; we have published a timetable of the witnesses which I will keep under review. We will not sit on various public holidays, nor on some days of religious observance, all | 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 | McGrail chose to retire knowing that the Governor was about to call for his resignation if he did not do so, because Mr McGrail had lost the confidence of both the interim Governor and the Chief Minister and therefore could not realistically continue in his position. The Attorney General supports that case, and others, for example the |
| 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 | speak for that length of time to supplement their written submissions; what matters is that those submissions finish within the day. We start hearing the evidence on Thursday at ten o'clock; we have published a timetable of the witnesses which I will keep under review. We will not sit on various public holidays, nor on some days of religious observance, all of which are set out on the Inquiry website. | 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 | McGrail chose to retire knowing that the Governor was about to call for his resignation if he did not do so, because Mr McGrail had lost the confidence of both the interim Governor and the Chief Minister and therefore could not realistically continue in his position. The Attorney General supports that case, and others, for example the Gibraltar Police Authority (to whom I will |
| 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 | speak for that length of time to supplement their written submissions; what matters is that those submissions finish within the day. We start hearing the evidence on Thursday at ten o'clock; we have published a timetable of the witnesses which I will keep under review. We will not sit on various public holidays, nor on some days of religious observance, all of which are set out on the Inquiry website. After the evidence finishes on Thurday 9 | 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 | McGrail chose to retire knowing that the Governor was about to call for his resignation if he did not do so, because Mr McGrail had lost the confidence of both the interim Governor and the Chief Minister and therefore could not realistically continue in his position. The Attorney General supports that case, and others, for example the Gibraltar Police Authority (to whom I will refer as the GPA), or the Royal Gibraltar |
| 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 | speak for that length of time to supplement their written submissions; what matters is that those submissions finish within the day. We start hearing the evidence on Thursday at ten o'clock; we have published a timetable of the witnesses which I will keep under review. We will not sit on various public holidays, nor on some days of religious observance, all of which are set out on the Inquiry website. After the evidence finishes on Thurday 9 May we will adjourn to allow the parties to | 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 | McGrail chose to retire knowing that the Governor was about to call for his resignation if he did not do so, because Mr McGrail had lost the confidence of both the interim Governor and the Chief Minister and therefore could not realistically continue in his position. The Attorney General supports that case, and others, for example the Gibraltar Police Authority (to whom I will refer as the GPA), or the Royal Gibraltar Police, do not advance a case, so to speak, as |
| 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 | speak for that length of time to supplement their written submissions; what matters is that those submissions finish within the day. We start hearing the evidence on Thursday at ten o'clock; we have published a timetable of the witnesses which I will keep under review. We will not sit on various public holidays, nor on some days of religious observance, all of which are set out on the Inquiry website. After the evidence finishes on Thurday 9 May we will adjourn to allow the parties to produce their written final submissions. We | 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 | McGrail chose to retire knowing that the Governor was about to call for his resignation if he did not do so, because Mr McGrail had lost the confidence of both the interim Governor and the Chief Minister and therefore could not realistically continue in his position. The Attorney General supports that case, and others, for example the Gibraltar Police Authority (to whom I will refer as the GPA), or the Royal Gibraltar Police, do not advance a case, so to speak, as to why Mr McGrail retired, but nevertheless |
| 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 | speak for that length of time to supplement their written submissions; what matters is that those submissions finish within the day. We start hearing the evidence on Thursday at ten o'clock; we have published a timetable of the witnesses which I will keep under review. We will not sit on various public holidays, nor on some days of religious observance, all of which are set out on the Inquiry website. After the evidence finishes on Thurday 9 May we will adjourn to allow the parties to produce their written final submissions. We will have another short hearing on 25 and 26 | 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 | McGrail chose to retire knowing that the Governor was about to call for his resignation if he did not do so, because Mr McGrail had lost the confidence of both the interim Governor and the Chief Minister and therefore could not realistically continue in his position. The Attorney General supports that case, and others, for example the Gibraltar Police Authority (to whom I will refer as the GPA), or the Royal Gibraltar Police, do not advance a case, so to speak, as to why Mr McGrail retired, but nevertheless were involved in the final exchanges and |
| 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 | speak for that length of time to supplement their written submissions; what matters is that those submissions finish within the day. We start hearing the evidence on Thursday at ten o'clock; we have published a timetable of the witnesses which I will keep under review. We will not sit on various public holidays, nor on some days of religious observance, all of which are set out on the Inquiry website. After the evidence finishes on Thurday 9 May we will adjourn to allow the parties to produce their written final submissions. We will have another short hearing on 25 and 26 June for the parties' final oral submissions; I | 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 | McGrail chose to retire knowing that the Governor was about to call for his resignation if he did not do so, because Mr McGrail had lost the confidence of both the interim Governor and the Chief Minister and therefore could not realistically continue in his position. The Attorney General supports that case, and others, for example the Gibraltar Police Authority (to whom I will refer as the GPA), or the Royal Gibraltar Police, do not advance a case, so to speak, as to why Mr McGrail retired, but nevertheless were involved in the final exchanges and therefore have relevant evidence and |
| 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 | speak for that length of time to supplement their written submissions; what matters is that those submissions finish within the day. We start hearing the evidence on Thursday at ten o'clock; we have published a timetable of the witnesses which I will keep under review. We will not sit on various public holidays, nor on some days of religious observance, all of which are set out on the Inquiry website. After the evidence finishes on Thurday 9 May we will adjourn to allow the parties to produce their written final submissions. We will have another short hearing on 25 and 26 June for the parties' final oral submissions; I regret that although we have tried to do so we | 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 | McGrail chose to retire knowing that the Governor was about to call for his resignation if he did not do so, because Mr McGrail had lost the confidence of both the interim Governor and the Chief Minister and therefore could not realistically continue in his position. The Attorney General supports that case, and others, for example the Gibraltar Police Authority (to whom I will refer as the GPA), or the Royal Gibraltar Police, do not advance a case, so to speak, as to why Mr McGrail retired, but nevertheless were involved in the final exchanges and therefore have relevant evidence and documents to provide to this Inquiry. This |
| 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 | speak for that length of time to supplement their written submissions; what matters is that those submissions finish within the day. We start hearing the evidence on Thursday at ten o'clock; we have published a timetable of the witnesses which I will keep under review. We will not sit on various public holidays, nor on some days of religious observance, all of which are set out on the Inquiry website. After the evidence finishes on Thurday 9 May we will adjourn to allow the parties to produce their written final submissions. We will have another short hearing on 25 and 26 June for the parties' final oral submissions; I regret that although we have tried to do so we simply have not been able to find a date | 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 | McGrail chose to retire knowing that the Governor was about to call for his resignation if he did not do so, because Mr McGrail had lost the confidence of both the interim Governor and the Chief Minister and therefore could not realistically continue in his position. The Attorney General supports that case, and others, for example the Gibraltar Police Authority (to whom I will refer as the GPA), or the Royal Gibraltar Police, do not advance a case, so to speak, as to why Mr McGrail retired, but nevertheless were involved in the final exchanges and therefore have relevant evidence and documents to provide to this Inquiry. This Inquiry, commissioned by the Government |
| 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 | speak for that length of time to supplement their written submissions; what matters is that those submissions finish within the day. We start hearing the evidence on Thursday at ten o'clock; we have published a timetable of the witnesses which I will keep under review. We will not sit on various public holidays, nor on some days of religious observance, all of which are set out on the Inquiry website. After the evidence finishes on Thurday 9 May we will adjourn to allow the parties to produce their written final submissions. We will have another short hearing on 25 and 26 June for the parties' final oral submissions; I regret that although we have tried to do so we simply have not been able to find a date convenient for everyone. Those are my short | 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 | McGrail chose to retire knowing that the Governor was about to call for his resignation if he did not do so, because Mr McGrail had lost the confidence of both the interim Governor and the Chief Minister and therefore could not realistically continue in his position. The Attorney General supports that case, and others, for example the Gibraltar Police Authority (to whom I will refer as the GPA), or the Royal Gibraltar Police, do not advance a case, so to speak, as to why Mr McGrail retired, but nevertheless were involved in the final exchanges and therefore have relevant evidence and documents to provide to this Inquiry. This Inquiry, commissioned by the Government on 4 February 2022, was commissioned |
| 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 | speak for that length of time to supplement their written submissions; what matters is that those submissions finish within the day. We start hearing the evidence on Thursday at ten o'clock; we have published a timetable of the witnesses which I will keep under review. We will not sit on various public holidays, nor on some days of religious observance, all of which are set out on the Inquiry website. After the evidence finishes on Thurday 9 May we will adjourn to allow the parties to produce their written final submissions. We will have another short hearing on 25 and 26 June for the parties' final oral submissions; I regret that although we have tried to do so we simply have not been able to find a date convenient for everyone. Those are my short introductory remarks, and I will now hand | 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 | McGrail chose to retire knowing that the Governor was about to call for his resignation if he did not do so, because Mr McGrail had lost the confidence of both the interim Governor and the Chief Minister and therefore could not realistically continue in his position. The Attorney General supports that case, and others, for example the Gibraltar Police Authority (to whom I will refer as the GPA), or the Royal Gibraltar Police, do not advance a case, so to speak, as to why Mr McGrail retired, but nevertheless were involved in the final exchanges and therefore have relevant evidence and documents to provide to this Inquiry. This Inquiry, commissioned by the Government on 4 February 2022, was commissioned under Section 3 of the Commissions of |
| 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 | speak for that length of time to supplement their written submissions; what matters is that those submissions finish within the day. We start hearing the evidence on Thursday at ten o'clock; we have published a timetable of the witnesses which I will keep under review. We will not sit on various public holidays, nor on some days of religious observance, all of which are set out on the Inquiry website. After the evidence finishes on Thurday 9 May we will adjourn to allow the parties to produce their written final submissions. We will have another short hearing on 25 and 26 June for the parties' final oral submissions; I regret that although we have tried to do so we simply have not been able to find a date convenient for everyone. Those are my short introductory remarks, and I will now hand over to Mr Santos, Counsel to the Inquiry, to | 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 | McGrail chose to retire knowing that the Governor was about to call for his resignation if he did not do so, because Mr McGrail had lost the confidence of both the interim Governor and the Chief Minister and therefore could not realistically continue in his position. The Attorney General supports that case, and others, for example the Gibraltar Police Authority (to whom I will refer as the GPA), or the Royal Gibraltar Police, do not advance a case, so to speak, as to why Mr McGrail retired, but nevertheless were involved in the final exchanges and therefore have relevant evidence and documents to provide to this Inquiry. This Inquiry, commissioned by the Government on 4 February 2022, was commissioned under Section 3 of the Commissions of Inquiry Act 1888, and according to the legal |
| 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 | speak for that length of time to supplement their written submissions; what matters is that those submissions finish within the day. We start hearing the evidence on Thursday at ten o'clock; we have published a timetable of the witnesses which I will keep under review. We will not sit on various public holidays, nor on some days of religious observance, all of which are set out on the Inquiry website. After the evidence finishes on Thurday 9 May we will adjourn to allow the parties to produce their written final submissions. We will have another short hearing on 25 and 26 June for the parties' final oral submissions; I regret that although we have tried to do so we simply have not been able to find a date convenient for everyone. Those are my short introductory remarks, and I will now hand over to Mr Santos, Counsel to the Inquiry, to introduce some of the issues into which we | 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 | McGrail chose to retire knowing that the Governor was about to call for his resignation if he did not do so, because Mr McGrail had lost the confidence of both the interim Governor and the Chief Minister and therefore could not realistically continue in his position. The Attorney General supports that case, and others, for example the Gibraltar Police Authority (to whom I will refer as the GPA), or the Royal Gibraltar Police, do not advance a case, so to speak, as to why Mr McGrail retired, but nevertheless were involved in the final exchanges and therefore have relevant evidence and documents to provide to this Inquiry. This Inquiry, commissioned by the Government on 4 February 2022, was commissioned under Section 3 of the Commissions of Inquiry Act 1888, and according to the legal notice commissioning the Inquiry you were |
| 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 | speak for that length of time to supplement their written submissions; what matters is that those submissions finish within the day. We start hearing the evidence on Thursday at ten o'clock; we have published a timetable of the witnesses which I will keep under review. We will not sit on various public holidays, nor on some days of religious observance, all of which are set out on the Inquiry website. After the evidence finishes on Thurday 9 May we will adjourn to allow the parties to produce their written final submissions. We will have another short hearing on 25 and 26 June for the parties' final oral submissions; I regret that although we have tried to do so we simply have not been able to find a date convenient for everyone. Those are my short introductory remarks, and I will now hand over to Mr Santos, Counsel to the Inquiry, to introduce some of the issues into which we will inquire. Yes, thank you. | 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 | McGrail chose to retire knowing that the Governor was about to call for his resignation if he did not do so, because Mr McGrail had lost the confidence of both the interim Governor and the Chief Minister and therefore could not realistically continue in his position. The Attorney General supports that case, and others, for example the Gibraltar Police Authority (to whom I will refer as the GPA), or the Royal Gibraltar Police, do not advance a case, so to speak, as to why Mr McGrail retired, but nevertheless were involved in the final exchanges and therefore have relevant evidence and documents to provide to this Inquiry. This Inquiry, commissioned by the Government on 4 February 2022, was commissioned under Section 3 of the Commissions of Inquiry Act 1888, and according to the legal notice commissioning the Inquiry you were appointed to inquire, as I say, and as you |
| 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 | speak for that length of time to supplement their written submissions; what matters is that those submissions finish within the day. We start hearing the evidence on Thursday at ten o'clock; we have published a timetable of the witnesses which I will keep under review. We will not sit on various public holidays, nor on some days of religious observance, all of which are set out on the Inquiry website. After the evidence finishes on Thurday 9 May we will adjourn to allow the parties to produce their written final submissions. We will have another short hearing on 25 and 26 June for the parties' final oral submissions; I regret that although we have tried to do so we simply have not been able to find a date convenient for everyone. Those are my short introductory remarks, and I will now hand over to Mr Santos, Counsel to the Inquiry, to introduce some of the issues into which we will inquire. Yes, thank you. MR SANTOS: Thank you, sir. Good | 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 | McGrail chose to retire knowing that the Governor was about to call for his resignation if he did not do so, because Mr McGrail had lost the confidence of both the interim Governor and the Chief Minister and therefore could not realistically continue in his position. The Attorney General supports that case, and others, for example the Gibraltar Police Authority (to whom I will refer as the GPA), or the Royal Gibraltar Police, do not advance a case, so to speak, as to why Mr McGrail retired, but nevertheless were involved in the final exchanges and therefore have relevant evidence and documents to provide to this Inquiry. This Inquiry, commissioned by the Government on 4 February 2022, was commissioned under Section 3 of the Commissions of Inquiry Act 1888, and according to the legal notice commissioning the Inquiry you were appointed to inquire, as I say, and as you shall in in your absolute discretion consider |
| 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24 | speak for that length of time to supplement their written submissions; what matters is that those submissions finish within the day. We start hearing the evidence on Thursday at ten o'clock; we have published a timetable of the witnesses which I will keep under review. We will not sit on various public holidays, nor on some days of religious observance, all of which are set out on the Inquiry website. After the evidence finishes on Thurday 9 May we will adjourn to allow the parties to produce their written final submissions. We will have another short hearing on 25 and 26 June for the parties' final oral submissions; I regret that although we have tried to do so we simply have not been able to find a date convenient for everyone. Those are my short introductory remarks, and I will now hand over to Mr Santos, Counsel to the Inquiry, to introduce some of the issues into which we will inquire. Yes, thank you. MR SANTOS: Thank you, sir. Good morning. On Tuesday 9 June 2020 the | 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24 | McGrail chose to retire knowing that the Governor was about to call for his resignation if he did not do so, because Mr McGrail had lost the confidence of both the interim Governor and the Chief Minister and therefore could not realistically continue in his position. The Attorney General supports that case, and others, for example the Gibraltar Police Authority (to whom I will refer as the GPA), or the Royal Gibraltar Police, do not advance a case, so to speak, as to why Mr McGrail retired, but nevertheless were involved in the final exchanges and therefore have relevant evidence and documents to provide to this Inquiry. This Inquiry, commissioned by the Government on 4 February 2022, was commissioned under Section 3 of the Commissions of Inquiry Act 1888, and according to the legal notice commissioning the Inquiry you were appointed to inquire, as I say, and as you shall in in your absolute discretion consider appropriate, "into the reasons and |
| 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 | speak for that length of time to supplement their written submissions; what matters is that those submissions finish within the day. We start hearing the evidence on Thursday at ten o'clock; we have published a timetable of the witnesses which I will keep under review. We will not sit on various public holidays, nor on some days of religious observance, all of which are set out on the Inquiry website. After the evidence finishes on Thurday 9 May we will adjourn to allow the parties to produce their written final submissions. We will have another short hearing on 25 and 26 June for the parties' final oral submissions; I regret that although we have tried to do so we simply have not been able to find a date convenient for everyone. Those are my short introductory remarks, and I will now hand over to Mr Santos, Counsel to the Inquiry, to introduce some of the issues into which we will inquire. Yes, thank you. MR SANTOS: Thank you, sir. Good | 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 | McGrail chose to retire knowing that the Governor was about to call for his resignation if he did not do so, because Mr McGrail had lost the confidence of both the interim Governor and the Chief Minister and therefore could not realistically continue in his position. The Attorney General supports that case, and others, for example the Gibraltar Police Authority (to whom I will refer as the GPA), or the Royal Gibraltar Police, do not advance a case, so to speak, as to why Mr McGrail retired, but nevertheless were involved in the final exchanges and therefore have relevant evidence and documents to provide to this Inquiry. This Inquiry, commissioned by the Government on 4 February 2022, was commissioned under Section 3 of the Commissions of Inquiry Act 1888, and according to the legal notice commissioning the Inquiry you were appointed to inquire, as I say, and as you shall in in your absolute discretion consider |
| 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24 | speak for that length of time to supplement their written submissions; what matters is that those submissions finish within the day. We start hearing the evidence on Thursday at ten o'clock; we have published a timetable of the witnesses which I will keep under review. We will not sit on various public holidays, nor on some days of religious observance, all of which are set out on the Inquiry website. After the evidence finishes on Thurday 9 May we will adjourn to allow the parties to produce their written final submissions. We will have another short hearing on 25 and 26 June for the parties' final oral submissions; I regret that although we have tried to do so we simply have not been able to find a date convenient for everyone. Those are my short introductory remarks, and I will now hand over to Mr Santos, Counsel to the Inquiry, to introduce some of the issues into which we will inquire. Yes, thank you. MR SANTOS: Thank you, sir. Good morning. On Tuesday 9 June 2020 the | 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24 | McGrail chose to retire knowing that the Governor was about to call for his resignation if he did not do so, because Mr McGrail had lost the confidence of both the interim Governor and the Chief Minister and therefore could not realistically continue in his position. The Attorney General supports that case, and others, for example the Gibraltar Police Authority (to whom I will refer as the GPA), or the Royal Gibraltar Police, do not advance a case, so to speak, as to why Mr McGrail retired, but nevertheless were involved in the final exchanges and therefore have relevant evidence and documents to provide to this Inquiry. This Inquiry, commissioned by the Government on 4 February 2022, was commissioned under Section 3 of the Commissions of Inquiry Act 1888, and according to the legal notice commissioning the Inquiry you were appointed to inquire, as I say, and as you shall in in your absolute discretion consider appropriate, "into the reasons and |

| 1 | ceasing to be Commissioner of Police in June | 1 | requiring those involved to give explanations |
|--|---|--|--|
| 2 | 2020 by taking early retirement." Those are | 2 | for their actions, their reasons for acting, and |
| 3 | what we refer to as the Inquiry's "terms of | 3 | if necessary identifying wrongdoing or |
| 4 | reference", and your task is to ascertain the | 4 | culpability. Also, restoring public confidence |
| 5 | facts relating to those terms of reference and | 5 | or allaying public disquiet following an |
| 6 | report to the Government on them. For the | 6 | event. This carries with it an element of |
| 7 | past 26 months this Inquiry team has | 7 | catharsis for the community through the |
| 8 | contacted all persons and bodies involved in | 8 | public ventilation and investigation of the |
| 9 | that process, and sought their accounts and | 9 | allegations that are made. There is no |
| 10 | any documents they hold which might shed | 10 | question that the past few weeks and months |
| 11 | light on the process. Now, in this opening | 11 | have been painful for Gibraltar, as this matter |
| 12 | statement I intend to cover three main topics. | 12 | has been the subject of increasingly frenzied |
| 13 | First, for the benefit of the public here today | 13 | comment in the press and social media, and it |
| 14 | and watching online or following in local | 14 | is time to finally ventilate these issues in a |
| 15 | news over the coming weeks, I intend to give | 15 | fair and open process, so that the truth may |
| 16 | a brief overview about what an inquiry | 16 | be determined and the public informed once |
| 17 | actually is: what the purpose of an inquiry is, | 17 | and for all. Finally, it is hoped that this will |
| 18 | what its process entails, and perhaps just as | 18 | serve the purpose, where appropriate, of |
| 19 | importantly what an inquiry is not. Second, I | 19 | learning lessons and making |
| 20 | will give a brief summary of the inquiry | 20 | recommendations. Turning to what this |
| 21 | process to date, and third (and this is going to | 21 | Inquiry is not: it is definitely not a criminal |
| 22 | be the bulk of this opening statement) I will | 22 | or a civil trial. This is an inquisitorial, not an |
| 23 | introduce the issues that we will be | 23 | adversarial, process. And, under Section 4 of |
| 24 | considering over the new five weeks. So, the | 24 | the Inquiries Act 2024 you are not to rule on, |
| 25 | first part of this statement is to explain what | 25 | and have no power to determine as |
| 23 | inst part of this statement is to explain what | 23 | and have no power to determine as |
| | Page 9 | | Page 11 |
| 1 | on inquiry is. There has been a good heavy of | 1 | Chairman, any person's civil or criminal |
| 1 2 | an inquiry is. There has been a cacophony of public comment in recent days and weeks, so | | liability. But, the Act also clarifies that you |
| 3 | I think it it helpful to provide an insight into | 2 3 | should not be inhibited, in finding the facts |
| 4 | what the purpose of this process is. There is | 4 | and any recommendations you choose to |
| 5 | a very helpful quote in the first sentence of | 5 | make, by a likelihood of liability being |
| 6 | Jason Beer KC's extremely helpful book on | 6 | inferred from those. So, just to make it |
| 7 | public inquiries, which I regret to say has | 7 | abundantly clear: there is no possibility of |
| 8 | lived mostly on my bedside table for the past | 8 | this Inquiry determining that anyone has |
| 9 | two years. Stephen Sedley QC, as he then | 9 | acted criminally, or that anybody has |
| 10 | was, described an inquiry as "the organising | 10 | committed a civil wrong. Whether that can |
| 11 | of controversy into a form more catholic than | 11 | be inferred is a different matter and should |
| 12 | litigation but less anarchic than street | 12 | not stop you in reporting the facts. Similarly, |
| 13 | fighting". So, one important aim of this | 13 | you as Chairman have no powers to issue |
| | process is to introduce some order and some | 14 | remedies or sanctions, or to commence |
| 14 15 | structure to addressing this issue of public | 15 | proceedings on the back of your factual |
| 16 | siructure to addressing this issue of public | | |
| 10 | importance and to prevent a trial by madia | 1.6 | findings: the Inquiry's natural anding is when |
| | importance, and to prevent a trial by media. | 16 17 | findings; the Inquiry's natural ending is when |
| 17 | To allow all involved to have their say, and | 17 | your report is filed. It is worth saying |
| 17 18 | To allow all involved to have their say, and for all the evidence and documents received | 17 18 | your report is filed. It is worth saying something, as well, about the roles of the |
| 17 18 19 | To allow all involved to have their say, and for all the evidence and documents received to be distilled so that you, as Chairman, may | 17 18 19 | your report is filed. It is worth saying something, as well, about the roles of the Inquiry team. First, we have the Inquiry |
| 17 18 19 20 | To allow all involved to have their say, and for all the evidence and documents received to be distilled so that you, as Chairman, may issue your report setting out the relevant facts | 17 18 19 20 | your report is filed. It is worth saying something, as well, about the roles of the Inquiry team. First, we have the Inquiry Secretary, Maurice Turnock, who has been in |
| 17 18 19 20 21 | To allow all involved to have their say, and for all the evidence and documents received to be distilled so that you, as Chairman, may issue your report setting out the relevant facts as you find them. Because, the function of | 17 18 19 20 21 | your report is filed. It is worth saying something, as well, about the roles of the Inquiry team. First, we have the Inquiry Secretary, Maurice Turnock, who has been in charge of the day-to-day management of the |
| 17 18 19 20 21 22 | To allow all involved to have their say, and for all the evidence and documents received to be distilled so that you, as Chairman, may issue your report setting out the relevant facts as you find them. Because, the function of an inquiry is just that: to establish the facts | 17 18 19 20 21 22 | your report is filed. It is worth saying something, as well, about the roles of the Inquiry team. First, we have the Inquiry Secretary, Maurice Turnock, who has been in charge of the day-to-day management of the Inquiry's logistics and administration, as well |
| 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 | To allow all involved to have their say, and for all the evidence and documents received to be distilled so that you, as Chairman, may issue your report setting out the relevant facts as you find them. Because, the function of an inquiry is just that: to establish the facts and provide a full account of what happened. | 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 | your report is filed. It is worth saying something, as well, about the roles of the Inquiry team. First, we have the Inquiry Secretary, Maurice Turnock, who has been in charge of the day-to-day management of the Inquiry's logistics and administration, as well as managing Inquiry finances. We also have |
| 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24 | To allow all involved to have their say, and for all the evidence and documents received to be distilled so that you, as Chairman, may issue your report setting out the relevant facts as you find them. Because, the function of an inquiry is just that: to establish the facts and provide a full account of what happened. By doing so, it is hoped it will also serve | 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24 | your report is filed. It is worth saying something, as well, about the roles of the Inquiry team. First, we have the Inquiry Secretary, Maurice Turnock, who has been in charge of the day-to-day management of the Inquiry's logistics and administration, as well as managing Inquiry finances. We also have the Solicitor to the Inquiry, Charles Simpson |
| 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 | To allow all involved to have their say, and for all the evidence and documents received to be distilled so that you, as Chairman, may issue your report setting out the relevant facts as you find them. Because, the function of an inquiry is just that: to establish the facts and provide a full account of what happened. | 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 | your report is filed. It is worth saying something, as well, about the roles of the Inquiry team. First, we have the Inquiry Secretary, Maurice Turnock, who has been in charge of the day-to-day management of the Inquiry's logistics and administration, as well as managing Inquiry finances. We also have |
| 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24 | To allow all involved to have their say, and for all the evidence and documents received to be distilled so that you, as Chairman, may issue your report setting out the relevant facts as you find them. Because, the function of an inquiry is just that: to establish the facts and provide a full account of what happened. By doing so, it is hoped it will also serve | 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24 | your report is filed. It is worth saying something, as well, about the roles of the Inquiry team. First, we have the Inquiry Secretary, Maurice Turnock, who has been in charge of the day-to-day management of the Inquiry's logistics and administration, as well as managing Inquiry finances. We also have the Solicitor to the Inquiry, Charles Simpson |

| 1 | Sebastian Triay and Rupert Moffatt. As | 1 | documents and allegations, and where |
|--|---|---|--|
| 2 | Solicitor to the Inquiry, Mr Simpson has had | 2 | relevant to explain their actions and |
| 3 | overall control over several of the Inquiry's | 3 | decisions. But, where I do challenge a |
| 4 | important functions, including evidence | 4 | witness firmly that should not be taken to |
| 5 | gathering and organisation of that evidence. | 5 | mean that I necessarily disagree with their |
| 6 | For example, sending requests for evidence | 6 | case or favour another witness or |
| 7 | to witnesses, conducting a very large | 7 | participant's case. Turning to the Inquiry |
| 8 | disclosure exercise, producing the electronic | 8 | process to date. I have already mentioned the |
| 9 | documents platform and preparing the | 9 | phrase "core participants" a couple of times, |
| 10 | enquiry bundles. He has also managed the | 10 | and I should explain for the benefit of the |
| 11 | Inquiry's communications with core | 11 | public that a core participant is a person, |
| 12 | participants and witnesses, has managed the | 12 | organisation or other entity with a significant |
| 13 | Inquiry' policies, assessed core participants' | 13 | interest in the subject matter of the Inquiry, |
| 14 | legal expenses and managed the Inquiry | 14 | and who has been designated as a core |
| 15 | hearings. Finally, we have my own role as | 15 | participant in accordance with the Inquiry's |
| 16 | Counsel to the Inquiry, in which I am assisted | 16 | core participants policy. They enjoy |
| 17 | by my brilliant and tireless junior, Hope | 17 | participatory rights, and are for example |
| 18 | Williams. Our role is to assist you as | 18 | entitled to receive disclosure of evidence and |
| 19 | Chairman in establishing the facts in a fair | 19 | documents, make opening and closing |
| 20 | and orderly manner, including by preparing | 20 | statements at this main Inquiry hearing, in |
| 21 | written and oral submissions for hearings, | 21 | some cases question witnesses, and in other |
| 22 | including the preliminary hearings and this | 22 | cases either apply for permission to question |
| 23 | main hearing; questioning witnesses at this | 23 | witnesses or submit questions to the Counsel |
| 24 | hearing, and providing legal and other advice | 24 | for the Inquiry team. The Inquiry could not |
| 25 | where required in order to assist you with | 25 | force anybody to be a core participant; they |
| 23 | where required in order to assist you with | 25 | force anybody to be a core participant, mey |
| | Page 13 | | Page 15 |
| | | . | |
| 1 | your decision-making. I want to make a | 1 | needed to apply for that status, and then you |
| 2 | couple of things clear about my role, though. | 2 | as Chairman would consider the factors in |
| 3 | First and most importantly: unless I indicate | 3 | paragraph five of the core participants policy |
| 4 | otherwise, any submissions I make and any | 4 | when determining that application. There are |
| 5 | questions I ask, I ask as Counsel to the | 5 | eleven core participants at this Inquiry: the |
| 6 | Inquiry, and reflect my own position and not | 6 | former Commissioner of Police himself, Mr |
| 7 | yours as Chairman. And, second, my role as | 7 | McGrail; the interim Governor at the time, |
| 8 | Counsel to the Inquiry is different to the role | | MARIADA A CUICACIA ELI |
| | 0 11 11 11 | 8 | Mr Nick Pyle; the Chief Minister, Fabian |
| 9 | of counsel in court proceedings; I have | 9 | Picardo KC; the Attorney General, Michael |
| 10 | already said this is an inquisitorial not an | 9 10 | Picardo KC; the Attorney General, Michael Llamas KC; the Gibraltar Police Authority, |
| 10 11 | already said this is an inquisitorial not an adversarial process, and it is not my role to | 9 10 11 | Picardo KC; the Attorney General, Michael Llamas KC; the Gibraltar Police Authority, the Royal Gibraltar Police, former |
| 10 11 12 | already said this is an inquisitorial not an adversarial process, and it is not my role to advance the case for anyone. My role is to | 9 10 11 12 | Picardo KC; the Attorney General, Michael Llamas KC; the Gibraltar Police Authority, the Royal Gibraltar Police, former Superintendent Paul Richardson, the |
| 10 11 12 13 | already said this is an inquisitorial not an adversarial process, and it is not my role to advance the case for anyone. My role is to assist the Inquiry in getting to the truth, and I | 9 10 11 12 13 | Picardo KC; the Attorney General, Michael Llamas KC; the Gibraltar Police Authority, the Royal Gibraltar Police, former Superintendent Paul Richardson, the Gibraltar Police Federation and the three |
| 10 11 12 13 14 | already said this is an inquisitorial not an adversarial process, and it is not my role to advance the case for anyone. My role is to assist the Inquiry in getting to the truth, and I will maintain neutrality; I will not make | 9 10 11 12 13 14 | Picardo KC; the Attorney General, Michael Llamas KC; the Gibraltar Police Authority, the Royal Gibraltar Police, former Superintendent Paul Richardson, the Gibraltar Police Federation and the three individuals we refer to as the Operation Delhi |
| 10 11 12 13 14 15 | already said this is an inquisitorial not an adversarial process, and it is not my role to advance the case for anyone. My role is to assist the Inquiry in getting to the truth, and I will maintain neutrality; I will not make submissions in the way that others might do | 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 | Picardo KC; the Attorney General, Michael Llamas KC; the Gibraltar Police Authority, the Royal Gibraltar Police, former Superintendent Paul Richardson, the Gibraltar Police Federation and the three individuals we refer to as the Operation Delhi defendants (Sir Thomas Cornelio, Mr John |
| 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 | already said this is an inquisitorial not an adversarial process, and it is not my role to advance the case for anyone. My role is to assist the Inquiry in getting to the truth, and I will maintain neutrality; I will not make submissions in the way that others might do where they are trying to advance a case, and | 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 | Picardo KC; the Attorney General, Michael Llamas KC; the Gibraltar Police Authority, the Royal Gibraltar Police, former Superintendent Paul Richardson, the Gibraltar Police Federation and the three individuals we refer to as the Operation Delhi defendants (Sir Thomas Cornelio, Mr John Pezez and Mr Caine Sanchez). Something |
| 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 | already said this is an inquisitorial not an adversarial process, and it is not my role to advance the case for anyone. My role is to assist the Inquiry in getting to the truth, and I will maintain neutrality; I will not make submissions in the way that others might do where they are trying to advance a case, and so my role may come across as more neutral | 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 | Picardo KC; the Attorney General, Michael Llamas KC; the Gibraltar Police Authority, the Royal Gibraltar Police, former Superintendent Paul Richardson, the Gibraltar Police Federation and the three individuals we refer to as the Operation Delhi defendants (Sir Thomas Cornelio, Mr John Pezez and Mr Caine Sanchez). Something we have addressed in our written |
| 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 | already said this is an inquisitorial not an adversarial process, and it is not my role to advance the case for anyone. My role is to assist the Inquiry in getting to the truth, and I will maintain neutrality; I will not make submissions in the way that others might do where they are trying to advance a case, and so my role may come across as more neutral than that of other counsel. In terms of my | 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 | Picardo KC; the Attorney General, Michael Llamas KC; the Gibraltar Police Authority, the Royal Gibraltar Police, former Superintendent Paul Richardson, the Gibraltar Police Federation and the three individuals we refer to as the Operation Delhi defendants (Sir Thomas Cornelio, Mr John Pezez and Mr Caine Sanchez). Something we have addressed in our written submissions, but which I should repeat for |
| 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 | already said this is an inquisitorial not an adversarial process, and it is not my role to advance the case for anyone. My role is to assist the Inquiry in getting to the truth, and I will maintain neutrality; I will not make submissions in the way that others might do where they are trying to advance a case, and so my role may come across as more neutral than that of other counsel. In terms of my questioning, I will question firmly, and probe | 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 | Picardo KC; the Attorney General, Michael Llamas KC; the Gibraltar Police Authority, the Royal Gibraltar Police, former Superintendent Paul Richardson, the Gibraltar Police Federation and the three individuals we refer to as the Operation Delhi defendants (Sir Thomas Cornelio, Mr John Pezez and Mr Caine Sanchez). Something we have addressed in our written submissions, but which I should repeat for the benefit of the public, is that it is worth |
| 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 | already said this is an inquisitorial not an adversarial process, and it is not my role to advance the case for anyone. My role is to assist the Inquiry in getting to the truth, and I will maintain neutrality; I will not make submissions in the way that others might do where they are trying to advance a case, and so my role may come across as more neutral than that of other counsel. In terms of my questioning, I will question firmly, and probe and even challenge witnesses where | 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 | Picardo KC; the Attorney General, Michael Llamas KC; the Gibraltar Police Authority, the Royal Gibraltar Police, former Superintendent Paul Richardson, the Gibraltar Police Federation and the three individuals we refer to as the Operation Delhi defendants (Sir Thomas Cornelio, Mr John Pezez and Mr Caine Sanchez). Something we have addressed in our written submissions, but which I should repeat for the benefit of the public, is that it is worth emphasising before turning to the facts our |
| 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 | already said this is an inquisitorial not an adversarial process, and it is not my role to advance the case for anyone. My role is to assist the Inquiry in getting to the truth, and I will maintain neutrality; I will not make submissions in the way that others might do where they are trying to advance a case, and so my role may come across as more neutral than that of other counsel. In terms of my questioning, I will question firmly, and probe and even challenge witnesses where necessary, but it is not my role to conduct a | 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 | Picardo KC; the Attorney General, Michael Llamas KC; the Gibraltar Police Authority, the Royal Gibraltar Police, former Superintendent Paul Richardson, the Gibraltar Police Federation and the three individuals we refer to as the Operation Delhi defendants (Sir Thomas Cornelio, Mr John Pezez and Mr Caine Sanchez). Something we have addressed in our written submissions, but which I should repeat for the benefit of the public, is that it is worth emphasising before turning to the facts our interpretation of the terms of reference, and |
| 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 | already said this is an inquisitorial not an adversarial process, and it is not my role to advance the case for anyone. My role is to assist the Inquiry in getting to the truth, and I will maintain neutrality; I will not make submissions in the way that others might do where they are trying to advance a case, and so my role may come across as more neutral than that of other counsel. In terms of my questioning, I will question firmly, and probe and even challenge witnesses where necessary, but it is not my role to conduct a cross-examination as seen in high-drama | 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 | Picardo KC; the Attorney General, Michael Llamas KC; the Gibraltar Police Authority, the Royal Gibraltar Police, former Superintendent Paul Richardson, the Gibraltar Police Federation and the three individuals we refer to as the Operation Delhi defendants (Sir Thomas Cornelio, Mr John Pezez and Mr Caine Sanchez). Something we have addressed in our written submissions, but which I should repeat for the benefit of the public, is that it is worth emphasising before turning to the facts our interpretation of the terms of reference, and in particular the meaning of the phrase |
| 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 | already said this is an inquisitorial not an adversarial process, and it is not my role to advance the case for anyone. My role is to assist the Inquiry in getting to the truth, and I will maintain neutrality; I will not make submissions in the way that others might do where they are trying to advance a case, and so my role may come across as more neutral than that of other counsel. In terms of my questioning, I will question firmly, and probe and even challenge witnesses where necessary, but it is not my role to conduct a cross-examination as seen in high-drama criminal jury trials, or to play to the gallery. | 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 | Picardo KC; the Attorney General, Michael Llamas KC; the Gibraltar Police Authority, the Royal Gibraltar Police, former Superintendent Paul Richardson, the Gibraltar Police Federation and the three individuals we refer to as the Operation Delhi defendants (Sir Thomas Cornelio, Mr John Pezez and Mr Caine Sanchez). Something we have addressed in our written submissions, but which I should repeat for the benefit of the public, is that it is worth emphasising before turning to the facts our interpretation of the terms of reference, and in particular the meaning of the phrase "reasons and circumstances leading to". The |
| 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24 | already said this is an inquisitorial not an adversarial process, and it is not my role to advance the case for anyone. My role is to assist the Inquiry in getting to the truth, and I will maintain neutrality; I will not make submissions in the way that others might do where they are trying to advance a case, and so my role may come across as more neutral than that of other counsel. In terms of my questioning, I will question firmly, and probe and even challenge witnesses where necessary, but it is not my role to conduct a cross-examination as seen in high-drama criminal jury trials, or to play to the gallery. It is my role to ensure that witnesses have a | 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24 | Picardo KC; the Attorney General, Michael Llamas KC; the Gibraltar Police Authority, the Royal Gibraltar Police, former Superintendent Paul Richardson, the Gibraltar Police Federation and the three individuals we refer to as the Operation Delhi defendants (Sir Thomas Cornelio, Mr John Pezez and Mr Caine Sanchez). Something we have addressed in our written submissions, but which I should repeat for the benefit of the public, is that it is worth emphasising before turning to the facts our interpretation of the terms of reference, and in particular the meaning of the phrase "reasons and circumstances leading to". The meaning of the word "reason" is a simple |
| 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 | already said this is an inquisitorial not an adversarial process, and it is not my role to advance the case for anyone. My role is to assist the Inquiry in getting to the truth, and I will maintain neutrality; I will not make submissions in the way that others might do where they are trying to advance a case, and so my role may come across as more neutral than that of other counsel. In terms of my questioning, I will question firmly, and probe and even challenge witnesses where necessary, but it is not my role to conduct a cross-examination as seen in high-drama criminal jury trials, or to play to the gallery. | 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 | Picardo KC; the Attorney General, Michael Llamas KC; the Gibraltar Police Authority, the Royal Gibraltar Police, former Superintendent Paul Richardson, the Gibraltar Police Federation and the three individuals we refer to as the Operation Delhi defendants (Sir Thomas Cornelio, Mr John Pezez and Mr Caine Sanchez). Something we have addressed in our written submissions, but which I should repeat for the benefit of the public, is that it is worth emphasising before turning to the facts our interpretation of the terms of reference, and in particular the meaning of the phrase "reasons and circumstances leading to". The |
| 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24 | already said this is an inquisitorial not an adversarial process, and it is not my role to advance the case for anyone. My role is to assist the Inquiry in getting to the truth, and I will maintain neutrality; I will not make submissions in the way that others might do where they are trying to advance a case, and so my role may come across as more neutral than that of other counsel. In terms of my questioning, I will question firmly, and probe and even challenge witnesses where necessary, but it is not my role to conduct a cross-examination as seen in high-drama criminal jury trials, or to play to the gallery. It is my role to ensure that witnesses have a | 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24 | Picardo KC; the Attorney General, Michael Llamas KC; the Gibraltar Police Authority, the Royal Gibraltar Police, former Superintendent Paul Richardson, the Gibraltar Police Federation and the three individuals we refer to as the Operation Delhi defendants (Sir Thomas Cornelio, Mr John Pezez and Mr Caine Sanchez). Something we have addressed in our written submissions, but which I should repeat for the benefit of the public, is that it is worth emphasising before turning to the facts our interpretation of the terms of reference, and in particular the meaning of the phrase "reasons and circumstances leading to". The meaning of the word "reason" is a simple |

| | | 1 | |
|---|---|---|---|
| 1 | English Dictionary defines it as "a cause, | 1 | Commissioner of Police. As I said at the first |
| 2 | explanation, or justification for an action or | 2 | preliminary hearing of this Inquiry in June |
| 3 | event." So, the inclusion of that word, | 3 | 2022, the Inquiry team (including you as |
| 4 | "reason", within the terms of reference | 4 | Chairman) started this process with no |
| 5 | imposes upon you, sir, an obligation to | 5 | knowledge about the events under inquiry, no |
| 6 | determine the causes, explanations or | 6 | information or documents at our disposal, |
| 7 | justifications for Mr McGrail ceasing to be | 7 | and purely with the terms of reference set out |
| 8 | Commissioner of Police. There are three | 8 | in the legal notice. We have been entirely |
| 9 | further general points that I would make | 9 | dependent on receiving information and |
| 10 | about "reasons". First, there can be more | 10 | documents from witnesses to learn about the |
| 11 | than one reason for an event or an action; if | 11 | matters which we are required to look into, |
| 12 | there is more than one reason some may be | 12 | so we started by approaching the four parties |
| 13 | of greater importance or significance as | 13 | who (according to the Police Act 2006) |
| 14 | causes for an event. Second, if a person | 14 | would or at least could have played a |
| 15 | states that X is a reason why they acted in a | 15 | statutory role in Mr McGrail's retirement; |
| 16 | particular way, that may well be true even if | 16 | namely, Mr McGrail himself, the Governor at |
| 17 | it may not be a good or justified reason, | 17 | the time, the Chief Minister and the |
| 18 | objectively judged. In other words, a bad | 18 | Chairman of the GPA (Dr Joey Britto). It |
| 19 | reason or a mistaken reason may still be a | 19 | was only upon receipt of these statements |
| 20 | real reason, and this brings an element of | 20 | that we were able to widen our request for |
| 21 | subjectivity into the equation. However, if a | 21 | evidence to other people whom we learnt |
| 22 | reason put forward by a witness is seen to be | 22 | were involved in the process, and to start |
| 23 | an illogical reason, for example, that could be | 23 | defining the issues requiring addressing. |
| 24 | relevant to you when you decide whether it | 24 | That has been an iterative process over the |
| 25 | was in fact that person's real reason for | 25 | course of these two years, with further |
| 23 | was in fact that person's real reason for | 25 | course of these two years, with further |
| | Page 17 | | Page 19 |
| | | | |
| 1 | acting. The third thing I would say about | 1 | requests being made either to the same |
| 2 | reasons is that even if a person gives a reason | 2 | witnesses or to different individuals and |
| 3 | for acting, that may not actually be the true | 3 | organisations. I am told by the Solicitor to |
| 4 | operative reason or the only operative reason | 4 | the Inquiry that we have received 94 witness |
| 5 | for acting; there may be other real reasons, | 5 | statements, running to over 1,600 pages, and |
| 6 | which are unstated or unidentified. As for | 6 | |
| 7 | | | about 16,000 pages of documents relevant to |
| | the word "circumstances", again the meaning | 7 | these issues. Sifting through that has been a |
| 8 | of that word cannot be in dispute: it is | 7 8 | these issues. Sifting through that has been a monumental task, for which I am very |
| 9 | of that word cannot be in dispute: it is defined by the same dictionary as "a fact or | 7 8 9 | these issues. Sifting through that has been a monumental task, for which I am very grateful in particular to Mr Triay and Mr |
| 9 10 | of that word cannot be in dispute: it is defined by the same dictionary as "a fact or condition connected with or relevant to an | 7 8 9 10 | these issues. Sifting through that has been a monumental task, for which I am very grateful in particular to Mr Triay and Mr Moffatt. I should say that although there is |
| 9 10 11 | of that word cannot be in dispute: it is defined by the same dictionary as "a fact or condition connected with or relevant to an event or action." The inclusion of the word | 7 8 9 10 11 | these issues. Sifting through that has been a monumental task, for which I am very grateful in particular to Mr Triay and Mr Moffatt. I should say that although there is clearly fierce disagreement on some key |
| 9 10 11 12 | of that word cannot be in dispute: it is defined by the same dictionary as "a fact or condition connected with or relevant to an event or action." The inclusion of the word "circumstances" within the terms of reference | 7 8 9 10 11 12 | these issues. Sifting through that has been a monumental task, for which I am very grateful in particular to Mr Triay and Mr Moffatt. I should say that although there is clearly fierce disagreement on some key factual matters there is also plenty of |
| 9 10 11 12 13 | of that word cannot be in dispute: it is defined by the same dictionary as "a fact or condition connected with or relevant to an event or action." The inclusion of the word "circumstances" within the terms of reference means that the Inquiry's remit is broader than | 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 | these issues. Sifting through that has been a monumental task, for which I am very grateful in particular to Mr Triay and Mr Moffatt. I should say that although there is clearly fierce disagreement on some key factual matters there is also plenty of agreement (or at least lack of dispute) in |
| 9 10 11 12 13 14 | of that word cannot be in dispute: it is defined by the same dictionary as "a fact or condition connected with or relevant to an event or action." The inclusion of the word "circumstances" within the terms of reference means that the Inquiry's remit is broader than merely looking for direct causes of Mr | 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 | these issues. Sifting through that has been a monumental task, for which I am very grateful in particular to Mr Triay and Mr Moffatt. I should say that although there is clearly fierce disagreement on some key factual matters there is also plenty of agreement (or at least lack of dispute) in relation to background facts, and so with the |
| 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 | of that word cannot be in dispute: it is defined by the same dictionary as "a fact or condition connected with or relevant to an event or action." The inclusion of the word "circumstances" within the terms of reference means that the Inquiry's remit is broader than merely looking for direct causes of Mr McGrail's decision to take early retirement, | 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 | these issues. Sifting through that has been a monumental task, for which I am very grateful in particular to Mr Triay and Mr Moffatt. I should say that although there is clearly fierce disagreement on some key factual matters there is also plenty of agreement (or at least lack of dispute) in relation to background facts, and so with the assistance of core participants we have |
| 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 | of that word cannot be in dispute: it is defined by the same dictionary as "a fact or condition connected with or relevant to an event or action." The inclusion of the word "circumstances" within the terms of reference means that the Inquiry's remit is broader than merely looking for direct causes of Mr McGrail's decision to take early retirement, and extends to looking at facts connected | 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 | these issues. Sifting through that has been a monumental task, for which I am very grateful in particular to Mr Triay and Mr Moffatt. I should say that although there is clearly fierce disagreement on some key factual matters there is also plenty of agreement (or at least lack of dispute) in relation to background facts, and so with the assistance of core participants we have prepared a document which we refer to as |
| 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 | of that word cannot be in dispute: it is defined by the same dictionary as "a fact or condition connected with or relevant to an event or action." The inclusion of the word "circumstances" within the terms of reference means that the Inquiry's remit is broader than merely looking for direct causes of Mr McGrail's decision to take early retirement, and extends to looking at facts connected with or relevant to that event. And, finally, | 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 | these issues. Sifting through that has been a monumental task, for which I am very grateful in particular to Mr Triay and Mr Moffatt. I should say that although there is clearly fierce disagreement on some key factual matters there is also plenty of agreement (or at least lack of dispute) in relation to background facts, and so with the assistance of core participants we have prepared a document which we refer to as "the undisputed facts", which can be used as |
| 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 | of that word cannot be in dispute: it is defined by the same dictionary as "a fact or condition connected with or relevant to an event or action." The inclusion of the word "circumstances" within the terms of reference means that the Inquiry's remit is broader than merely looking for direct causes of Mr McGrail's decision to take early retirement, and extends to looking at facts connected with or relevant to that event. And, finally, the words "leading to" reinforce the need for | 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 | these issues. Sifting through that has been a monumental task, for which I am very grateful in particular to Mr Triay and Mr Moffatt. I should say that although there is clearly fierce disagreement on some key factual matters there is also plenty of agreement (or at least lack of dispute) in relation to background facts, and so with the assistance of core participants we have prepared a document which we refer to as "the undisputed facts", which can be used as a working chronology throughout this main |
| 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 | of that word cannot be in dispute: it is defined by the same dictionary as "a fact or condition connected with or relevant to an event or action." The inclusion of the word "circumstances" within the terms of reference means that the Inquiry's remit is broader than merely looking for direct causes of Mr McGrail's decision to take early retirement, and extends to looking at facts connected with or relevant to that event. And, finally, the words "leading to" reinforce the need for a link between the "reasons and | 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 | these issues. Sifting through that has been a monumental task, for which I am very grateful in particular to Mr Triay and Mr Moffatt. I should say that although there is clearly fierce disagreement on some key factual matters there is also plenty of agreement (or at least lack of dispute) in relation to background facts, and so with the assistance of core participants we have prepared a document which we refer to as "the undisputed facts", which can be used as a working chronology throughout this main Inquiry hearing, although I would accept that |
| 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 | of that word cannot be in dispute: it is defined by the same dictionary as "a fact or condition connected with or relevant to an event or action." The inclusion of the word "circumstances" within the terms of reference means that the Inquiry's remit is broader than merely looking for direct causes of Mr McGrail's decision to take early retirement, and extends to looking at facts connected with or relevant to that event. And, finally, the words "leading to" reinforce the need for a link between the "reasons and circumstances" and the ultimate fact of Mr | 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 | these issues. Sifting through that has been a monumental task, for which I am very grateful in particular to Mr Triay and Mr Moffatt. I should say that although there is clearly fierce disagreement on some key factual matters there is also plenty of agreement (or at least lack of dispute) in relation to background facts, and so with the assistance of core participants we have prepared a document which we refer to as "the undisputed facts", which can be used as a working chronology throughout this main Inquiry hearing, although I would accept that it is not a complete document given that there |
| 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 | of that word cannot be in dispute: it is defined by the same dictionary as "a fact or condition connected with or relevant to an event or action." The inclusion of the word "circumstances" within the terms of reference means that the Inquiry's remit is broader than merely looking for direct causes of Mr McGrail's decision to take early retirement, and extends to looking at facts connected with or relevant to that event. And, finally, the words "leading to" reinforce the need for a link between the "reasons and circumstances" and the ultimate fact of Mr McGrail ceasing to be Commissioner of | 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 | these issues. Sifting through that has been a monumental task, for which I am very grateful in particular to Mr Triay and Mr Moffatt. I should say that although there is clearly fierce disagreement on some key factual matters there is also plenty of agreement (or at least lack of dispute) in relation to background facts, and so with the assistance of core participants we have prepared a document which we refer to as "the undisputed facts", which can be used as a working chronology throughout this main Inquiry hearing, although I would accept that it is not a complete document given that there are some important disputed facts. There are |
| 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 | of that word cannot be in dispute: it is defined by the same dictionary as "a fact or condition connected with or relevant to an event or action." The inclusion of the word "circumstances" within the terms of reference means that the Inquiry's remit is broader than merely looking for direct causes of Mr McGrail's decision to take early retirement, and extends to looking at facts connected with or relevant to that event. And, finally, the words "leading to" reinforce the need for a link between the "reasons and circumstances" and the ultimate fact of Mr McGrail ceasing to be Commissioner of Police. But, we would submit that they | 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 | these issues. Sifting through that has been a monumental task, for which I am very grateful in particular to Mr Triay and Mr Moffatt. I should say that although there is clearly fierce disagreement on some key factual matters there is also plenty of agreement (or at least lack of dispute) in relation to background facts, and so with the assistance of core participants we have prepared a document which we refer to as "the undisputed facts", which can be used as a working chronology throughout this main Inquiry hearing, although I would accept that it is not a complete document given that there are some important disputed facts. There are two procedural issues that I should address |
| 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 | of that word cannot be in dispute: it is defined by the same dictionary as "a fact or condition connected with or relevant to an event or action." The inclusion of the word "circumstances" within the terms of reference means that the Inquiry's remit is broader than merely looking for direct causes of Mr McGrail's decision to take early retirement, and extends to looking at facts connected with or relevant to that event. And, finally, the words "leading to" reinforce the need for a link between the "reasons and circumstances" and the ultimate fact of Mr McGrail ceasing to be Commissioner of Police. But, we would submit that they maintain the slightly broader nature of the | 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 | these issues. Sifting through that has been a monumental task, for which I am very grateful in particular to Mr Triay and Mr Moffatt. I should say that although there is clearly fierce disagreement on some key factual matters there is also plenty of agreement (or at least lack of dispute) in relation to background facts, and so with the assistance of core participants we have prepared a document which we refer to as "the undisputed facts", which can be used as a working chronology throughout this main Inquiry hearing, although I would accept that it is not a complete document given that there are some important disputed facts. There are two procedural issues that I should address before I turn to the substantive content of this |
| 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24 | of that word cannot be in dispute: it is defined by the same dictionary as "a fact or condition connected with or relevant to an event or action." The inclusion of the word "circumstances" within the terms of reference means that the Inquiry's remit is broader than merely looking for direct causes of Mr McGrail's decision to take early retirement, and extends to looking at facts connected with or relevant to that event. And, finally, the words "leading to" reinforce the need for a link between the "reasons and circumstances" and the ultimate fact of Mr McGrail ceasing to be Commissioner of Police. But, we would submit that they maintain the slightly broader nature of the exercise than a pure assessment of the direct | 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24 | these issues. Sifting through that has been a monumental task, for which I am very grateful in particular to Mr Triay and Mr Moffatt. I should say that although there is clearly fierce disagreement on some key factual matters there is also plenty of agreement (or at least lack of dispute) in relation to background facts, and so with the assistance of core participants we have prepared a document which we refer to as "the undisputed facts", which can be used as a working chronology throughout this main Inquiry hearing, although I would accept that it is not a complete document given that there are some important disputed facts. There are two procedural issues that I should address before I turn to the substantive content of this statement. There has been significant media |
| 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 | of that word cannot be in dispute: it is defined by the same dictionary as "a fact or condition connected with or relevant to an event or action." The inclusion of the word "circumstances" within the terms of reference means that the Inquiry's remit is broader than merely looking for direct causes of Mr McGrail's decision to take early retirement, and extends to looking at facts connected with or relevant to that event. And, finally, the words "leading to" reinforce the need for a link between the "reasons and circumstances" and the ultimate fact of Mr McGrail ceasing to be Commissioner of Police. But, we would submit that they maintain the slightly broader nature of the | 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 | these issues. Sifting through that has been a monumental task, for which I am very grateful in particular to Mr Triay and Mr Moffatt. I should say that although there is clearly fierce disagreement on some key factual matters there is also plenty of agreement (or at least lack of dispute) in relation to background facts, and so with the assistance of core participants we have prepared a document which we refer to as "the undisputed facts", which can be used as a working chronology throughout this main Inquiry hearing, although I would accept that it is not a complete document given that there are some important disputed facts. There are two procedural issues that I should address before I turn to the substantive content of this |
| 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24 | of that word cannot be in dispute: it is defined by the same dictionary as "a fact or condition connected with or relevant to an event or action." The inclusion of the word "circumstances" within the terms of reference means that the Inquiry's remit is broader than merely looking for direct causes of Mr McGrail's decision to take early retirement, and extends to looking at facts connected with or relevant to that event. And, finally, the words "leading to" reinforce the need for a link between the "reasons and circumstances" and the ultimate fact of Mr McGrail ceasing to be Commissioner of Police. But, we would submit that they maintain the slightly broader nature of the exercise than a pure assessment of the direct | 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24 | these issues. Sifting through that has been a monumental task, for which I am very grateful in particular to Mr Triay and Mr Moffatt. I should say that although there is clearly fierce disagreement on some key factual matters there is also plenty of agreement (or at least lack of dispute) in relation to background facts, and so with the assistance of core participants we have prepared a document which we refer to as "the undisputed facts", which can be used as a working chronology throughout this main Inquiry hearing, although I would accept that it is not a complete document given that there are some important disputed facts. There are two procedural issues that I should address before I turn to the substantive content of this statement. There has been significant media |

| i . | | | |
|---|--|---|---|
| 1 | matters: the first the introduction of the | 1 | committed or been involved in a crime in |
| 2 | Inquiries Act 2024, and the second the | 2 | their evidence, if that were to happen, that |
| 3 | allegations that incentives have been offered | 3 | does not mean that they cannot be prosecuted |
| 4 | to certain witnesses in exchange for them | 4 | for that crime; it just means that their |
| 5 | giving evidence in the Inquiry. First, to | 5 | evidence to the Inquiry cannot be the basis |
| 6 | address the Inquiries Act 2024. Sir, you have | 6 | for that prosecution and would not be |
| 7 | already referred to this Act; it commenced | 7 | admissible in any criminal proceedings. The |
| 8 | less than two weeks ago on 28 March 2024. | 8 | other significant change brought about by the |
| 9 | The Inquiry team issued a fact sheet (which | 9 | new Act is Section 19, which introduces a |
| 10 | is available on the Inquiry website) | 10 | power on behalf of the Government to issue |
| 11 | explaining the changes that this brought | 11 | restrictions notices requiring evidence only to |
| 12 | about, but there are two points in particular | 12 | be hard in private. Under the old Act that |
| 13 | on which I should elaborate. First, a | 13 | was purely a matter for you as chairman, and |
| 14 | significant change under the new Act is the | 14 | under the new Act the Government has this |
| 15 | position on the law on self-incrimination. | 15 | power to issue notices. |
| 16 | Under the old Act witnesses could not refuse | 16 | (10.30) |
| 17 | to answer questions on the basis that doing so | 17 | On Friday we received such a restriction |
| 18 | might incriminate them; however, any | 18 | notice which you have already addressed at |
| 19 | answers which they did give could not be | 19 | the start. I do not need to comment further, |
| 20 | admitted as evidence against them in civil or | 20 | save to say that this has added a considerable |
| 21 | criminal proceedings. All witnesses who | 21 | burden to the team in our final days of |
| 22 | have given evidence to this Inquiry did so | 22 | preparation. In particular, the Inquiry's |
| 23 | under those rules. Section 22 of the new Act | 23 | bundles needed to be redacted and I am very |
| 24 | changed the position: it says that the Inquiry | 24 | grateful to Mr Triay for arranging that at the |
| 25 | cannot require a witness to give evidence or | 25 | last minute. |
| | Similar require a ministra to give eminer or | =0 | 1000 11111000 |
| | Page 21 | | Page 23 |
| | 1. 1 1. 1. 1. 1. 1. 1. 1. 1. 1. 1. 1. 1. | , | 771 T ' '11 1 4 '4' 11' 4 |
| 1 | disclosure which could not be required by a | 1 | The Inquiry will endeavour to sit in public to |
| 2 | | 1 2 | 41 |
| | civil court, which means that witnesses could | 2 | the maximum extent possible, and we |
| 3 | refuse to answer questions on the basis that it | 3 | anticipate that this notice will require only |
| 3 4 | refuse to answer questions on the basis that it might incriminate them. This is also the law | 3 4 | anticipate that this notice will require only some of the witnesses to give a small amount |
| 3 4 5 | refuse to answer questions on the basis that it might incriminate them. This is also the law in the UK, and in the UK in the light of that | 3 4 5 | anticipate that this notice will require only some of the witnesses to give a small amount of their evidence in private. |
| 3 4 5 6 | refuse to answer questions on the basis that it might incriminate them. This is also the law in the UK, and in the UK in the light of that law many recent inquiries have requested | 3 4 5 6 | anticipate that this notice will require only some of the witnesses to give a small amount of their evidence in private. The second procedural matter which I wish |
| 3 4 5 6 7 | refuse to answer questions on the basis that it might incriminate them. This is also the law in the UK, and in the UK in the light of that law many recent inquiries have requested that the Attorney General provide an | 3 4 5 6 7 | anticipate that this notice will require only some of the witnesses to give a small amount of their evidence in private. The second procedural matter which I wish to address is the allegations which were first |
| 3 4 5 6 7 8 | refuse to answer questions on the basis that it might incriminate them. This is also the law in the UK, and in the UK in the light of that law many recent inquiries have requested that the Attorney General provide an undertaking that he or she will not use | 3 4 5 6 7 8 | anticipate that this notice will require only some of the witnesses to give a small amount of their evidence in private. The second procedural matter which I wish to address is the allegations which were first raised by Mr McGrail to the Inquiry in his |
| 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 | refuse to answer questions on the basis that it might incriminate them. This is also the law in the UK, and in the UK in the light of that law many recent inquiries have requested that the Attorney General provide an undertaking that he or she will not use evidence given to the inquiry in future | 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 | anticipate that this notice will require only some of the witnesses to give a small amount of their evidence in private. The second procedural matter which I wish to address is the allegations which were first raised by Mr McGrail to the Inquiry in his third affidavit that two police officers subject |
| 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 | refuse to answer questions on the basis that it might incriminate them. This is also the law in the UK, and in the UK in the light of that law many recent inquiries have requested that the Attorney General provide an undertaking that he or she will not use evidence given to the inquiry in future criminal proceedings. The aim of the | 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 | anticipate that this notice will require only some of the witnesses to give a small amount of their evidence in private. The second procedural matter which I wish to address is the allegations which were first raised by Mr McGrail to the Inquiry in his third affidavit that two police officers subject to investigation for corrupt or improper |
| 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 | refuse to answer questions on the basis that it might incriminate them. This is also the law in the UK, and in the UK in the light of that law many recent inquiries have requested that the Attorney General provide an undertaking that he or she will not use evidence given to the inquiry in future criminal proceedings. The aim of the undertaking is to allow witnesses to give | 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 | anticipate that this notice will require only some of the witnesses to give a small amount of their evidence in private. The second procedural matter which I wish to address is the allegations which were first raised by Mr McGrail to the Inquiry in his third affidavit that two police officers subject to investigation for corrupt or improper practices have been assured that they would |
| 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 | refuse to answer questions on the basis that it might incriminate them. This is also the law in the UK, and in the UK in the light of that law many recent inquiries have requested that the Attorney General provide an undertaking that he or she will not use evidence given to the inquiry in future criminal proceedings. The aim of the undertaking is to allow witnesses to give evidence freely, knowing that they are not at | 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 | anticipate that this notice will require only some of the witnesses to give a small amount of their evidence in private. The second procedural matter which I wish to address is the allegations which were first raised by Mr McGrail to the Inquiry in his third affidavit that two police officers subject to investigation for corrupt or improper practices have been assured that they would not go onto half pay and their futures would |
| 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 | refuse to answer questions on the basis that it might incriminate them. This is also the law in the UK, and in the UK in the light of that law many recent inquiries have requested that the Attorney General provide an undertaking that he or she will not use evidence given to the inquiry in future criminal proceedings. The aim of the undertaking is to allow witnesses to give evidence freely, knowing that they are not at risk of subsequent prosecution on the basis of | 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 | anticipate that this notice will require only some of the witnesses to give a small amount of their evidence in private. The second procedural matter which I wish to address is the allegations which were first raised by Mr McGrail to the Inquiry in his third affidavit that two police officers subject to investigation for corrupt or improper practices have been assured that they would not go onto half pay and their futures would be safeguarded if they came forward with |
| 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 | refuse to answer questions on the basis that it might incriminate them. This is also the law in the UK, and in the UK in the light of that law many recent inquiries have requested that the Attorney General provide an undertaking that he or she will not use evidence given to the inquiry in future criminal proceedings. The aim of the undertaking is to allow witnesses to give evidence freely, knowing that they are not at risk of subsequent prosecution on the basis of the evidence that they give. In the light of | 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 | anticipate that this notice will require only some of the witnesses to give a small amount of their evidence in private. The second procedural matter which I wish to address is the allegations which were first raised by Mr McGrail to the Inquiry in his third affidavit that two police officers subject to investigation for corrupt or improper practices have been assured that they would not go onto half pay and their futures would be safeguarded if they came forward with information about Mr McGrail during the |
| 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 | refuse to answer questions on the basis that it might incriminate them. This is also the law in the UK, and in the UK in the light of that law many recent inquiries have requested that the Attorney General provide an undertaking that he or she will not use evidence given to the inquiry in future criminal proceedings. The aim of the undertaking is to allow witnesses to give evidence freely, knowing that they are not at risk of subsequent prosecution on the basis of the evidence that they give. In the light of the change of the law to mirror the UK the | 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 | anticipate that this notice will require only some of the witnesses to give a small amount of their evidence in private. The second procedural matter which I wish to address is the allegations which were first raised by Mr McGrail to the Inquiry in his third affidavit that two police officers subject to investigation for corrupt or improper practices have been assured that they would not go onto half pay and their futures would be safeguarded if they came forward with information about Mr McGrail during the Inquiry. |
| 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 | refuse to answer questions on the basis that it might incriminate them. This is also the law in the UK, and in the UK in the light of that law many recent inquiries have requested that the Attorney General provide an undertaking that he or she will not use evidence given to the inquiry in future criminal proceedings. The aim of the undertaking is to allow witnesses to give evidence freely, knowing that they are not at risk of subsequent prosecution on the basis of the evidence that they give. In the light of the change of the law to mirror the UK the Inquiry followed the approach in the UK and | 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 | anticipate that this notice will require only some of the witnesses to give a small amount of their evidence in private. The second procedural matter which I wish to address is the allegations which were first raised by Mr McGrail to the Inquiry in his third affidavit that two police officers subject to investigation for corrupt or improper practices have been assured that they would not go onto half pay and their futures would be safeguarded if they came forward with information about Mr McGrail during the Inquiry. Mr McGrail alleged that Number 6 Convent |
| 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 | refuse to answer questions on the basis that it might incriminate them. This is also the law in the UK, and in the UK in the light of that law many recent inquiries have requested that the Attorney General provide an undertaking that he or she will not use evidence given to the inquiry in future criminal proceedings. The aim of the undertaking is to allow witnesses to give evidence freely, knowing that they are not at risk of subsequent prosecution on the basis of the evidence that they give. In the light of the change of the law to mirror the UK the Inquiry followed the approach in the UK and immediately requested an undertaking from | 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 | anticipate that this notice will require only some of the witnesses to give a small amount of their evidence in private. The second procedural matter which I wish to address is the allegations which were first raised by Mr McGrail to the Inquiry in his third affidavit that two police officers subject to investigation for corrupt or improper practices have been assured that they would not go onto half pay and their futures would be safeguarded if they came forward with information about Mr McGrail during the Inquiry. Mr McGrail alleged that Number 6 Convent Place was involved in making these offers, |
| 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 | refuse to answer questions on the basis that it might incriminate them. This is also the law in the UK, and in the UK in the light of that law many recent inquiries have requested that the Attorney General provide an undertaking that he or she will not use evidence given to the inquiry in future criminal proceedings. The aim of the undertaking is to allow witnesses to give evidence freely, knowing that they are not at risk of subsequent prosecution on the basis of the evidence that they give. In the light of the change of the law to mirror the UK the Inquiry followed the approach in the UK and immediately requested an undertaking from the Attorney General in terms that would | 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 | anticipate that this notice will require only some of the witnesses to give a small amount of their evidence in private. The second procedural matter which I wish to address is the allegations which were first raised by Mr McGrail to the Inquiry in his third affidavit that two police officers subject to investigation for corrupt or improper practices have been assured that they would not go onto half pay and their futures would be safeguarded if they came forward with information about Mr McGrail during the Inquiry. Mr McGrail alleged that Number 6 Convent Place was involved in making these offers, including the Chief Minister and the |
| 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 | refuse to answer questions on the basis that it might incriminate them. This is also the law in the UK, and in the UK in the light of that law many recent inquiries have requested that the Attorney General provide an undertaking that he or she will not use evidence given to the inquiry in future criminal proceedings. The aim of the undertaking is to allow witnesses to give evidence freely, knowing that they are not at risk of subsequent prosecution on the basis of the evidence that they give. In the light of the change of the law to mirror the UK the Inquiry followed the approach in the UK and immediately requested an undertaking from the Attorney General in terms that would place witnesses in the same position as they | 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 | anticipate that this notice will require only some of the witnesses to give a small amount of their evidence in private. The second procedural matter which I wish to address is the allegations which were first raised by Mr McGrail to the Inquiry in his third affidavit that two police officers subject to investigation for corrupt or improper practices have been assured that they would not go onto half pay and their futures would be safeguarded if they came forward with information about Mr McGrail during the Inquiry. Mr McGrail alleged that Number 6 Convent Place was involved in making these offers, including the Chief Minister and the Government official Mr Michael Crome. |
| 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 | refuse to answer questions on the basis that it might incriminate them. This is also the law in the UK, and in the UK in the light of that law many recent inquiries have requested that the Attorney General provide an undertaking that he or she will not use evidence given to the inquiry in future criminal proceedings. The aim of the undertaking is to allow witnesses to give evidence freely, knowing that they are not at risk of subsequent prosecution on the basis of the evidence that they give. In the light of the change of the law to mirror the UK the Inquiry followed the approach in the UK and immediately requested an undertaking from the Attorney General in terms that would place witnesses in the same position as they were under the old Act. The Attorney | 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 | anticipate that this notice will require only some of the witnesses to give a small amount of their evidence in private. The second procedural matter which I wish to address is the allegations which were first raised by Mr McGrail to the Inquiry in his third affidavit that two police officers subject to investigation for corrupt or improper practices have been assured that they would not go onto half pay and their futures would be safeguarded if they came forward with information about Mr McGrail during the Inquiry. Mr McGrail alleged that Number 6 Convent Place was involved in making these offers, including the Chief Minister and the Government official Mr Michael Crome. The Chief Minister denied any impropriety |
| 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 | refuse to answer questions on the basis that it might incriminate them. This is also the law in the UK, and in the UK in the light of that law many recent inquiries have requested that the Attorney General provide an undertaking that he or she will not use evidence given to the inquiry in future criminal proceedings. The aim of the undertaking is to allow witnesses to give evidence freely, knowing that they are not at risk of subsequent prosecution on the basis of the evidence that they give. In the light of the change of the law to mirror the UK the Inquiry followed the approach in the UK and immediately requested an undertaking from the Attorney General in terms that would place witnesses in the same position as they were under the old Act. The Attorney General has provided this undertaking, and | 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 | anticipate that this notice will require only some of the witnesses to give a small amount of their evidence in private. The second procedural matter which I wish to address is the allegations which were first raised by Mr McGrail to the Inquiry in his third affidavit that two police officers subject to investigation for corrupt or improper practices have been assured that they would not go onto half pay and their futures would be safeguarded if they came forward with information about Mr McGrail during the Inquiry. Mr McGrail alleged that Number 6 Convent Place was involved in making these offers, including the Chief Minister and the Government official Mr Michael Crome. The Chief Minister denied any impropriety on his part in his second affidavit, stating that |
| 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 | refuse to answer questions on the basis that it might incriminate them. This is also the law in the UK, and in the UK in the light of that law many recent inquiries have requested that the Attorney General provide an undertaking that he or she will not use evidence given to the inquiry in future criminal proceedings. The aim of the undertaking is to allow witnesses to give evidence freely, knowing that they are not at risk of subsequent prosecution on the basis of the evidence that they give. In the light of the change of the law to mirror the UK the Inquiry followed the approach in the UK and immediately requested an undertaking from the Attorney General in terms that would place witnesses in the same position as they were under the old Act. The Attorney General has provided this undertaking, and the Solicitor to the Inquiry will shortly be | 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 | anticipate that this notice will require only some of the witnesses to give a small amount of their evidence in private. The second procedural matter which I wish to address is the allegations which were first raised by Mr McGrail to the Inquiry in his third affidavit that two police officers subject to investigation for corrupt or improper practices have been assured that they would not go onto half pay and their futures would be safeguarded if they came forward with information about Mr McGrail during the Inquiry. Mr McGrail alleged that Number 6 Convent Place was involved in making these offers, including the Chief Minister and the Government official Mr Michael Crome. The Chief Minister denied any impropriety on his part in his second affidavit, stating that he acted on advice to ensure that |
| 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 | refuse to answer questions on the basis that it might incriminate them. This is also the law in the UK, and in the UK in the light of that law many recent inquiries have requested that the Attorney General provide an undertaking that he or she will not use evidence given to the inquiry in future criminal proceedings. The aim of the undertaking is to allow witnesses to give evidence freely, knowing that they are not at risk of subsequent prosecution on the basis of the evidence that they give. In the light of the change of the law to mirror the UK the Inquiry followed the approach in the UK and immediately requested an undertaking from the Attorney General in terms that would place witnesses in the same position as they were under the old Act. The Attorney General has provided this undertaking, and the Solicitor to the Inquiry's website. We | 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 | anticipate that this notice will require only some of the witnesses to give a small amount of their evidence in private. The second procedural matter which I wish to address is the allegations which were first raised by Mr McGrail to the Inquiry in his third affidavit that two police officers subject to investigation for corrupt or improper practices have been assured that they would not go onto half pay and their futures would be safeguarded if they came forward with information about Mr McGrail during the Inquiry. Mr McGrail alleged that Number 6 Convent Place was involved in making these offers, including the Chief Minister and the Government official Mr Michael Crome. The Chief Minister denied any impropriety on his part in his second affidavit, stating that he acted on advice to ensure that whistleblowers can give evidence to the |
| 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24 | refuse to answer questions on the basis that it might incriminate them. This is also the law in the UK, and in the UK in the light of that law many recent inquiries have requested that the Attorney General provide an undertaking that he or she will not use evidence given to the inquiry in future criminal proceedings. The aim of the undertaking is to allow witnesses to give evidence freely, knowing that they are not at risk of subsequent prosecution on the basis of the evidence that they give. In the light of the change of the law to mirror the UK the Inquiry followed the approach in the UK and immediately requested an undertaking from the Attorney General in terms that would place witnesses in the same position as they were under the old Act. The Attorney General has provided this undertaking, and the Solicitor to the Inquiry will shortly be uploading it to the Inquiry's website. We have reached this position knowing that just | 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24 | anticipate that this notice will require only some of the witnesses to give a small amount of their evidence in private. The second procedural matter which I wish to address is the allegations which were first raised by Mr McGrail to the Inquiry in his third affidavit that two police officers subject to investigation for corrupt or improper practices have been assured that they would not go onto half pay and their futures would be safeguarded if they came forward with information about Mr McGrail during the Inquiry. Mr McGrail alleged that Number 6 Convent Place was involved in making these offers, including the Chief Minister and the Government official Mr Michael Crome. The Chief Minister denied any impropriety on his part in his second affidavit, stating that he acted on advice to ensure that whistleblowers can give evidence to the Inquiry. The Government also confirmed in |
| 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 | refuse to answer questions on the basis that it might incriminate them. This is also the law in the UK, and in the UK in the light of that law many recent inquiries have requested that the Attorney General provide an undertaking that he or she will not use evidence given to the inquiry in future criminal proceedings. The aim of the undertaking is to allow witnesses to give evidence freely, knowing that they are not at risk of subsequent prosecution on the basis of the evidence that they give. In the light of the change of the law to mirror the UK the Inquiry followed the approach in the UK and immediately requested an undertaking from the Attorney General in terms that would place witnesses in the same position as they were under the old Act. The Attorney General has provided this undertaking, and the Solicitor to the Inquiry's website. We | 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 | anticipate that this notice will require only some of the witnesses to give a small amount of their evidence in private. The second procedural matter which I wish to address is the allegations which were first raised by Mr McGrail to the Inquiry in his third affidavit that two police officers subject to investigation for corrupt or improper practices have been assured that they would not go onto half pay and their futures would be safeguarded if they came forward with information about Mr McGrail during the Inquiry. Mr McGrail alleged that Number 6 Convent Place was involved in making these offers, including the Chief Minister and the Government official Mr Michael Crome. The Chief Minister denied any impropriety on his part in his second affidavit, stating that he acted on advice to ensure that whistleblowers can give evidence to the |
| 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24 | refuse to answer questions on the basis that it might incriminate them. This is also the law in the UK, and in the UK in the light of that law many recent inquiries have requested that the Attorney General provide an undertaking that he or she will not use evidence given to the inquiry in future criminal proceedings. The aim of the undertaking is to allow witnesses to give evidence freely, knowing that they are not at risk of subsequent prosecution on the basis of the evidence that they give. In the light of the change of the law to mirror the UK the Inquiry followed the approach in the UK and immediately requested an undertaking from the Attorney General in terms that would place witnesses in the same position as they were under the old Act. The Attorney General has provided this undertaking, and the Solicitor to the Inquiry will shortly be uploading it to the Inquiry's website. We have reached this position knowing that just | 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24 | anticipate that this notice will require only some of the witnesses to give a small amount of their evidence in private. The second procedural matter which I wish to address is the allegations which were first raised by Mr McGrail to the Inquiry in his third affidavit that two police officers subject to investigation for corrupt or improper practices have been assured that they would not go onto half pay and their futures would be safeguarded if they came forward with information about Mr McGrail during the Inquiry. Mr McGrail alleged that Number 6 Convent Place was involved in making these offers, including the Chief Minister and the Government official Mr Michael Crome. The Chief Minister denied any impropriety on his part in his second affidavit, stating that he acted on advice to ensure that whistleblowers can give evidence to the Inquiry. The Government also confirmed in |

| | | 1 | |
|--|--|---|---|
| 1 | Chief Minister's actions were in keeping with | 1 | individuals were granted whistleblower |
| 2 | the protected disclosure provisions of the | 2 | status and what redeployment, payment or |
| 3 | Employment Act 1932. | 3 | other benefit had been offered to them in |
| 4 | These allegations were aired further during | 4 | exchange for their evidence to the Inquiry. |
| 5 | Mr McGrail's sexual assault trial last year | 5 | This evidence has not been received to date, |
| 6 | where he was found not guilty. Mr Crone | 6 | but the Inquiry is in ongoing correspondence |
| 7 | gave evidence at that trial where he stated | 7 | with the witnesses on this point. |
| 8 | that he gave the complainant assurances that | 8 | Given the impending main hearing, we |
| 9 | if she wished to lay a statement before the | 9 | decided to take a pragmatic approach to |
| 10 | Inquiry she would be afforded protection | 10 | investigating this issue. In the first instance, |
| 11 | through whistleblowing law. | 11 | this will be explored in questioning when |
| 12 | In March 2023 the Inquiry received 19 | 12 | certain witnesses come to give their evidence |
| 13 | witness statements from current or former | 13 | in the next few weeks. At the end of the |
| 14 | members of the GPF, the Gibraltar Police | 14 | Inquiry hearing you, as Chairman, may |
| 15 | Federation, which raised a large number of | 15 | consider that this issue may need to be the |
| 16 | varied allegations about Mr McGrail and the | 16 | subject of further evidence, disclosure or |
| 17 | RGP's senior management. At the fourth | 17 | submissions. At this juncture, I only wish to |
| 18 | preliminary hearing on 19 July 2023 the | 18 | reassure the public that the Inquiry team is |
| 19 | Inquiry was due to consider the relevance of | 19 | firm in its view that these allegations fall |
| 20 | these allegations to the Inquiry and also | 20 | within the Inquiry's terms of reference. You, |
| 21 | whether the Inquiry should investigate the | 21 | as Chairman, have a duty to oversee and |
| 22 | allegations of witness inducement that had | 22 | safeguard the Inquiry's procedure so that you |
| 23 | been made. However, the night before PH4 | 23 | can ensure the Inquiry is properly and |
| 24 | the Inquiry was informed that senior | 24 | effectively carried out and the allegations, in |
| 25 | investigating officer John McVea, an officer | 25 | our submission, therefore need to be |
| 23 | mvestigating officer voin 112 vea, an officer | 20 | our such assisting the rest to be |
| | Page 25 | | Page 27 |
| 1 | of the DCD for the recording of this | 1 | th amount by inspections of |
| 1 | of the RGP for the purposes of this | 1 | thoroughly investigated. Now I will turn to the third and main part of |
| 2 3 | investigation, was already investigating these | 2 | Now I will turn to the third and main part of |
| | allogations for the DCD. The Ingriture | | |
| | allegations for the RGP. The Inquiry | 3 | my statement, which is the issues themselves. |
| 4 | therefore agreed to adjourn consideration of | 3 4 | my statement, which is the issues themselves. As I explained earlier, our first requests for |
| 4 5 | therefore agreed to adjourn consideration of these two issues to allow that investigation to | 3 4 5 | my statement, which is the issues themselves. As I explained earlier, our first requests for evidence were sent to those who had a |
| 4 5 6 | therefore agreed to adjourn consideration of these two issues to allow that investigation to proceed. | 3 4 5 6 | my statement, which is the issues themselves. As I explained earlier, our first requests for evidence were sent to those who had a statutory role under the Police Act. Each |
| 4 5 6 7 | therefore agreed to adjourn consideration of these two issues to allow that investigation to proceed. In January 2024 SIO McVey updated the | 3 4 5 6 7 | my statement, which is the issues themselves. As I explained earlier, our first requests for evidence were sent to those who had a statutory role under the Police Act. Each witness gave differing accounts as to the |
| 4 5 6 7 8 | therefore agreed to adjourn consideration of these two issues to allow that investigation to proceed. In January 2024 SIO McVey updated the Inquiry on the progress of that investigation | 3 4 5 6 7 8 | my statement, which is the issues themselves. As I explained earlier, our first requests for evidence were sent to those who had a statutory role under the Police Act. Each witness gave differing accounts as to the reasons and circumstances leading to Mr |
| 4 5 6 7 8 9 | therefore agreed to adjourn consideration of these two issues to allow that investigation to proceed. In January 2024 SIO McVey updated the Inquiry on the progress of that investigation and indicated that the RGP did not object to | 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 | my statement, which is the issues themselves. As I explained earlier, our first requests for evidence were sent to those who had a statutory role under the Police Act. Each witness gave differing accounts as to the reasons and circumstances leading to Mr McGrail ceasing to be Commissioner of |
| 4 5 6 7 8 9 | therefore agreed to adjourn consideration of these two issues to allow that investigation to proceed. In January 2024 SIO McVey updated the Inquiry on the progress of that investigation and indicated that the RGP did not object to the main Inquiry hearing proceeding | 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 | my statement, which is the issues themselves. As I explained earlier, our first requests for evidence were sent to those who had a statutory role under the Police Act. Each witness gave differing accounts as to the reasons and circumstances leading to Mr McGrail ceasing to be Commissioner of Police. I will summarise them, but it should |
| 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 | therefore agreed to adjourn consideration of these two issues to allow that investigation to proceed. In January 2024 SIO McVey updated the Inquiry on the progress of that investigation and indicated that the RGP did not object to the main Inquiry hearing proceeding alongside his investigation. | 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 | my statement, which is the issues themselves. As I explained earlier, our first requests for evidence were sent to those who had a statutory role under the Police Act. Each witness gave differing accounts as to the reasons and circumstances leading to Mr McGrail ceasing to be Commissioner of Police. I will summarise them, but it should be noted that these are the witnesses' cases |
| 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 | therefore agreed to adjourn consideration of these two issues to allow that investigation to proceed. In January 2024 SIO McVey updated the Inquiry on the progress of that investigation and indicated that the RGP did not object to the main Inquiry hearing proceeding alongside his investigation. You, as Chairman, therefore ruled upon the | 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 | my statement, which is the issues themselves. As I explained earlier, our first requests for evidence were sent to those who had a statutory role under the Police Act. Each witness gave differing accounts as to the reasons and circumstances leading to Mr McGrail ceasing to be Commissioner of Police. I will summarise them, but it should be noted that these are the witnesses' cases and allegations and not the Inquiry's |
| 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 | therefore agreed to adjourn consideration of these two issues to allow that investigation to proceed. In January 2024 SIO McVey updated the Inquiry on the progress of that investigation and indicated that the RGP did not object to the main Inquiry hearing proceeding alongside his investigation. You, as Chairman, therefore ruled upon the pending issues in a private ruling in March | 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 | my statement, which is the issues themselves. As I explained earlier, our first requests for evidence were sent to those who had a statutory role under the Police Act. Each witness gave differing accounts as to the reasons and circumstances leading to Mr McGrail ceasing to be Commissioner of Police. I will summarise them, but it should be noted that these are the witnesses' cases and allegations and not the Inquiry's conclusions or views. |
| 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 | therefore agreed to adjourn consideration of these two issues to allow that investigation to proceed. In January 2024 SIO McVey updated the Inquiry on the progress of that investigation and indicated that the RGP did not object to the main Inquiry hearing proceeding alongside his investigation. You, as Chairman, therefore ruled upon the pending issues in a private ruling in March this year and published a public summary of | 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 | my statement, which is the issues themselves. As I explained earlier, our first requests for evidence were sent to those who had a statutory role under the Police Act. Each witness gave differing accounts as to the reasons and circumstances leading to Mr McGrail ceasing to be Commissioner of Police. I will summarise them, but it should be noted that these are the witnesses' cases and allegations and not the Inquiry's conclusions or views. The first statement that we received was from |
| 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 | therefore agreed to adjourn consideration of these two issues to allow that investigation to proceed. In January 2024 SIO McVey updated the Inquiry on the progress of that investigation and indicated that the RGP did not object to the main Inquiry hearing proceeding alongside his investigation. You, as Chairman, therefore ruled upon the pending issues in a private ruling in March this year and published a public summary of that ruling on the Inquiry website. In | 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 | my statement, which is the issues themselves. As I explained earlier, our first requests for evidence were sent to those who had a statutory role under the Police Act. Each witness gave differing accounts as to the reasons and circumstances leading to Mr McGrail ceasing to be Commissioner of Police. I will summarise them, but it should be noted that these are the witnesses' cases and allegations and not the Inquiry's conclusions or views. The first statement that we received was from Mr Nick Pyle, the interim Governor at the |
| 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 | therefore agreed to adjourn consideration of these two issues to allow that investigation to proceed. In January 2024 SIO McVey updated the Inquiry on the progress of that investigation and indicated that the RGP did not object to the main Inquiry hearing proceeding alongside his investigation. You, as Chairman, therefore ruled upon the pending issues in a private ruling in March this year and published a public summary of that ruling on the Inquiry website. In summary, you concluded that in order to | 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 | my statement, which is the issues themselves. As I explained earlier, our first requests for evidence were sent to those who had a statutory role under the Police Act. Each witness gave differing accounts as to the reasons and circumstances leading to Mr McGrail ceasing to be Commissioner of Police. I will summarise them, but it should be noted that these are the witnesses' cases and allegations and not the Inquiry's conclusions or views. The first statement that we received was from Mr Nick Pyle, the interim Governor at the time. His evidence is in Pyle 1, paragraph 13 |
| 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 | therefore agreed to adjourn consideration of these two issues to allow that investigation to proceed. In January 2024 SIO McVey updated the Inquiry on the progress of that investigation and indicated that the RGP did not object to the main Inquiry hearing proceeding alongside his investigation. You, as Chairman, therefore ruled upon the pending issues in a private ruling in March this year and published a public summary of that ruling on the Inquiry website. In summary, you concluded that in order to maintain the integrity of the Inquiry and to | 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 | my statement, which is the issues themselves. As I explained earlier, our first requests for evidence were sent to those who had a statutory role under the Police Act. Each witness gave differing accounts as to the reasons and circumstances leading to Mr McGrail ceasing to be Commissioner of Police. I will summarise them, but it should be noted that these are the witnesses' cases and allegations and not the Inquiry's conclusions or views. The first statement that we received was from Mr Nick Pyle, the interim Governor at the time. His evidence is in Pyle 1, paragraph 13 onwards, at bundle A240, but I will |
| 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 | therefore agreed to adjourn consideration of these two issues to allow that investigation to proceed. In January 2024 SIO McVey updated the Inquiry on the progress of that investigation and indicated that the RGP did not object to the main Inquiry hearing proceeding alongside his investigation. You, as Chairman, therefore ruled upon the pending issues in a private ruling in March this year and published a public summary of that ruling on the Inquiry website. In summary, you concluded that in order to maintain the integrity of the Inquiry and to retain public confidence, the Inquiry should | 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 | my statement, which is the issues themselves. As I explained earlier, our first requests for evidence were sent to those who had a statutory role under the Police Act. Each witness gave differing accounts as to the reasons and circumstances leading to Mr McGrail ceasing to be Commissioner of Police. I will summarise them, but it should be noted that these are the witnesses' cases and allegations and not the Inquiry's conclusions or views. The first statement that we received was from Mr Nick Pyle, the interim Governor at the time. His evidence is in Pyle 1, paragraph 13 onwards, at bundle A240, but I will summarise it as follows. On 13 May 2020 |
| 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 | therefore agreed to adjourn consideration of these two issues to allow that investigation to proceed. In January 2024 SIO McVey updated the Inquiry on the progress of that investigation and indicated that the RGP did not object to the main Inquiry hearing proceeding alongside his investigation. You, as Chairman, therefore ruled upon the pending issues in a private ruling in March this year and published a public summary of that ruling on the Inquiry website. In summary, you concluded that in order to maintain the integrity of the Inquiry and to retain public confidence, the Inquiry should seek evidence and disclosure of the | 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 | my statement, which is the issues themselves. As I explained earlier, our first requests for evidence were sent to those who had a statutory role under the Police Act. Each witness gave differing accounts as to the reasons and circumstances leading to Mr McGrail ceasing to be Commissioner of Police. I will summarise them, but it should be noted that these are the witnesses' cases and allegations and not the Inquiry's conclusions or views. The first statement that we received was from Mr Nick Pyle, the interim Governor at the time. His evidence is in Pyle 1, paragraph 13 onwards, at bundle A240, but I will summarise it as follows. On 13 May 2020 Mr Pyle received a telephone call from the |
| 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 | therefore agreed to adjourn consideration of these two issues to allow that investigation to proceed. In January 2024 SIO McVey updated the Inquiry on the progress of that investigation and indicated that the RGP did not object to the main Inquiry hearing proceeding alongside his investigation. You, as Chairman, therefore ruled upon the pending issues in a private ruling in March this year and published a public summary of that ruling on the Inquiry website. In summary, you concluded that in order to maintain the integrity of the Inquiry and to retain public confidence, the Inquiry should seek evidence and disclosure of the circumstances in which the statements came | 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 | my statement, which is the issues themselves. As I explained earlier, our first requests for evidence were sent to those who had a statutory role under the Police Act. Each witness gave differing accounts as to the reasons and circumstances leading to Mr McGrail ceasing to be Commissioner of Police. I will summarise them, but it should be noted that these are the witnesses' cases and allegations and not the Inquiry's conclusions or views. The first statement that we received was from Mr Nick Pyle, the interim Governor at the time. His evidence is in Pyle 1, paragraph 13 onwards, at bundle A240, but I will summarise it as follows. On 13 May 2020 Mr Pyle received a telephone call from the Chief Minister saying he wished to discuss |
| 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 | therefore agreed to adjourn consideration of these two issues to allow that investigation to proceed. In January 2024 SIO McVey updated the Inquiry on the progress of that investigation and indicated that the RGP did not object to the main Inquiry hearing proceeding alongside his investigation. You, as Chairman, therefore ruled upon the pending issues in a private ruling in March this year and published a public summary of that ruling on the Inquiry website. In summary, you concluded that in order to maintain the integrity of the Inquiry and to retain public confidence, the Inquiry should seek evidence and disclosure of the circumstances in which the statements came to be made. In accordance with that ruling, | 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 | my statement, which is the issues themselves. As I explained earlier, our first requests for evidence were sent to those who had a statutory role under the Police Act. Each witness gave differing accounts as to the reasons and circumstances leading to Mr McGrail ceasing to be Commissioner of Police. I will summarise them, but it should be noted that these are the witnesses' cases and allegations and not the Inquiry's conclusions or views. The first statement that we received was from Mr Nick Pyle, the interim Governor at the time. His evidence is in Pyle 1, paragraph 13 onwards, at bundle A240, but I will summarise it as follows. On 13 May 2020 Mr Pyle received a telephone call from the Chief Minister saying he wished to discuss an important issue surrounding the RGP with |
| 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 | therefore agreed to adjourn consideration of these two issues to allow that investigation to proceed. In January 2024 SIO McVey updated the Inquiry on the progress of that investigation and indicated that the RGP did not object to the main Inquiry hearing proceeding alongside his investigation. You, as Chairman, therefore ruled upon the pending issues in a private ruling in March this year and published a public summary of that ruling on the Inquiry website. In summary, you concluded that in order to maintain the integrity of the Inquiry and to retain public confidence, the Inquiry should seek evidence and disclosure of the circumstances in which the statements came to be made. In accordance with that ruling, the solicitor to the Inquiry has written to the | 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 | my statement, which is the issues themselves. As I explained earlier, our first requests for evidence were sent to those who had a statutory role under the Police Act. Each witness gave differing accounts as to the reasons and circumstances leading to Mr McGrail ceasing to be Commissioner of Police. I will summarise them, but it should be noted that these are the witnesses' cases and allegations and not the Inquiry's conclusions or views. The first statement that we received was from Mr Nick Pyle, the interim Governor at the time. His evidence is in Pyle 1, paragraph 13 onwards, at bundle A240, but I will summarise it as follows. On 13 May 2020 Mr Pyle received a telephone call from the Chief Minister saying he wished to discuss an important issue surrounding the RGP with him. Mr Pyle's response was that this was a |
| 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 | therefore agreed to adjourn consideration of these two issues to allow that investigation to proceed. In January 2024 SIO McVey updated the Inquiry on the progress of that investigation and indicated that the RGP did not object to the main Inquiry hearing proceeding alongside his investigation. You, as Chairman, therefore ruled upon the pending issues in a private ruling in March this year and published a public summary of that ruling on the Inquiry website. In summary, you concluded that in order to maintain the integrity of the Inquiry and to retain public confidence, the Inquiry should seek evidence and disclosure of the circumstances in which the statements came to be made. In accordance with that ruling, the solicitor to the Inquiry has written to the 19 witnesses, to the Chief Minister and to Mr | 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 | my statement, which is the issues themselves. As I explained earlier, our first requests for evidence were sent to those who had a statutory role under the Police Act. Each witness gave differing accounts as to the reasons and circumstances leading to Mr McGrail ceasing to be Commissioner of Police. I will summarise them, but it should be noted that these are the witnesses' cases and allegations and not the Inquiry's conclusions or views. The first statement that we received was from Mr Nick Pyle, the interim Governor at the time. His evidence is in Pyle 1, paragraph 13 onwards, at bundle A240, but I will summarise it as follows. On 13 May 2020 Mr Pyle received a telephone call from the Chief Minister saying he wished to discuss an important issue surrounding the RGP with him. Mr Pyle's response was that this was a remarkable coincidence because he wanted to |
| 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24 | therefore agreed to adjourn consideration of these two issues to allow that investigation to proceed. In January 2024 SIO McVey updated the Inquiry on the progress of that investigation and indicated that the RGP did not object to the main Inquiry hearing proceeding alongside his investigation. You, as Chairman, therefore ruled upon the pending issues in a private ruling in March this year and published a public summary of that ruling on the Inquiry website. In summary, you concluded that in order to maintain the integrity of the Inquiry and to retain public confidence, the Inquiry should seek evidence and disclosure of the circumstances in which the statements came to be made. In accordance with that ruling, the solicitor to the Inquiry has written to the 19 witnesses, to the Chief Minister and to Mr Crone to request evidence and/or disclosure | 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24 | my statement, which is the issues themselves. As I explained earlier, our first requests for evidence were sent to those who had a statutory role under the Police Act. Each witness gave differing accounts as to the reasons and circumstances leading to Mr McGrail ceasing to be Commissioner of Police. I will summarise them, but it should be noted that these are the witnesses' cases and allegations and not the Inquiry's conclusions or views. The first statement that we received was from Mr Nick Pyle, the interim Governor at the time. His evidence is in Pyle 1, paragraph 13 onwards, at bundle A240, but I will summarise it as follows. On 13 May 2020 Mr Pyle received a telephone call from the Chief Minister saying he wished to discuss an important issue surrounding the RGP with him. Mr Pyle's response was that this was a remarkable coincidence because he wanted to discuss his deep concerns about the RGP's |
| 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 | therefore agreed to adjourn consideration of these two issues to allow that investigation to proceed. In January 2024 SIO McVey updated the Inquiry on the progress of that investigation and indicated that the RGP did not object to the main Inquiry hearing proceeding alongside his investigation. You, as Chairman, therefore ruled upon the pending issues in a private ruling in March this year and published a public summary of that ruling on the Inquiry website. In summary, you concluded that in order to maintain the integrity of the Inquiry and to retain public confidence, the Inquiry should seek evidence and disclosure of the circumstances in which the statements came to be made. In accordance with that ruling, the solicitor to the Inquiry has written to the 19 witnesses, to the Chief Minister and to Mr | 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 | my statement, which is the issues themselves. As I explained earlier, our first requests for evidence were sent to those who had a statutory role under the Police Act. Each witness gave differing accounts as to the reasons and circumstances leading to Mr McGrail ceasing to be Commissioner of Police. I will summarise them, but it should be noted that these are the witnesses' cases and allegations and not the Inquiry's conclusions or views. The first statement that we received was from Mr Nick Pyle, the interim Governor at the time. His evidence is in Pyle 1, paragraph 13 onwards, at bundle A240, but I will summarise it as follows. On 13 May 2020 Mr Pyle received a telephone call from the Chief Minister saying he wished to discuss an important issue surrounding the RGP with him. Mr Pyle's response was that this was a remarkable coincidence because he wanted to |
| 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24 | therefore agreed to adjourn consideration of these two issues to allow that investigation to proceed. In January 2024 SIO McVey updated the Inquiry on the progress of that investigation and indicated that the RGP did not object to the main Inquiry hearing proceeding alongside his investigation. You, as Chairman, therefore ruled upon the pending issues in a private ruling in March this year and published a public summary of that ruling on the Inquiry website. In summary, you concluded that in order to maintain the integrity of the Inquiry and to retain public confidence, the Inquiry should seek evidence and disclosure of the circumstances in which the statements came to be made. In accordance with that ruling, the solicitor to the Inquiry has written to the 19 witnesses, to the Chief Minister and to Mr Crone to request evidence and/or disclosure | 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24 | my statement, which is the issues themselves. As I explained earlier, our first requests for evidence were sent to those who had a statutory role under the Police Act. Each witness gave differing accounts as to the reasons and circumstances leading to Mr McGrail ceasing to be Commissioner of Police. I will summarise them, but it should be noted that these are the witnesses' cases and allegations and not the Inquiry's conclusions or views. The first statement that we received was from Mr Nick Pyle, the interim Governor at the time. His evidence is in Pyle 1, paragraph 13 onwards, at bundle A240, but I will summarise it as follows. On 13 May 2020 Mr Pyle received a telephone call from the Chief Minister saying he wished to discuss an important issue surrounding the RGP with him. Mr Pyle's response was that this was a remarkable coincidence because he wanted to discuss his deep concerns about the RGP's |

| agreed to meet the next day. On 15 May 2 2020 during a meeting the Chief Minister and Mr Pyle agreed that they had both lost confidence in Mr McGrail as Commissioner of Police for reasons that they discussed. Mr Pyle's loss of confidence in Mr McGrail's probity and integrity and his leadership of the RGP had been progressive over a period of time and by reason of a number of incidents and matters. He listed five matters. First, what we refer to as the airport incident on 8 February 2017. This is where Mr Pyle says his concerns over the leadership of the RGP and the behaviour and judgment of Mr McGrail in particular started. I will go into this in more detail in due course but it relates to a dispute between the Ministry of Defence and the RGP as to jurisdiction over an employee of the MoD who was suspected of criminal activity. The dispute ultimately resulted in a standoff on the runway at Gibraltar Airport with RGP officers driving vehicles onto the runway to prevent an RAF plane on which the individual was boarded | already causing him concern and causing him to begin to lose confidence in him. Mr Pyle also refers to anecdotal stories of bad practice and behaviours by the RGP but says he did not feel it possible to act on them, although they contributed to his growing sense of unease. Fourth, there is the report by Her Majesty's Inspectorate Constabulary and Fire and Rescue Services, known as the HMIC report, which was published in April 2020 and which Mr Pyle says found that only two of the eight recommendations in the prior report in 2016 had been met. Mr Pyle describes it as a damning report which he put down culture and leadership. In Mr Pyle's view, the report reflected deterioration rather than progress at the RGP as a result of Mr McGrail's management style, and to some extent validated the GPS(sic) grievances. Fifth and finally, there is the collision at sea on 8 March 2020, a collision between an RGP vessel and a rigid hull inflatable boat or rib, as a result of which two persons on the |
|---|--|
| 25 from taking off and the subsequent arrest of | 25 rib were killed, which was later discovered to |
| Page 29 | Page 31 |
| three senior MoD personnel on 1 March 2 2017. Second, there is what we call the helicopter pilot assault investigation. Mr Pyle refers to a helicopter pilot and another member of crew being assaulted in a bar in Gibraltar with the pilot fracturing a check or jaw bone preventing him from flying. He refers to the RGP stating after several weeks that the forensic evidence they collected was inconclusive and says that the widely held belief in MoD circles was that the RGP did not investigate the crime correctly to protect those involved in the attack. Third, there is Mr McGrail's fractured relationship with the Gibraltar Police Federation, a Federation which represented junior offices in the RGP. Mr Pyle puts this down to Mr McGrail's management style and says that the tension led to allegations of bullying and intimidation regularly being discussed by the Gibraltar Police Authority. Mr Pyle says this was at a lower level of gravity but fitted into the pattern of behaviours by Mr McGrail which was | have taken place in Spanish waters. Mr Pyle's main complaints are that, firstly, Mr McGrail deliberately withheld from him important information about the nature of his understanding of the location of the collision, only telling him that it was highly likely that the incident took place outside British Gibraltar territorial waters on 11 March, three days later. Secondly, that a draft report into the incident, known as the SOLAS Report, found that there was a lack of marine section management standards and oversight over pursuit methods and patrols and there was no proper training in pursuits of suspect vessels. Mr Pyle's evidence is that he and the Chief Minister agreed to seek a meeting with the chairman of the GPA, Dr Britto, during which they would ask the GPA to invite Mr McGrail to retire under section 34 of the Police Act, and that meeting was held at the convent on 18 May 2020. I will go into the procedure that followed later on, but for present purposes it suffices to note that there was a GPA process which the GPA ultimately accepted to be procedurally |
| Page 30 | Page 32 |

| 1 | flawed. Although he was a member of the | 1 | on 26 May 2022. I can summarise his |
|--|--|--|---|
| 2 | GPA, Mr Pyle did not participate in that | 2 | evidence as follows. The immediate cause of |
| 3 | process, given his position as Interim | 3 | Mr McGrail's retirement, according to the |
| 4 | Governor. Mr Pyle then met with the Chief | 4 | Chief Minister, was his email to the GPA on |
| 5 | Minister and the Attorney General and | 5 | 5 June 2020 referring to the unfairness of his |
| 6 | agreed to speak to Mr McGrail on 5 June, the | 6 | treatment and the improper pressure put on |
| 7 | Friday, and inform him that he was prepared | 7 | him to alter the course of a live investigation, |
| 8 | to call for his resignation under section 13 of | 8 | although the Chief Minister points out that by |
| 9 | the Police Act, but that he would read all | 9 | that point Mr McGrail knew that both the |
| 10 | relevant papers over the weekend and then | 10 | Governor and the Chief Minister had lost |
| 11 | inform Mr McGrail of his decision on the | 11 | confidence in him, and why that was the |
| 12 | Monday, 8 June. | 12 | case. |
| 13 | On 8 June Mr Pyle again met Mr McGrail | 13 | As to why he lost confidence in Mr McGrail, |
| 14 | and Mr McGrail confirmed his intention to | 14 | the Chief Minister refers to five matters |
| 15 | retire subject to terms being agreed. Those | 15 | which overlap to some extent but not entirely |
| 16 | terms were agreed late that night, and on 9 | 16 | with Mr Pyle's. |
| 17 | June Mr McGrail wrote to Mr Pyle | 17 | First, we have the airport incident which I |
| 18 | requesting early retirement on terms set out | 18 | have already referred to in the context of Mr |
| 19 | in that letter, which we will turn to in due | 19 | Pyle's evidence. |
| 20 | | 20 | Second, we have the collision at sea, which |
| 20 | course. That was approved by Mr Pyle and | 21 | again I have referred to in relation to Mr |
| 22 | Mr McGrail relinquished command at 6 p.m. on 9 June 2020. | 21 22 | <u> </u> |
| | | 22 23 | Pyle. From the Chief Minister's perspective, |
| 23 | The second statement which we received was | 23 | there was the added issue of a failure by Mr |
| 24 | from Dr Britto, the chair of the GPA, who | | McGrail, as the Chief Minister saw it, to |
| 25 | confirms that the Interim Governor invited | 25 | inform him of claims being made against the |
| | Page 33 | | Page 35 |
| | 0 | | O |
| | | | |
| 1 | him to a meeting at the convent with the | 1 | RGP in respect of the collision. Again, I will |
| 1 2 | him to a meeting at the convent with the Chief Minister on 18 May 2020 and that they | 1 2 | RGP in respect of the collision. Again, I will cover this in more detail later in this |
| 2 | Chief Minister on 18 May 2020 and that they | 2 | cover this in more detail later in this |
| | | 2 3 | cover this in more detail later in this statement, but the Chief Minister says that |
| 2 3 | Chief Minister on 18 May 2020 and that they informed him that they had both lost | 2 | cover this in more detail later in this |
| 2 3 4 5 | Chief Minister on 18 May 2020 and that they informed him that they had both lost confidence with Mr McGrail and then asked the GPA to commence the section 34 Police | 2 3 4 5 | cover this in more detail later in this statement, but the Chief Minister says that this prompted him to request a factual report from Mr McGrail on incident under section |
| 2 3 4 | Chief Minister on 18 May 2020 and that they informed him that they had both lost confidence with Mr McGrail and then asked the GPA to commence the section 34 Police Act procedure. Again, I will go into that | 2 3 4 | cover this in more detail later in this statement, but the Chief Minister says that this prompted him to request a factual report from Mr McGrail on incident under section 15.1(a) of the Police Act 2006. |
| 2 3 4 5 6 7 | Chief Minister on 18 May 2020 and that they informed him that they had both lost confidence with Mr McGrail and then asked the GPA to commence the section 34 Police Act procedure. Again, I will go into that procedure in more detail in due course but Dr | 2 3 4 5 6 7 | cover this in more detail later in this statement, but the Chief Minister says that this prompted him to request a factual report from Mr McGrail on incident under section 15.1(a) of the Police Act 2006. Third, there is the HMIC report which the |
| 2 3 4 5 6 | Chief Minister on 18 May 2020 and that they informed him that they had both lost confidence with Mr McGrail and then asked the GPA to commence the section 34 Police Act procedure. Again, I will go into that procedure in more detail in due course but Dr Britto confirms that the GPA was advised by | 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 | cover this in more detail later in this statement, but the Chief Minister says that this prompted him to request a factual report from Mr McGrail on incident under section 15.1(a) of the Police Act 2006. Third, there is the HMIC report which the Chief Minister says he only read in detail |
| 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 | Chief Minister on 18 May 2020 and that they informed him that they had both lost confidence with Mr McGrail and then asked the GPA to commence the section 34 Police Act procedure. Again, I will go into that procedure in more detail in due course but Dr Britto confirms that the GPA was advised by its lawyer, Mr James Neish KC, that its | 2 3 4 5 6 7 | cover this in more detail later in this statement, but the Chief Minister says that this prompted him to request a factual report from Mr McGrail on incident under section 15.1(a) of the Police Act 2006. Third, there is the HMIC report which the Chief Minister says he only read in detail some time after publication and which he |
| 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 | Chief Minister on 18 May 2020 and that they informed him that they had both lost confidence with Mr McGrail and then asked the GPA to commence the section 34 Police Act procedure. Again, I will go into that procedure in more detail in due course but Dr Britto confirms that the GPA was advised by its lawyer, Mr James Neish KC, that its procedure had been fundamentally flawed | 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 | cover this in more detail later in this statement, but the Chief Minister says that this prompted him to request a factual report from Mr McGrail on incident under section 15.1(a) of the Police Act 2006. Third, there is the HMIC report which the Chief Minister says he only read in detail some time after publication and which he found to be very damning. He considered |
| 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 | Chief Minister on 18 May 2020 and that they informed him that they had both lost confidence with Mr McGrail and then asked the GPA to commence the section 34 Police Act procedure. Again, I will go into that procedure in more detail in due course but Dr Britto confirms that the GPA was advised by its lawyer, Mr James Neish KC, that its procedure had been fundamentally flawed and so it ultimately withdrew its invitation to | 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 | cover this in more detail later in this statement, but the Chief Minister says that this prompted him to request a factual report from Mr McGrail on incident under section 15.1(a) of the Police Act 2006. Third, there is the HMIC report which the Chief Minister says he only read in detail some time after publication and which he found to be very damning. He considered that the report reflected on Mr McGrail's |
| 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 | Chief Minister on 18 May 2020 and that they informed him that they had both lost confidence with Mr McGrail and then asked the GPA to commence the section 34 Police Act procedure. Again, I will go into that procedure in more detail in due course but Dr Britto confirms that the GPA was advised by its lawyer, Mr James Neish KC, that its procedure had been fundamentally flawed and so it ultimately withdrew its invitation to Mr McGrail to retire. The GPA wrote to Mr | 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 | cover this in more detail later in this statement, but the Chief Minister says that this prompted him to request a factual report from Mr McGrail on incident under section 15.1(a) of the Police Act 2006. Third, there is the HMIC report which the Chief Minister says he only read in detail some time after publication and which he found to be very damning. He considered that the report reflected on Mr McGrail's ability to maintain the efficiency and |
| 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 | Chief Minister on 18 May 2020 and that they informed him that they had both lost confidence with Mr McGrail and then asked the GPA to commence the section 34 Police Act procedure. Again, I will go into that procedure in more detail in due course but Dr Britto confirms that the GPA was advised by its lawyer, Mr James Neish KC, that its procedure had been fundamentally flawed and so it ultimately withdrew its invitation to Mr McGrail to retire. The GPA wrote to Mr McGrail's lawyers, Gomez & Co., informing | 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 | cover this in more detail later in this statement, but the Chief Minister says that this prompted him to request a factual report from Mr McGrail on incident under section 15.1(a) of the Police Act 2006. Third, there is the HMIC report which the Chief Minister says he only read in detail some time after publication and which he found to be very damning. He considered that the report reflected on Mr McGrail's ability to maintain the efficiency and effectiveness of the RGP and was not |
| 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 | Chief Minister on 18 May 2020 and that they informed him that they had both lost confidence with Mr McGrail and then asked the GPA to commence the section 34 Police Act procedure. Again, I will go into that procedure in more detail in due course but Dr Britto confirms that the GPA was advised by its lawyer, Mr James Neish KC, that its procedure had been fundamentally flawed and so it ultimately withdrew its invitation to Mr McGrail to retire. The GPA wrote to Mr McGrail's lawyers, Gomez & Co., informing them of this on 5 June 2020, and on the same | 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 | cover this in more detail later in this statement, but the Chief Minister says that this prompted him to request a factual report from Mr McGrail on incident under section 15.1(a) of the Police Act 2006. Third, there is the HMIC report which the Chief Minister says he only read in detail some time after publication and which he found to be very damning. He considered that the report reflected on Mr McGrail's ability to maintain the efficiency and effectiveness of the RGP and was not confident that Mr McGrail could be the |
| 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 | Chief Minister on 18 May 2020 and that they informed him that they had both lost confidence with Mr McGrail and then asked the GPA to commence the section 34 Police Act procedure. Again, I will go into that procedure in more detail in due course but Dr Britto confirms that the GPA was advised by its lawyer, Mr James Neish KC, that its procedure had been fundamentally flawed and so it ultimately withdrew its invitation to Mr McGrail to retire. The GPA wrote to Mr McGrail's lawyers, Gomez & Co., informing them of this on 5 June 2020, and on the same day Mr McGrail's lawyers wrote in response | 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 | cover this in more detail later in this statement, but the Chief Minister says that this prompted him to request a factual report from Mr McGrail on incident under section 15.1(a) of the Police Act 2006. Third, there is the HMIC report which the Chief Minister says he only read in detail some time after publication and which he found to be very damning. He considered that the report reflected on Mr McGrail's ability to maintain the efficiency and effectiveness of the RGP and was not confident that Mr McGrail could be the person to address the HMIC |
| 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 | Chief Minister on 18 May 2020 and that they informed him that they had both lost confidence with Mr McGrail and then asked the GPA to commence the section 34 Police Act procedure. Again, I will go into that procedure in more detail in due course but Dr Britto confirms that the GPA was advised by its lawyer, Mr James Neish KC, that its procedure had been fundamentally flawed and so it ultimately withdrew its invitation to Mr McGrail to retire. The GPA wrote to Mr McGrail's lawyers, Gomez & Co., informing them of this on 5 June 2020, and on the same day Mr McGrail's lawyers wrote in response stating that given the unfair treatment which | 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 | cover this in more detail later in this statement, but the Chief Minister says that this prompted him to request a factual report from Mr McGrail on incident under section 15.1(a) of the Police Act 2006. Third, there is the HMIC report which the Chief Minister says he only read in detail some time after publication and which he found to be very damning. He considered that the report reflected on Mr McGrail's ability to maintain the efficiency and effectiveness of the RGP and was not confident that Mr McGrail could be the person to address the HMIC recommendations given his failure to act |
| 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 | Chief Minister on 18 May 2020 and that they informed him that they had both lost confidence with Mr McGrail and then asked the GPA to commence the section 34 Police Act procedure. Again, I will go into that procedure in more detail in due course but Dr Britto confirms that the GPA was advised by its lawyer, Mr James Neish KC, that its procedure had been fundamentally flawed and so it ultimately withdrew its invitation to Mr McGrail to retire. The GPA wrote to Mr McGrail's lawyers, Gomez & Co., informing them of this on 5 June 2020, and on the same day Mr McGrail's lawyers wrote in response stating that given the unfair treatment which Mr McGrail had been subjected to and the | 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 | cover this in more detail later in this statement, but the Chief Minister says that this prompted him to request a factual report from Mr McGrail on incident under section 15.1(a) of the Police Act 2006. Third, there is the HMIC report which the Chief Minister says he only read in detail some time after publication and which he found to be very damning. He considered that the report reflected on Mr McGrail's ability to maintain the efficiency and effectiveness of the RGP and was not confident that Mr McGrail could be the person to address the HMIC recommendations given his failure to act since 2018. |
| 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 | Chief Minister on 18 May 2020 and that they informed him that they had both lost confidence with Mr McGrail and then asked the GPA to commence the section 34 Police Act procedure. Again, I will go into that procedure in more detail in due course but Dr Britto confirms that the GPA was advised by its lawyer, Mr James Neish KC, that its procedure had been fundamentally flawed and so it ultimately withdrew its invitation to Mr McGrail to retire. The GPA wrote to Mr McGrail's lawyers, Gomez & Co., informing them of this on 5 June 2020, and on the same day Mr McGrail's lawyers wrote in response stating that given the unfair treatment which Mr McGrail had been subjected to and the improper pressure put on him to alter the | 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 | cover this in more detail later in this statement, but the Chief Minister says that this prompted him to request a factual report from Mr McGrail on incident under section 15.1(a) of the Police Act 2006. Third, there is the HMIC report which the Chief Minister says he only read in detail some time after publication and which he found to be very damning. He considered that the report reflected on Mr McGrail's ability to maintain the efficiency and effectiveness of the RGP and was not confident that Mr McGrail could be the person to address the HMIC recommendations given his failure to act since 2018. Fourth, there is the relationship with the |
| 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 | Chief Minister on 18 May 2020 and that they informed him that they had both lost confidence with Mr McGrail and then asked the GPA to commence the section 34 Police Act procedure. Again, I will go into that procedure in more detail in due course but Dr Britto confirms that the GPA was advised by its lawyer, Mr James Neish KC, that its procedure had been fundamentally flawed and so it ultimately withdrew its invitation to Mr McGrail to retire. The GPA wrote to Mr McGrail's lawyers, Gomez & Co., informing them of this on 5 June 2020, and on the same day Mr McGrail's lawyers wrote in response stating that given the unfair treatment which Mr McGrail had been subjected to and the improper pressure put on him to alter the course of a live criminal investigation, Mr | 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 | cover this in more detail later in this statement, but the Chief Minister says that this prompted him to request a factual report from Mr McGrail on incident under section 15.1(a) of the Police Act 2006. Third, there is the HMIC report which the Chief Minister says he only read in detail some time after publication and which he found to be very damning. He considered that the report reflected on Mr McGrail's ability to maintain the efficiency and effectiveness of the RGP and was not confident that Mr McGrail could be the person to address the HMIC recommendations given his failure to act since 2018. Fourth, there is the relationship with the Gibraltar Police Federation which the Chief |
| 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 | Chief Minister on 18 May 2020 and that they informed him that they had both lost confidence with Mr McGrail and then asked the GPA to commence the section 34 Police Act procedure. Again, I will go into that procedure in more detail in due course but Dr Britto confirms that the GPA was advised by its lawyer, Mr James Neish KC, that its procedure had been fundamentally flawed and so it ultimately withdrew its invitation to Mr McGrail to retire. The GPA wrote to Mr McGrail's lawyers, Gomez & Co., informing them of this on 5 June 2020, and on the same day Mr McGrail's lawyers wrote in response stating that given the unfair treatment which Mr McGrail had been subjected to and the improper pressure put on him to alter the course of a live criminal investigation, Mr McGrail felt he must apply for early | 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 | cover this in more detail later in this statement, but the Chief Minister says that this prompted him to request a factual report from Mr McGrail on incident under section 15.1(a) of the Police Act 2006. Third, there is the HMIC report which the Chief Minister says he only read in detail some time after publication and which he found to be very damning. He considered that the report reflected on Mr McGrail's ability to maintain the efficiency and effectiveness of the RGP and was not confident that Mr McGrail could be the person to address the HMIC recommendations given his failure to act since 2018. Fourth, there is the relationship with the Gibraltar Police Federation which the Chief Minister says did not cause him to lose |
| 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 | Chief Minister on 18 May 2020 and that they informed him that they had both lost confidence with Mr McGrail and then asked the GPA to commence the section 34 Police Act procedure. Again, I will go into that procedure in more detail in due course but Dr Britto confirms that the GPA was advised by its lawyer, Mr James Neish KC, that its procedure had been fundamentally flawed and so it ultimately withdrew its invitation to Mr McGrail to retire. The GPA wrote to Mr McGrail's lawyers, Gomez & Co., informing them of this on 5 June 2020, and on the same day Mr McGrail's lawyers wrote in response stating that given the unfair treatment which Mr McGrail had been subjected to and the improper pressure put on him to alter the course of a live criminal investigation, Mr McGrail felt he must apply for early retirement. Dr Britto had no further | 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 | cover this in more detail later in this statement, but the Chief Minister says that this prompted him to request a factual report from Mr McGrail on incident under section 15.1(a) of the Police Act 2006. Third, there is the HMIC report which the Chief Minister says he only read in detail some time after publication and which he found to be very damning. He considered that the report reflected on Mr McGrail's ability to maintain the efficiency and effectiveness of the RGP and was not confident that Mr McGrail could be the person to address the HMIC recommendations given his failure to act since 2018. Fourth, there is the relationship with the Gibraltar Police Federation which the Chief Minister says did not cause him to lose confidence in Mr McGrail but was a |
| 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 | Chief Minister on 18 May 2020 and that they informed him that they had both lost confidence with Mr McGrail and then asked the GPA to commence the section 34 Police Act procedure. Again, I will go into that procedure in more detail in due course but Dr Britto confirms that the GPA was advised by its lawyer, Mr James Neish KC, that its procedure had been fundamentally flawed and so it ultimately withdrew its invitation to Mr McGrail to retire. The GPA wrote to Mr McGrail's lawyers, Gomez & Co., informing them of this on 5 June 2020, and on the same day Mr McGrail's lawyers wrote in response stating that given the unfair treatment which Mr McGrail had been subjected to and the improper pressure put on him to alter the course of a live criminal investigation, Mr McGrail felt he must apply for early retirement. Dr Britto had no further involvement and learned on 8 June 2020 that | 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 | cover this in more detail later in this statement, but the Chief Minister says that this prompted him to request a factual report from Mr McGrail on incident under section 15.1(a) of the Police Act 2006. Third, there is the HMIC report which the Chief Minister says he only read in detail some time after publication and which he found to be very damning. He considered that the report reflected on Mr McGrail's ability to maintain the efficiency and effectiveness of the RGP and was not confident that Mr McGrail could be the person to address the HMIC recommendations given his failure to act since 2018. Fourth, there is the relationship with the Gibraltar Police Federation which the Chief Minister says did not cause him to lose confidence in Mr McGrail but was a demonstration of his very fractious and |
| 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 | Chief Minister on 18 May 2020 and that they informed him that they had both lost confidence with Mr McGrail and then asked the GPA to commence the section 34 Police Act procedure. Again, I will go into that procedure in more detail in due course but Dr Britto confirms that the GPA was advised by its lawyer, Mr James Neish KC, that its procedure had been fundamentally flawed and so it ultimately withdrew its invitation to Mr McGrail to retire. The GPA wrote to Mr McGrail's lawyers, Gomez & Co., informing them of this on 5 June 2020, and on the same day Mr McGrail's lawyers wrote in response stating that given the unfair treatment which Mr McGrail had been subjected to and the improper pressure put on him to alter the course of a live criminal investigation, Mr McGrail felt he must apply for early retirement. Dr Britto had no further involvement and learned on 8 June 2020 that Mr McGrail was negotiating his retirement. | 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 | cover this in more detail later in this statement, but the Chief Minister says that this prompted him to request a factual report from Mr McGrail on incident under section 15.1(a) of the Police Act 2006. Third, there is the HMIC report which the Chief Minister says he only read in detail some time after publication and which he found to be very damning. He considered that the report reflected on Mr McGrail's ability to maintain the efficiency and effectiveness of the RGP and was not confident that Mr McGrail could be the person to address the HMIC recommendations given his failure to act since 2018. Fourth, there is the relationship with the Gibraltar Police Federation which the Chief Minister says did not cause him to lose confidence in Mr McGrail but was a demonstration of his very fractious and difficult approach to relationships. |
| 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24 | Chief Minister on 18 May 2020 and that they informed him that they had both lost confidence with Mr McGrail and then asked the GPA to commence the section 34 Police Act procedure. Again, I will go into that procedure in more detail in due course but Dr Britto confirms that the GPA was advised by its lawyer, Mr James Neish KC, that its procedure had been fundamentally flawed and so it ultimately withdrew its invitation to Mr McGrail to retire. The GPA wrote to Mr McGrail's lawyers, Gomez & Co., informing them of this on 5 June 2020, and on the same day Mr McGrail's lawyers wrote in response stating that given the unfair treatment which Mr McGrail had been subjected to and the improper pressure put on him to alter the course of a live criminal investigation, Mr McGrail felt he must apply for early retirement. Dr Britto had no further involvement and learned on 8 June 2020 that Mr McGrail was negotiating his retirement. We next received a statement from the Chief | 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24 | cover this in more detail later in this statement, but the Chief Minister says that this prompted him to request a factual report from Mr McGrail on incident under section 15.1(a) of the Police Act 2006. Third, there is the HMIC report which the Chief Minister says he only read in detail some time after publication and which he found to be very damning. He considered that the report reflected on Mr McGrail's ability to maintain the efficiency and effectiveness of the RGP and was not confident that Mr McGrail could be the person to address the HMIC recommendations given his failure to act since 2018. Fourth, there is the relationship with the Gibraltar Police Federation which the Chief Minister says did not cause him to lose confidence in Mr McGrail but was a demonstration of his very fractious and difficult approach to relationships. Fifth and finally is what the Chief Minister |
| 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 | Chief Minister on 18 May 2020 and that they informed him that they had both lost confidence with Mr McGrail and then asked the GPA to commence the section 34 Police Act procedure. Again, I will go into that procedure in more detail in due course but Dr Britto confirms that the GPA was advised by its lawyer, Mr James Neish KC, that its procedure had been fundamentally flawed and so it ultimately withdrew its invitation to Mr McGrail to retire. The GPA wrote to Mr McGrail's lawyers, Gomez & Co., informing them of this on 5 June 2020, and on the same day Mr McGrail's lawyers wrote in response stating that given the unfair treatment which Mr McGrail had been subjected to and the improper pressure put on him to alter the course of a live criminal investigation, Mr McGrail felt he must apply for early retirement. Dr Britto had no further involvement and learned on 8 June 2020 that Mr McGrail was negotiating his retirement. | 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 | cover this in more detail later in this statement, but the Chief Minister says that this prompted him to request a factual report from Mr McGrail on incident under section 15.1(a) of the Police Act 2006. Third, there is the HMIC report which the Chief Minister says he only read in detail some time after publication and which he found to be very damning. He considered that the report reflected on Mr McGrail's ability to maintain the efficiency and effectiveness of the RGP and was not confident that Mr McGrail could be the person to address the HMIC recommendations given his failure to act since 2018. Fourth, there is the relationship with the Gibraltar Police Federation which the Chief Minister says did not cause him to lose confidence in Mr McGrail but was a demonstration of his very fractious and difficult approach to relationships. |
| 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24 | Chief Minister on 18 May 2020 and that they informed him that they had both lost confidence with Mr McGrail and then asked the GPA to commence the section 34 Police Act procedure. Again, I will go into that procedure in more detail in due course but Dr Britto confirms that the GPA was advised by its lawyer, Mr James Neish KC, that its procedure had been fundamentally flawed and so it ultimately withdrew its invitation to Mr McGrail to retire. The GPA wrote to Mr McGrail's lawyers, Gomez & Co., informing them of this on 5 June 2020, and on the same day Mr McGrail's lawyers wrote in response stating that given the unfair treatment which Mr McGrail had been subjected to and the improper pressure put on him to alter the course of a live criminal investigation, Mr McGrail felt he must apply for early retirement. Dr Britto had no further involvement and learned on 8 June 2020 that Mr McGrail was negotiating his retirement. We next received a statement from the Chief | 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24 | cover this in more detail later in this statement, but the Chief Minister says that this prompted him to request a factual report from Mr McGrail on incident under section 15.1(a) of the Police Act 2006. Third, there is the HMIC report which the Chief Minister says he only read in detail some time after publication and which he found to be very damning. He considered that the report reflected on Mr McGrail's ability to maintain the efficiency and effectiveness of the RGP and was not confident that Mr McGrail could be the person to address the HMIC recommendations given his failure to act since 2018. Fourth, there is the relationship with the Gibraltar Police Federation which the Chief Minister says did not cause him to lose confidence in Mr McGrail but was a demonstration of his very fractious and difficult approach to relationships. Fifth and finally is what the Chief Minister |

| 1 | important factor in his loss of confidence | 1 | to him, he lost all confidence in his probity |
|----|---|----|---|
| 2 | which was his dealings with Mr McGrail in | 2 | and integrity in their dealings and lost all |
| 3 | respect of the criminal investigation, | 3 | confidence generally in him as a result. |
| 4 | Operation Delhi. Unlike the other matters, | 4 | We received Mr McGrail's evidence on 20 |
| 5 | this was not something raised by the | 5 | June 2022. Mr McGrail's contention is that |
| 6 | Governor Mr Pyle as having caused a loss of | 6 | he was placed under improper pressure by |
| 7 | confidence on his part in Mr McGrail. | 7 | the Attorney General and the Chief Minister |
| 8 | Operation Delhi is a name for an | 8 | in relation to the Operation Delhi |
| 9 | investigation arising from a complaint by | 9 | investigation. Again, I will address this in |
| 10 | Bland Limited relating to the alleged conduct | 10 | full detail when I deal with the criminal |
| 11 | of two of its former employees, Mr Thomas | 11 | investigation in substance but to summarise |
| 12 | Cornelio and Mr John Berris. The | 12 | on 12 May at the meeting at Number 6 |
| 13 | investigation included matters relating to the | 13 | Convent Place, the day of the proposed |
| 14 | actions of a civil servant, Mr Sanchez, who | 14 | execution of the search warrants, Mr McGrail |
| 15 | had been the private secretary to the Deputy | 15 | says that he received what he calls a |
| 16 | Chief Minister, the Honourable Joseph | 16 | dressing-down of his 26-year law |
| 17 | Garcia. The investigation involved a new | 17 | enforcement career from the Chief Minister. |
| 18 | entity formed by the former employees of | 18 | He felt that the Chief Minister was |
| 19 | Bland Limited, 36 North Limited, in which | 19 | questioning an operational decision on a live |
| 20 | the partners of Hassans law firm held shares | 20 | criminal matter and that this was not |
| 21 | through another company, Astalon Limited. | 21 | appropriate. He specifically alleges that the |
| 22 | The Chief Minister attributes his loss of | 22 | Chief Minister said that there would be |
| 23 | confidence to a meeting between him, the | 23 | consequences if the RGP were found not to |
| 24 | Attorney General and Mr McGrail on 12 | 24 | have conducted themselves properly by a |
| 25 | May 2020, the day when the RGP attended | 25 | court, which he perceived as a threat. He |
| | 11111 2020, 010 0111 1110 1110 11101 0110100 | - | r, |
| | Page 37 | | Page 39 |
| 1 | the offices of Hassans with a view to | 1 | was also reprimanded by the Chief Minister |
| 2 | executing search warrants on the office and | 2 | for not having made the Attorney General |
| 3 | home of the senior partner of Hassans, Mr | 3 | aware of the team's intentions, and adds that |
| 4 | James Levy KC. The Chief Minister says | 4 | the Attorney General stated in a highly |
| 5 | that in that meeting after he had made clear | 5 | emotional tone that Mr McGrail had betrayed |
| 6 | to Mr McGrail that he considered that the | 6 | him by breaking the agreement they had |
| 7 | RGP had not acted properly in seeking to | 7 | reached. Mr McGrail says that that was |
| 8 | execute a search warrant in respect of Mr | 8 | incorrect; no such agreement had been |
| 9 | Levy, Mr McGrail said, among other things, | 9 | reached and in any event it was improper for |
| 10 | that he had taken the advice of the Attorney | 10 | the Attorney General to interfere on |
| 11 | General, something which Mr Llamas | 11 | operational matters. Mr McGrail's position is |
| 12 | denied, and that Mr McGrail then insisted | 12 | that the Attorney General misunderstood |
| 13 | that he had sought the advice of the Director | 13 | what was agreed which was that Mr McGrail |
| 14 | of Public Prosecutions, Christian Rocca KC, | 14 | would revert to him with the proposed |
| 15 | which the Attorney General later established | 15 | charges but not before all the key enquiries |
| 16 | by talking to the DPP was not true. | 16 | were completed including the search |
| 17 | Finally, the Attorney General also made the | 17 | warrants, as it would not make sense to do so |
| 18 | point that he and Mr McGrail had agreed that | 18 | before then. |
| 19 | there should be no further action on the | 19 | Subsequent meetings on 13, 15 and 20 May |
| 20 | criminal investigation without them speaking | 20 | with the Attorney General and others caused |
| 21 | further and that Mr McGrail had acted | 21 | Mr McGrail to feel that he was being |
| 22 | contrary to that agreement. | 22 | muscled out of progressing the investigation |
| 23 | The Chief Minister's position is that once he | 23 | with the Attorney General enquiring whether |
| 24 | | 24 | Mr Levy could be interviewed not under |
| ∠+ | established that Mr McGrail, the most senior | | |
| 25 | established that Mr McGrail, the most senior law enforcement officer in Gibraltar, had lied | 25 | · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · |
| | law enforcement officer in Gibraltar, had lied | 1 | caution and influencing the officers present |
| | | 1 | · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · |

| 1 | to consider ways to treat Mr Levy in a way | 1 | to Mr Pyle citing the immense pressure |
|----|--|----|--|
| 2 | other than as a suspect. I should say at this | 2 | placed on him and his family and the grave |
| 3 | juncture that this allegation is firmly denied | 3 | realisation that he can no longer count on the |
| 4 | by the Attorney General. | 4 | impartiality of the most senior members of |
| 5 | Mr McGrail denies the allegations levelled at | 5 | Gibraltar's Government, which left him with |
| 6 | him in respect of the airport incident, the | 6 | no choice but to apply for early retirement |
| 7 | collision at sea, the HMIC report, the Police | 7 | subject to agreement of appropriate terms. |
| 8 | Federation and the helicopter pilot assault | 8 | Following the meeting with Mr Pyle on 8 |
| 9 | investigation. | 9 | June, Mr McGrail considered that his best |
| 10 | On 22 May Dr Britto met with Mr McGrail | 10 | option was to find the best way out, given |
| 11 | and informed him that the Chief Minister and | 11 | that his mental health was very badly |
| 12 | the Attorney General had lost confidence in | 12 | affected and he did not want to jeopardise his |
| 13 | his ability to lead and manage the RGP. Dr | 13 | pension entitlements. |
| 14 | Britto also provided Mr McGrail with a letter | 14 | Those are the accounts from the four parties |
| 15 | formally notifying him of the exercise of the | 15 | who are part of the statutory process, and is |
| 16 | section 34.1 power inviting him to retire and | 16 | largely based on those four accounts that we |
| 17 | inviting representations from him but | 17 | formulated our provisional list of issues |
| 18 | providing limited detail. A second more | 18 | which I am now happy to rebrand as the list |
| 19 | detailed letter followed in response to a | 19 | of issues. The issues therefore for us to |
| 20 | request by Mr McGrail for more detail as to | 20 | consider over the next five weeks are: issue |
| 21 | the reasons for the GPA's invitation. There is | 21 | one, the airport incident; issue two, the |
| 22 | no dispute that the Chief Minister amended | 22 | helicopter pilot assault investigation; issue |
| 23 | that second letter to add more information as | 23 | three, the collision at sea; issue four, the |
| 24 | to his and Mr Pyle's reasons for their loss of | 24 | HMIC report; issue five, the conspiracy |
| 25 | confidence. The pressure of the situation led | 25 | investigation; issue six, the Federation |
| 23 | confidence. The pressure of the situation lea | 25 | investigation, issue six, the redefation |
| | Page 41 | | Page 43 |
| | | | |
| 1 | Mr McGrail to seek medical help and he was | 1 | complaints. Issue seven did not emerge from |
| 2 | diagnosed as suffering from clinical | 2 | these statements but rather from a WhatsApp |
| 3 | depression. | 3 | message disclosed by the Chief Minister in |
| 4 | On 5 June 2020 after the GPA withdrew its | 4 | the body of his first affidavit which can be |
| 5 | invitation due to the flawed process, Mr | 5 | found in bundle A page 198. This is a |
| 6 | McGrail's lawyers wrote to the GPA stating | 6 | message sent at 9.49 in the morning on 14 |
| 7 | that given how unfairly he had been treated | 7 | May 2020. If we can go to bundle A page |
| 8 | and the improper pressure put upon him to | 8 | 198, at the bottom of the page we can see the |
| 9 | alter the course of a live criminal | 9 | WhatsApp message which is from the Chief |
| 10 | investigation, he felt that he must apply for | 10 | Minister to Mr Pyle. It reads as follows: "Hi, |
| 11 | early retirement. On the following day Mr | 11 | this article has just appeared. A civil claim |
| 12 | Pyle emailed a letter to Mr McGrail asking | 12 | has been filed in Spain in Selta(?) by the |
| 13 | him whether he would be tendering his | 13 | families of the deceased in the incident with |
| 14 | resignation and this caused Mr McGrail great | 14 | the RGP off the east side. This is obviously |
| 15 | stress and concern. He was worried that Mr | 15 | going to cause us huge issues, damages, |
| 16 | Pyle was already exercising his powers under | 16 | claims, political problems, etc. I am totally |
| 17 | section 13 of the Police Act to call for Mr | 17 | there to support the officers on the front line. |
| 18 | McGrail's resignation as opposed to | 18 | I am starting to have huge concerns about the |
| 19 | retirement in an ultra vires manner, and he | 19 | senior management of the RGP. I will alert |
| 20 | also feared that if he was forced to resign he | 20 | to a particular matter when we meet but in |
| 21 | would lose all his pension rights. He says | 21 | terms of the past few months alone, (1) this |
| 22 | that by that point the loss of confidence | 22 | case of deaths occasioned outside of BGTW |
| 23 | between him and the Chief Minister, Mr Pyle | 23 | where the statute gives him no status as a |
| 24 | and the Attorney General was mutual and | 24 | police officer. (2) the HMIC inspection |
| 25 | therefore on 7 June 2020 his solicitor wrote | 25 | issues. (3) the Federation bullying |
| | Dago 42 | | Dago 44 |
| | Page 42 | | Page 44 |

| | | 1 | |
|--|--|--|---|
| 1 | allegations. (4) the incident where we had to | 1 | the order they are set out in the list of issues |
| 2 | go in to bat for them despite all aspects | 2 | that is in chronological order, except for |
| 3 | having clearly been mishandled by the RGP | 3 | issues two and seven which I will take |
| 4 | and parts of MoD also. (5) the continuing | 4 | together. |
| 5 | saga of the Alcaressa(?) claims. I think I will | 5 | Issue one is the airport incident. This |
| 6 | be asking Ian McGrail to provide more detail | 6 | incident occurred in early 2017 when Mr |
| 7 | and in writing as to what happened here and | 7 | Eddie Yome was Commissioner of Police. |
| 8 | what they are going to do to engage with | 8 | Mr McGrail was Superintendent responsible |
| 9 | these claims before there is any requirement | 9 | for crime and protective services. At the |
| 10 | that they do so. I am starting to lose | 10 | time, Leicestershire Police had reasonable |
| 11 | confidence here. Best wishes, Fabian." | 11 | grounds to suspect that serving member of |
| 12 | | 12 | the British Forces stationed in Gibraltar was |
| 13 | Neither the Chief Minister nor Mr Pyle refers in their evidence to the Alcaressa claims as a | 13 | |
| 13 | | 14 | in possession of indecent images of children on his IT devices. The serviceman was |
| | reason for loss of confidence, but given the | | |
| 15 | reference to them in this contemporaneous | 15 | initially arrested and his IT devices seized by |
| 16 | communication, we consider that this matter | 16 | the Joint Provost and Security Units. The |
| 17 | needed to be investigated. | 17 | Ministry of Defence believed that it had the |
| 18 | Issue 8 is the letter of 29 May 2020 sent by | 18 | power to make the arrest under the UK |
| 19 | Mr McGrail's lawyers, Charles Gomez & | 19 | Armed Forces Act 2006. Commissioner |
| 20 | Co., to the GPA in response to the GPA's | 20 | Yome instructed Mr McGrail to investigate |
| 21 | invitation to them to make submissions on | 21 | the matter and report to him, and Mr McGrail |
| 22 | the section 34 decision to invite him to seek | 22 | led the operation in close consultation with |
| 23 | early retirement. The Chief Minister and the | 23 | Commissioner Yome. They sought legal |
| 24 | Governor say that this letter cemented their | 24 | advice from the Attorney General and Senior |
| 25 | loss of confidence in Mr McGrail, and the | 25 | Crown Counsel, Ricky Rolder KC, who |
| | Page 45 | | Page 47 |
| | 1 age 43 | | 1 age 4/ |
| | | | |
| 1 | Attorney General says that this letter | 1 | advised that the serviceman's arrest and |
| | Attorney General says that this letter deepened his loss of confidence in Mr | l . | advised that the serviceman's arrest and detention and the seizure of his devices had |
| 2 | deepened his loss of confidence in Mr | 2 | detention and the seizure of his devices had |
| 2 3 | deepened his loss of confidence in Mr McGrail. | l . | detention and the seizure of his devices had been unlawful. The RGP's position was that |
| 2 3 4 | deepened his loss of confidence in Mr McGrail. Issue nine is Mr Pyle's stated intention as to | 2 3 4 | detention and the seizure of his devices had been unlawful. The RGP's position was that if the serviceman's computer contained |
| 2 3 4 5 | deepened his loss of confidence in Mr McGrail. Issue nine is Mr Pyle's stated intention as to his power under section 13 of the Police Act | 2 3 4 5 | detention and the seizure of his devices had been unlawful. The RGP's position was that if the serviceman's computer contained indecent images of children, they were now |
| 2 3 4 5 6 | deepened his loss of confidence in Mr McGrail. Issue nine is Mr Pyle's stated intention as to his power under section 13 of the Police Act to call for the resignation of Mr McGrail as | 2 3 4 5 6 | detention and the seizure of his devices had been unlawful. The RGP's position was that if the serviceman's computer contained indecent images of children, they were now in the jurisdiction of Gibraltar and in breach |
| 2 3 4 5 6 7 | deepened his loss of confidence in Mr McGrail. Issue nine is Mr Pyle's stated intention as to his power under section 13 of the Police Act to call for the resignation of Mr McGrail as well as the imminent commencement of Sir | 2 3 4 5 6 7 | detention and the seizure of his devices had been unlawful. The RGP's position was that if the serviceman's computer contained indecent images of children, they were now in the jurisdiction of Gibraltar and in breach of Gibraltar law. This gave rise to a firm |
| 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 | deepened his loss of confidence in Mr McGrail. Issue nine is Mr Pyle's stated intention as to his power under section 13 of the Police Act to call for the resignation of Mr McGrail as well as the imminent commencement of Sir David Steel as Governor. As we have heard, | 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 | detention and the seizure of his devices had been unlawful. The RGP's position was that if the serviceman's computer contained indecent images of children, they were now in the jurisdiction of Gibraltar and in breach of Gibraltar law. This gave rise to a firm disagreement between the MoD and the RGP |
| 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 | deepened his loss of confidence in Mr McGrail. Issue nine is Mr Pyle's stated intention as to his power under section 13 of the Police Act to call for the resignation of Mr McGrail as well as the imminent commencement of Sir David Steel as Governor. As we have heard, Mr McGrail cites Mr Pyle's intention as | 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 | detention and the seizure of his devices had been unlawful. The RGP's position was that if the serviceman's computer contained indecent images of children, they were now in the jurisdiction of Gibraltar and in breach of Gibraltar law. This gave rise to a firm disagreement between the MoD and the RGP as to who had jurisdiction over the |
| 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 | deepened his loss of confidence in Mr McGrail. Issue nine is Mr Pyle's stated intention as to his power under section 13 of the Police Act to call for the resignation of Mr McGrail as well as the imminent commencement of Sir David Steel as Governor. As we have heard, Mr McGrail cites Mr Pyle's intention as having a significant impact on his decision to | 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 | detention and the seizure of his devices had been unlawful. The RGP's position was that if the serviceman's computer contained indecent images of children, they were now in the jurisdiction of Gibraltar and in breach of Gibraltar law. This gave rise to a firm disagreement between the MoD and the RGP as to who had jurisdiction over the serviceman's actions, which continued |
| 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 | deepened his loss of confidence in Mr McGrail. Issue nine is Mr Pyle's stated intention as to his power under section 13 of the Police Act to call for the resignation of Mr McGrail as well as the imminent commencement of Sir David Steel as Governor. As we have heard, Mr McGrail cites Mr Pyle's intention as having a significant impact on his decision to seek early retirement. | 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 | detention and the seizure of his devices had been unlawful. The RGP's position was that if the serviceman's computer contained indecent images of children, they were now in the jurisdiction of Gibraltar and in breach of Gibraltar law. This gave rise to a firm disagreement between the MoD and the RGP as to who had jurisdiction over the serviceman's actions, which continued despite meetings and calls between Mr |
| 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 | deepened his loss of confidence in Mr McGrail. Issue nine is Mr Pyle's stated intention as to his power under section 13 of the Police Act to call for the resignation of Mr McGrail as well as the imminent commencement of Sir David Steel as Governor. As we have heard, Mr McGrail cites Mr Pyle's intention as having a significant impact on his decision to seek early retirement. Finally, as issue ten we have the GPA's | 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 | detention and the seizure of his devices had been unlawful. The RGP's position was that if the serviceman's computer contained indecent images of children, they were now in the jurisdiction of Gibraltar and in breach of Gibraltar law. This gave rise to a firm disagreement between the MoD and the RGP as to who had jurisdiction over the serviceman's actions, which continued despite meetings and calls between Mr McGrail and other senior officers on the one |
| 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 | deepened his loss of confidence in Mr McGrail. Issue nine is Mr Pyle's stated intention as to his power under section 13 of the Police Act to call for the resignation of Mr McGrail as well as the imminent commencement of Sir David Steel as Governor. As we have heard, Mr McGrail cites Mr Pyle's intention as having a significant impact on his decision to seek early retirement. Finally, as issue ten we have the GPA's process and decision and its subsequent | 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 | detention and the seizure of his devices had been unlawful. The RGP's position was that if the serviceman's computer contained indecent images of children, they were now in the jurisdiction of Gibraltar and in breach of Gibraltar law. This gave rise to a firm disagreement between the MoD and the RGP as to who had jurisdiction over the serviceman's actions, which continued despite meetings and calls between Mr McGrail and other senior officers on the one hand, and Provost Marshal Chris Collins and |
| 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 | deepened his loss of confidence in Mr McGrail. Issue nine is Mr Pyle's stated intention as to his power under section 13 of the Police Act to call for the resignation of Mr McGrail as well as the imminent commencement of Sir David Steel as Governor. As we have heard, Mr McGrail cites Mr Pyle's intention as having a significant impact on his decision to seek early retirement. Finally, as issue ten we have the GPA's process and decision and its subsequent withdrawal of that decision which is what Mr | 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 | detention and the seizure of his devices had been unlawful. The RGP's position was that if the serviceman's computer contained indecent images of children, they were now in the jurisdiction of Gibraltar and in breach of Gibraltar law. This gave rise to a firm disagreement between the MoD and the RGP as to who had jurisdiction over the serviceman's actions, which continued despite meetings and calls between Mr McGrail and other senior officers on the one hand, and Provost Marshal Chris Collins and Chief of Staff Colonel Frank Green on the |
| 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 | deepened his loss of confidence in Mr McGrail. Issue nine is Mr Pyle's stated intention as to his power under section 13 of the Police Act to call for the resignation of Mr McGrail as well as the imminent commencement of Sir David Steel as Governor. As we have heard, Mr McGrail cites Mr Pyle's intention as having a significant impact on his decision to seek early retirement. Finally, as issue ten we have the GPA's process and decision and its subsequent withdrawal of that decision which is what Mr Pyle says drove him to seek to exercise his | 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 | detention and the seizure of his devices had been unlawful. The RGP's position was that if the serviceman's computer contained indecent images of children, they were now in the jurisdiction of Gibraltar and in breach of Gibraltar law. This gave rise to a firm disagreement between the MoD and the RGP as to who had jurisdiction over the serviceman's actions, which continued despite meetings and calls between Mr McGrail and other senior officers on the one hand, and Provost Marshal Chris Collins and Chief of Staff Colonel Frank Green on the other. Eventually the RGP learned that the |
| 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 | deepened his loss of confidence in Mr McGrail. Issue nine is Mr Pyle's stated intention as to his power under section 13 of the Police Act to call for the resignation of Mr McGrail as well as the imminent commencement of Sir David Steel as Governor. As we have heard, Mr McGrail cites Mr Pyle's intention as having a significant impact on his decision to seek early retirement. Finally, as issue ten we have the GPA's process and decision and its subsequent withdrawal of that decision which is what Mr Pyle says drove him to seek to exercise his power under section 13. | 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 | detention and the seizure of his devices had been unlawful. The RGP's position was that if the serviceman's computer contained indecent images of children, they were now in the jurisdiction of Gibraltar and in breach of Gibraltar law. This gave rise to a firm disagreement between the MoD and the RGP as to who had jurisdiction over the serviceman's actions, which continued despite meetings and calls between Mr McGrail and other senior officers on the one hand, and Provost Marshal Chris Collins and Chief of Staff Colonel Frank Green on the other. Eventually the RGP learned that the MoD planned to place the serviceman on a |
| 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 | deepened his loss of confidence in Mr McGrail. Issue nine is Mr Pyle's stated intention as to his power under section 13 of the Police Act to call for the resignation of Mr McGrail as well as the imminent commencement of Sir David Steel as Governor. As we have heard, Mr McGrail cites Mr Pyle's intention as having a significant impact on his decision to seek early retirement. Finally, as issue ten we have the GPA's process and decision and its subsequent withdrawal of that decision which is what Mr Pyle says drove him to seek to exercise his power under section 13. I will now introduce each of these issues for | 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 | detention and the seizure of his devices had been unlawful. The RGP's position was that if the serviceman's computer contained indecent images of children, they were now in the jurisdiction of Gibraltar and in breach of Gibraltar law. This gave rise to a firm disagreement between the MoD and the RGP as to who had jurisdiction over the serviceman's actions, which continued despite meetings and calls between Mr McGrail and other senior officers on the one hand, and Provost Marshal Chris Collins and Chief of Staff Colonel Frank Green on the other. Eventually the RGP learned that the MoD planned to place the serviceman on a plane to the UK at the earliest opportunity. |
| 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 | deepened his loss of confidence in Mr McGrail. Issue nine is Mr Pyle's stated intention as to his power under section 13 of the Police Act to call for the resignation of Mr McGrail as well as the imminent commencement of Sir David Steel as Governor. As we have heard, Mr McGrail cites Mr Pyle's intention as having a significant impact on his decision to seek early retirement. Finally, as issue ten we have the GPA's process and decision and its subsequent withdrawal of that decision which is what Mr Pyle says drove him to seek to exercise his power under section 13. I will now introduce each of these issues for this main hearing by setting out the | 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 | detention and the seizure of his devices had been unlawful. The RGP's position was that if the serviceman's computer contained indecent images of children, they were now in the jurisdiction of Gibraltar and in breach of Gibraltar law. This gave rise to a firm disagreement between the MoD and the RGP as to who had jurisdiction over the serviceman's actions, which continued despite meetings and calls between Mr McGrail and other senior officers on the one hand, and Provost Marshal Chris Collins and Chief of Staff Colonel Frank Green on the other. Eventually the RGP learned that the MoD planned to place the serviceman on a plane to the UK at the earliest opportunity. Commissioner Yome and Mr McGrail both |
| 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 | deepened his loss of confidence in Mr McGrail. Issue nine is Mr Pyle's stated intention as to his power under section 13 of the Police Act to call for the resignation of Mr McGrail as well as the imminent commencement of Sir David Steel as Governor. As we have heard, Mr McGrail cites Mr Pyle's intention as having a significant impact on his decision to seek early retirement. Finally, as issue ten we have the GPA's process and decision and its subsequent withdrawal of that decision which is what Mr Pyle says drove him to seek to exercise his power under section 13. I will now introduce each of these issues for this main hearing by setting out the background to them in order to provide | 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 | detention and the seizure of his devices had been unlawful. The RGP's position was that if the serviceman's computer contained indecent images of children, they were now in the jurisdiction of Gibraltar and in breach of Gibraltar law. This gave rise to a firm disagreement between the MoD and the RGP as to who had jurisdiction over the serviceman's actions, which continued despite meetings and calls between Mr McGrail and other senior officers on the one hand, and Provost Marshal Chris Collins and Chief of Staff Colonel Frank Green on the other. Eventually the RGP learned that the MoD planned to place the serviceman on a plane to the UK at the earliest opportunity. Commissioner Yome and Mr McGrail both attest that Mr Yome made many unsuccessful |
| 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 | deepened his loss of confidence in Mr McGrail. Issue nine is Mr Pyle's stated intention as to his power under section 13 of the Police Act to call for the resignation of Mr McGrail as well as the imminent commencement of Sir David Steel as Governor. As we have heard, Mr McGrail cites Mr Pyle's intention as having a significant impact on his decision to seek early retirement. Finally, as issue ten we have the GPA's process and decision and its subsequent withdrawal of that decision which is what Mr Pyle says drove him to seek to exercise his power under section 13. I will now introduce each of these issues for this main hearing by setting out the background to them in order to provide context of the evidence that we shall hear | 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 | detention and the seizure of his devices had been unlawful. The RGP's position was that if the serviceman's computer contained indecent images of children, they were now in the jurisdiction of Gibraltar and in breach of Gibraltar law. This gave rise to a firm disagreement between the MoD and the RGP as to who had jurisdiction over the serviceman's actions, which continued despite meetings and calls between Mr McGrail and other senior officers on the one hand, and Provost Marshal Chris Collins and Chief of Staff Colonel Frank Green on the other. Eventually the RGP learned that the MoD planned to place the serviceman on a plane to the UK at the earliest opportunity. Commissioner Yome and Mr McGrail both attest that Mr Yome made many unsuccessful attempts to contact the commander of British |
| 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 | deepened his loss of confidence in Mr McGrail. Issue nine is Mr Pyle's stated intention as to his power under section 13 of the Police Act to call for the resignation of Mr McGrail as well as the imminent commencement of Sir David Steel as Governor. As we have heard, Mr McGrail cites Mr Pyle's intention as having a significant impact on his decision to seek early retirement. Finally, as issue ten we have the GPA's process and decision and its subsequent withdrawal of that decision which is what Mr Pyle says drove him to seek to exercise his power under section 13. I will now introduce each of these issues for this main hearing by setting out the background to them in order to provide context of the evidence that we shall hear over the coming weeks. In some instances I | 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 | detention and the seizure of his devices had been unlawful. The RGP's position was that if the serviceman's computer contained indecent images of children, they were now in the jurisdiction of Gibraltar and in breach of Gibraltar law. This gave rise to a firm disagreement between the MoD and the RGP as to who had jurisdiction over the serviceman's actions, which continued despite meetings and calls between Mr McGrail and other senior officers on the one hand, and Provost Marshal Chris Collins and Chief of Staff Colonel Frank Green on the other. Eventually the RGP learned that the MoD planned to place the serviceman on a plane to the UK at the earliest opportunity. Commissioner Yome and Mr McGrail both attest that Mr Yome made many unsuccessful attempts to contact the commander of British Forces at the time, Commodore Mike |
| 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 | deepened his loss of confidence in Mr McGrail. Issue nine is Mr Pyle's stated intention as to his power under section 13 of the Police Act to call for the resignation of Mr McGrail as well as the imminent commencement of Sir David Steel as Governor. As we have heard, Mr McGrail cites Mr Pyle's intention as having a significant impact on his decision to seek early retirement. Finally, as issue ten we have the GPA's process and decision and its subsequent withdrawal of that decision which is what Mr Pyle says drove him to seek to exercise his power under section 13. I will now introduce each of these issues for this main hearing by setting out the background to them in order to provide context of the evidence that we shall hear over the coming weeks. In some instances I will also refer to some of the key | 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 | detention and the seizure of his devices had been unlawful. The RGP's position was that if the serviceman's computer contained indecent images of children, they were now in the jurisdiction of Gibraltar and in breach of Gibraltar law. This gave rise to a firm disagreement between the MoD and the RGP as to who had jurisdiction over the serviceman's actions, which continued despite meetings and calls between Mr McGrail and other senior officers on the one hand, and Provost Marshal Chris Collins and Chief of Staff Colonel Frank Green on the other. Eventually the RGP learned that the MoD planned to place the serviceman on a plane to the UK at the earliest opportunity. Commissioner Yome and Mr McGrail both attest that Mr Yome made many unsuccessful attempts to contact the commander of British Forces at the time, Commodore Mike Walliker, in order to agree a cooperative |
| 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 | deepened his loss of confidence in Mr McGrail. Issue nine is Mr Pyle's stated intention as to his power under section 13 of the Police Act to call for the resignation of Mr McGrail as well as the imminent commencement of Sir David Steel as Governor. As we have heard, Mr McGrail cites Mr Pyle's intention as having a significant impact on his decision to seek early retirement. Finally, as issue ten we have the GPA's process and decision and its subsequent withdrawal of that decision which is what Mr Pyle says drove him to seek to exercise his power under section 13. I will now introduce each of these issues for this main hearing by setting out the background to them in order to provide context of the evidence that we shall hear over the coming weeks. In some instances I will also refer to some of the key contemporaneous documents that will also be | 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 | detention and the seizure of his devices had been unlawful. The RGP's position was that if the serviceman's computer contained indecent images of children, they were now in the jurisdiction of Gibraltar and in breach of Gibraltar law. This gave rise to a firm disagreement between the MoD and the RGP as to who had jurisdiction over the serviceman's actions, which continued despite meetings and calls between Mr McGrail and other senior officers on the one hand, and Provost Marshal Chris Collins and Chief of Staff Colonel Frank Green on the other. Eventually the RGP learned that the MoD planned to place the serviceman on a plane to the UK at the earliest opportunity. Commissioner Yome and Mr McGrail both attest that Mr Yome made many unsuccessful attempts to contact the commander of British Forces at the time, Commodore Mike Walliker, in order to agree a cooperative approach and that despite repeated requests |
| 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24 | deepened his loss of confidence in Mr McGrail. Issue nine is Mr Pyle's stated intention as to his power under section 13 of the Police Act to call for the resignation of Mr McGrail as well as the imminent commencement of Sir David Steel as Governor. As we have heard, Mr McGrail cites Mr Pyle's intention as having a significant impact on his decision to seek early retirement. Finally, as issue ten we have the GPA's process and decision and its subsequent withdrawal of that decision which is what Mr Pyle says drove him to seek to exercise his power under section 13. I will now introduce each of these issues for this main hearing by setting out the background to them in order to provide context of the evidence that we shall hear over the coming weeks. In some instances I will also refer to some of the key contemporaneous documents that will also be the context for that live evidence as well as | 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24 | detention and the seizure of his devices had been unlawful. The RGP's position was that if the serviceman's computer contained indecent images of children, they were now in the jurisdiction of Gibraltar and in breach of Gibraltar law. This gave rise to a firm disagreement between the MoD and the RGP as to who had jurisdiction over the serviceman's actions, which continued despite meetings and calls between Mr McGrail and other senior officers on the one hand, and Provost Marshal Chris Collins and Chief of Staff Colonel Frank Green on the other. Eventually the RGP learned that the MoD planned to place the serviceman on a plane to the UK at the earliest opportunity. Commissioner Yome and Mr McGrail both attest that Mr Yome made many unsuccessful attempts to contact the commander of British Forces at the time, Commodore Mike Walliker, in order to agree a cooperative approach and that despite repeated requests the MoD failed to disclose their plans in |
| 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 | deepened his loss of confidence in Mr McGrail. Issue nine is Mr Pyle's stated intention as to his power under section 13 of the Police Act to call for the resignation of Mr McGrail as well as the imminent commencement of Sir David Steel as Governor. As we have heard, Mr McGrail cites Mr Pyle's intention as having a significant impact on his decision to seek early retirement. Finally, as issue ten we have the GPA's process and decision and its subsequent withdrawal of that decision which is what Mr Pyle says drove him to seek to exercise his power under section 13. I will now introduce each of these issues for this main hearing by setting out the background to them in order to provide context of the evidence that we shall hear over the coming weeks. In some instances I will also refer to some of the key contemporaneous documents that will also be | 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 | detention and the seizure of his devices had been unlawful. The RGP's position was that if the serviceman's computer contained indecent images of children, they were now in the jurisdiction of Gibraltar and in breach of Gibraltar law. This gave rise to a firm disagreement between the MoD and the RGP as to who had jurisdiction over the serviceman's actions, which continued despite meetings and calls between Mr McGrail and other senior officers on the one hand, and Provost Marshal Chris Collins and Chief of Staff Colonel Frank Green on the other. Eventually the RGP learned that the MoD planned to place the serviceman on a plane to the UK at the earliest opportunity. Commissioner Yome and Mr McGrail both attest that Mr Yome made many unsuccessful attempts to contact the commander of British Forces at the time, Commodore Mike Walliker, in order to agree a cooperative approach and that despite repeated requests |
| 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24 | deepened his loss of confidence in Mr McGrail. Issue nine is Mr Pyle's stated intention as to his power under section 13 of the Police Act to call for the resignation of Mr McGrail as well as the imminent commencement of Sir David Steel as Governor. As we have heard, Mr McGrail cites Mr Pyle's intention as having a significant impact on his decision to seek early retirement. Finally, as issue ten we have the GPA's process and decision and its subsequent withdrawal of that decision which is what Mr Pyle says drove him to seek to exercise his power under section 13. I will now introduce each of these issues for this main hearing by setting out the background to them in order to provide context of the evidence that we shall hear over the coming weeks. In some instances I will also refer to some of the key contemporaneous documents that will also be the context for that live evidence as well as | 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24 | detention and the seizure of his devices had been unlawful. The RGP's position was that if the serviceman's computer contained indecent images of children, they were now in the jurisdiction of Gibraltar and in breach of Gibraltar law. This gave rise to a firm disagreement between the MoD and the RGP as to who had jurisdiction over the serviceman's actions, which continued despite meetings and calls between Mr McGrail and other senior officers on the one hand, and Provost Marshal Chris Collins and Chief of Staff Colonel Frank Green on the other. Eventually the RGP learned that the MoD planned to place the serviceman on a plane to the UK at the earliest opportunity. Commissioner Yome and Mr McGrail both attest that Mr Yome made many unsuccessful attempts to contact the commander of British Forces at the time, Commodore Mike Walliker, in order to agree a cooperative approach and that despite repeated requests the MoD failed to disclose their plans in |

| 1 | Commodore Walliker has given evidence | 1 | taken off the aircraft. The search warrant |
|--|---|--|---|
| 2 | that his reaction was to wonder why the RGP | 2 | was not executed and the exhibits were |
| 3 | felt compelled to insert themselves | 3 | handed over voluntarily to the RGP. Mr |
| 4 | unnecessarily in his view into a criminal | 4 | McGrail maintains that the escalation of |
| 5 | investigation being conducted by another | 5 | tension was not down to lack of will on the |
| 6 | police force. Commissioner Yome also | 6 | RGP's part to resolve the issues in a grown- |
| 7 | telephoned the Governor at the time, | 7 | up manner but that there had been a serious |
| 8 | Lieutenant General Edward Davis, and | 8 | breach of trust and confidence by Colonel |
| 9 | informed him of the events that had | 9 | Green, Provost Marshal Collins and Station |
| 10 | transpired. Things came to a head on 8 | 10 | Commander Hutchison. The Governor at the |
| 11 | February 2017. The RGP learned that a | 11 | time did not and still does not think that the |
| 12 | military aircraft had landed at RAF Gibraltar | 12 | RGP obstructing the runway to prevent a |
| 13 | and that the serviceman and exhibits were to | 13 | military aircraft from taking off was an |
| 14 | be removed from Gibraltar on the aircraft, | 14 | appropriate way for the civil and military |
| 15 | something which Commissioner Yome | 15 | authorities to conduct themselves and |
| 16 | thought was unacceptable. At the same time, | 16 | believes that matters should not have reached |
| 17 | Mr McGrail applied for a search warrant in | 17 | such a stage. However, he telephoned CBF |
| 18 | the Supreme Court with a hearing listed for 3 | 18 | Walliker and instructed him to keep the |
| 19 | p.m. The warrant was granted at 3.20 | 19 | serviceman in Gibraltar until the RGP |
| 20 | although the Chief Justice opined that it was | 20 | completed preliminary enquiries and to hand |
| 21 | not a good day for law enforcement when | 21 | the computer over to the RGP. CBF |
| 22 | one law enforcement agency had to take | 22 | Walliker opines that the RGP's behaviour on |
| 23 | executive action against another agency in | 23 | 8 February 2017 was bizarre, potentially |
| 24 | this fashion. While Mr McGrail was at court, | 24 | dangerous and unbecoming, and PM Collins |
| 25 | Commissioner Yome instructed Richard | 25 | is of the view that the encroachment onto the |
| | 001111110110110110110110110110110110110 | 23 | is of the view that the enerodemicin one the |
| | Page 49 | | Page 51 |
| | | | |
| 1 | Ullger now Commissioner of Police of | 1 | runway was a vastly disproportionate act |
| 1 2 | Ullger, now Commissioner of Police, of | 1 2 | runway was a vastly disproportionate act. In terms of the aftermath of 8 February 2017 |
| 2 | course, to attend the RAF station and | 2 | In terms of the aftermath of 8 February 2017, |
| 2 3 | course, to attend the RAF station and investigate whether the MoD intended to | 2 3 | In terms of the aftermath of 8 February 2017, it is clear that both sides felt that they were in |
| 2 3 4 | course, to attend the RAF station and investigate whether the MoD intended to remove the serviceman and exhibits. The | 2 3 4 | In terms of the aftermath of 8 February 2017, it is clear that both sides felt that they were in the right following the incident. As an |
| 2 3 4 5 | course, to attend the RAF station and investigate whether the MoD intended to remove the serviceman and exhibits. The flight manifest did not record that the | 2 3 4 5 | In terms of the aftermath of 8 February 2017, it is clear that both sides felt that they were in the right following the incident. As an example, we can look at CBF Walliker's |
| 2 3 4 5 6 | course, to attend the RAF station and investigate whether the MoD intended to remove the serviceman and exhibits. The flight manifest did not record that the serviceman or exhibits were on board. | 2 3 4 5 6 | In terms of the aftermath of 8 February 2017, it is clear that both sides felt that they were in the right following the incident. As an example, we can look at CBF Walliker's statement which is in bundle A at 1386. At |
| 2 3 4 5 6 7 | course, to attend the RAF station and investigate whether the MoD intended to remove the serviceman and exhibits. The flight manifest did not record that the serviceman or exhibits were on board. Commissioner Yome then learned that the | 2 3 4 5 6 7 | In terms of the aftermath of 8 February 2017, it is clear that both sides felt that they were in the right following the incident. As an example, we can look at CBF Walliker's statement which is in bundle A at 1386. At paragraph 6 he says as follows: |
| 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 | course, to attend the RAF station and investigate whether the MoD intended to remove the serviceman and exhibits. The flight manifest did not record that the serviceman or exhibits were on board. Commissioner Yome then learned that the serviceman and exhibits had already been | 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 | In terms of the aftermath of 8 February 2017, it is clear that both sides felt that they were in the right following the incident. As an example, we can look at CBF Walliker's statement which is in bundle A at 1386. At paragraph 6 he says as follows: "Notwithstanding my concerns over the |
| 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 | course, to attend the RAF station and investigate whether the MoD intended to remove the serviceman and exhibits. The flight manifest did not record that the serviceman or exhibits were on board. Commissioner Yome then learned that the serviceman and exhibits had already been taken on board the aircraft and that the | 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 | In terms of the aftermath of 8 February 2017, it is clear that both sides felt that they were in the right following the incident. As an example, we can look at CBF Walliker's statement which is in bundle A at 1386. At paragraph 6 he says as follows: "Notwithstanding my concerns over the issuing of a warrant, general behaviour of |
| 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 | course, to attend the RAF station and investigate whether the MoD intended to remove the serviceman and exhibits. The flight manifest did not record that the serviceman or exhibits were on board. Commissioner Yome then learned that the serviceman and exhibits had already been taken on board the aircraft and that the aircraft was proceeding to its take-off | 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 | In terms of the aftermath of 8 February 2017, it is clear that both sides felt that they were in the right following the incident. As an example, we can look at CBF Walliker's statement which is in bundle A at 1386. At paragraph 6 he says as follows: "Notwithstanding my concerns over the issuing of a warrant, general behaviour of RGP officers on 8 February from the very |
| 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 | course, to attend the RAF station and investigate whether the MoD intended to remove the serviceman and exhibits. The flight manifest did not record that the serviceman or exhibits were on board. Commissioner Yome then learned that the serviceman and exhibits had already been taken on board the aircraft and that the aircraft was proceeding to its take-off position, so he instructed RGP officers to | 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 | In terms of the aftermath of 8 February 2017, it is clear that both sides felt that they were in the right following the incident. As an example, we can look at CBF Walliker's statement which is in bundle A at 1386. At paragraph 6 he says as follows: "Notwithstanding my concerns over the issuing of a warrant, general behaviour of RGP officers on 8 February from the very top down was bizarre, potentially dangerous |
| 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 | course, to attend the RAF station and investigate whether the MoD intended to remove the serviceman and exhibits. The flight manifest did not record that the serviceman or exhibits were on board. Commissioner Yome then learned that the serviceman and exhibits had already been taken on board the aircraft and that the aircraft was proceeding to its take-off position, so he instructed RGP officers to drive police vehicles onto the runway to | 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 | In terms of the aftermath of 8 February 2017, it is clear that both sides felt that they were in the right following the incident. As an example, we can look at CBF Walliker's statement which is in bundle A at 1386. At paragraph 6 he says as follows: "Notwithstanding my concerns over the issuing of a warrant, general behaviour of RGP officers on 8 February from the very top down was bizarre, potentially dangerous and unbecoming. When I arrived back on the |
| 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 | course, to attend the RAF station and investigate whether the MoD intended to remove the serviceman and exhibits. The flight manifest did not record that the serviceman or exhibits were on board. Commissioner Yome then learned that the serviceman and exhibits had already been taken on board the aircraft and that the aircraft was proceeding to its take-off position, so he instructed RGP officers to drive police vehicles onto the runway to prevent it from taking off. There was, in | 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 | In terms of the aftermath of 8 February 2017, it is clear that both sides felt that they were in the right following the incident. As an example, we can look at CBF Walliker's statement which is in bundle A at 1386. At paragraph 6 he says as follows: "Notwithstanding my concerns over the issuing of a warrant, general behaviour of RGP officers on 8 February from the very top down was bizarre, potentially dangerous and unbecoming. When I arrived back on the Rock I received a full debrief from my chief |
| 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 | course, to attend the RAF station and investigate whether the MoD intended to remove the serviceman and exhibits. The flight manifest did not record that the serviceman or exhibits were on board. Commissioner Yome then learned that the serviceman and exhibits had already been taken on board the aircraft and that the aircraft was proceeding to its take-off position, so he instructed RGP officers to drive police vehicles onto the runway to prevent it from taking off. There was, in particular, confrontation by the north barrier | 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 | In terms of the aftermath of 8 February 2017, it is clear that both sides felt that they were in the right following the incident. As an example, we can look at CBF Walliker's statement which is in bundle A at 1386. At paragraph 6 he says as follows: "Notwithstanding my concerns over the issuing of a warrant, general behaviour of RGP officers on 8 February from the very top down was bizarre, potentially dangerous and unbecoming. When I arrived back on the Rock I received a full debrief from my chief of staff, the RAF Station Commander and the |
| 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 | course, to attend the RAF station and investigate whether the MoD intended to remove the serviceman and exhibits. The flight manifest did not record that the serviceman or exhibits were on board. Commissioner Yome then learned that the serviceman and exhibits had already been taken on board the aircraft and that the aircraft was proceeding to its take-off position, so he instructed RGP officers to drive police vehicles onto the runway to prevent it from taking off. There was, in particular, confrontation by the north barrier between Inspector Berrera and Station | 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 | In terms of the aftermath of 8 February 2017, it is clear that both sides felt that they were in the right following the incident. As an example, we can look at CBF Walliker's statement which is in bundle A at 1386. At paragraph 6 he says as follows: "Notwithstanding my concerns over the issuing of a warrant, general behaviour of RGP officers on 8 February from the very top down was bizarre, potentially dangerous and unbecoming. When I arrived back on the Rock I received a full debrief from my chief of staff, the RAF Station Commander and the Provost Marshal. I made my feelings known |
| 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 | course, to attend the RAF station and investigate whether the MoD intended to remove the serviceman and exhibits. The flight manifest did not record that the serviceman or exhibits were on board. Commissioner Yome then learned that the serviceman and exhibits had already been taken on board the aircraft and that the aircraft was proceeding to its take-off position, so he instructed RGP officers to drive police vehicles onto the runway to prevent it from taking off. There was, in particular, confrontation by the north barrier between Inspector Berrera and Station Commander Liz Hutchison, who then spoke | 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 | In terms of the aftermath of 8 February 2017, it is clear that both sides felt that they were in the right following the incident. As an example, we can look at CBF Walliker's statement which is in bundle A at 1386. At paragraph 6 he says as follows: "Notwithstanding my concerns over the issuing of a warrant, general behaviour of RGP officers on 8 February from the very top down was bizarre, potentially dangerous and unbecoming. When I arrived back on the Rock I received a full debrief from my chief of staff, the RAF Station Commander and the Provost Marshal. I made my feelings known to His Excellency the Governor and the Chief |
| 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 | course, to attend the RAF station and investigate whether the MoD intended to remove the serviceman and exhibits. The flight manifest did not record that the serviceman or exhibits were on board. Commissioner Yome then learned that the serviceman and exhibits had already been taken on board the aircraft and that the aircraft was proceeding to its take-off position, so he instructed RGP officers to drive police vehicles onto the runway to prevent it from taking off. There was, in particular, confrontation by the north barrier between Inspector Berrera and Station Commander Liz Hutchison, who then spoke to Mr Ullger over the phone. Mr Yome's | 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 | In terms of the aftermath of 8 February 2017, it is clear that both sides felt that they were in the right following the incident. As an example, we can look at CBF Walliker's statement which is in bundle A at 1386. At paragraph 6 he says as follows: "Notwithstanding my concerns over the issuing of a warrant, general behaviour of RGP officers on 8 February from the very top down was bizarre, potentially dangerous and unbecoming. When I arrived back on the Rock I received a full debrief from my chief of staff, the RAF Station Commander and the Provost Marshal. I made my feelings known to His Excellency the Governor and the Chief Minister and upwards through my command |
| 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 | course, to attend the RAF station and investigate whether the MoD intended to remove the serviceman and exhibits. The flight manifest did not record that the serviceman or exhibits were on board. Commissioner Yome then learned that the serviceman and exhibits had already been taken on board the aircraft and that the aircraft was proceeding to its take-off position, so he instructed RGP officers to drive police vehicles onto the runway to prevent it from taking off. There was, in particular, confrontation by the north barrier between Inspector Berrera and Station Commander Liz Hutchison, who then spoke to Mr Ullger over the phone. Mr Yome's evidence is that Commodore Walliker | 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 | In terms of the aftermath of 8 February 2017, it is clear that both sides felt that they were in the right following the incident. As an example, we can look at CBF Walliker's statement which is in bundle A at 1386. At paragraph 6 he says as follows: "Notwithstanding my concerns over the issuing of a warrant, general behaviour of RGP officers on 8 February from the very top down was bizarre, potentially dangerous and unbecoming. When I arrived back on the Rock I received a full debrief from my chief of staff, the RAF Station Commander and the Provost Marshal. I made my feelings known to His Excellency the Governor and the Chief Minister and upwards through my command chain via a second Naval officer, Chief of |
| 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 | course, to attend the RAF station and investigate whether the MoD intended to remove the serviceman and exhibits. The flight manifest did not record that the serviceman or exhibits were on board. Commissioner Yome then learned that the serviceman and exhibits had already been taken on board the aircraft and that the aircraft was proceeding to its take-off position, so he instructed RGP officers to drive police vehicles onto the runway to prevent it from taking off. There was, in particular, confrontation by the north barrier between Inspector Berrera and Station Commander Liz Hutchison, who then spoke to Mr Ullger over the phone. Mr Yome's evidence is that Commodore Walliker eventually phoned him and, although he | 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 | In terms of the aftermath of 8 February 2017, it is clear that both sides felt that they were in the right following the incident. As an example, we can look at CBF Walliker's statement which is in bundle A at 1386. At paragraph 6 he says as follows: "Notwithstanding my concerns over the issuing of a warrant, general behaviour of RGP officers on 8 February from the very top down was bizarre, potentially dangerous and unbecoming. When I arrived back on the Rock I received a full debrief from my chief of staff, the RAF Station Commander and the Provost Marshal. I made my feelings known to His Excellency the Governor and the Chief Minister and upwards through my command chain via a second Naval officer, Chief of Staff, Joint Force Command, to the Joint |
| 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 | course, to attend the RAF station and investigate whether the MoD intended to remove the serviceman and exhibits. The flight manifest did not record that the serviceman or exhibits were on board. Commissioner Yome then learned that the serviceman and exhibits had already been taken on board the aircraft and that the aircraft was proceeding to its take-off position, so he instructed RGP officers to drive police vehicles onto the runway to prevent it from taking off. There was, in particular, confrontation by the north barrier between Inspector Berrera and Station Commander Liz Hutchison, who then spoke to Mr Ullger over the phone. Mr Yome's evidence is that Commodore Walliker eventually phoned him and, although he originally stated that neither the individual | 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 | In terms of the aftermath of 8 February 2017, it is clear that both sides felt that they were in the right following the incident. As an example, we can look at CBF Walliker's statement which is in bundle A at 1386. At paragraph 6 he says as follows: "Notwithstanding my concerns over the issuing of a warrant, general behaviour of RGP officers on 8 February from the very top down was bizarre, potentially dangerous and unbecoming. When I arrived back on the Rock I received a full debrief from my chief of staff, the RAF Station Commander and the Provost Marshal. I made my feelings known to His Excellency the Governor and the Chief Minister and upwards through my command chain via a second Naval officer, Chief of Staff, Joint Force Command, to the Joint Force Commander, a four-star General. I |
| 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 | course, to attend the RAF station and investigate whether the MoD intended to remove the serviceman and exhibits. The flight manifest did not record that the serviceman or exhibits were on board. Commissioner Yome then learned that the serviceman and exhibits had already been taken on board the aircraft and that the aircraft was proceeding to its take-off position, so he instructed RGP officers to drive police vehicles onto the runway to prevent it from taking off. There was, in particular, confrontation by the north barrier between Inspector Berrera and Station Commander Liz Hutchison, who then spoke to Mr Ullger over the phone. Mr Yome's evidence is that Commodore Walliker eventually phoned him and, although he originally stated that neither the individual nor the competing questions were on the | 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 | In terms of the aftermath of 8 February 2017, it is clear that both sides felt that they were in the right following the incident. As an example, we can look at CBF Walliker's statement which is in bundle A at 1386. At paragraph 6 he says as follows: "Notwithstanding my concerns over the issuing of a warrant, general behaviour of RGP officers on 8 February from the very top down was bizarre, potentially dangerous and unbecoming. When I arrived back on the Rock I received a full debrief from my chief of staff, the RAF Station Commander and the Provost Marshal. I made my feelings known to His Excellency the Governor and the Chief Minister and upwards through my command chain via a second Naval officer, Chief of Staff, Joint Force Command, to the Joint Force Commander, a four-star General. I recommended that an inquiry be conducted |
| 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 | course, to attend the RAF station and investigate whether the MoD intended to remove the serviceman and exhibits. The flight manifest did not record that the serviceman or exhibits were on board. Commissioner Yome then learned that the serviceman and exhibits had already been taken on board the aircraft and that the aircraft was proceeding to its take-off position, so he instructed RGP officers to drive police vehicles onto the runway to prevent it from taking off. There was, in particular, confrontation by the north barrier between Inspector Berrera and Station Commander Liz Hutchison, who then spoke to Mr Ullger over the phone. Mr Yome's evidence is that Commodore Walliker eventually phoned him and, although he originally stated that neither the individual nor the competing questions were on the aircraft, once Mr Yome warned him that he | 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 | In terms of the aftermath of 8 February 2017, it is clear that both sides felt that they were in the right following the incident. As an example, we can look at CBF Walliker's statement which is in bundle A at 1386. At paragraph 6 he says as follows: "Notwithstanding my concerns over the issuing of a warrant, general behaviour of RGP officers on 8 February from the very top down was bizarre, potentially dangerous and unbecoming. When I arrived back on the Rock I received a full debrief from my chief of staff, the RAF Station Commander and the Provost Marshal. I made my feelings known to His Excellency the Governor and the Chief Minister and upwards through my command chain via a second Naval officer, Chief of Staff, Joint Force Command, to the Joint Force Commander, a four-star General. I recommended that an inquiry be conducted as a matter of urgency as the narrative on the |
| 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 | course, to attend the RAF station and investigate whether the MoD intended to remove the serviceman and exhibits. The flight manifest did not record that the serviceman or exhibits were on board. Commissioner Yome then learned that the serviceman and exhibits had already been taken on board the aircraft and that the aircraft was proceeding to its take-off position, so he instructed RGP officers to drive police vehicles onto the runway to prevent it from taking off. There was, in particular, confrontation by the north barrier between Inspector Berrera and Station Commander Liz Hutchison, who then spoke to Mr Ullger over the phone. Mr Yome's evidence is that Commodore Walliker eventually phoned him and, although he originally stated that neither the individual nor the competing questions were on the aircraft, once Mr Yome warned him that he may be obstructing police he stated that the | 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 | In terms of the aftermath of 8 February 2017, it is clear that both sides felt that they were in the right following the incident. As an example, we can look at CBF Walliker's statement which is in bundle A at 1386. At paragraph 6 he says as follows: "Notwithstanding my concerns over the issuing of a warrant, general behaviour of RGP officers on 8 February from the very top down was bizarre, potentially dangerous and unbecoming. When I arrived back on the Rock I received a full debrief from my chief of staff, the RAF Station Commander and the Provost Marshal. I made my feelings known to His Excellency the Governor and the Chief Minister and upwards through my command chain via a second Naval officer, Chief of Staff, Joint Force Command, to the Joint Force Commander, a four-star General. I recommended that an inquiry be conducted as a matter of urgency as the narrative on the Rock appeared to eulogise the actions of the |
| 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24 | course, to attend the RAF station and investigate whether the MoD intended to remove the serviceman and exhibits. The flight manifest did not record that the serviceman or exhibits were on board. Commissioner Yome then learned that the serviceman and exhibits had already been taken on board the aircraft and that the aircraft was proceeding to its take-off position, so he instructed RGP officers to drive police vehicles onto the runway to prevent it from taking off. There was, in particular, confrontation by the north barrier between Inspector Berrera and Station Commander Liz Hutchison, who then spoke to Mr Ullger over the phone. Mr Yome's evidence is that Commodore Walliker eventually phoned him and, although he originally stated that neither the individual nor the competing questions were on the aircraft, once Mr Yome warned him that he may be obstructing police he stated that the aircraft would return to its stand. Shortly | 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24 | In terms of the aftermath of 8 February 2017, it is clear that both sides felt that they were in the right following the incident. As an example, we can look at CBF Walliker's statement which is in bundle A at 1386. At paragraph 6 he says as follows: "Notwithstanding my concerns over the issuing of a warrant, general behaviour of RGP officers on 8 February from the very top down was bizarre, potentially dangerous and unbecoming. When I arrived back on the Rock I received a full debrief from my chief of staff, the RAF Station Commander and the Provost Marshal. I made my feelings known to His Excellency the Governor and the Chief Minister and upwards through my command chain via a second Naval officer, Chief of Staff, Joint Force Command, to the Joint Force Commander, a four-star General. I recommended that an inquiry be conducted as a matter of urgency as the narrative on the Rock appeared to eulogise the actions of the |
| 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 | course, to attend the RAF station and investigate whether the MoD intended to remove the serviceman and exhibits. The flight manifest did not record that the serviceman or exhibits were on board. Commissioner Yome then learned that the serviceman and exhibits had already been taken on board the aircraft and that the aircraft was proceeding to its take-off position, so he instructed RGP officers to drive police vehicles onto the runway to prevent it from taking off. There was, in particular, confrontation by the north barrier between Inspector Berrera and Station Commander Liz Hutchison, who then spoke to Mr Ullger over the phone. Mr Yome's evidence is that Commodore Walliker eventually phoned him and, although he originally stated that neither the individual nor the competing questions were on the aircraft, once Mr Yome warned him that he may be obstructing police he stated that the | 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 | In terms of the aftermath of 8 February 2017, it is clear that both sides felt that they were in the right following the incident. As an example, we can look at CBF Walliker's statement which is in bundle A at 1386. At paragraph 6 he says as follows: "Notwithstanding my concerns over the issuing of a warrant, general behaviour of RGP officers on 8 February from the very top down was bizarre, potentially dangerous and unbecoming. When I arrived back on the Rock I received a full debrief from my chief of staff, the RAF Station Commander and the Provost Marshal. I made my feelings known to His Excellency the Governor and the Chief Minister and upwards through my command chain via a second Naval officer, Chief of Staff, Joint Force Command, to the Joint Force Commander, a four-star General. I recommended that an inquiry be conducted as a matter of urgency as the narrative on the Rock appeared to eulogise the actions of the |
| 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24 | course, to attend the RAF station and investigate whether the MoD intended to remove the serviceman and exhibits. The flight manifest did not record that the serviceman or exhibits were on board. Commissioner Yome then learned that the serviceman and exhibits had already been taken on board the aircraft and that the aircraft was proceeding to its take-off position, so he instructed RGP officers to drive police vehicles onto the runway to prevent it from taking off. There was, in particular, confrontation by the north barrier between Inspector Berrera and Station Commander Liz Hutchison, who then spoke to Mr Ullger over the phone. Mr Yome's evidence is that Commodore Walliker eventually phoned him and, although he originally stated that neither the individual nor the competing questions were on the aircraft, once Mr Yome warned him that he may be obstructing police he stated that the aircraft would return to its stand. Shortly | 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24 | In terms of the aftermath of 8 February 2017, it is clear that both sides felt that they were in the right following the incident. As an example, we can look at CBF Walliker's statement which is in bundle A at 1386. At paragraph 6 he says as follows: "Notwithstanding my concerns over the issuing of a warrant, general behaviour of RGP officers on 8 February from the very top down was bizarre, potentially dangerous and unbecoming. When I arrived back on the Rock I received a full debrief from my chief of staff, the RAF Station Commander and the Provost Marshal. I made my feelings known to His Excellency the Governor and the Chief Minister and upwards through my command chain via a second Naval officer, Chief of Staff, Joint Force Command, to the Joint Force Commander, a four-star General. I recommended that an inquiry be conducted as a matter of urgency as the narrative on the Rock appeared to eulogise the actions of the |

| 1 | Minister a few days after the incident I was | 1 | execute search warrants at the office of the |
|--|--|--|---|
| 2 | able to correct a couple of errors of fact in | 2 | CBF, the Naval Provost officers, and the |
| 3 | the RGP's report of the incident but I could | 3 | RAF Station Commander's office, and those |
| 4 | not alter his view that his police force had | 4 | were granted by the Stipendiary Magistrate. |
| 5 | behaved exceptionally well but that MoD | 5 | Mr McGrail then advised Commissioner |
| 6 | personnel had not. To his mind, the RGP had | 6 | Yome that there was sufficient evidence to |
| 7 | saved the MoD from itself, and to my mind | 7 | proceed against the Chief of Staff, the Naval |
| 8 | they had behaved disgracefully. My opinion | 8 | Provost and the RAF Station Commander, |
| 9 | has not changed since that date. The report | 9 | and it was agreed that they should be |
| 10 | by Superintendent McGrail into the incident, | 10 | arrested. On 28 February 2017 the Attorney |
| 11 | dated 10 February 2017, was given to me by | 11 | General received a joint opinion from Lord |
| 12 | the Deputy Governor and it confirmed my | 12 | Pannick KC and Emile Neale, which advised |
| 13 | view that the RGP had not behaved correctly. | 13 | that the Provost Marshal's department did not |
| 14 | The report itself was poorly written and the | 14 | have the powers to arrest the serviceman in |
| 15 | fact that Superintendent McGrail did not use | 15 | Gibraltar, nor to seize his devices, and so |
| 16 | the correct spelling for the surname of the | 16 | their actions were unlawful. On 1 March |
| 17 | RAF Station Commander caused me to | 17 | 2017 the RGP arrested Colonel Green, |
| 18 | conclude that the administration of the RGP | 18 | Station Commander Hutchison and Provost |
| 19 | was sloppy and suboptimal. When I | 19 | Marshal Collins on suspicion of obstructing |
| 20 | suggested that the report should be corrected | 20 | the police and attempting to pervert the |
| 21 | I was told that I should not have been given | 21 | course of justice. They were the three most |
| 22 | access to it, a deeply worrying statement | 22 | senior MoD members of staff in Gibraltar. |
| 23 | from the then Commissioner of Police." | 23 | Mr McGrail was involved in the execution of |
| 24 | As for His Excellency the Governor at the | 24 | the warrant at the British Forces Gibraltar |
| 25 | time, Lieutenant General Davis, if we can go | 25 | HQ, known as The Tower, and arrested |
| | | | |
| | Page 53 | | Page 55 |
| | | | |
| 1 | 4- A 1410 -4 4h - h -44 | 1 | Calanal Comm. MaD annuate annual |
| 1 | to A 1410 at the bottom of the page, | 1 | Colonel Green. MoD property, personal |
| 2 | paragraph 14, he says as follows: "My sense | 2 | devices and motor vehicles were also seized. |
| 2 3 | paragraph 14, he says as follows: "My sense at the time was that there was a potential for | 2 3 | devices and motor vehicles were also seized. CBF Walliker gives evidence on this too", |
| 2 3 4 | paragraph 14, he says as follows: "My sense at the time was that there was a potential for significant and long-term damage to relations | 2 3 4 | devices and motor vehicles were also seized. CBF Walliker gives evidence on this too", and that is at page 1387 of bundle A. He |
| 2 3 4 5 | paragraph 14, he says as follows: "My sense at the time was that there was a potential for significant and long-term damage to relations between Gibraltar and the UK. I therefore | 2 3 4 5 | devices and motor vehicles were also seized. CBF Walliker gives evidence on this too", and that is at page 1387 of bundle A. He says as follows at paragraph 8: "Turning to |
| 2 3 4 5 6 | paragraph 14, he says as follows: "My sense at the time was that there was a potential for significant and long-term damage to relations between Gibraltar and the UK. I therefore saw my role as concentrating on getting both | 2 3 4 5 6 | devices and motor vehicles were also seized. CBF Walliker gives evidence on this too", and that is at page 1387 of bundle A. He says as follows at paragraph 8: "Turning to the arrests, I can add little to any statements |
| 2 3 4 5 6 7 | paragraph 14, he says as follows: "My sense at the time was that there was a potential for significant and long-term damage to relations between Gibraltar and the UK. I therefore saw my role as concentrating on getting both parties back to working together in a | 2 3 4 5 6 7 | devices and motor vehicles were also seized. CBF Walliker gives evidence on this too", and that is at page 1387 of bundle A. He says as follows at paragraph 8: "Turning to the arrests, I can add little to any statements that the Inquiry has presumably sought from |
| 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 | paragraph 14, he says as follows: "My sense at the time was that there was a potential for significant and long-term damage to relations between Gibraltar and the UK. I therefore saw my role as concentrating on getting both parties back to working together in a mutually supportive and appropriate way as | 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 | devices and motor vehicles were also seized. CBF Walliker gives evidence on this too", and that is at page 1387 of bundle A. He says as follows at paragraph 8: "Turning to the arrests, I can add little to any statements that the Inquiry has presumably sought from the three UK armed officers who were |
| 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 | paragraph 14, he says as follows: "My sense at the time was that there was a potential for significant and long-term damage to relations between Gibraltar and the UK. I therefore saw my role as concentrating on getting both parties back to working together in a mutually supportive and appropriate way as soon as possible. Accordingly, this was the | 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 | devices and motor vehicles were also seized. CBF Walliker gives evidence on this too", and that is at page 1387 of bundle A. He says as follows at paragraph 8: "Turning to the arrests, I can add little to any statements that the Inquiry has presumably sought from the three UK armed officers who were subjected to unnecessary and |
| 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 | paragraph 14, he says as follows: "My sense at the time was that there was a potential for significant and long-term damage to relations between Gibraltar and the UK. I therefore saw my role as concentrating on getting both parties back to working together in a mutually supportive and appropriate way as soon as possible. Accordingly, this was the focus o0f my deputy, Mr Pyle, and I upon my | 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 | devices and motor vehicles were also seized. CBF Walliker gives evidence on this too", and that is at page 1387 of bundle A. He says as follows at paragraph 8: "Turning to the arrests, I can add little to any statements that the Inquiry has presumably sought from the three UK armed officers who were subjected to unnecessary and disproportionate treatment. It was an open |
| 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 | paragraph 14, he says as follows: "My sense at the time was that there was a potential for significant and long-term damage to relations between Gibraltar and the UK. I therefore saw my role as concentrating on getting both parties back to working together in a mutually supportive and appropriate way as soon as possible. Accordingly, this was the focus o0f my deputy, Mr Pyle, and I upon my return to Gibraltar." | 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 | devices and motor vehicles were also seized. CBF Walliker gives evidence on this too", and that is at page 1387 of bundle A. He says as follows at paragraph 8: "Turning to the arrests, I can add little to any statements that the Inquiry has presumably sought from the three UK armed officers who were subjected to unnecessary and disproportionate treatment. It was an open secret that the three officers were being |
| 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 | paragraph 14, he says as follows: "My sense at the time was that there was a potential for significant and long-term damage to relations between Gibraltar and the UK. I therefore saw my role as concentrating on getting both parties back to working together in a mutually supportive and appropriate way as soon as possible. Accordingly, this was the focus o0f my deputy, Mr Pyle, and I upon my return to Gibraltar." Over the page at paragraph 17, he says: "At | 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 | devices and motor vehicles were also seized. CBF Walliker gives evidence on this too", and that is at page 1387 of bundle A. He says as follows at paragraph 8: "Turning to the arrests, I can add little to any statements that the Inquiry has presumably sought from the three UK armed officers who were subjected to unnecessary and disproportionate treatment. It was an open secret that the three officers were being investigated on suspicion of conspiring to |
| 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 | paragraph 14, he says as follows: "My sense at the time was that there was a potential for significant and long-term damage to relations between Gibraltar and the UK. I therefore saw my role as concentrating on getting both parties back to working together in a mutually supportive and appropriate way as soon as possible. Accordingly, this was the focus o0f my deputy, Mr Pyle, and I upon my return to Gibraltar." Over the page at paragraph 17, he says: "At some stage during this period I also had a | 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 | devices and motor vehicles were also seized. CBF Walliker gives evidence on this too", and that is at page 1387 of bundle A. He says as follows at paragraph 8: "Turning to the arrests, I can add little to any statements that the Inquiry has presumably sought from the three UK armed officers who were subjected to unnecessary and disproportionate treatment. It was an open secret that the three officers were being investigated on suspicion of conspiring to pervert the course of justice and I had spoken |
| 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 | paragraph 14, he says as follows: "My sense at the time was that there was a potential for significant and long-term damage to relations between Gibraltar and the UK. I therefore saw my role as concentrating on getting both parties back to working together in a mutually supportive and appropriate way as soon as possible. Accordingly, this was the focus o0f my deputy, Mr Pyle, and I upon my return to Gibraltar." Over the page at paragraph 17, he says: "At some stage during this period I also had a telephone call with the then Minister for | 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 | devices and motor vehicles were also seized. CBF Walliker gives evidence on this too", and that is at page 1387 of bundle A. He says as follows at paragraph 8: "Turning to the arrests, I can add little to any statements that the Inquiry has presumably sought from the three UK armed officers who were subjected to unnecessary and disproportionate treatment. It was an open secret that the three officers were being investigated on suspicion of conspiring to pervert the course of justice and I had spoken personally to both the Commissioner of |
| 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 | paragraph 14, he says as follows: "My sense at the time was that there was a potential for significant and long-term damage to relations between Gibraltar and the UK. I therefore saw my role as concentrating on getting both parties back to working together in a mutually supportive and appropriate way as soon as possible. Accordingly, this was the focus o0f my deputy, Mr Pyle, and I upon my return to Gibraltar." Over the page at paragraph 17, he says: "At some stage during this period I also had a telephone call with the then Minister for Europe to give him my account of the airport | 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 | devices and motor vehicles were also seized. CBF Walliker gives evidence on this too", and that is at page 1387 of bundle A. He says as follows at paragraph 8: "Turning to the arrests, I can add little to any statements that the Inquiry has presumably sought from the three UK armed officers who were subjected to unnecessary and disproportionate treatment. It was an open secret that the three officers were being investigated on suspicion of conspiring to pervert the course of justice and I had spoken personally to both the Commissioner of Police and Superintendent McGrail in the |
| 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 | paragraph 14, he says as follows: "My sense at the time was that there was a potential for significant and long-term damage to relations between Gibraltar and the UK. I therefore saw my role as concentrating on getting both parties back to working together in a mutually supportive and appropriate way as soon as possible. Accordingly, this was the focus o0f my deputy, Mr Pyle, and I upon my return to Gibraltar." Over the page at paragraph 17, he says: "At some stage during this period I also had a telephone call with the then Minister for Europe to give him my account of the airport incident and to recommend that an | 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 | devices and motor vehicles were also seized. CBF Walliker gives evidence on this too", and that is at page 1387 of bundle A. He says as follows at paragraph 8: "Turning to the arrests, I can add little to any statements that the Inquiry has presumably sought from the three UK armed officers who were subjected to unnecessary and disproportionate treatment. It was an open secret that the three officers were being investigated on suspicion of conspiring to pervert the course of justice and I had spoken personally to both the Commissioner of Police and Superintendent McGrail in the days leading up to the arrests and confirmed |
| 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 | paragraph 14, he says as follows: "My sense at the time was that there was a potential for significant and long-term damage to relations between Gibraltar and the UK. I therefore saw my role as concentrating on getting both parties back to working together in a mutually supportive and appropriate way as soon as possible. Accordingly, this was the focus o0f my deputy, Mr Pyle, and I upon my return to Gibraltar." Over the page at paragraph 17, he says: "At some stage during this period I also had a telephone call with the then Minister for Europe to give him my account of the airport incident and to recommend that an independent review be conducted. It was | 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 | devices and motor vehicles were also seized. CBF Walliker gives evidence on this too", and that is at page 1387 of bundle A. He says as follows at paragraph 8: "Turning to the arrests, I can add little to any statements that the Inquiry has presumably sought from the three UK armed officers who were subjected to unnecessary and disproportionate treatment. It was an open secret that the three officers were being investigated on suspicion of conspiring to pervert the course of justice and I had spoken personally to both the Commissioner of Police and Superintendent McGrail in the days leading up to the arrests and confirmed that all three were happy to report to New |
| 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 | paragraph 14, he says as follows: "My sense at the time was that there was a potential for significant and long-term damage to relations between Gibraltar and the UK. I therefore saw my role as concentrating on getting both parties back to working together in a mutually supportive and appropriate way as soon as possible. Accordingly, this was the focus o0f my deputy, Mr Pyle, and I upon my return to Gibraltar." Over the page at paragraph 17, he says: "At some stage during this period I also had a telephone call with the then Minister for Europe to give him my account of the airport incident and to recommend that an independent review be conducted. It was then agreed between the Governor, | 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 | devices and motor vehicles were also seized. CBF Walliker gives evidence on this too", and that is at page 1387 of bundle A. He says as follows at paragraph 8: "Turning to the arrests, I can add little to any statements that the Inquiry has presumably sought from the three UK armed officers who were subjected to unnecessary and disproportionate treatment. It was an open secret that the three officers were being investigated on suspicion of conspiring to pervert the course of justice and I had spoken personally to both the Commissioner of Police and Superintendent McGrail in the days leading up to the arrests and confirmed that all three were happy to report to New Mole House accompanied by a solicitor. My |
| 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 | paragraph 14, he says as follows: "My sense at the time was that there was a potential for significant and long-term damage to relations between Gibraltar and the UK. I therefore saw my role as concentrating on getting both parties back to working together in a mutually supportive and appropriate way as soon as possible. Accordingly, this was the focus o0f my deputy, Mr Pyle, and I upon my return to Gibraltar." Over the page at paragraph 17, he says: "At some stage during this period I also had a telephone call with the then Minister for Europe to give him my account of the airport incident and to recommend that an independent review be conducted. It was then agreed between the Governor, Commissioner Yome and CBF Walliker that | 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 | devices and motor vehicles were also seized. CBF Walliker gives evidence on this too", and that is at page 1387 of bundle A. He says as follows at paragraph 8: "Turning to the arrests, I can add little to any statements that the Inquiry has presumably sought from the three UK armed officers who were subjected to unnecessary and disproportionate treatment. It was an open secret that the three officers were being investigated on suspicion of conspiring to pervert the course of justice and I had spoken personally to both the Commissioner of Police and Superintendent McGrail in the days leading up to the arrests and confirmed that all three were happy to report to New Mole House accompanied by a solicitor. My aim was to avoid a public arrest which I |
| 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 | paragraph 14, he says as follows: "My sense at the time was that there was a potential for significant and long-term damage to relations between Gibraltar and the UK. I therefore saw my role as concentrating on getting both parties back to working together in a mutually supportive and appropriate way as soon as possible. Accordingly, this was the focus o0f my deputy, Mr Pyle, and I upon my return to Gibraltar." Over the page at paragraph 17, he says: "At some stage during this period I also had a telephone call with the then Minister for Europe to give him my account of the airport incident and to recommend that an independent review be conducted. It was then agreed between the Governor, Commissioner Yome and CBF Walliker that the RGP would investigate whether sexual | 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 | devices and motor vehicles were also seized. CBF Walliker gives evidence on this too", and that is at page 1387 of bundle A. He says as follows at paragraph 8: "Turning to the arrests, I can add little to any statements that the Inquiry has presumably sought from the three UK armed officers who were subjected to unnecessary and disproportionate treatment. It was an open secret that the three officers were being investigated on suspicion of conspiring to pervert the course of justice and I had spoken personally to both the Commissioner of Police and Superintendent McGrail in the days leading up to the arrests and confirmed that all three were happy to report to New Mole House accompanied by a solicitor. My aim was to avoid a public arrest which I believed to be in the interests of all. |
| 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 | paragraph 14, he says as follows: "My sense at the time was that there was a potential for significant and long-term damage to relations between Gibraltar and the UK. I therefore saw my role as concentrating on getting both parties back to working together in a mutually supportive and appropriate way as soon as possible. Accordingly, this was the focus o0f my deputy, Mr Pyle, and I upon my return to Gibraltar." Over the page at paragraph 17, he says: "At some stage during this period I also had a telephone call with the then Minister for Europe to give him my account of the airport incident and to recommend that an independent review be conducted. It was then agreed between the Governor, Commissioner Yome and CBF Walliker that the RGP would investigate whether sexual offences had been committed in Gibraltar. | 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 | devices and motor vehicles were also seized. CBF Walliker gives evidence on this too", and that is at page 1387 of bundle A. He says as follows at paragraph 8: "Turning to the arrests, I can add little to any statements that the Inquiry has presumably sought from the three UK armed officers who were subjected to unnecessary and disproportionate treatment. It was an open secret that the three officers were being investigated on suspicion of conspiring to pervert the course of justice and I had spoken personally to both the Commissioner of Police and Superintendent McGrail in the days leading up to the arrests and confirmed that all three were happy to report to New Mole House accompanied by a solicitor. My aim was to avoid a public arrest which I believed to be in the interests of all. (11.10) |
| 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 | paragraph 14, he says as follows: "My sense at the time was that there was a potential for significant and long-term damage to relations between Gibraltar and the UK. I therefore saw my role as concentrating on getting both parties back to working together in a mutually supportive and appropriate way as soon as possible. Accordingly, this was the focus o0f my deputy, Mr Pyle, and I upon my return to Gibraltar." Over the page at paragraph 17, he says: "At some stage during this period I also had a telephone call with the then Minister for Europe to give him my account of the airport incident and to recommend that an independent review be conducted. It was then agreed between the Governor, Commissioner Yome and CBF Walliker that the RGP would investigate whether sexual offences had been committed in Gibraltar. | 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 | devices and motor vehicles were also seized. CBF Walliker gives evidence on this too", and that is at page 1387 of bundle A. He says as follows at paragraph 8: "Turning to the arrests, I can add little to any statements that the Inquiry has presumably sought from the three UK armed officers who were subjected to unnecessary and disproportionate treatment. It was an open secret that the three officers were being investigated on suspicion of conspiring to pervert the course of justice and I had spoken personally to both the Commissioner of Police and Superintendent McGrail in the days leading up to the arrests and confirmed that all three were happy to report to New Mole House accompanied by a solicitor. My aim was to avoid a public arrest which I believed to be in the interests of all. (11.10) My assessment is that the RGP intended to |
| 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 | paragraph 14, he says as follows: "My sense at the time was that there was a potential for significant and long-term damage to relations between Gibraltar and the UK. I therefore saw my role as concentrating on getting both parties back to working together in a mutually supportive and appropriate way as soon as possible. Accordingly, this was the focus o0f my deputy, Mr Pyle, and I upon my return to Gibraltar." Over the page at paragraph 17, he says: "At some stage during this period I also had a telephone call with the then Minister for Europe to give him my account of the airport incident and to recommend that an independent review be conducted. It was then agreed between the Governor, Commissioner Yome and CBF Walliker that the RGP would investigate whether sexual offences had been committed in Gibraltar. Commissioner Yome also instructed Mr McGrail to conduct a thorough investigation | 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 | devices and motor vehicles were also seized. CBF Walliker gives evidence on this too", and that is at page 1387 of bundle A. He says as follows at paragraph 8: "Turning to the arrests, I can add little to any statements that the Inquiry has presumably sought from the three UK armed officers who were subjected to unnecessary and disproportionate treatment. It was an open secret that the three officers were being investigated on suspicion of conspiring to pervert the course of justice and I had spoken personally to both the Commissioner of Police and Superintendent McGrail in the days leading up to the arrests and confirmed that all three were happy to report to New Mole House accompanied by a solicitor. My aim was to avoid a public arrest which I believed to be in the interests of all. (11.10) My assessment is that the RGP intended to humiliate the MD in as public a place as |
| 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 | paragraph 14, he says as follows: "My sense at the time was that there was a potential for significant and long-term damage to relations between Gibraltar and the UK. I therefore saw my role as concentrating on getting both parties back to working together in a mutually supportive and appropriate way as soon as possible. Accordingly, this was the focus o0f my deputy, Mr Pyle, and I upon my return to Gibraltar." Over the page at paragraph 17, he says: "At some stage during this period I also had a telephone call with the then Minister for Europe to give him my account of the airport incident and to recommend that an independent review be conducted. It was then agreed between the Governor, Commissioner Yome and CBF Walliker that the RGP would investigate whether sexual offences had been committed in Gibraltar. | 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 | devices and motor vehicles were also seized. CBF Walliker gives evidence on this too", and that is at page 1387 of bundle A. He says as follows at paragraph 8: "Turning to the arrests, I can add little to any statements that the Inquiry has presumably sought from the three UK armed officers who were subjected to unnecessary and disproportionate treatment. It was an open secret that the three officers were being investigated on suspicion of conspiring to pervert the course of justice and I had spoken personally to both the Commissioner of Police and Superintendent McGrail in the days leading up to the arrests and confirmed that all three were happy to report to New Mole House accompanied by a solicitor. My aim was to avoid a public arrest which I believed to be in the interests of all. (11.10) My assessment is that the RGP intended to humiliate the MD in as public a place as possible and I personally witnessed RGP |
| 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24 | paragraph 14, he says as follows: "My sense at the time was that there was a potential for significant and long-term damage to relations between Gibraltar and the UK. I therefore saw my role as concentrating on getting both parties back to working together in a mutually supportive and appropriate way as soon as possible. Accordingly, this was the focus o0f my deputy, Mr Pyle, and I upon my return to Gibraltar." Over the page at paragraph 17, he says: "At some stage during this period I also had a telephone call with the then Minister for Europe to give him my account of the airport incident and to recommend that an independent review be conducted. It was then agreed between the Governor, Commissioner Yome and CBF Walliker that the RGP would investigate whether sexual offences had been committed in Gibraltar. Commissioner Yome also instructed Mr McGrail to conduct a thorough investigation into the actions of the senior MoD officers. | 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24 | devices and motor vehicles were also seized. CBF Walliker gives evidence on this too", and that is at page 1387 of bundle A. He says as follows at paragraph 8: "Turning to the arrests, I can add little to any statements that the Inquiry has presumably sought from the three UK armed officers who were subjected to unnecessary and disproportionate treatment. It was an open secret that the three officers were being investigated on suspicion of conspiring to pervert the course of justice and I had spoken personally to both the Commissioner of Police and Superintendent McGrail in the days leading up to the arrests and confirmed that all three were happy to report to New Mole House accompanied by a solicitor. My aim was to avoid a public arrest which I believed to be in the interests of all. (11.10) My assessment is that the RGP intended to humiliate the MD in as public a place as possible and I personally witnessed RGP officers giving each other high fives outside |
| 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24 | paragraph 14, he says as follows: "My sense at the time was that there was a potential for significant and long-term damage to relations between Gibraltar and the UK. I therefore saw my role as concentrating on getting both parties back to working together in a mutually supportive and appropriate way as soon as possible. Accordingly, this was the focus o0f my deputy, Mr Pyle, and I upon my return to Gibraltar." Over the page at paragraph 17, he says: "At some stage during this period I also had a telephone call with the then Minister for Europe to give him my account of the airport incident and to recommend that an independent review be conducted. It was then agreed between the Governor, Commissioner Yome and CBF Walliker that the RGP would investigate whether sexual offences had been committed in Gibraltar. Commissioner Yome also instructed Mr McGrail to conduct a thorough investigation into the actions of the senior MoD officers. | 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24 | devices and motor vehicles were also seized. CBF Walliker gives evidence on this too", and that is at page 1387 of bundle A. He says as follows at paragraph 8: "Turning to the arrests, I can add little to any statements that the Inquiry has presumably sought from the three UK armed officers who were subjected to unnecessary and disproportionate treatment. It was an open secret that the three officers were being investigated on suspicion of conspiring to pervert the course of justice and I had spoken personally to both the Commissioner of Police and Superintendent McGrail in the days leading up to the arrests and confirmed that all three were happy to report to New Mole House accompanied by a solicitor. My aim was to avoid a public arrest which I believed to be in the interests of all. (11.10) My assessment is that the RGP intended to humiliate the MD in as public a place as possible and I personally witnessed RGP |

| 1 | the tower as my chief of staff was being | 1 | RGP accepting that they had honestly but |
|----------|---|-----|--|
| 2 | placed under arrest. The Provost Marshall | 2 | erroneously believed that they were acting |
| 3 | was arrested in the arrivals section of | 3 | lawfully and therefore were released from |
| 4 | Gibraltar Airport as he stepped off an aircraft | 4 | arrest and the RGP gave them formal |
| 5 | following a short spell back in the UK. That | 5 | warnings. |
| 6 | was wholly unnecessary. I personally | 6 | The examination of the serviceman's devices |
| 7 | witnessed the behaviour of Superintendent | 7 | in Gibraltar by the RGP failed to identify any |
| 8 | McGrail on the day of the arrests. It was | 8 | indecent images and he was effectively |
| 9 | utterly unprofessional and from that moment | 9 | cleared and released, but upon his return to |
| 10 | on I had lost any confidence in him. I felt | 10 | the UK forensic experts retained by the MOD |
| | | 11 | found more than 40,000 indecent images of |
| 11 | that he had acted with only self-interest in | 12 | |
| 12 13 | mind and without a shred of integrity or | 13 | children, some at the most serious level. He |
| | emotional intelligence. | | was ultimately convicted in the Crown Court |
| 14 | Mr McGrail denies that CBF Walliker made | 14 | and sentenced to imprisonment. |
| 15 | such an offer in terms of attending New Mole | 15 | On 9 May 2017 the Chief Minister requested |
| 16 | House and maintains that all officers behaved | 16 | that the GPA inquire into the airport incident. |
| 17 | professionally throughout, displaying due | 17 | On 5 September 2017 after investigating the |
| 18 | respect and courtesy. He also points out that | 18 | matter and seeking information and |
| 19 | he continued to work with CBF Walliker | 19 | documents from Commission Yome, the |
| 20 | when he was appointed Commissioner, right | 20 | GPA came to the firm conclusion that the |
| 21 | up to the end of the CBF's posting in | 21 | actions of and the restraint shown by the |
| 22 | Gibraltar. | 22 | relevant RGP officers during the incident |
| 23 | On 6 and 8 March emails were sent by CBF | 23 | were considered, deliberated, entirely |
| 24 | Walliker and Chief of Staff Rear Admiral | 24 | proportional and highly commendable. As |
| 25 | Radakin apologising for the events of 8 | 25 | such we do not doubt the effectiveness and |
| | 72 - 55 | | D 50 |
| | Page 57 | | Page 59 |
| 1 | Echmany Doon Adminal Dadalrin accounted | 1 | muchity of the melicine demonstrated by the |
| 1 2 | February. Rear Admiral Radakin accepted that the MOD's view at the time as to | 1 2 | probity of the policing demonstrated by the RGP in respect of the incident. We would |
| 3 | jurisdiction was not correct and expressed | 3 | |
| | • | | take the liberty of adding, though it may not |
| 4 | regret at the altercations between the forces. | 4 | be our place to do so, that the actions of |
| 5 | Apology letters were subsequently issued by | 5 | certain MOD personnel in respect of the |
| 6 | each of the three arrested MOD personnel. | 6 | incident deserve censure and that you should |
| 7 | On the same date a member of FCO staff | 7 | consider whether a full inquiry ought to be |
| 8 | emailed the Chief Minister, copying the | 8 | undertaken by a body independent of the |
| 9 | Attorney General Mr Pyle and the Governor, | 9 | RGP and the MOD so that lessons may be |
| 10 | stating that he had updated Sir Alan Duncan, | 10 | learned from this incident. |
| 11 | Foreign Secretary, as to the events and that | 11 | Two junior MOD personnel made a |
| 12 | the Minister was very happy that we | 12 | complaint to the Police Complaints Board |
| 13 | appeared to have reached a good outcome | 13 | two years later, in August 2019. Those |
| 14 | and had expressed his personal gratitude to | 14 | complaints centred around Detective Chief |
| 15 | the Chief Minister and the Commissioner of | 15 | Inspector Tunbridge's execution of the |
| 16 | Police for helping to get to that point. On 10 | 16 | warrant but also complained about comments |
| 17 | March 2017 the Governor at the time sent an | 17 | allegedly made by Mr McGrail which he |
| 18 | email to Commissioner Yome, copied to the | 18 | denied having made. Those complaints were |
| 19 | Chief Minister and to the Attorney General, | 19 | dismissed on the grounds of insufficient |
| 20 | offering his deep gratitude to Commissioner | 20 | evidence and the GPA deemed the decision |
| 21 | Yome and his officers for the efficacy and | 21 | not to qualify for an appeal. |
| 22 | the manner in which the RGP had conducted | 22 | Finally, Lieutenant General Davis confirms |
| 23 | the investigation, which he described as a | 23 | that it was ultimately considered that an |
| 24 | very tough job very well done. | 24 | independent review would be detrimental to |
| 25 | The officers were not ultimately charged, the | 25 | the significant progress that had been made |
| | | | |
| Ī | Page 58 | | Page 60 |
| | | | |

| 1 | in strengthening the relationship and | 1 | Their report exonerated the GPA. The GPA |
|----|---|----|--|
| 2 | cooperation between the RGP and the MOD | 2 | methodology, however, was in my opinion |
| 3 | in the aftermath of the incident. | 3 | seriously flawed, not least as they did not |
| 4 | In terms of where the airport incident is | 4 | conduct any interviews with the MOD nor |
| 5 | relied upon and by whom in this inquiry, this | 5 | did they seek any information from them." |
| 6 | issue is particularly relied upon by Mr Pyle. | 6 | Jumping to the bottom of the page 21.10, he |
| 7 | If we can turn to Pyle 1 at paragraph 21.4 to | 7 | says: |
| 8 | 21.11, which is page 246, starting in 21.4 he | 8 | "Issues over the forensic capabilities of the |
| 9 | says in the second sentence: | 9 | RGP also came to light during this incident. |
| 10 | "These events naturally became public and | 10 | The RGP insisted that they conducted the |
| 11 | caused considerable consternation given the | 11 | forensic examination of the suspect laptop |
| 12 | close and friendly nature of the constitutional | 12 | and phone, et cetera. I cannot recollect the |
| 13 | relationship between the UK and Gibraltar | 13 | exact timeframe but remember being told |
| 14 | and indeed the very friendly relations that | 14 | that the RGP investigation should only take a |
| 15 | have always existed between the MOD and | 15 | couple of weeks, after which the equipment |
| 16 | Gibraltar." | 16 | would be handed over to MOD. Some two |
| 17 | Jumping ahead to halfway down 21.5: | 17 | months or so later, with delays resulting from |
| 18 | "One of them, the Provost Marshall, was | 18 | the RGP forensic officer being off work with |
| 19 | with quite unnecessary drama removed from | 19 | stress, the RGP pronounced there was no |
| 20 | a civilian commercial flight from the UK as | 20 | incriminating evidence on the suspect |
| 21 | soon as it landed in Gibraltar. Colonel Green | 21 | computer, which was then handed over to the |
| 22 | was arrested in front of his superior, the | 22 | MOD. Within two weeks MOD forensic |
| 23 | Commander of British Forces Gibraltar | 23 | examination identified the most serious of |
| 24 | Commodore Mike Walliker. Station | 24 | imagery on the computer, resulting in the |
| 25 | Commander Hutchison was arrested in front | 25 | accused being found guilty and given a |
| 23 | Commander Frutchison was arrested in Iront | 23 | accused being round gunty and given a |
| | Page 61 | | Page 63 |
| | 2 2.7.511 | . | |
| 1 | of a team at RAF Gibraltar's station | 1 | custodial sentence. Over 1,000 images were |
| 2 | headquarters. The manner of the arrests were | 2 | recovered. |
| 3 | unpleasant. Also on 1 March the RGP | 3 | "It is difficult to overestimate the strain |
| 4 | entered HM Naval Base and seized and | 4 | which the relationship between the MOD and |
| 5 | removed service personnel equipment | 5 | Gibraltar was placed and the damage done to |
| 6 | including computer terminals and a white | 6 | it by this incident and the RGP conduct in |
| 7 | board. They then took one officer to her | 7 | relation to it. It required ministerial |
| 8 | home to take possession of her personal | 8 | intervention in both UK and Gibraltar and |
| 9 | phone. These actions were taken by the RGP | 9 | military intervention at the highest level in |
| 10 | notwithstanding that the incident had been | 10 | the UK to draw a line under it." |
| 11 | resolved. | 11 | If we can now turn to A186, this is the |
| 12 | "I raise my concerns over the RGP's above | 12 | evidence of the Chief Minister in relation to |
| 13 | behaviours and in particular Mr McGrail's | 13 | the airport incident. I am just quoting some |
| 14 | formally on numerous occasions with the | 14 | paragraphs from there. At 21 he says: |
| 15 | GPA, the Governor and the Chief Minister | 15 | "Mr McGrail led this investigation and the |
| 16 | and with the Foreign Commonwealth and | 16 | operations in question. It became apparent to |
| 17 | Development Office. Some of the actions | 17 | me that the manner in which Mr McGrail had |
| 18 | and behaviours were described to me by | 18 | led the investigation was unnecessarily |
| 19 | senior MOD people as a cross between the | 19 | institutionally confrontational in respect of |
| 20 | Sweeney and Life on Mars and extremely | 20 | the MOD. While I believe that the policing |
| 21 | and unnecessarily discourteous. I pushed | 21 | objectives were meritorious in the pursuit of |
| 22 | hard for a review, not an inquiry, into the | 22 | the investigation in question and I gave the |
| 23 | incident to expose the RGP behaviours. This | 23 | RGP my full and public support in that |
| 24 | was accepted by the Chief Minister, who | 24 | respect, that objective could and should have |
| 25 | tasked the GPA to conduct their own review. | 25 | been more quickly, effectively and easily |
| | Page 62 | | Daga 64 |
| | Page 62 | I | Page 64 |

1 achieved by a more collaborative and 1 team: 2 2 conventional route. "Ian, I have tried calling CBF, goes into 3 3 "I was clear in my view that while the MOD answering machine. Told HE," 4 4 his Excellency had not handled the matter well either, Mr 5 McGrail had led the RGP into a dangerous, 5 "and CM, HE wants a pragmatic approach 6 6 and to speak to CBF. I have texted CBF, difficult and damaging situation for Gibraltar 7 in terms of its relationship with the MOD, 7 waiting for him to call me. CM wants us to 8 8 which would and subsequently did require a go for the jugular." 9 9 If we can go to C142, please, this is an email lot of my time and effort to mitigate. In fact, 10 working with the Attorney General Michael 10 by the Chief Minister of 8 February 2017 to 11 11 Commissioner Yome, Mr McGrail and others Llamas QC and the now Chief of Defence 12 Staff, formerly First Sea Lord Tony Radakin 12 of the senior management team as well as the 13 we were able to put in place new procedures 13 then Minister for Justice Neil Costa and the 14 to ensure that there was never a reoccurrence 14 Attorney General. It reads as follows: 15 15 of events such as those which Mr McGrail's "Gents, I just want to say as a Gibraltarian 16 16 approach had resulted in." how proud I am of the work you have 17 17 In paragraph 24 he emphasises the vitally properly done today. Asserting our 18 important relationship with the MOD and 18 jurisdiction properly and reasonably for all 19 19 then goes on to say at 25: the right reasons and within the law is what 20 20 "Very considerable damage was done to the future generations would have expected us to 21 relationship with the MOD by Mr McGrail's 21 do. It is a pity the MOD have not been more 22 22 elegant in the way they have approached this. handling of and conduct during this incident. 23 23 Despite this and despite the political and We have taught them a number of lessons 24 24 diplomatic efforts required to resolve it, I felt today. You have done Gibraltar proud. 25 25 that Mr McGrail was not displeased with the "There are a number of obvious questions Page 65 Page 67 1 manner of his actions and not for one 1 arising as to how some people behaved 2 moment remorseful of the consequences for 2 today, whether the people lied to you or were 3 3 lying to themselves is going to be a relevant Gibraltar and that his leadership of the 4 operation had resulted in." 4 question in coming days. We must not 5 5 In response Mr McGrail maintains that he exacerbate matters but we cannot allow 6 6 was merely carrying out his duties diligently people to get away with having misled the 7 7 and professionally and made efforts to RGP or having obstructed you. The law is 8 8 deescalate the situation. He refers to the the law for all of us and an Armed Force 9 9 GPA's report to the Chief Minister which uniform does not suspend application of the 10 10 commended the RGP's actions as well as the law to an individual or of whatever rank. 11 advice of London counsel obtained by the That is what the UK taught us and we are not 11 12 Attorney General and the apologies given by 12 going to allow them to talk us out of it when 13 Rear Admiral Tony Radakin and the three 13 it applies to some, but those are issues for 14 senior ranking military officials. He 14 tomorrow. 15 describes the Chief Minister's criticisms as 15 "You have enjoyed my full support today at 16 false and self-serving and refers to a number 16 every stage of the way. Excellent work. 17 17 of communications by the Chief Minister at Please pass my sentiments if not my email to 18 the time, both public and directly to the RGP. 18 those who have been on the front line today." 19 19 He refers, for example, to a message from Mr McGrail also refers to a meeting with the 20 Commissioner Yome to the RGP senior 20 Chief Minister and Assistant Commissioner 21 21 management team Whatsapp group with at the time Ullger in mid-February 2017 22 instructions on 7 February 2017 on the eve of 22 when the Chief Minister thanked and 23 23 the incidents. If we can go to bundle C, page congratulated them for the manner with 24 24 757, please. this is that message. Just reading which they had dealt with the incident, 25 from it, it is from Commissioner Yome to the 25 describing the three senior MOD officials as Page 66 Page 68

| 1 | "fucking idiots" and expecting them to face | 1 | Pyle's inert activity in relation to the incident |
|---|--|--|--|
| 2 | due process for their actions. | 2 | contributed to the unfortunate escalation, |
| 3 | He also refers to bundle C207, which is an | 3 | something with which Mr Pyle disagrees. He |
| 4 | email of 3 March from the Chief Minister to | 4 | asserts that Mr Pyle knew from very early on |
| 5 | Mr Yome and the Attorney General two days | 5 | that the UK services police had no |
| 6 | after the arrests, which reads as follows: | 6 | jurisdiction and so his recollection is biased. |
| 7 | "Eddie, Michael, I have now read this and | 7 | He denies that there was any unnecessary |
| 8 | Michael's response. My impression and clear | 8 | drama and insists that the officers were very |
| 9 | understanding is that the MOD have now | 9 | discreet and accommodating. He also alleges |
| 10 | fully understood the position and the | 10 | that Mr Pyle never raised any concerns about |
| 11 | nonsense and bravado being displayed by | 11 | the incident. |
| 12 | fools such as those you refer to below in fact | 12 | Finally, while he acknowledges that the RGP |
| 13 | illustrates how and why we have found | 13 | failed to find indecent images on the devices |
| 14 | ourselves in this unnecessary unpleasant | 14 | and that this was embarrassing, he says that |
| 15 | situation. If it requires another turn of the | 15 | cannot be laid at his door and does not |
| 16 | screw, which I will not hesitate to support | 16 | detract from the MOD's unlawful actions. |
| 17 | you in, it will once again have been brought | 17 | Having summarised the facts of that incident, |
| 18 | by those who failed to recognise the need to | 18 | I turn to consider whether that was a reason |
| 19 | show proper and genuine contrition and | 19 | or circumstance. This incident of course |
| 20 | respect for the RGP and for our constitution. | 20 | took place in early 2017, long before Mr |
| 21 | Failing to respect our constitution is not to | 21 | McGrail was appointed Commissioner. It |
| 22 | fail to respect just Gibraltar, it is to fail to | 22 | was not mentioned by Dr Britto in his |
| 23 | respect the UK Parliament and the same | 23 | meeting with Mr McGrail on 22 May nor in |
| 24 | monarch that these clowns in uniform have | 24 | the letters from the GPA to Mr McGrail of |
| 25 | sworn an oath to." | 25 | the same day. None of the three letters from |
| | | | • |
| | Page 69 | | Page 71 |
| 1 | Just to jump ahead by two paragraphs: | 1 | the Chief Minister, Mr Pyle and the Attorney |
| 2 | "I can also tell you that Gibraltar will not be | 2 | General refer to it directly, although Mr Pyle |
| 3 | home for the people in question for long and | 3 | does refer to already existing concerns, |
| 4 | we won't be blocking the tarmac for a | 4 | which may well be a reference to this. |
| 5 | moment to delay the plane when the time | 5 | It was, however, mentioned by the Chief |
| 6 | soon comes for them to wave goodbye to the | 6 | Minister in his text at the time on 14 May, as |
| 7 | best place these idiots have ever had the good | | |
| 8 | • | 7 | I said earlier, where he refers to the runway |
| U | fortune to live in their petty lives. Good | | I said earlier, where he refers to the runway incident where we had to go into to bat for |
| | fortune to live in their petty lives. Good riddance, and goodbye won't come soon | 8 9 | incident where we had to go into to bat for |
| 9 | riddance, and goodbye won't come soon | 8 9 | incident where we had to go into to bat for them, despite all aspects having clearly been |
| | riddance, and goodbye won't come soon enough. I can tell you one thing, Eddie, | 8 9 10 | incident where we had to go into to bat for them, despite all aspects having clearly been mishandled by the RGP and parts of the |
| 9 10 | riddance, and goodbye won't come soon enough. I can tell you one thing, Eddie, Gibraltar, its Chief Ministers, its government | 8 9 | incident where we had to go into to bat for them, despite all aspects having clearly been mishandled by the RGP and parts of the MOD also. It does appear from Mr Pyle's |
| 9 10 11 | riddance, and goodbye won't come soon enough. I can tell you one thing, Eddie, Gibraltar, its Chief Ministers, its government and its people are proud of their police and | 8 9 10 11 | incident where we had to go into to bat for them, despite all aspects having clearly been mishandled by the RGP and parts of the MOD also. It does appear from Mr Pyle's evidence that the airport incident and reports |
| 9 10 11 12 | riddance, and goodbye won't come soon enough. I can tell you one thing, Eddie, Gibraltar, its Chief Ministers, its government and its people are proud of their police and the SMT Commissioner and their Attorney | 8 9 10 11 12 | incident where we had to go into to bat for them, despite all aspects having clearly been mishandled by the RGP and parts of the MOD also. It does appear from Mr Pyle's evidence that the airport incident and reports he received may have coloured his mind as to |
| 9 10 11 12 13 | riddance, and goodbye won't come soon enough. I can tell you one thing, Eddie, Gibraltar, its Chief Ministers, its government and its people are proud of their police and the SMT Commissioner and their Attorney General. The UK as a whole conversely has | 8 9 10 11 12 13 | incident where we had to go into to bat for them, despite all aspects having clearly been mishandled by the RGP and parts of the MOD also. It does appear from Mr Pyle's evidence that the airport incident and reports he received may have coloured his mind as to his impression of Mr McGrail, even though |
| 9 10 11 12 13 14 | riddance, and goodbye won't come soon enough. I can tell you one thing, Eddie, Gibraltar, its Chief Ministers, its government and its people are proud of their police and the SMT Commissioner and their Attorney General. The UK as a whole conversely has been embarrassed by its senior ranks on the | 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 | incident where we had to go into to bat for them, despite all aspects having clearly been mishandled by the RGP and parts of the MOD also. It does appear from Mr Pyle's evidence that the airport incident and reports he received may have coloured his mind as to his impression of Mr McGrail, even though he does not appear to have raised it during |
| 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 | riddance, and goodbye won't come soon enough. I can tell you one thing, Eddie, Gibraltar, its Chief Ministers, its government and its people are proud of their police and the SMT Commissioner and their Attorney General. The UK as a whole conversely has been embarrassed by its senior ranks on the rock, as can be seen by the reports in the | 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 | incident where we had to go into to bat for them, despite all aspects having clearly been mishandled by the RGP and parts of the MOD also. It does appear from Mr Pyle's evidence that the airport incident and reports he received may have coloured his mind as to his impression of Mr McGrail, even though |
| 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 | riddance, and goodbye won't come soon enough. I can tell you one thing, Eddie, Gibraltar, its Chief Ministers, its government and its people are proud of their police and the SMT Commissioner and their Attorney General. The UK as a whole conversely has been embarrassed by its senior ranks on the rock, as can be seen by the reports in the newspapers of actions taken here. I would | 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 | incident where we had to go into to bat for them, despite all aspects having clearly been mishandled by the RGP and parts of the MOD also. It does appear from Mr Pyle's evidence that the airport incident and reports he received may have coloured his mind as to his impression of Mr McGrail, even though he does not appear to have raised it during the application process for Commissioner of Police in 2018. |
| 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 | riddance, and goodbye won't come soon enough. I can tell you one thing, Eddie, Gibraltar, its Chief Ministers, its government and its people are proud of their police and the SMT Commissioner and their Attorney General. The UK as a whole conversely has been embarrassed by its senior ranks on the rock, as can be seen by the reports in the | 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 | incident where we had to go into to bat for them, despite all aspects having clearly been mishandled by the RGP and parts of the MOD also. It does appear from Mr Pyle's evidence that the airport incident and reports he received may have coloured his mind as to his impression of Mr McGrail, even though he does not appear to have raised it during the application process for Commissioner of Police in 2018. So that deals with issue one. I just wonder |
| 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 | riddance, and goodbye won't come soon enough. I can tell you one thing, Eddie, Gibraltar, its Chief Ministers, its government and its people are proud of their police and the SMT Commissioner and their Attorney General. The UK as a whole conversely has been embarrassed by its senior ranks on the rock, as can be seen by the reports in the newspapers of actions taken here. I would rather be in your shoes than theirs." | 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 | incident where we had to go into to bat for them, despite all aspects having clearly been mishandled by the RGP and parts of the MOD also. It does appear from Mr Pyle's evidence that the airport incident and reports he received may have coloured his mind as to his impression of Mr McGrail, even though he does not appear to have raised it during the application process for Commissioner of Police in 2018. So that deals with issue one. I just wonder whether now is an opportune time to have |
| 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 | riddance, and goodbye won't come soon enough. I can tell you one thing, Eddie, Gibraltar, its Chief Ministers, its government and its people are proud of their police and the SMT Commissioner and their Attorney General. The UK as a whole conversely has been embarrassed by its senior ranks on the rock, as can be seen by the reports in the newspapers of actions taken here. I would rather be in your shoes than theirs." | 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 | incident where we had to go into to bat for them, despite all aspects having clearly been mishandled by the RGP and parts of the MOD also. It does appear from Mr Pyle's evidence that the airport incident and reports he received may have coloured his mind as to his impression of Mr McGrail, even though he does not appear to have raised it during the application process for Commissioner of Police in 2018. So that deals with issue one. I just wonder |
| 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 | riddance, and goodbye won't come soon enough. I can tell you one thing, Eddie, Gibraltar, its Chief Ministers, its government and its people are proud of their police and the SMT Commissioner and their Attorney General. The UK as a whole conversely has been embarrassed by its senior ranks on the rock, as can be seen by the reports in the newspapers of actions taken here. I would rather be in your shoes than theirs." Mr McGrail refers also to an email which he says was drafted by the Chief Minister for | 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 | incident where we had to go into to bat for them, despite all aspects having clearly been mishandled by the RGP and parts of the MOD also. It does appear from Mr Pyle's evidence that the airport incident and reports he received may have coloured his mind as to his impression of Mr McGrail, even though he does not appear to have raised it during the application process for Commissioner of Police in 2018. So that deals with issue one. I just wonder whether now is an opportune time to have our mid-morning break before I turn to issues two and seven. |
| 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 | riddance, and goodbye won't come soon enough. I can tell you one thing, Eddie, Gibraltar, its Chief Ministers, its government and its people are proud of their police and the SMT Commissioner and their Attorney General. The UK as a whole conversely has been embarrassed by its senior ranks on the rock, as can be seen by the reports in the newspapers of actions taken here. I would rather be in your shoes than theirs." Mr McGrail refers also to an email which he says was drafted by the Chief Minister for Commissioner Yome to send to the CBF on 5 March 2017 and a media interview where the | 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 | incident where we had to go into to bat for them, despite all aspects having clearly been mishandled by the RGP and parts of the MOD also. It does appear from Mr Pyle's evidence that the airport incident and reports he received may have coloured his mind as to his impression of Mr McGrail, even though he does not appear to have raised it during the application process for Commissioner of Police in 2018. So that deals with issue one. I just wonder whether now is an opportune time to have our mid-morning break before I turn to issues |
| 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 | riddance, and goodbye won't come soon enough. I can tell you one thing, Eddie, Gibraltar, its Chief Ministers, its government and its people are proud of their police and the SMT Commissioner and their Attorney General. The UK as a whole conversely has been embarrassed by its senior ranks on the rock, as can be seen by the reports in the newspapers of actions taken here. I would rather be in your shoes than theirs." Mr McGrail refers also to an email which he says was drafted by the Chief Minister for Commissioner Yome to send to the CBF on 5 | 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 | incident where we had to go into to bat for them, despite all aspects having clearly been mishandled by the RGP and parts of the MOD also. It does appear from Mr Pyle's evidence that the airport incident and reports he received may have coloured his mind as to his impression of Mr McGrail, even though he does not appear to have raised it during the application process for Commissioner of Police in 2018. So that deals with issue one. I just wonder whether now is an opportune time to have our mid-morning break before I turn to issues two and seven. THE CHAIRMAN: Yes, I think that is a |
| 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 | riddance, and goodbye won't come soon enough. I can tell you one thing, Eddie, Gibraltar, its Chief Ministers, its government and its people are proud of their police and the SMT Commissioner and their Attorney General. The UK as a whole conversely has been embarrassed by its senior ranks on the rock, as can be seen by the reports in the newspapers of actions taken here. I would rather be in your shoes than theirs." Mr McGrail refers also to an email which he says was drafted by the Chief Minister for Commissioner Yome to send to the CBF on 5 March 2017 and a media interview where the Chief Minister congratulated the RGP's actions. | 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 | incident where we had to go into to bat for them, despite all aspects having clearly been mishandled by the RGP and parts of the MOD also. It does appear from Mr Pyle's evidence that the airport incident and reports he received may have coloured his mind as to his impression of Mr McGrail, even though he does not appear to have raised it during the application process for Commissioner of Police in 2018. So that deals with issue one. I just wonder whether now is an opportune time to have our mid-morning break before I turn to issues two and seven. THE CHAIRMAN: Yes, I think that is a good idea. But it is a short break |
| 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24 | riddance, and goodbye won't come soon enough. I can tell you one thing, Eddie, Gibraltar, its Chief Ministers, its government and its people are proud of their police and the SMT Commissioner and their Attorney General. The UK as a whole conversely has been embarrassed by its senior ranks on the rock, as can be seen by the reports in the newspapers of actions taken here. I would rather be in your shoes than theirs." Mr McGrail refers also to an email which he says was drafted by the Chief Minister for Commissioner Yome to send to the CBF on 5 March 2017 and a media interview where the Chief Minister congratulated the RGP's actions. In response to Mr Pyle, he alleges that Mr | 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24 | incident where we had to go into to bat for them, despite all aspects having clearly been mishandled by the RGP and parts of the MOD also. It does appear from Mr Pyle's evidence that the airport incident and reports he received may have coloured his mind as to his impression of Mr McGrail, even though he does not appear to have raised it during the application process for Commissioner of Police in 2018. So that deals with issue one. I just wonder whether now is an opportune time to have our mid-morning break before I turn to issues two and seven. THE CHAIRMAN: Yes, I think that is a good idea. But it is a short break MR SANTOS: Five minutes. THE CHAIRMAN: not a coffee break. |
| 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24 | riddance, and goodbye won't come soon enough. I can tell you one thing, Eddie, Gibraltar, its Chief Ministers, its government and its people are proud of their police and the SMT Commissioner and their Attorney General. The UK as a whole conversely has been embarrassed by its senior ranks on the rock, as can be seen by the reports in the newspapers of actions taken here. I would rather be in your shoes than theirs." Mr McGrail refers also to an email which he says was drafted by the Chief Minister for Commissioner Yome to send to the CBF on 5 March 2017 and a media interview where the Chief Minister congratulated the RGP's actions. | 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24 | incident where we had to go into to bat for them, despite all aspects having clearly been mishandled by the RGP and parts of the MOD also. It does appear from Mr Pyle's evidence that the airport incident and reports he received may have coloured his mind as to his impression of Mr McGrail, even though he does not appear to have raised it during the application process for Commissioner of Police in 2018. So that deals with issue one. I just wonder whether now is an opportune time to have our mid-morning break before I turn to issues two and seven. THE CHAIRMAN: Yes, I think that is a good idea. But it is a short break MR SANTOS: Five minutes. |

| 1 MR SANTOS: Yes. 2 THE CHAIRMAN: Okay, 3 (Adjourned for a short time) 4 THE CHAIRMAN: Well done, everyone 5 back on time. Yes, Mr Santos. 6 MR SANTOS: Mr Chairman, we move now 7 to issues two and seven, the helicopter pilot 8 assault investigation and the Aleaidesa 9 claims. I can deal with these two issues 9 fairly briefly. Both again predate Mr 10 McGrail's appointment as Commissioner of 11 Police and neither was mentioned in the 12 meeting between Dr Britto and Mr McGrail 13 meeting between Dr Britto and Mr McGrail 14 on 22 May 2020. The GPA's letters to Mr 15 McGrail of the same day also do not mention 16 them, or do the three letters, again other than 17 perhaps as part of Mr Pyle's already existing 18 concerns. In terms of the Aleaidesa claim, of 19 course I have explained how that arises, 19 which is in the Whatsapp message of 14 May 20 zoo. 20 Just dealing with the issue two first, the 21 ledicopter pilot assault investigation. As I 22 said, this investigation followed an incident 23 on 11 March 2017, hot on the heels of the 24 pargaraph 22, if we can go to bundle A, page 25 investigation the RGP concluded that the 26 investigation the RGP concluded that the 27 likelihood of a conviction was non-existent. 28 mryor filothy and a forensic report 29 processed. It took the RGP several 30 investigation being conducted whatsoesequed him that the McGrail had the McGrail had abbsequently told 31 bim that the helicopter pilot and the Aleaidesa of the Rope on the Aleaidesa 32 statements obtained and a forensic report 33 perpared but utilimately the officer in charge concluded that there was a thorough and forensic report 34 were reasonal to the same that arises, and in the matter of the crew were assaulted an incident of the many file and the same than the would have ever said what former CBF Walliker 34 a irror incident and arrests, when two 35 mryor incident and arrests, when two 36 mryor incident and arrests, when two 37 mryor incident and arrests, when two 38 mryor incident and arrests, when two 39 mryor inc | | | | |
|--|----------------------|---|----------------------|---|
| THE CHAIRMAN: Okay. (Adjourned for a short time) THE CHAIRMAN: Well done, everyone back on time. Yes, Mr Santos. MR SANTOS: Mr Chairman, we move now to issues two and seven, the helicopter pilot assauti investigation and the Alcaidesa claims. I can deal with these two issues of fairly briefly. Both again predate Mr McGrail and and a forensic report in relation to this and established that there is as an investigation with 18 witness statements obtained and a forensic report of propared but ultimately the officer in charge or concluded that there was insufficient evidence and the charces of a conviction were non-existent. Based on the evidence available, it appears that there was a hinvosuph and professional investigation. Mr McGrail of the same day also do not mention them, or do the three letters, again other than perhaps as part of Mr Pyle's already existing concers. In terms of the Alcaidesa claim, of course I have explained how that arises, which is in the Whatsapp message of 14 May 2020. Just dealing with the issue two first, the helicopter pilot assault investigation. As I said, this investigation followed an incident on 11 March 2017, hot on the heels of the Page 73 airport incident and arrests, when two members of the British Royal Navy serving as helicopter crew were assaulted and suffered injuries. Two men were identified on CCTV and arrested but following investigation followed an incident in Gibraltar, a helicopter pilot and another member of the crew were assaulted in a baria in Gibraltar, helicopter pilot and another with the service of the RGP oncluded that the incident was finactured, which prevented him from Hory ing. Despite witnesses and I believe CCTV, charges were never pressed. It took the RGP several weeks to state that the forensic evidence they had collected was not conclusive. The vidence and that Mr McGrail and abusive and theelicopter pilot asserting the states as a final that Mides and horse is tatement of the coresion of the report of the CRP of the Crist of the McGrail and in | 1 | MR SANTOS: Yes. | 1 | investigation being conducted whatsoever |
| 4 THE CHAIRMAN: Well done, everyone 5 back on time. Yes, Mr Santos. 6 MR SANTOS: Mr Chairman, we move now to issues two and seven, the helicopter pilot assault investigation and the Alcaidesa 9 claims. I can deal with these two issues 9 claims. I can deal with these two issues 9 claims. I can deal with these two issues 9 claims. I can deal with these two issues 9 claims. I can deal with these two issues 10 fairly briefly. Both again predate Mr 11 McGrail's appointment as Commissioner of 12 Police and neither was mentioned in the meeting between Dr Britto and Mr McGrail 13 available, it appears that there was a 14 thorough and professional investigation. 14 McGrail's depoint on the meeting between Dr Britto and Mr McGrail 14 on 22 May 2020. The GPA's letters to Mr 15 McGrail's on 22 May 2020. The GPA's letters to Mr 16 perhaps as part of Mr Pyle's aircade ye visiting 18 concerns. In terms of the Alcaidesa claim, of 19 course I have explained how that arises, 20 which is in the Whatsapp message of 14 May 2020. 22 Just dealing with the issue two first, the 16 belicopter pilot assult investigation. As 1 said, this investigation for 10 lowed an incident on CCTV and arrested but following 1 investigation the RGP concluded that the 18 filed by 10 paragraph 22, if we can go to bundle A, page 10 248, please. He says as follows: 10 paragraph 22, if we can go to bundle A, page 10 248, please. He says as follows: 11 m March 2017 turing a stopover in 12 Gibraltar, a helicopter pilot and another 19 weeks to state that the forensic evidence they 18 had collected was not conclusive. The 19 weeks to state that the forensic evidence they 19 had collected was not conclusive. The 19 weeks to state that the forensic evidence they 19 had collected was not conclusive. The 19 widely held belief in MOD circles is that the 22 RGP did not investigate the crime correctly 23 to protect those involved in the attack." 24 Former CBF Walliker addresses this too, 25 seserting that there is no evidence of any 25 sesering that there is no eviden | | | | |
| 4 THE CHAIRMAN: Well done, everyone 5 back on time. Ves, Mr Santos. 6 MR SANTOS: Mr Chairman, we move now 7 to issues two and seven, the helicopter pilot 8 assault investigation and the Alcaidesa 9 claims. I can deal with these two issues 9 claims. I can deal with these two issues 10 fairly brielly. Both again predate Mr 11 McGrail's appointment as Commissioner of 12 Police and neither was mentioned in the 13 meeting between Dr Britto and Mr McGrail 14 on 22 May 2020. The GPA's letters to Mr 15 McGrail of the same day also do not mention 16 them, or do the three letters, again other than 17 perhaps as part of Mr Pyle's already existing 18 concerns. In terms of the Alcaidesa claim, of 19 course I have explained how that arises, 20 which is in the Whatsapp message of 14 May 20 2020. 21 Just dealing with the issue two first, the 21 helicopter pilot assault investigation. As 1 22 said, this investigation followed an incident 23 on 11 March 2017, hot on the heels of the 24 airport incident and arrests, when two 25 members of the British Royal Navy serving 26 a shelicopter crew were assaulted and 27 surport incident and arrests, when two 28 members of the British Royal Navy serving 29 as helicopter reput were assaulted and 39 suffered injuries. Two men were identified 30 n CCTV and arrested but following 31 in March 2017 during a stopover in 32 Gibraltar, a helicopter pilot and another 33 member of the crew were assaulted in a bar 34 in Gibraltar, the pilot so severely that his 35 check or jawbone was fractured, which 36 paragraph 22, if we can go to bundle A, page 37 to the Corrected him from flying. Despite 38 weeks to state that the forensic evidence they 39 had collected was not conclusive. The 30 weeks to state that the forensic evidence they 30 had collected was not conclusive. The 31 weeks to state that the forensic evidence they 32 had collected was not conclusive. The 33 weeks to state that the forensic evidence they 34 had collected was not conclusive. The 35 weeks to state that the forensic evidence they 3 | | | | 1 , |
| 5 back on time. Yes, Mr Santos. 6 MR SANTOS: Mr Chairman, we move now to issues two and seven, the helicopter pilot assault investigation and the Alcaidesa claims. I can deal with these two issues to concluded that there was an investigation with 18 witness statements obtained and a forensic report prepared but ultimately the officer in charge concluded that there was insufficient evidence and the chances of a conviction meeting between Dr Britto and Mr McGrail on 22 May 2020. The GPA's letters to Mr 15 McGrail of the same day also do not mention 16 them, or do the three letters, again other than 16 perhaps as part of Mr Pyle's already existing 18 concerns. In terms of the Alcaidesa claim, of course I have explained how that arises. 20 which is in the Whatsapp message of 14 May 21 2020. Which is in the Whatsapp message of 14 May 220 2020. Which is in the Whatsapp message of 14 May 21 2020. Just dealing with the issue two first, the 23 helicopter pilot assault investigation. As 1 asid, this investigation followed an incident on 11 March 2017, hot on the heels of the Page 73 1 airport incident and arrests, when two members of the British Royal Navy serving as helicopter relive were assaulted in a suffered injuries. Two men were identified 5 on CCTV and arrested but following as helicopter relive were assulted in a bar in Gibraltar, a helicopter pilot and another method of the Rop Concluded that the fischlich of a conviction was non-existent. Mr Pyle refers to this in his first affidavit at paragraph 22, if we can go to bundle A, page 10 248, please. He says as follows: 1 "In March 2017 daring a stopover in Gibraltar, a helicopter pilot and another in Gibraltar, a helicopter pilot and another method that the forensic evidence they had collected was not conclusive. The witches or just the file of the Rop Several weeks to state that the forensic evidence they had collected was not conclusive. The witches of the Rop Several with paragraph 22, if we can go to bundle A, page 10 248, please. He says as follows: 1 air | | · • | | |
| 6 MR SANTOS: Mr Chairman, we move now to issues two and seven, the helicopter pilot assault investigation and the Aleaidesa elaims. I can deal with these two issues of fairly briefly. Both again predate Mr 11 McGrail's appointment as Commissioner of 12 Police and neither was mentioned in the 12 meeting between Dr Britto and Mr McGrail on 22 May 2020. The GPA's letters to Mr 14 McGrail on 22 May 2020. The GPA's letters to Mr 15 McGrail of the same day also do not mention 16 them, or do the three letters, again other than 17 perhaps as part of Mr Pyle's already existing 18 concerns. In terms of the Aleaidesa claim, of 2020. 22 Just dealing with the issue two first, the 2020. 23 Just dealing with the issue two first, the 21 said, this investigation followed an incident 25 on 11 March 2017, hot on the heels of the 26 members of the British Royal Navy serving 29 as helicopter crew were assaulted and 4 suffered injuries. Two men were identified 5 on CCTV and arrested but following 6 investigation the RGP concluded that the 18 vintess as attained and a forensic report were assaulted and 2 water through and professional investigation. Mr McGrail's evidence is that his involvement was limited to receiving updates. He describes Mr Pyle's evidence as aband and an insulting and denies that he would have ever said what former CBF Walliker evidence, so this is something that we will have ever said what former CBF Walliker evidence, so this is something that we will have ever said what former CBF Walliker evidence, so this is something that we will have ever said what former CBF Walliker evidence, so this is something that we will have ever said what former CBF Walliker evidence, so this is something that we will have ever said what former CBF Walliker evidence, so this is something that we will have ever said what former CBF Walliker evidence, so this is something that we will have ever said what former CBF Walliker evidence, so this is something that we will have ever said what former CBF Walliker evidence, so this is som | | · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · | | = |
| to issues two and seven, the helicopter pilot assault investigation and the Alcaidesa olaims. I can deal with these two issues fairly briefly. Both again predate Mr McGrail's appointment as Commissioner of Police and neither was mentioned in the meeting between Dr Britto and Mr McGrail on 22 May 2020. The GPA's letters to Mr McGrail of the same day also do not mention them, or do the three letters, again other than perhaps as part of Mr Pyle's already existing concerns. In terms of the Alcaidesa claim, of course I have explained how that arises, which is in the Whatsapp message of 14 May 2020. Just dealing with the issue two first, the helicopter pilot assault investigation. As I said, this investigation followed an incident on 11 March 2017, but on the heels of the Page 73 airport incident and arrests, when two members of the British Royal Navy serving as helicopter crew were assaulted and suffered injuries. Two men were identified on CCTV and arrested but following investigation the RGP concluded that the likelihood of a conviction was non-existent. Mr Pyle refers to this in his first affidavit at paragraph 22, if we can go to bundle A, page 248, please. He says as findlows: This issue only appears in the list of issues due to the reference by the Chief Minister to Page 75 1 it in his Whatsapp message of 14 May 2020 Isisting things which were causing him to start to lose confidence in the senior management of the RGP. It is not relied on by the Chief Minister of Mr Pyle in their evidence. A spackground, this incident goes back to August 2010 when officers of the RGP emtered a flat in Alcaidesa, Spain, on two occasions without a warrant and removed properly belonging to the tenant. Mr McGrail's evidence is that his work and warrant and removed to lose confidence in the senior management to lose confidence in the senior management of the RGP. It is not relied on by the Chief Minister of Mr Pyle in their evidence. A spack 2010 when officers of the RGP emtered a flat in Alcaidesa, Spain, on two occasions win | | | | ž , v , v |
| sasult investigation and the Aleaidesa claims. I can deal with these two issues of fairly briefly. Both again predate Mr 11 McGrail's appointment as Commissioner of Police and neither was mentioned in the meeting between Dr Britto and Mr McGrail on 22 May 2020. The GPA's letters to Mr 14 McGrail's appointment as Commissioner of Police and neither was mentioned in the meeting between Dr Britto and Mr McGrail on 22 May 2020. The GPA's letters to Mr 15 McGrail of the same day also do not mention them, or do the three letters, again other than perhaps as part of Mr Pyle's already existing concerns. In terms of the Aleaidesa claim, of course I have explained how that arises, which is in the Whatsapp message of 14 May 2020. Which is in the Whatsapp message of 14 May 2020. Just dealing with the issue two first, the laborate property and the world have ever said what former CBF Walliker claims, as I say. This issue only appears in the list of issues were the Aleaidesa claims, as I say. This issue only appears in the list of issues due to the reference by the Chief Minister to Page 75 1 airport incident and arrests, when two members of the British Royal Navy serving as helicopter crew were assaulted and suffered injuries. Two men were identified on CTV and arrested but following investigation the RGP concluded that the likelihood of a conviction was non-existent. Mr Pyle refers to this in his first affidavit at paragraph 22, if we can go to bundle A, page 248, please. He says as follows: 1 min March 2017 during a stopover in Gibraltar, a helicopter pilot and another moment of the crew were assaulted in a bar in Gibraltar, the pilot so severely that his cheek or jawbone was fractured, which prevented him from flying. Despite witnesses and I believe CCTV, charges were never pressed. It took the RGP several weeks to state that the forensic evidence they had collected was not conclusive. The widely held belief in MOD circles is that the RGP did not investigate the crime correctly to sesting Hollow to very large of the fea | | | | |
| prepared but ultimately the officer in charge concluded that there was insufficient occurred and the policy of the same day also do not mention the meeting between Dr Britto and Mr McGrail of the same day also do not mention the moeting between Dr Britto and Mr McGrail of the same day also do not mention the moeting between Dr Britto and Mr McGrail of the same day also do not mention the more of the the perfect same and the perfect of the same day also do not mention them, or do the three letters, again other than perhaps as part of Mr Pyle's already existing concerns. In terms of the Alcaidesa claim, of course I have explained how that arises, which is in the Whatsapp message of 14 May 2020. Just dealing with the issue two first, the helicopter pilot assault investigation. As I said, this investigation followed an incident as suffered injuries. Two men were identified on CCTV and arrested but following investigation the RGP concluded that the paragraph 22, if we can go to bundle A, page 10 248, please. He says as follows: "In March 2017 during a stopover in Gibraltar, the pilot so severely that his cheek or jawbone was fractured, which prevented him from flying. Despite witnesses and I believe CCTV, charges were non-existent. Based on the evidence and the chances of a conviction was non-cuistent. Based on the evidence and the chances of a conviction was non-cuistent. Based on the evidence and the chances of a conviction was non-cuistent. In the cheal of the cream of the cream of the cream of the would have will as a busined to receiving updates. He describes Mr Pyle's evidence as absurd and insulting and denies that he would have ever sail what former CBF Walliker claims he said. Mr Pyle stands by his evidence, so this is something that we will law to address in questioning. It is his Whatsapp message of 14 May 2020 listing things which were causing him to start to lose confidence in the senior management to lose confidence in the senior management to lose confidence in the senior management of the CFP of t | | | | |
| fairly briefly. Both again predate Mr McGrail's appointment as Commissioner of Police and neither was mentioned in the meeting between Dr Britto and Mr McGrail at on 22 May 2020. The GPA's letters to Mr McGrail of the same day also do not mention them, or do the three letters, again other than perhaps as part of Mr Pyle's already existing concerns. In terms of the Alcaidesa claim, of course I have explained how that arises, which is in the Whatsapp message of 14 May 2020. The Which is in the Whatsapp message of 14 May 21 2020. Just dealing with the issue two first, the helicopter pilot assault investigation. As I assid, this investigation followed an incident on 11 March 2017, hot on the heels of the Page 73 airport incident and arrests, when two members of the British Royal Navy serving as helicopter reve were assaulted and suffered injuries. Two men were identified on CCTV and arrested but following in investigation for RGP concluded that there was insufficient evidence available, it appears that there was a thorough and professional investigation. Mr McGrail's evidence is that his involvement was limited to receiving updates. He describes Mr Pyle's evidence as absurd and insulting and denies that he would have ever said what former CBF Walliker claims he said. Mr Pyle stands by his claims he said. Mr Pyle stands by his assurd and insulting and denies that he woill have ever said that former CBF Walliker and insulting and denies that he woill have ever said what former CBF Walliker claims he said. Mr Pyle stands by his law to address in questioning. 12 signe transcription of the RGP and the Alcaidesa claims, as I say. This issue only appears in the list of issues due to the reference by the Chief Minister to Page 75 1 airport incident and arrests, when two members of the British Royal Navy serving as helicopter rever assaulted and suffered injuries. Two men were identified on CCTV and arrested but following in the standard processing from the limited to the reference by the Chief Minister of Mr Pyle in | | = | | = |
| veidence and the chances of a conviction between Dr Britto and Mr McGrail converting between Dr Britto and Mr McGrail converting between Dr Britto and Mr McGrail converting the same day also do not mention them, or do the three letters, again other than the perhaps as part of Mr Pyle's already existing concerns. In terms of the Alcaidesa claim, of convert have explained how that arises, which is in the Whatsapp message of 14 May 2020. Just dealing with the issue two first, the helicopter pilot assault investigation. As I said, this investigation followed an incident on 11 March 2017, hot on the heels of the Page 73 airport incident and arrests, when two members of the British Royal Navy serving a shelicopter crew were assaulted and suffered injuries. Two men were identified on CCTV and arrested but following investigation the RGP concluded that the likelihood of a conviction were non-existent. Based on the evidence is that his incompleted in the same day also do not mention them, or do the three letters, again other than to divide the same day also do not mention them, or do the three letters, again other than to divide the same day also do not mention them, or do the three letters, again other than to divide the same day also do not mention them, or do the three letters, again other than to divide the describes Mr Pyle's evidence as absurd and insulting and denies that he would a dissurd and insulting and denies that he would updates. He describes Mr Pyle's evidence as absurd and insulting and denies that he would updates. He describes Mr Pyle's evidence as absurd and insulting and denies that he will have ever said what former CBF Walliker claims he said. Mr Pyle stands by his evidence, so this is something that we will like object that his investigation followed an incident to a time the describes Mr Pyle's evidence is that his it in his Whatsapp message of 14 May 2020 listing this prevented and the chances of a conviction were now the Alcaidesa. Spain, on two occasions without a warrant and removed prope | | | | |
| Police and neither was mentioned in the meeting between Dr Britto and Mr McGrail of the gray that there was a thorough and professional investigation. The GPA's letters to Mr McGrail of the same day also do not mention them, or do the three letters, again other than perhaps as part of Mr Pyle's already existing concerns. In terms of the Alcaidesa claim, of course I have explained how that arises, which is in the Whatsapp message of 14 May 2020. Just dealing with the issue two first, the helicopter pilot assault investigation. As I said, this investigation followed an incident on 11 March 2017, hot on the heels of the Page 73 airport incident and arrests, when two members of the British Royal Navy serving as helicopter crew were assaulted and suffered injuries. Two men were identified on CCTV and arrested but following in investigation the RGP concluded that the likelihood of a conviction was non-existent. Mr Pyle refers to this in his first affidavit at paragraph 22, if we can go to bundle A, page 10 248, please. He says as follows: In March 2017 during a stopover in Gibraltar, the pilot so severely that his in Gibraltar, th | | | | |
| meeting between Dr Britto and Mr McGrail on 22 May 2020. The GPA's letters to Mr McGrail of the same day also do not mention them, or do the three letters, again other than perhaps as part of Mr Pyle's already existing concerns. In terms of the Alcaidesa claim, of course I have explained how that arises, which is in the Whatsapp message of 14 May 2020. 21 Just dealing with the issue two first, the 23 helicopter pilot assault investigation. As I said, this investigation followed an incident 25 on 11 March 2017, hot on the heels of the Page 73 1 airport incident and arrests, when two members of the British Royal Navy serving as helicopter crew were assaulted and suffered injuries. Two men were identified on CCTV and arrested but following investigation the RGP concluded that the likelihood of a conviction was non-existent. Mr Pyle refers to this in his first affidavit at paragraph 22, if we can go to bundle A, page 10 248, please. He says as follows: 11 "In March 2017 during a stopover in 12 Gibraltar, a helicopter pilot and another member of the crew were assaulted in a bar in Gibraltar, a helicopter pilot and another member of the crew were assaulted in a bar in Gibraltar, the pilot so severely that his check or jawbone was fractured, which prevented him from flying. Despite weeks to state that the forensic evidence they had collected was not conclusive. The widely held belief in MOD circles is that the RGP did not investigate the crime correctly to had collected was not conclusive. The widely held belief in MOD circles is that the RGP did not investigate the crime correctly to protect those involved in the attack." 24 Former CBF Walliker addresses this too, asserting that there is no evidence of any | | | | |
| 14 morough and professional investigation. 15 McGrail of the same day also do not mention to them, or do the three letters, again other than 17 perhaps as part of Mr Pyle's already existing concerns. In terms of the Alcaidesa claim, of course I have explained how that arises, which is in the Whatsapp message of 14 May 2020. 20 which is in the Whatsapp message of 14 May 2020 Just dealing with the issue two first, the 23 helicopter pilot assault investigation. As 1 said, this investigation followed an incident 25 on 11 March 2017, hot on the heels of the Page 73 1 airport incident and arrests, when two 2 members of the British Royal Navy serving 3 as helicopter crew were assaulted and 4 suffered injuries. Two men were identified 5 on CCTV and arrested but following 6 investigation the RGP concluded that the 7 likelihood of a conviction was non-existent. 8 Mr Pyle refers to this in his first affidavit at 9 paragraph 22, if we can go to bundle A, page 10 248, please. He says as follows: 11 "In March 2017 during a stopover in 12 Gibraltar, a helicopter pilot and another member of the crew were assaulted in a bra 14 in Gibraltar, the pilot so severely that his check or jawbone was fractured, which pervented him from flying. Despite witnesses and I believe CCTV, charges were never pressed. It took the RGP several weeks to state that the forensic evidence they had collected was not conclusive. The widely held belief in MOD circles is that the 24 to address in the would have ever said what former CBF walliker claims he said. Mr Pyle's swidence as absurd and insulting and denies that he would have ever said what former CBF Walliker claims he said. Mr Pyle's swidence is that that would have ever said what former CBF Walliker claims, as 15 say. 15 the vectoe of 14 May 2020 listing thins in questioning. 15 the total the would have ever said what former CBF Walliker claims he said. Mr Pyle stands by his evidence, so this sis something that we will have ever said what former CBF Walliker claims, as 1 say. 15 thins in the Mac | | | | |
| McGrail of the same day also do not mention them, or do the three letters, again other than perhaps as part of Mr Pyle's already existing concerns. In terms of the Alcaidesa claim, of course I have explained how that arises, which is in the Whatsapp message of 14 May 2020. Just dealing with the issue two first, the helicopter pilot assault investigation followed an incident on 11 March 2017, hot on the heels of the Page 73 airport incident and arrests, when two members of the British Royal Navy serving as helicopter crew were assaulted and suffered injuries. Two men were identified on CCTV and arrested but following investigation the RGP concluded that the likelihood of a conviction was non-existent. Mr Pyle refers to this in his first affidavit at paragraph 22, if we can go to bundle A, page 20 248, please. He says as follows: I mind a provided in the prevented him from flying. Despite witnesses and I believe CCTV, charges were never pressed. It took the RGP several weeks to state that the forensic evidence they had collected was not conclusive. The widely held belief in MOD circles is that the RGP did not investigate the rime correctly to asserting that there is no evidence of any 25 but again this incideating in June 2019 but again this does not feature in the Chief will stage asserting that there is no evidence of any 25 but again this does not feature in the Chief will again this does not feature in the Chief will again this does not feature in the Chief will again this does not feature in the Chief will again this does not feature in the Chief will again this does not feature in the Chief will again this does not feature in the Chief will again this does not feature in the Chief will again this does not feature in the Chief will again this does not feature in the Chief will be a concerned in a Spanish court in relation to the incident. We are not aware of any claims in a civil sense that his concerns a dashurd and insulting and denies that he would have ever said what former CBF walliker addresses this | | _ | | * ** |
| them, or do the three letters, again other than perhaps as part of Mr Pyle's already existing concerns. In terms of the Alcaidesa claim, of course I have explained how that arises, which is in the Whatsapp message of 14 May 202 2020. 22 Just dealing with the issue two first, the helicopter pilot assault investigation. As I said, this investigation followed an incident on 11 March 2017, hot on the heels of the Page 73 1 airport incident and arrests, when two members of the British Royal Navy serving as as helicopter crew were assaulted and suffered injuries. Two men were identified on CCTV and arrested but following in investigation was non-existent. Mr Pyle refers to this in his first affidavit at paragraph 22, if we can go to bundle A, page 10 248, please. He says as follows: 11 "In March 2017 during a stopover in member of the crew were assaulted in a bar in Gibraltar, the pilot so severely that his check or jawbone was fractured, which prevented him from flying. Despite witnesses and I believe CCTV, charges were never pressed. It took the RGP several witnesses and is provered the more of the crew were assaulted in a bar in Gibraltar, the pilot so severely that his echeck or jawbone was fractured, which prevented him from flying. Despite witnesses and I believe CCTV, charges were never pressed. It took the RGP several wetched the crim correctly to protect those involved in the attack." 24 Former CBF Walliker addresses this too, asserting that there is no evidence from the attack." 25 In March 2017 during a stopover in correctly to did not investigate the crim correctly as a fellower contact and arrested but following to the search of the RGP. It is not relied on by the Chief Minister to to seconfidence in the senior management of the RGP officers of the RGP entered a flat in Alcaidesa, Spain, on two occasions without a warrant and removed | | - | | |
| perhaps as part of Mr Pyle's already existing concerns. In terms of the Alcaidesa claim, of course I have explained how that arises, which is in the Whatsapp message of 14 May 2020. Just dealing with the issue two first, the said, this investigation followed an incident on 11 March 2017, hot on the heels of the Page 73 airport incident and arrests, when two members of the British Royal Navy serving as helicopter crew were assaulted and suffered injuries. Two men were identified on CCTV and arrested but following investigation the RGP concluded that the likelihood of a conviction was non-existent. Mr Pyle refers to this in his first affidavit at paragraph 22, if we can go to bundle A, page 248, please. He says as follows: "In March 2017 during a stopover in Gibraltar, a helicopter pilot and another in Gibraltar, the pilot so severely that his cheek or jawbone was fractured, which prevented him from flying. Despite witnesses and I believe CCTV, charges were never pressed. It took the RGP several weeks to state that the forensic evidence they had collected was not conclusive. The widely held belief in MOD circles is that the 2RGP did not investigate the crime correctly to protect those involved in the attack." 24 Former CBF Walliker addresses this too, asserting that there is no evidence of any 2020 under said what former CBF Walliker addresses ting too. 14 May 2020 listing things and undertied and insulting and denies that he would have ever said what former CBF Walliker addresses ting too. 20 dash was about an dissulting and denies that he would have ever said what former CBF Walliker addresses ting too. 20 dash was about an dissulting and denies that he would have to address in questioning. 20 laims be avidence, so this is something that we will have to address in questioning. 21 laws to address in questioning. 22 laws to address in questioning. 22 laws to address in questioning. 23 laws ever is the Alcaidesa claims, as I say. This is sue of advents will have to address on this is something the will have to | | | | |
| concerns. In terms of the Alcaidesa claim, of course I have explained how that arises, which is in the Whatsapp message of 14 May 21 2020. 22 Just dealing with the issue two first, the helicopter pilot assault investigation. As I said, this investigation followed an incident said, this investigation followed an incident 24 and as helicopter or were assaulted and suffered injuries. Two men were identified on CCTV and arrested but following investigation the RGP concluded that the likelihood of a conviction was non-existent. Mr Pyle refers to this in his first affidavit at paragraph 22, if we can go to bundle A, page 248, please. He says as follows: 10 argantal paragraph 22, if we can go to bundle A, page 25 a paragraph 22, if we can go to bundle A, page 26 a paragraph 22, if we can go to bundle A, page 27 a member of the crew were assaulted in a bar in Gibraltar, the pilot so severely that his check or jawbone was fractured, which 15 check or jawbone was fractured, which 16 prevented him from flying. Despite weeks to state that the forensic evidence they asserting that there is no evidence of any 25 but again this does not feature in the Chief of the CGP winters and the condition of the RGP several widely held belief in MOD circles is that the RGP did not investigate the crime correctly 22 asserting that there is no evidence of any 25 but again this does not feature in the Chief or a paragraph 22, asserting that there is no evidence of any 25 but again this does not feature in the Chief or lambur delation in June 2019 but again this does not feature in the Chief or lambur and denies that he would have ever said what for claims be said. Mr Pyle stands by his evidence, calims be vidence, calims be vidence, so this is something that we will have to address in questioning. Is always to evidence, so this is something that we will have to address in questioning. Is always to evidence, so this is something that we will have to address in the Ist of issues due to the reference by the Chief Minister to of the RGP. It i | | | | _ |
| course I have explained how that arises, which is in the Whatsapp message of 14 May 2020. Just dealing with the issue two first, the helicopter pilot assault investigation. As I said, this investigation followed an incident on 11 March 2017, hot on the heels of the Page 73 | | | | |
| 20 which is in the Whatsapp message of 14 May 21 2020. 22 Just dealing with the issue two first, the 23 helicopter pilot assault investigation. As I 24 said, this investigation followed an incident 25 on 11 March 2017, hot on the heels of the Page 73 1 airport incident and arrests, when two 2 members of the British Royal Navy serving 3 as helicopter crew were assaulted and 4 suffered injuries. Two men were identified 5 on CCTV and arrested but following 6 investigation the RGP concluded that the 7 likelihood of a conviction was non-existent. 8 Mr Pyle refers to this in his first affidavit at 9 paragraph 22, if we can go to bundle A, page 10 248, please. He says as follows: 11 "In March 2017 during a stopover in 12 Gibraltar, a helicopter pilot and another 13 member of the crew were assaulted in a bar 14 in Gibraltar, the pilot so severely that his 15 cheek or jawbone was fractured, which 16 prevented him from flying. Despite 17 witnesses and I believe CCTV, charges were 18 never pressed. It took the RGP several 19 weeks to state that the forensic evidence they 20 had collected was not conclusive. The 21 widely held belief in MOD circles is that the 22 RGP did not investigate the erime correctly 23 to protect those involved in the attack." 24 Former CBF Walliker addresses this too, 25 saserting that there is no evidence of any 26 lambar to evidence, so this in som question and eve to address in questioning. 27 lawe to address in question and eve to address in questioning. 28 lawe to address in questioning. 29 lawe to address in question and event to address in questioning. 20 lawe to address in questioning. 21 lawe to address in questioning. 22 listing this seven is the Alcaidesa claims, as I say. 24 This issue only appears in the list of issues due to the reference by the Chief Minister to 25 due to the reference by the Chief Minister to 26 listing things which were causing him to start to olse confidence in the senior management of the RGP offers in this in his Watsapp message of 14 May 2020 21 listing thin | | | | |
| 21 2020. 22 Just dealing with the issue two first, the 23 helicopter pilot assault investigation. As 1 24 said, this investigation followed an incident 25 on 11 March 2017, hot on the heels of the Page 73 1 airport incident and arrests, when two 2 members of the British Royal Navy serving 3 as helicopter crew were assaulted and 4 suffered injuries. Two men were identified 5 on CCTV and arrested but following 6 investigation the RGP concluded that the 7 likelihood of a conviction was non-existent. 8 Mr Pyle refers to this in his first affidavit at 9 paragraph 22, if we can go to bundle A, page 10 248, please. He says as follows: 11 "In March 2017 during a stopover in 12 Gibraltar, a helicopter pilot and another 13 member of the crew were assaulted in a bar 14 in Gibraltar, the pilot so severely that his 15 cheek or jawbone was fractured, which 16 prevented him from flying. Despite 17 witnesses and I believe CCTV, charges were 18 never pressed. It took the RGP several 19 weeks to state that the forensic evidence they 20 had collected was not conclusive. The 21 widely held belief in MOD circles is that the 22 RGP did not investigate the crime correctly 23 asserting that there is no evidence of any 21 evidence, so this is something that we will 22 have to address in questioning. 23 Issue seven is the Alcaidesa claims, as I say. 24 Former CBF Walliker addresses this too, 25 Issue seven is the Alcaidesa claims, as I say. 26 to address in questioning. 26 lave to address in questioning. 27 Issue and Leaidesa claims, as I say. 28 to inside the Aclaidesa claims, as I say. 29 Issue seven is the Alcaidesa claims, as I say. 29 It is not relied on by the Chief Minister to 20 Minister to Mr Pyle in their evidence. 3 Issue seven is the Alcaidesa claims, as I say. 24 Former CBF Walliker addresses this too, 25 Issue such is its wond the tist of issues due to the reference by the Chief Minister to 26 As background, this incident goes back to 27 August 2010 when officers of the RGP 28 entered a flat in Alcaidesa, Spain, on two 2 | | | | |
| Just dealing with the issue two first, the helicopter pilot assault investigation. As I said, this investigation followed an incident on 11 March 2017, hot on the heels of the Page 73 1 | | | | · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · |
| helicopter pilot assault investigation. As I said, this investigation followed an incident on 11 March 2017, hot on the heels of the Page 73 This issue only appears in the list of issues due to the reference by the Chief Minister to Page 75 This issue only appears in the list of issues due to the reference by the Chief Minister to Page 75 This issue only appears in the list of issues due to the reference by the Chief Minister to Page 75 This issue only appears in the list of issues due to the reference by the Chief Minister to Page 75 This issue only appears in the list of issues due to the reference by the Chief Minister to Page 75 This issue only appears in the list of issues due to the reference by the Chief Minister to Page 75 This issue only appears in the list of issues due to the reference by the Chief Minister to Page 75 This issue only appears in the list of issues due to the reference by the Chief Minister to Page 75 This issue only appears in the list of issues due to the reference by the Chief Minister to Page 75 This issue only appears in the list of issues due to the reference by the Chief Minister to Page 75 This issue only appears in the list of issues due to the reference by the Chief Minister to Page 75 This issue only appears in the list of issues due to the reference by the Chief Minister to Page 75 This issue only appears in the list of issues due to the reference by the Chief Minister to Page 75 This issue only appears in the list of issues due to the reference by the Chief Minister to Page 75 This issue only appears in the list of issues due to the reference by the Chief Minister to Dead The Page 75 This issue only appears in the list of issues due to the reference by the Chief Minister to Dead 75 It is in his Whatsapp message of 14 May 2020 listing things which were causing him to start to loose confidence in the senior management of the RGP. It is not relied on by the Chief Minister of Mr Pyle in their evidence. As background, this incident goes back to August 2010 whe | | | | |
| said, this investigation followed an incident on 11 March 2017, hot on the heels of the Page 73 1 airport incident and arrests, when two members of the British Royal Navy serving 3 as helicopter crew were assaulted and 4 suffered injuries. Two men were identified 5 on CCTV and arrested but following 6 investigation the RGP concluded that the 7 likelihood of a conviction was non-existent. 8 Mr Pyle refers to this in his first affidavit at 9 paragraph 22, if we can go to bundle A, page 10 248, please. He says as follows: 11 march 2017 during a stopover in 12 Gibraltar, a helicopter pilot and another 13 member of the crew were assaulted in a bar 14 in Gibraltar, the pilot so severely that his 15 cheek or jawbone was fractured, which 16 prevented him from flying. Despite 17 witnesses and I believe CCTV, charges were never pressed. It took the RGP several 18 weeks to state that the forensic evidence they 19 had collected was not conclusive. The 21 widely held belief in MOD circles is that the 22 RGP did not investigate the crime correctly 23 to protect those involved in the attack." 24 Former CBF Walliker addresses this too, 25 asserting that there is no evidence of any 24 but again this does not feature in the Chief 3 tit in his Whatsapp message of 14 May 2020 listing things which were causing him to start 20 lose confidence in the senior management of the RGP. It is not relied on by the Chief 4 Minister of Mr Pyle in their evidence. As background, this incident goes back to 4 August 2010 when officers of the RGP and a collected and an another 10 minister of Mr Pyle in their evidence. As background, this incident in the senior management of the RGP. It is not relied on by the Chief 4 Minister of Mr Pyle in their evidence. As background, this incident goes back to August 2010 when officers of the RGP argust 2010 when officers of the RGP property belonging to the tenant. Mr 11 minister of Mr Pyle in their evidence. As background, this incident goes back to had property belonging to the tenant. Mr 12 involved. The In | | _ | | ž – – |
| 25 on 11 March 2017, hot on the heels of the Page 73 1 airport incident and arrests, when two 2 members of the British Royal Navy serving 3 as helicopter crew were assaulted and 4 suffered injuries. Two men were identified 5 on CCTV and arrested but following 6 investigation the RGP concluded that the 7 likelihood of a conviction was non-existent. 8 Mr Pyle refers to this in his first affidavit at 9 paragraph 22, if we can go to bundle A, page 10 248, please. He says as follows: 11 "In March 2017 during a stopover in 12 Gibraltar, a helicopter pilot and another 13 member of the crew were assaulted in a bar 14 in Gibraltar, the pilot so severely that his 15 cheek or jawbone was fractured, which 16 prevented him from flying. Despite 17 witnesses and I believe CCTV, charges were 18 never pressed. It took the RGP several 19 weeks to state that the forensic evidence they 20 had collected was not conclusive. The 21 widely held belief in MOD circles is that the 22 RGP did not investigate the crime correctly 23 to protect those involved in the attack." 24 Former CBF Walliker addresses this too, 25 asserting that there is no evidence of any 25 due to the reference by the Chief Minister to Page 75 1 it in his Whatsapp message of 14 May 2020 1 isting things which were causing him to start to lose confidence in the senior management of the RGP. It is not relied on by the Chief 4 of the RGP. It is not relied on by the Chief 4 of the RGP. It is not relied on by the Chief 6 As background, this incident gone back to 7 August 2010 when officers of the RGP 8 entered a flat in Alcaidesa, Spain, on two 9 occasions without a warrant and removed 10 property belonging to the tenant. Mr 11 McGrail was not one of the RGP officers 12 involved. The Inquiry has looked into this 13 investigation culminated in a report 14 investigation culminated in a report 15 recommending disciplinary proceedings for 16 discreditable conduct against seven officers. 17 On 26 November 2018 five individuals, 18 including two serving RGP officers, were 19 | | | | = |
| airport incident and arrests, when two members of the British Royal Navy serving as helicopter crew were assaulted and suffered injuries. Two men were identified on CCTV and arrested but following investigation the RGP concluded that the likelihood of a conviction was non-existent. Mr Pyle refers to this in his first affidavit at paragraph 22, if we can go to bundle A, page defining a stopover in limely and another displaying a stopover in di | | | | |
| airport incident and arrests, when two members of the British Royal Navy serving as helicopter crew were assaulted and suffered injuries. Two men were identified on CCTV and arrested but following investigation the RGP concluded that the likelihood of a conviction was non-existent. Mr Pyle refers to this in his first affidavit at paragraph 22, if we can go to bundle A, page 248, please. He says as follows: Gibraltar, a helicopter pilot and another in Gibraltar, the pilot so severely that his cheek or jawbone was fractured, which prevented him from flying. Despite weeks to state that the forensic evidence they had collected was not conclusive. The widely held belief in MOD circles is that the Right as helicopte in the senior management of the RGP. It is not relied on by the Chief Minister of Mr Pyle in their evidence. As background, this incident goes back to August 2010 when officers of the RGP entered a flat in Alcaidesa, Spain, on two occasions without a warrant and removed property belonging to the tenant. Mr McGrail was not one of the RGP officers invostigation into the matter. The investigation into the matter. The investigation culminated in a report recommending disciplinary proceedings for discreditable conduct against seven officers. On 26 November 2018 five individuals, including two serving RGP officers, were sentenced in a Spanish court in relation to the incident. We are not aware of any claims in a civil sense, although there were, as I say, criminal proceedings. The matter was reported upon in local media in June 2019 but again this does not feature in the Chief | 23 | on 11 March 2017, not on the needs of the | 23 | due to the reference by the Ciner Willister to |
| airport incident and arrests, when two members of the British Royal Navy serving as helicopter crew were assaulted and suffered injuries. Two men were identified on CCTV and arrested but following investigation the RGP concluded that the likelihood of a conviction was non-existent. Mr Pyle refers to this in his first affidavit at paragraph 22, if we can go to bundle A, page 248, please. He says as follows: Gibraltar, a helicopter pilot and another in Gibraltar, the pilot so severely that his cheek or jawbone was fractured, which prevented him from flying. Despite weeks to state that the forensic evidence they had collected was not conclusive. The widely held belief in MOD circles is that the Right as helicopte in the senior management of the RGP. It is not relied on by the Chief Minister of Mr Pyle in their evidence. As background, this incident goes back to August 2010 when officers of the RGP entered a flat in Alcaidesa, Spain, on two occasions without a warrant and removed property belonging to the tenant. Mr McGrail was not one of the RGP officers invostigation into the matter. The investigation into the matter. The investigation culminated in a report recommending disciplinary proceedings for discreditable conduct against seven officers. On 26 November 2018 five individuals, including two serving RGP officers, were sentenced in a Spanish court in relation to the incident. We are not aware of any claims in a civil sense, although there were, as I say, criminal proceedings. The matter was reported upon in local media in June 2019 but again this does not feature in the Chief | | Page 73 | | Page 75 |
| members of the British Royal Navy serving as helicopter crew were assaulted and suffered injuries. Two men were identified on CCTV and arrested but following investigation the RGP concluded that the likelihood of a conviction was non-existent. Mr Pyle refers to this in his first affidavit at paragraph 22, if we can go to bundle A, page 248, please. He says as follows: 10 Gibraltar, a helicopter pilot and another in Gibraltar, the pilot so severely that his cheek or jawbone was fractured, which prevented him from flying. Despite never pressed. It took the RGP several weeks to state that the forensic evidence they had collected was not conclusive. The widely held belief in MOD circles is that the RGP walliker addresses this too, asserting that there is no evidence of any serving RGP offical took case on fidence in the senior management of the RGP. It is not relied on by the Chief of the RGP sentered a flat in Alcaidsa, Spain, on two occasions without a warrant and removed property belonging to the tenant. Mr occasions without a warrant and removed in the RGP officers involved. The Inqui | | | | |
| as helicopter crew were assaulted and suffered injuries. Two men were identified on CCTV and arrested but following investigation the RGP concluded that the likelihood of a conviction was non-existent. Mr Pyle refers to this in his first affidavit at paragraph 22, if we can go to bundle A, page 248, please. He says as follows: Gibraltar, a helicopter pilot and another member of the crew were assaulted in a bar in Gibraltar, the pilot so severely that his cheek or jawbone was fractured, which prevented him from flying. Despite witnesses and I believe CCTV, charges were never pressed. It took the RGP several weeks to state that the forensic evidence they had collected was not conclusive. The widely held belief in MOD circles is that the RGP did not investigate the crime correctly asserting that there is no evidence of any to lose confidence in the senior management of the RGP. It is not relied on by the Chief Minister of Mr Pyle in their evidence. As background, this incident goes back to August 2010 when officers of the RGP abackground, this incident goes back to As background, this incident goes back to August 2010 when officers of the RGP preyer de flat in Alcaidesa, Spain, on two occasions without a warrant and removed property belonging to the tenant. Mr McGrail was not one of the RGP officers involved. The Inquiry has looked into this issue, including the RGP's internal investigation into the matter. The investigation int | 1 | airport incident and arrests, when two | 1 | it in his Whatsapp message of 14 May 2020 |
| 4 suffered injuries. Two men were identified 5 on CCTV and arrested but following 6 investigation the RGP concluded that the 7 likelihood of a conviction was non-existent. 8 Mr Pyle refers to this in his first affidavit at 9 paragraph 22, if we can go to bundle A, page 10 248, please. He says as follows: 11 "In March 2017 during a stopover in 12 Gibraltar, a helicopter pilot and another 13 member of the crew were assaulted in a bar 14 in Gibraltar, the pilot so severely that his 15 check or jawbone was fractured, which 16 prevented him from flying. Despite 17 witnesses and I believe CCTV, charges were 18 never pressed. It took the RGP several 19 weeks to state that the forensic evidence they 20 had collected was not conclusive. The 21 widely held belief in MOD circles is that the 22 RGP did not investigate the crime correctly 23 to protect those involved in the attack." 24 Former CBF Walliker addresses this too, 25 asserting that there is no evidence of any 26 of the RGP. It is not relied on by the Chief 27 Minister of Mr Pyle in their evidence. 28 Minister of Mr Pyle in their evidence. 29 As background, this incident goes back to 29 August 2010 when officers of the RGP 20 entered a flat in Alcaidesa, Spain, on two 20 occasions without a warrant and removed 21 property belonging to the tenant. Mr 22 In McGrail was not one of the RGP officers 23 involved. The Inquiry has looked into this 24 investigation into the matter. The 25 investigation culminated in a report 26 recommending disciplinary proceedings for 27 discreditable conduct against seven officers. 28 On 26 November 2018 five individuals, 29 including two serving RGP officers, were 20 sentenced in a Spanish court in relation to the 21 investigation into the matter. The 22 a civil sense, although there were, as I say, 23 criminal proceedings. The matter was 24 reported upon in local media in June 2019 25 but again this does not feature in the Chief | 2 | members of the British Royal Navy serving | 2 | listing things which were causing him to start |
| on CCTV and arrested but following investigation the RGP concluded that the likelihood of a conviction was non-existent. Mr Pyle refers to this in his first affidavit at paragraph 22, if we can go to bundle A, page 248, please. He says as follows: "In March 2017 during a stopover in dibraltar, the pilot so severely that his cheek or jawbone was fractured, which prevented him from flying. Despite meyer pressed. It took the RGP several weeks to state that the forensic evidence they had collected was not conclusive. The widely held belief in MOD circles is that the RGP did not investigate the crime correctly on property belonging to the tenant. Mr McGrail was not one of the RGP officers involved. The Inquiry has looked into this investigation into the matter. The investigation culminated in a report recommending disciplinary proceedings for discreditable conduct against seven officers. On 26 November 2018 five individuals, including two serving RGP officers, were sentenced in a Spanish court in relation to the incident. We are not aware of any claims in a civil sense, although there were, as I say, criminal proceedings. The matter was reported upon in local media in June 2019 but again this does not feature in the Chief | 3 | as helicopter crew were assaulted and | 3 | to lose confidence in the senior management |
| 6 investigation the RGP concluded that the 7 likelihood of a conviction was non-existent. 8 Mr Pyle refers to this in his first affidavit at 9 paragraph 22, if we can go to bundle A, page 10 248, please. He says as follows: 11 "In March 2017 during a stopover in 12 Gibraltar, a helicopter pilot and another 13 member of the crew were assaulted in a bar 14 in Gibraltar, the pilot so severely that his 15 cheek or jawbone was fractured, which 16 prevented him from flying. Despite 17 witnesses and I believe CCTV, charges were 18 never pressed. It took the RGP several 19 weeks to state that the forensic evidence they 20 had collected was not conclusive. The 21 widely held belief in MOD circles is that the 22 RGP did not investigate the crime correctly 23 to protect those involved in the attack." 24 Former CBF Walliker addresses this too, 25 asserting that there is no evidence of any 26 As background, this incident goes back to 27 August 2010 when officers of the RGP 28 August 2010 when officers of the RGP 29 August 2010 when officers of the RGP 20 august 2010 when officers of the RGP 20 august 2010 when officers of the RGP 20 casions without a warrant and removed 21 property belonging to the tenant. Mr 21 McGrail was not one of the RGP officers 21 involved. The Inquiry has looked into this 22 involved. The Inquiry has looked into this 23 insue, including the RGP's internal 24 investigation culminated in a report 25 recommending disciplinary proceedings for 26 discreditable conduct against seven officers. 27 discreditable conduct against seven officers. 28 On 26 November 2018 five individuals, 29 including two serving RGP officers, were 20 sentenced in a Spanish court in relation to the 21 incident. We are not aware of any claims in 22 a civil sense, although there were, as I say, 23 criminal proceedings. The matter was 24 reported upon in local media in June 2019 25 but again this does not feature in the Chief | 4 | suffered injuries. Two men were identified | 4 | of the RGP. It is not relied on by the Chief |
| Rope | 5 | on CCTV and arrested but following | 5 | Minister of Mr Pyle in their evidence. |
| Mr Pyle refers to this in his first affidavit at paragraph 22, if we can go to bundle A, page 248, please. He says as follows: In March 2017 during a stopover in Gibraltar, a helicopter pilot and another in Gibraltar, the pilot so severely that his cheek or jawbone was fractured, which prevented him from flying. Despite revented him from flying. Despite never pressed. It took the RGP several weeks to state that the forensic evidence they had collected was not conclusive. The widely held belief in MOD circles is that the RGP did not investigate the crime correctly RGP did not investigate the crime correctly asserting that there is no evidence of any McGrail was not one of the RGP officers involved. The Inquiry has looked into this investigation into the matter. The investigation into the matter. The investigation culminated in a report recommending disciplinary proceedings for discreditable conduct against seven officers. On 26 November 2018 five individuals, including two serving RGP officers, were sentenced in a Spanish court in relation to the incident. We are not aware of any claims in a civil sense, although there were, as I say, criminal proceedings. The matter was reported upon in local media in June 2019 but again this does not feature in the Chief | 6 | investigation the RGP concluded that the | 6 | As background, this incident goes back to |
| paragraph 22, if we can go to bundle A, page 248, please. He says as follows: "In March 2017 during a stopover in Gibraltar, a helicopter pilot and another in Gibraltar, the pilot so severely that his cheek or jawbone was fractured, which prevented him from flying. Despite recommending disciplinary proceedings for witnesses and I believe CCTV, charges were never pressed. It took the RGP several weeks to state that the forensic evidence they had collected was not conclusive. The widely held belief in MOD circles is that the RGP did not investigate the crime correctly asserting that there is no evidence of any property belonging to the tenant. Mr McGrail was not one of the RGP officers involved. The Inquiry has looked into this investigation into the matter. The investigation culminated in a report recommending disciplinary proceedings for discreditable conduct against seven officers. On 26 November 2018 five individuals, including two serving RGP officers, were sentenced in a Spanish court in relation to the incident. We are not aware of any claims in a civil sense, although there were, as I say, criminal proceedings. The matter was reported upon in local media in June 2019 but again this does not feature in the Chief | 7 | likelihood of a conviction was non-existent. | 7 | August 2010 when officers of the RGP |
| 248, please. He says as follows: "In March 2017 during a stopover in Gibraltar, a helicopter pilot and another in Gibraltar, the pilot so severely that his cheek or jawbone was fractured, which prevented him from flying. Despite never pressed. It took the RGP several weeks to state that the forensic evidence they had collected was not conclusive. The widely held belief in MOD circles is that the RGP did not investigate the crime correctly Sasserting that there is no evidence of any 10 property belonging to the tenant. Mr McGrail was not one of the RGP officers involved. The Inquiry has looked into this issue, including the RGP's internal investigation into the matter. The investigation culminated in a report recommending disciplinary proceedings for discreditable conduct against seven officers. On 26 November 2018 five individuals, including two serving RGP officers, were sentenced in a Spanish court in relation to the incident. We are not aware of any claims in a civil sense, although there were, as I say, criminal proceedings. The matter was reported upon in local media in June 2019 but again this does not feature in the Chief | 8 | Mr Pyle refers to this in his first affidavit at | 8 | entered a flat in Alcaidesa, Spain, on two |
| "In March 2017 during a stopover in Gibraltar, a helicopter pilot and another in Gibraltar, the pilot so severely that his cheek or jawbone was fractured, which prevented him from flying. Despite never pressed. It took the RGP several weeks to state that the forensic evidence they had collected was not one of the RGP officers involved. The Inquiry has looked into this issue, including the RGP's internal investigation into the matter. The investigation culminated in a report recommending disciplinary proceedings for discreditable conduct against seven officers. On 26 November 2018 five individuals, including two serving RGP officers, were sentenced in a Spanish court in relation to the incident. We are not aware of any claims in a civil sense, although there were, as I say, criminal proceedings. The matter was reported upon in local media in June 2019 but again this does not feature in the Chief | 9 | paragraph 22, if we can go to bundle A, page | 9 | occasions without a warrant and removed |
| Gibraltar, a helicopter pilot and another member of the crew were assaulted in a bar in Gibraltar, the pilot so severely that his cheek or jawbone was fractured, which prevented him from flying. Despite never pressed. It took the RGP several weeks to state that the forensic evidence they had collected was not conclusive. The widely held belief in MOD circles is that the RGP did not investigate the crime correctly RGP did not investigate the crime correctly asserting that there is no evidence of any 12 involved. The Inquiry has looked into this issue, including the RGP's internal investigation into the matter. The investigation culminated in a report recommending disciplinary proceedings for discreditable conduct against seven officers. On 26 November 2018 five individuals, including two serving RGP officers, were sentenced in a Spanish court in relation to the incident. We are not aware of any claims in a civil sense, although there were, as I say, criminal proceedings. The matter was reported upon in local media in June 2019 but again this does not feature in the Chief | 10 | 248, please. He says as follows: | 10 | property belonging to the tenant. Mr |
| member of the crew were assaulted in a bar in Gibraltar, the pilot so severely that his cheek or jawbone was fractured, which prevented him from flying. Despite 16 recommending disciplinary proceedings for witnesses and I believe CCTV, charges were never pressed. It took the RGP several weeks to state that the forensic evidence they had collected was not conclusive. The widely held belief in MOD circles is that the 22 RGP did not investigate the crime correctly to protect those involved in the attack." 23 criminal proceedings. The matter was reported upon in local media in June 2019 asserting that there is no evidence of any 25 but again this does not feature in the Chief | 11 | "In March 2017 during a stopover in | 11 | McGrail was not one of the RGP officers |
| in Gibraltar, the pilot so severely that his cheek or jawbone was fractured, which prevented him from flying. Despite witnesses and I believe CCTV, charges were never pressed. It took the RGP several weeks to state that the forensic evidence they had collected was not conclusive. The widely held belief in MOD circles is that the RGP did not investigate the crime correctly RGP did not investigate the crime correctly former CBF Walliker addresses this too, asserting that there is no evidence of any 14 investigation into the matter. The investigation culminated in a report recommending disciplinary proceedings for discreditable conduct against seven officers. Pon 26 November 2018 five individuals, including two serving RGP officers, were sentenced in a Spanish court in relation to the incident. We are not aware of any claims in a civil sense, although there were, as I say, criminal proceedings. The matter was reported upon in local media in June 2019 but again this does not feature in the Chief | 12 | Gibraltar, a helicopter pilot and another | 12 | involved. The Inquiry has looked into this |
| cheek or jawbone was fractured, which prevented him from flying. Despite witnesses and I believe CCTV, charges were never pressed. It took the RGP several weeks to state that the forensic evidence they had collected was not conclusive. The widely held belief in MOD circles is that the RGP did not investigate the crime correctly RGP did not investigate the crime correctly former CBF Walliker addresses this too, asserting that there is no evidence of any 15 investigation culminated in a report recommending disciplinary proceedings for discreditable conduct against seven officers. On 26 November 2018 five individuals, including two serving RGP officers, were sentenced in a Spanish court in relation to the incident. We are not aware of any claims in a civil sense, although there were, as I say, criminal proceedings. The matter was reported upon in local media in June 2019 but again this does not feature in the Chief | 13 | member of the crew were assaulted in a bar | 13 | issue, including the RGP's internal |
| prevented him from flying. Despite witnesses and I believe CCTV, charges were never pressed. It took the RGP several weeks to state that the forensic evidence they had collected was not conclusive. The widely held belief in MOD circles is that the RGP did not investigate the crime correctly rope former CBF Walliker addresses this too, asserting that there is no evidence of any 16 recommending disciplinary proceedings for discreditable conduct against seven officers. On 26 November 2018 five individuals, including two serving RGP officers, were sentenced in a Spanish court in relation to the incident. We are not aware of any claims in a civil sense, although there were, as I say, criminal proceedings. The matter was reported upon in local media in June 2019 but again this does not feature in the Chief | 14 | in Gibraltar, the pilot so severely that his | 14 | investigation into the matter. The |
| witnesses and I believe CCTV, charges were never pressed. It took the RGP several weeks to state that the forensic evidence they had collected was not conclusive. The widely held belief in MOD circles is that the RGP did not investigate the crime correctly to protect those involved in the attack." Former CBF Walliker addresses this too, asserting that there is no evidence of any discreditable conduct against seven officers. On 26 November 2018 five individuals, including two serving RGP officers, were sentenced in a Spanish court in relation to the incident. We are not aware of any claims in a civil sense, although there were, as I say, criminal proceedings. The matter was reported upon in local media in June 2019 but again this does not feature in the Chief | 15 | cheek or jawbone was fractured, which | 15 | investigation culminated in a report |
| never pressed. It took the RGP several weeks to state that the forensic evidence they had collected was not conclusive. The widely held belief in MOD circles is that the RGP did not investigate the crime correctly to protect those involved in the attack." Former CBF Walliker addresses this too, asserting that there is no evidence of any 18 On 26 November 2018 five individuals, including two serving RGP officers, were sentenced in a Spanish court in relation to the incident. We are not aware of any claims in a civil sense, although there were, as I say, criminal proceedings. The matter was reported upon in local media in June 2019 but again this does not feature in the Chief | 16 | prevented him from flying. Despite | 16 | recommending disciplinary proceedings for |
| weeks to state that the forensic evidence they had collected was not conclusive. The widely held belief in MOD circles is that the RGP did not investigate the crime correctly to protect those involved in the attack." Former CBF Walliker addresses this too, asserting that there is no evidence of any 19 including two serving RGP officers, were sentenced in a Spanish court in relation to the incident. We are not aware of any claims in a civil sense, although there were, as I say, criminal proceedings. The matter was reported upon in local media in June 2019 but again this does not feature in the Chief | 17 | witnesses and I believe CCTV, charges were | 17 | discreditable conduct against seven officers. |
| weeks to state that the forensic evidence they had collected was not conclusive. The widely held belief in MOD circles is that the RGP did not investigate the crime correctly to protect those involved in the attack." Former CBF Walliker addresses this too, asserting that there is no evidence of any 19 including two serving RGP officers, were sentenced in a Spanish court in relation to the incident. We are not aware of any claims in a civil sense, although there were, as I say, criminal proceedings. The matter was reported upon in local media in June 2019 but again this does not feature in the Chief | 18 | never pressed. It took the RGP several | 18 | On 26 November 2018 five individuals, |
| had collected was not conclusive. The widely held belief in MOD circles is that the RGP did not investigate the crime correctly to protect those involved in the attack." Former CBF Walliker addresses this too, asserting that there is no evidence of any 20 sentenced in a Spanish court in relation to the incident. We are not aware of any claims in a civil sense, although there were, as I say, criminal proceedings. The matter was reported upon in local media in June 2019 but again this does not feature in the Chief | 19 | | 19 | including two serving RGP officers, were |
| RGP did not investigate the crime correctly to protect those involved in the attack." 22 a civil sense, although there were, as I say, criminal proceedings. The matter was reported upon in local media in June 2019 asserting that there is no evidence of any but again this does not feature in the Chief | 20 | had callected was not conclusive. The | 20 | sentenced in a Spanish court in relation to the |
| to protect those involved in the attack." 23 criminal proceedings. The matter was 24 Former CBF Walliker addresses this too, 25 asserting that there is no evidence of any 26 criminal proceedings. The matter was 27 reported upon in local media in June 2019 28 but again this does not feature in the Chief | 20 | had confected was not conclusive. The | | |
| to protect those involved in the attack." 23 criminal proceedings. The matter was 24 Former CBF Walliker addresses this too, 25 asserting that there is no evidence of any 26 criminal proceedings. The matter was 27 reported upon in local media in June 2019 28 but again this does not feature in the Chief | | | | incident. We are not aware of any claims in |
| Former CBF Walliker addresses this too, 24 reported upon in local media in June 2019 asserting that there is no evidence of any 25 but again this does not feature in the Chief | 21 | widely held belief in MOD circles is that the | 21 | a civil sense, although there were, as I say, |
| 25 asserting that there is no evidence of any 25 but again this does not feature in the Chief | 21 22 | widely held belief in MOD circles is that the RGP did not investigate the crime correctly | 21 22 | a civil sense, although there were, as I say, |
| | 21 22 23 | widely held belief in MOD circles is that the RGP did not investigate the crime correctly to protect those involved in the attack." | 21 22 23 | a civil sense, although there were, as I say, criminal proceedings. The matter was |
| Page 74 Page 76 | 21 22 23 24 | widely held belief in MOD circles is that the RGP did not investigate the crime correctly to protect those involved in the attack." Former CBF Walliker addresses this too, | 21 22 23 24 | a civil sense, although there were, as I say, criminal proceedings. The matter was reported upon in local media in June 2019 |
| | 21 22 23 24 | widely held belief in MOD circles is that the RGP did not investigate the crime correctly to protect those involved in the attack." Former CBF Walliker addresses this too, asserting that there is no evidence of any | 21 22 23 24 | a civil sense, although there were, as I say, criminal proceedings. The matter was reported upon in local media in June 2019 but again this does not feature in the Chief |

| I 1 | | | |
|---|--|--|---|
| 1 | Minister's or Mr Pyle's evidence and so we | 1 | a Whatsapp message from Mr McGrail |
| 2 | will seek to clarify the position in | 2 | informing me of a collision at sea involving |
| 3 | questioning. | 3 | an RGP vessel, as a result of which two |
| 4 | So much for issues two and seven, now | 4 | people were killed. I replied at 9.25 thanking |
| 5 | turning to issue three, the collision at sea. | 5 | him for his message and expressing the hope |
| 6 | On 8 March 2020 a collision took place | 6 | that his men were okay. I asked whether he |
| 7 | between an RGP vessel and a RIB following | 7 | needed help from HMG. |
| 8 | a nine minute high speed chase. The vessel | 8 | "Whilst walking my dog past New Mole |
| 9 | was suspected of either engaging in or | 9 | House at around midday on 8 March I |
| 10 | assisting illicit activities. The best | 10 | decided to call in and ask to see Mr McGrail. |
| 11 | information from later reconstructions is that | 11 | He was there and agreed to see me. Given |
| 12 | the collision occurred at about 3.38 with | 12 | the possibility of a diplomatic and political |
| 13 | coordinates N36 9.96 minutes and W5 12.51 | 13 | situation with Spain about this incident, |
| 14 | minutes. This was at least 5.1 nautical miles | 14 | which being external affairs would be the |
| 15 | inside Spanish territorial waters. One of the | 15 | responsibility of the Governor and Her |
| 16 | persons aboard the RIB was killed | 16 | Majesty's Government of Gibraltar, my |
| 17 | immediately on impact and a second | 17 | primary concern was to establish the location |
| 18 | individual was seriously injured, later dying | 18 | of this incident and whether it had occurred |
| 19 | of those injuries. During the chase and | 19 | in Spanish territorial waters. I therefore |
| 20 | collision the RGP vessel's GPS and chart | 20 | asked Mr McGrail about the location and |
| 21 | plotter were turned off, meaning that the | 21 | whether it was inside or outside BGTW. He |
| 22 | vessel's automatic identification system or | 22 | replied with a slightly flippant waving of his |
| 23 | AIS was not operative. | 23 | hands: 'Could be in and could be out, it's |
| 24 | The RGP arranged for two independent | 24 | difficult to tell at night'. |
| 25 | investigations into the events, both arriving | 25 | "Following that meeting with Mr McGrail I |
| | | | |
| | Page 77 | | Page 79 |
| 1 | on the Rock on 13 May 2020. First, a team | 1 | sent him a Whatsapp message at 13.33 hours |
| 2 | from the Directorate of Professional | 2 | on 8 March in the following terms: 'Thanks |
| 3 | Standards of the Metropolitan Police, led by | 3 | for the briefing. I'll do a quick note for |
| | | | |
| 14 | Detective Chief Inspector Gary Smith, and | 1 | |
| 4 5 | Detective Chief Inspector Gary Smith, and second from Captain Richard Michael, an | 4 | London for when it hits the press. Line will |
| 5 | second from Captain Richard Michael, an | 4 5 | London for when it hits the press. Line will be: investigation ongoing, Spanish national |
| 5 6 | second from Captain Richard Michael, an independent investigator with Solis Marine | 4 5 6 | London for when it hits the press. Line will be: investigation ongoing, Spanish national from Cueta - did you say one person was |
| 5 6 7 | second from Captain Richard Michael, an independent investigator with Solis Marine Consultants. | 4 5 6 7 | London for when it hits the press. Line will be: investigation ongoing, Spanish national from Cueta - did you say one person was Portuguese? Not sure in whose waters |
| 5 6 7 8 | second from Captain Richard Michael, an independent investigator with Solis Marine Consultants. In terms of reliance on this issue, this is a | 4 5 6 7 8 | London for when it hits the press. Line will be: investigation ongoing, Spanish national from Cueta - did you say one person was Portuguese? Not sure in whose waters incident took place. RGP seeking assistance |
| 5 6 7 8 9 | second from Captain Richard Michael, an independent investigator with Solis Marine Consultants. In terms of reliance on this issue, this is a matter which features very high on Mr Pyle's | 4 5 6 7 8 9 | London for when it hits the press. Line will be: investigation ongoing, Spanish national from Cueta - did you say one person was Portuguese? Not sure in whose waters incident took place. RGP seeking assistance from UK police authorities. No assistance |
| 5 6 7 8 | second from Captain Richard Michael, an independent investigator with Solis Marine Consultants. In terms of reliance on this issue, this is a | 4 5 6 7 8 | London for when it hits the press. Line will be: investigation ongoing, Spanish national from Cueta - did you say one person was Portuguese? Not sure in whose waters incident took place. RGP seeking assistance from UK police authorities. No assistance needed from FCO at this stage.' |
| 5 6 7 8 9 10 | second from Captain Richard Michael, an independent investigator with Solis Marine Consultants. In terms of reliance on this issue, this is a matter which features very high on Mr Pyle's list, possibly even at the top, in terms of reasons for his loss of confidence in Mr | 4 5 6 7 8 9 | London for when it hits the press. Line will be: investigation ongoing, Spanish national from Cueta - did you say one person was Portuguese? Not sure in whose waters incident took place. RGP seeking assistance from UK police authorities. No assistance needed from FCO at this stage.' "Mr McGrail replied by two Whatsapp |
| 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 | second from Captain Richard Michael, an independent investigator with Solis Marine Consultants. In terms of reliance on this issue, this is a matter which features very high on Mr Pyle's list, possibly even at the top, in terms of reasons for his loss of confidence in Mr McGrail. If we can go to his witness | 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 | London for when it hits the press. Line will be: investigation ongoing, Spanish national from Cueta - did you say one person was Portuguese? Not sure in whose waters incident took place. RGP seeking assistance from UK police authorities. No assistance needed from FCO at this stage.' "Mr McGrail replied by two Whatsapp messages, also on 8 March, at 13.46 stating: |
| 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 | second from Captain Richard Michael, an independent investigator with Solis Marine Consultants. In terms of reliance on this issue, this is a matter which features very high on Mr Pyle's list, possibly even at the top, in terms of reasons for his loss of confidence in Mr McGrail. If we can go to his witness statement first of all, it is at A251 paragraph | 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 | London for when it hits the press. Line will be: investigation ongoing, Spanish national from Cueta - did you say one person was Portuguese? Not sure in whose waters incident took place. RGP seeking assistance from UK police authorities. No assistance needed from FCO at this stage.' "Mr McGrail replied by two Whatsapp messages, also on 8 March, at 13.46 stating: 'Yes, all correct, indeed one was Portuguese,' |
| 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 | second from Captain Richard Michael, an independent investigator with Solis Marine Consultants. In terms of reliance on this issue, this is a matter which features very high on Mr Pyle's list, possibly even at the top, in terms of reasons for his loss of confidence in Mr McGrail. If we can go to his witness statement first of all, it is at A251 paragraph 25. Just reading from there: | 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 | London for when it hits the press. Line will be: investigation ongoing, Spanish national from Cueta - did you say one person was Portuguese? Not sure in whose waters incident took place. RGP seeking assistance from UK police authorities. No assistance needed from FCO at this stage.' "Mr McGrail replied by two Whatsapp messages, also on 8 March, at 13.46 stating: 'Yes, all correct, indeed one was Portuguese,' and at 13.47 stating: 'Trying to clarify exact |
| 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 | second from Captain Richard Michael, an independent investigator with Solis Marine Consultants. In terms of reliance on this issue, this is a matter which features very high on Mr Pyle's list, possibly even at the top, in terms of reasons for his loss of confidence in Mr McGrail. If we can go to his witness statement first of all, it is at A251 paragraph 25. Just reading from there: "Without doubt, the most serious incident | 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 | London for when it hits the press. Line will be: investigation ongoing, Spanish national from Cueta - did you say one person was Portuguese? Not sure in whose waters incident took place. RGP seeking assistance from UK police authorities. No assistance needed from FCO at this stage.' "Mr McGrail replied by two Whatsapp messages, also on 8 March, at 13.46 stating: 'Yes, all correct, indeed one was Portuguese,' and at 13.47 stating: 'Trying to clarify exact position of the collision.' |
| 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 | second from Captain Richard Michael, an independent investigator with Solis Marine Consultants. In terms of reliance on this issue, this is a matter which features very high on Mr Pyle's list, possibly even at the top, in terms of reasons for his loss of confidence in Mr McGrail. If we can go to his witness statement first of all, it is at A251 paragraph 25. Just reading from there: | 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 | London for when it hits the press. Line will be: investigation ongoing, Spanish national from Cueta - did you say one person was Portuguese? Not sure in whose waters incident took place. RGP seeking assistance from UK police authorities. No assistance needed from FCO at this stage.' "Mr McGrail replied by two Whatsapp messages, also on 8 March, at 13.46 stating: 'Yes, all correct, indeed one was Portuguese,' and at 13.47 stating: 'Trying to clarify exact position of the collision.' "On the evening of 8 March the Attorney |
| 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 | second from Captain Richard Michael, an independent investigator with Solis Marine Consultants. In terms of reliance on this issue, this is a matter which features very high on Mr Pyle's list, possibly even at the top, in terms of reasons for his loss of confidence in Mr McGrail. If we can go to his witness statement first of all, it is at A251 paragraph 25. Just reading from there: "Without doubt, the most serious incident that was the tipping point for my growing concerns changing to recognising that things | 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 | London for when it hits the press. Line will be: investigation ongoing, Spanish national from Cueta - did you say one person was Portuguese? Not sure in whose waters incident took place. RGP seeking assistance from UK police authorities. No assistance needed from FCO at this stage.' "Mr McGrail replied by two Whatsapp messages, also on 8 March, at 13.46 stating: 'Yes, all correct, indeed one was Portuguese,' and at 13.47 stating: 'Trying to clarify exact position of the collision.' "On the evening of 8 March the Attorney General and I agreed that we needed to see |
| 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 | second from Captain Richard Michael, an independent investigator with Solis Marine Consultants. In terms of reliance on this issue, this is a matter which features very high on Mr Pyle's list, possibly even at the top, in terms of reasons for his loss of confidence in Mr McGrail. If we can go to his witness statement first of all, it is at A251 paragraph 25. Just reading from there: "Without doubt, the most serious incident that was the tipping point for my growing | 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 | London for when it hits the press. Line will be: investigation ongoing, Spanish national from Cueta - did you say one person was Portuguese? Not sure in whose waters incident took place. RGP seeking assistance from UK police authorities. No assistance needed from FCO at this stage.' "Mr McGrail replied by two Whatsapp messages, also on 8 March, at 13.46 stating: 'Yes, all correct, indeed one was Portuguese,' and at 13.47 stating: 'Trying to clarify exact position of the collision.' "On the evening of 8 March the Attorney |
| 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 | second from Captain Richard Michael, an independent investigator with Solis Marine Consultants. In terms of reliance on this issue, this is a matter which features very high on Mr Pyle's list, possibly even at the top, in terms of reasons for his loss of confidence in Mr McGrail. If we can go to his witness statement first of all, it is at A251 paragraph 25. Just reading from there: "Without doubt, the most serious incident that was the tipping point for my growing concerns changing to recognising that things could not go on as they were and that change | 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 | London for when it hits the press. Line will be: investigation ongoing, Spanish national from Cueta - did you say one person was Portuguese? Not sure in whose waters incident took place. RGP seeking assistance from UK police authorities. No assistance needed from FCO at this stage.' "Mr McGrail replied by two Whatsapp messages, also on 8 March, at 13.46 stating: 'Yes, all correct, indeed one was Portuguese,' and at 13.47 stating: 'Trying to clarify exact position of the collision.' "On the evening of 8 March the Attorney General and I agreed that we needed to see Mr McGrail the next day to get details and clarity of the incident, not least given the |
| 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 | second from Captain Richard Michael, an independent investigator with Solis Marine Consultants. In terms of reliance on this issue, this is a matter which features very high on Mr Pyle's list, possibly even at the top, in terms of reasons for his loss of confidence in Mr McGrail. If we can go to his witness statement first of all, it is at A251 paragraph 25. Just reading from there: "Without doubt, the most serious incident that was the tipping point for my growing concerns changing to recognising that things could not go on as they were and that change was needed arose in relation to this incident, | 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 | London for when it hits the press. Line will be: investigation ongoing, Spanish national from Cueta - did you say one person was Portuguese? Not sure in whose waters incident took place. RGP seeking assistance from UK police authorities. No assistance needed from FCO at this stage.' "Mr McGrail replied by two Whatsapp messages, also on 8 March, at 13.46 stating: 'Yes, all correct, indeed one was Portuguese,' and at 13.47 stating: 'Trying to clarify exact position of the collision.' "On the evening of 8 March the Attorney General and I agreed that we needed to see Mr McGrail the next day to get details and |
| 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 | second from Captain Richard Michael, an independent investigator with Solis Marine Consultants. In terms of reliance on this issue, this is a matter which features very high on Mr Pyle's list, possibly even at the top, in terms of reasons for his loss of confidence in Mr McGrail. If we can go to his witness statement first of all, it is at A251 paragraph 25. Just reading from there: "Without doubt, the most serious incident that was the tipping point for my growing concerns changing to recognising that things could not go on as they were and that change was needed arose in relation to this incident, which set in motion a chain of events that led | 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 | London for when it hits the press. Line will be: investigation ongoing, Spanish national from Cueta - did you say one person was Portuguese? Not sure in whose waters incident took place. RGP seeking assistance from UK police authorities. No assistance needed from FCO at this stage.' "Mr McGrail replied by two Whatsapp messages, also on 8 March, at 13.46 stating: 'Yes, all correct, indeed one was Portuguese,' and at 13.47 stating: 'Trying to clarify exact position of the collision.' "On the evening of 8 March the Attorney General and I agreed that we needed to see Mr McGrail the next day to get details and clarity of the incident, not least given the Gibraltar EU exist negotiations with Spain |
| 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 | second from Captain Richard Michael, an independent investigator with Solis Marine Consultants. In terms of reliance on this issue, this is a matter which features very high on Mr Pyle's list, possibly even at the top, in terms of reasons for his loss of confidence in Mr McGrail. If we can go to his witness statement first of all, it is at A251 paragraph 25. Just reading from there: "Without doubt, the most serious incident that was the tipping point for my growing concerns changing to recognising that things could not go on as they were and that change was needed arose in relation to this incident, which set in motion a chain of events that led me to lose confidence in the abilities of the | 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 | London for when it hits the press. Line will be: investigation ongoing, Spanish national from Cueta - did you say one person was Portuguese? Not sure in whose waters incident took place. RGP seeking assistance from UK police authorities. No assistance needed from FCO at this stage.' "Mr McGrail replied by two Whatsapp messages, also on 8 March, at 13.46 stating: 'Yes, all correct, indeed one was Portuguese,' and at 13.47 stating: 'Trying to clarify exact position of the collision.' "On the evening of 8 March the Attorney General and I agreed that we needed to see Mr McGrail the next day to get details and clarity of the incident, not least given the Gibraltar EU exist negotiations with Spain which were then ongoing and which were |
| 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 | second from Captain Richard Michael, an independent investigator with Solis Marine Consultants. In terms of reliance on this issue, this is a matter which features very high on Mr Pyle's list, possibly even at the top, in terms of reasons for his loss of confidence in Mr McGrail. If we can go to his witness statement first of all, it is at A251 paragraph 25. Just reading from there: "Without doubt, the most serious incident that was the tipping point for my growing concerns changing to recognising that things could not go on as they were and that change was needed arose in relation to this incident, which set in motion a chain of events that led me to lose confidence in the abilities of the Commissioner to effectively lead his police | 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 | London for when it hits the press. Line will be: investigation ongoing, Spanish national from Cueta - did you say one person was Portuguese? Not sure in whose waters incident took place. RGP seeking assistance from UK police authorities. No assistance needed from FCO at this stage.' "Mr McGrail replied by two Whatsapp messages, also on 8 March, at 13.46 stating: 'Yes, all correct, indeed one was Portuguese,' and at 13.47 stating: 'Trying to clarify exact position of the collision.' "On the evening of 8 March the Attorney General and I agreed that we needed to see Mr McGrail the next day to get details and clarity of the incident, not least given the Gibraltar EU exist negotiations with Spain which were then ongoing and which were scheduled to continue that week. I said I |
| 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 | second from Captain Richard Michael, an independent investigator with Solis Marine Consultants. In terms of reliance on this issue, this is a matter which features very high on Mr Pyle's list, possibly even at the top, in terms of reasons for his loss of confidence in Mr McGrail. If we can go to his witness statement first of all, it is at A251 paragraph 25. Just reading from there: "Without doubt, the most serious incident that was the tipping point for my growing concerns changing to recognising that things could not go on as they were and that change was needed arose in relation to this incident, which set in motion a chain of events that led me to lose confidence in the abilities of the Commissioner to effectively lead his police force and indeed caused me to lose | 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 | London for when it hits the press. Line will be: investigation ongoing, Spanish national from Cueta - did you say one person was Portuguese? Not sure in whose waters incident took place. RGP seeking assistance from UK police authorities. No assistance needed from FCO at this stage.' "Mr McGrail replied by two Whatsapp messages, also on 8 March, at 13.46 stating: 'Yes, all correct, indeed one was Portuguese,' and at 13.47 stating: 'Trying to clarify exact position of the collision.' "On the evening of 8 March the Attorney General and I agreed that we needed to see Mr McGrail the next day to get details and clarity of the incident, not least given the Gibraltar EU exist negotiations with Spain which were then ongoing and which were scheduled to continue that week. I said I would set up a meeting and did so. |
| 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24 | second from Captain Richard Michael, an independent investigator with Solis Marine Consultants. In terms of reliance on this issue, this is a matter which features very high on Mr Pyle's list, possibly even at the top, in terms of reasons for his loss of confidence in Mr McGrail. If we can go to his witness statement first of all, it is at A251 paragraph 25. Just reading from there: "Without doubt, the most serious incident that was the tipping point for my growing concerns changing to recognising that things could not go on as they were and that change was needed arose in relation to this incident, which set in motion a chain of events that led me to lose confidence in the abilities of the Commissioner to effectively lead his police force and indeed caused me to lose confidence in is probity. "At 6.05 on Sunday 8 March 2020 I received | 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24 | London for when it hits the press. Line will be: investigation ongoing, Spanish national from Cueta - did you say one person was Portuguese? Not sure in whose waters incident took place. RGP seeking assistance from UK police authorities. No assistance needed from FCO at this stage.' "Mr McGrail replied by two Whatsapp messages, also on 8 March, at 13.46 stating: 'Yes, all correct, indeed one was Portuguese,' and at 13.47 stating: 'Trying to clarify exact position of the collision.' "On the evening of 8 March the Attorney General and I agreed that we needed to see Mr McGrail the next day to get details and clarity of the incident, not least given the Gibraltar EU exist negotiations with Spain which were then ongoing and which were scheduled to continue that week. I said I would set up a meeting and did so. "On 9 March the Attorney General and I met Mr McGrail at New Mole House. I again |
| 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24 | second from Captain Richard Michael, an independent investigator with Solis Marine Consultants. In terms of reliance on this issue, this is a matter which features very high on Mr Pyle's list, possibly even at the top, in terms of reasons for his loss of confidence in Mr McGrail. If we can go to his witness statement first of all, it is at A251 paragraph 25. Just reading from there: "Without doubt, the most serious incident that was the tipping point for my growing concerns changing to recognising that things could not go on as they were and that change was needed arose in relation to this incident, which set in motion a chain of events that led me to lose confidence in the abilities of the Commissioner to effectively lead his police force and indeed caused me to lose confidence in is probity. | 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24 | London for when it hits the press. Line will be: investigation ongoing, Spanish national from Cueta - did you say one person was Portuguese? Not sure in whose waters incident took place. RGP seeking assistance from UK police authorities. No assistance needed from FCO at this stage.' "Mr McGrail replied by two Whatsapp messages, also on 8 March, at 13.46 stating: 'Yes, all correct, indeed one was Portuguese,' and at 13.47 stating: 'Trying to clarify exact position of the collision.' "On the evening of 8 March the Attorney General and I agreed that we needed to see Mr McGrail the next day to get details and clarity of the incident, not least given the Gibraltar EU exist negotiations with Spain which were then ongoing and which were scheduled to continue that week. I said I would set up a meeting and did so. "On 9 March the Attorney General and I met |

| asked Mr McGrail asid the was still not sure. I queried why the GFS AIS systems could not provide this information. Mr McGrail replied that the instruments had been switched off. I asked why the officers would do that. Mr McGrail replied: You know what it is like in the heat of the moment. I said I did not, adding that surely standard operating procedures dictated that such equipment should always be on. I said that this was a vitally important issue given the state of negotiations with Spain. 14 "On 11 March 2020 I sent an email at 18.58 to Mr McGrail shape whether we are clearer as to where the collision took place. London keen to know whether inside or outside BGTW and if latter by how far. Mr McGrail and probing from WIISS and should be able to confirm soon. It is highly probable that it did occur outside BGTW. Page 81 We are getting it plotted which will provide a better understanding in terms of distanced from IRITW. Page 81 We are getting it plotted which will provide a better understanding in terms of distanced from IRITW. Page 81 We are getting it plotted which will provide a better understanding in terms of distanced from IRITW. Page 81 We are getting it plotted which will provide a better understanding of the location of this incident, which were matters of prime importance to myself as Governor and to HMC in terms of its incident, which were matters of prime importance to myself as Governor and to HMC in terms of its incident, which were matters of prime importance to hours after the incident, which suggested and that had caused him to believe with though the complete, indeed erroneous, available." It in formation very early on 8 March, just a few hours after the incident, which suggested and that had caused him to believe with though a discloses that a 6 idod command meeting discloses that a close of the incident had a discloses that a close of the incident had a discloses that a close of the incident had information very early on 8 March, just a few hours after the incident, which sugges | | | | |
|--|----|---|----|---|
| 2 by DCI John Field that the collision occurred 3 sure. I queried why the GPS AIS systems 4 could not provide this information. Mr 5 McGrail replied that the instruments had 5 been switched off. I asked why the Officers 7 would do that. Mr McGrail replied: You 8 know what it is like in the heat of the 9 moment! I said I did not, adding that surely 10 standard operating procedures dictated that 11 such equipment should always be on. I said 12 that this was a vitally important issue given 13 the state of negotiations with Spain. 14 "On 11 March 2020 I sent an email at 18.58 15 to Mr McGrail asking whether we are cleared 1a sto where the collision took place. London 1b keen to know whether inside or outside 1B BGTW and if latter by how far. Mr McGrail 1g responded by email on the same day at 19.07 2stating that: We are getting there on 21 establishing exact coordinates of where 22 collision took place. We are tying up some 23 loose ends and probing from WHSS and 24 should be able to confirm soon. It is highly 25 probable that it did occur outside BGTW. Page 81 We are getting it plotted which will provide a 2 better understanding in terms of distanced 3 from BGTW: Was regetting it plotted which will provide a 2 better understanding in terms of distanced 3 from BGTW: Was a schiberately withholding from me important information about the nature of his 10 understanding of the location of this incident, 11 which were matters of prime importance to 12 myself as Governor and to HMG in terms of 13 our responsibility for Gibraltar's external 14 affairs. My suspicions were later confirmed 15 when I discovered from sight of the section 16 Is report prepared by Mr McGrail had 18 information very early on 8 March, just a few 19 hours after the incident, which suggested and 20 that had caused him to believe with 21 reasonable clarity that the incident had 22 occurred well inside Spanish waters." 23 He refers to an email timed at 8 March at 24 10.11 from Paul Richardson to Mr McGrail 25 discloses that a Gold command meeting | 1 | asked Mr McGrail about the location of this | 1 | chaired by Mr McGrail was advised at 09.40 |
| sure. I queried why the GPS AIS systems decould not provide this information. Mr McGrail replied that the instruments had been switched off. I asked why the officers would do that. Mr McGrail replied: You know what it is like in the heat of the moment. I said I did not, adding that surely standard operating procedures dictated that such equipment should always be on. I said that this was a vitally important issue given the state of negotiations with Spain. 'On 11 March 2020 I sent an email at 18.58 to Mr McGrail asking whether we are clearer as to where the collision took place. London keen to know whether inside or outside BGTW and if latter by how far. Mr McGrail responded by email on the same day at 19.07 stating that: 'We are getting there on collision took place. We are tying up some collision took place was a finishly probable that it did occur outside BGTW. Pape 81 We are getting it plotted which will provide a better understanding in terms of distanced from BGTW. What spop to the Attorney General to that effect. This obviously placed the territorial waters. 10 Mr McGrail and sent a Whatsapp to the Chief Minister stating that the incident was that Mr McGrail that the collision took place outside BGTW, Whatsapp to the Attorney General to that effect with a trial do cour outside BGTW. This was a reference to a Whatsapp serve that Mr McGrail was answering my questions prior to 11 March about the location of the incident was that Mr McGrail was deliberately withholding from me important information about the nature of his understanding of the location of this incident, which were matters of prime importance to pusped as Governor and to HMG in terms of our responsibility for Gibraltar's external understanding of the location of this incident, which were matters of prime importance to pusped as Governor and to HMG in terms of our responsibility for Gibraltar's external information very early on 8 March, just a lew hours after the incident, which suggested and that had caused him to believe with reasona | | | | • |
| 4 could not provide this information. Mr 5 McGrail replied that the instruments had 6 been switched off. I asked why the officers 7 would do that. Mr McGrail replied: 'You 8 know what it is like in the heat of the 9 moment'. I said I did not, adding that surely 10 standard operating procedures dictated that 11 such equipment should always be on. I said 12 that this was a vitally important issue given 13 the state of negotiations with Spain. 14 "On 11 March 2020 I sent an email at 18.58 15 to Mr McGrail asking whether we are clearer 16 as to where the collision took place. London 17 keen to know whether inside or outside 18 BGTW and if latter by how far. Mr McGrail 19 responded by email on the same day at 19.07 20 stating that: 'We are getting there on 21 costablishing exact coordinates of where 22 collision took place. We are tying up some 23 loose ends and probing from WHSS and 24 should be able to confirm soon. It is highly 25 probable that it did occur outside BGTW. Page 81 We are getting it plotted which will provide a 2 better understanding in terms of distanced 1 We are getting it plotted which will provide a 2 better understanding in terms of distanced 1 We are getting it plotted which will provide a 2 better understanding in terms of distanced 1 We are getting it plotted which will provide a 2 better understanding in terms of distanced 1 We are getting it plotted which will provide a 2 better understanding of the location of the incident was that Mr McGrail 2 was deliberately withholding from me 2 important information about the nature of his 2 understanding of the location of this incident, 3 which were matters of prime importance to 4 myself as Governor and to HMG in terms of 5 our responsibility for Gibraltar's external 5 understanding of the location of this incident, 5 when the did a did to the following the proposition were later confirmed 5 when I discovered from sight of the section 6 15 report prepared by Mr McGrail had 7 information very early on 8 March, just a few 8 hours after the inciden | | | | • |
| 5 McGrail heplied that the instruments had 6 been switched off. I asked why the officers 7 would do that. Mr McGrail replict: You 8 know what it is like in the heat of the 9 moment. I said I did not, adding that surely 10 standard operating procedures dictated that 11 such equipment should always be on. I said 12 that this was a vitally important issue given 13 the state of negotiations with Spain. 14 "On I1 March 2020 I sent an email at 18.58 15 to Mr McGrail asking whether we are clearer 16 as to where the collision took place. London 17 keen to know whether inside or outside 18 BGTW and if latter by how far. Mr McGrail 19 responded by email on the same day at 19.07 20 stating that: We are getting there on 21 establishing exact coordinates of where 22 collision took place. We are tying up some 23 loose ends and probing from WHSS and 24 should be able to confirm soon. It is highly 25 probable that it did occur outside BGTW. 26 We are getting it plotted which will provide a 27 better understanding in terms of distanced 28 from BGTW. 29 The moment of the sum of t | | | | = |
| been switched off. I asked why the officers would do that. Mr McGrail replied: You 8 know what it is like in the heat of the 9 moment. I said I did not, adding that surely 1 standard operating procedures distated that 11 such equipment should always be on. I said 1 that this was a vitally important issue given 1 that this was a vitally important issue given 1 that this was a vitally important issue given 1 that this was a vitally important issue given 1 that this was a vitally important issue given 1 that the collision took place usual to BGTW, 1 stating that: We are getting there on 2 to stablishing exact coordinates of where 2 collision took place. We are tying up some 2 loose ends and probing from WIISS and 3 should be able to confirm soon. It is highly 25 probable that it did occur outside BGTW. 1 We are getting it plotted which will provide a 2 better understanding in terms of distanced 3 from BGTW. 2 We are getting it plotted which will provide a 2 better understanding in terms of distanced 3 from BGTW. 3 We are getting it plotted which will provide a 2 better understanding in terms of distanced 3 from BGTW. 4 "My strong sense and suspicion at the time 4 that Mr McGrail was answering my 6 questions prior to 11 March about the 7 location of the incident was that Mr McGrail was answering my 6 questions prior to 11 March about the 7 location of the incident was that Mr McGrail was deliberately withholding from me 1 important information about the nature of his understanding of the location of this incident, which were matters of prime importance to myself as Governor and to HMG in terms of 11 March at 7.07 hours referred to in myelf as Governor and to HMG in terms of 11 March at 2.00 from Mr McGrail in which the confirmation than was affairs. My suspicions were later confirmed when I discovered from sight of the section 1 is report prepared by Mr McGrail for the 1 reasonable clarity that the incident had 2 cocurred well inside Spanish waters." 5 He refers to an email a 18.58 that the Collision took plac | | <u>-</u> | | |
| would do that. Mr McGrail replied: 'You know what it is like in the heat of the moment'. I said I did not, adding that surely standard operating procedures dictated that such equipment should always be on. I said that this was a vitally important issue given the state of regotiations with Spain. "On 11 March 2020 I sent an email at 18.58 to Mr McGrail asking whether we are clearer as to where the collision took place. London Keen to know whether inside or outside BGTW and if latter by how far. Mr McGrail responded by email on the same day at 19.07 stating that: 'We are getting there on establishing exact coordinates of where collision took place. We are tying up some loose ends and probing from WHSS and should be able to confirm soon. It is highly probable that it did occur outside BGTW. Page 81 We are getting it plotted which will provide a better understanding in terms of distanced from BGTW. Page 81 We are getting it plotted which will provide a better understanding in terms of distanced from BGTW. "My strong sense and suspicion at the time to location of the incident was that Mr McGrail was deliberately withholding from me important information about the nature of his understanding of the location of this incident, which were matters of prime importance to myself as Governor and to HMG in terms of our responsibility for Gibraltar's external affairs. My suspicions were later confirmed when I discovered from sight of the section 15 report prepared by Mr McGrail had 16 report prepared by Mr McGrail had 17 reasonable clarity that the incident had 22 occurred well miside Spanish waters." He refers to an email at 18.58 to Mr McGrail on S March at 11.40 in which the AG informed that not only did the collision take place in Spanish waters, so did the whole of the paragraph: 'Minister that it was virtually certain it was virtually certa | | | | = |
| Second | | | | · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · |
| moment. I said I did not, adding that surely standard operating procedures dictated that this was a vitally important issue given the state of negotiations with Spain. 14 "On 11 March 2020 I sent an email at 18.58 to Mr McGrail asking whether we are clearer as to where the collision took place. London Reen to know whether inside or outside BGTW and if latter by how far. Mr McGrail Proposed by email on the same day at 19.07 stating that: "We are getting there on establishing exact coordinates of where collision took place. We are tying up some loose ends and probing from WHSS and should be able to confirm soon. It is highly probable that it did occur outside BGTW. Page 81 We are getting it plotted which will provide a better understanding in terms of distanced from BGTW. Page 81 We are getting it plotted which will provide a better understanding in terms of distanced from BGTW. Page 81 We are getting it plotted which will provide a better understanding in terms of distanced from BGTW. Page 83 Minister that it was a reference to a Whatsapp sent by the Attorney General to the Chief Minister that Mr McGrail for the chief when I discovered from sight of the section of the incident was that Mr McGrail for the Chief Minister that in was company to the Attorney General and the Chief Minister that Mr McGrail for the Chief | | | | |
| standard operating procedures dictated that such equipment should always be on. I said that such equipment should always be on. I said that it was a vitally important issue given the state of negotiations with Spain. "On 11 March 2020 I sent an email at 18.58 to Mr McGrail saking whether we are clearer as to where the collision took place. London keen to know whether inside or outside BGTW, approximately 6 nautical miles east off the as to where the collision took place. London keen to know whether inside or outside BGTW and if latter by how far. Mr McGrail responded by email on the same day at 19.07 stating that: "We are getting there on 21 establishing exact coordinates of where collision took place. We are tying up some loss cends and probing from WHSS and 24 should be able to confirm soon. It is highly probable that it did occur outside BGTW. Page 81 We are getting it plotted which will provide a better understanding in terms of distanced from BGTW. Page 81 We are getting it plotted which will provide a better understanding in terms of distanced from BGTW. "My strong sense and suspicion at the time that Mr McGrail was answering my questions prior to 11 March about the location of the incident was that Mr McGrail was deliberately withholding from me important information about the nature of his incident, which were matters of prime importance to myself as Governor and to HMG in terms of our responsibility for Gibraltar's external affairs. My suspicions were later confirmed to the fireformation very early on 8 March, just a few hours after the incident, which suggested and that had caused him to believe with consumer and the Chief Minister, that Mr McGrail for the Chief Minister that Mr McGrail for the Chief Minister that Mr McGrail for the Chief Minister, that Mr McGrail for the Chief Minister that Mr McGr | | | | = |
| such equipment should always be on. I said that this was a vitally important issue given that was a vitally important issue given that was a vitally important issue given that was a vitally important information about the nature of his understanding of the location of the incident was that Mr McGrail was also information about the nature of his understanding of the location of the incident was that of the whole were matters of prime importance to myes after the incident, which were matters of prime importance to mye after the incident, which were matters of prime importance to mour after the incident, which were matters of prime importance to hours after the incident, which were matters of prime importance to hours after the incident, which were matters of prime importance to hours after the incident, which were matters of prime importance to hours after the incident, which were matters of prime importance to hours after the incident, which were matters of prime importance to hours after the incident, which were matters of prime importance to hours after the incident, which suggested and that had caused him to believe with course of the control of the incident had occurred well inside Spanish waters." 11 Graph and the information that the collision took place outside BGTW, approximately 6 nature and whatsapp to the Attorney General saying that: 12 Mere recollision took place as London are value was an advailed. The continued when the chief when the collision took place as London are value in the propose of where collision took place as London are value in the propose of where collision took place as London are value was an advailed. The collision took place as London are value was assumed the collision took place as London are value was a | | | | |
| that this was a vitally important issue given the state of negotiations with Spain. "On 11 March 2020 I sent an email at 18.58 to Mr McGrail asking whether we are clearer as to where the collision took place. London keen to know whether inside or outside BGTW and if latter by how far. Mr McGrail responded by email on the same day at 19.07 stating that: We are getting there on establishing exact coordinates of where collision took place. We are tying up some loose ends and probing from WHSS and should be able to confirm soon. It is highly probable that it did occur outside BGTW. Page 81 We are getting it plotted which will provide a better understanding in terms of distanced better understanding in terms of distanced from BGTW. "My strong sense and suspicion at the time that Mr McGrail was answering my questions prior to 11 March about the location of the incident was that Mr McGrail was deliberately withholding from me important information about the nature of his understanding of the location of this incident, which were matters of prime importance to large when I discovered from sight of the section loft Chief Minister that Mr McGrail had information very early on 8 March, just a few hours after the incident, which were matters of prime importance to the when I discovered from sight of the section loft Chief Minister that Mr McGrail had information very early on 8 March, just a few hours after the incident, which suggested and that had caused him to believe with reasonable clarity that the incident had occurred well inside Spanish waters." He refers to an email timed at 8 March at 24 lo.11 from Paul Richardson to Mr McGrail discloses that a Gold command meeting In that the collision took place ustatic that the cellarity of the Attorney General saying that: Whatsapp to the Attorney General saying that: Whatsapp to the Attorney General saying that: "HE, Nick, is asking for confirmation of where collision took place as London are keen to know. I have informed him along the same lines that you advised CM, | | . • . | | |
| the state of negotiations with Spain. 13 the state of negotiations with Spain. 14 "On 11 March 2020 I sent an email at 18.58 to Mr McGrail asking whether we are clearer as to where the collision took place. London keen to know whether inside or outside 15 god where to know whether inside or outside 18 BGTW and if fatter by how far. Mr McGrail 19 responded by email on the same day at 19.07 stating that: We are getting there on ecollision took place. We are tying up some losse ends and probing from WHSS and should be able to confirm soon. It is highly probable that it did occur outside BGTW. Page 81 We are getting it plotted which will provide a better understanding in terms of distanced from BGTW. Page 81 We are getting it plotted which will provide a better understanding in terms of distanced from BGTW. Why strong sense and suspicion at the time of the location of the incident was that Mr McGrail was answering my audition of the incident was that Mr McGrail was answering my important information about the nature of his understanding of the location of the incident was that Mr McGrail affairs. My suspicions were later confirmed to myself as Governor and to HMG in terms of the which were matters of prime importance to myself as Governor and to HMG in terms of the chief when I discovered from sight of the section of the incident, which suggested and that had caused him to believe with reasonable clarity that the incident had occurred well inside Spanish waters." Hat the collision took place outside BGTW, approximately 6 nautical miles east off the runway and stable and provide a better understanding of where collision took place as London are keen to know. It hat hat: 15 that the collision took place outside BGTW. On 11 March 2020 at 7.09 Mr McGrail sent at that: 18 that: 18 that the collision took place outside BGTW. On 11 March 2020 at 7.09 Mr McGrail sent at: 18 the state of live Autorney General and the Chief Minister that it is highly probable that it happened outside BGTW. Minister topie to Mr | | | | |
| 14 "On 11 March 2020 I sent an email at 18.58 to Mr McGrail asking whether we are clearer 16 as to where the collision took place. London 17 keen to know whether inside or outside 18 BGTW and if latter by how far. Mr McGrail 18 BGTW and if latter by how far. Mr McGrail 19 responded by email on the same day at 19.07 20 stating that: We are getting there on 21 establishing exact coordinates of where 22 collision took place. We are tying up some 23 loose ends and probing from WHSS and 24 should be able to confirm soon. It is highly 25 probable that it did occur outside BGTW. Page 81 We are getting it plotted which will provide a 22 better understanding in terms of distanced 3 from BGTW. Whatsapp to the Attorney General saying that: "HE, Nick, is asking for confirmation of where collision took place as London are where toollision took place as London are where toollision took place as London are where collision took place as London are where toollision took place as London are where toollision took place as London are where collision took place as London are where toollision took place as London are where collision took place a | | | | = |
| to Mr McGrail asking whether we are clearer as to where the collision took place. London 17 keen to know whether inside or outside 18 BGTW and if latter by how far. Mr McGrail 19 responded by email on the same day at 19.07 stating that: "We are getting there on 20 stating that: "We are getting there on 21 establishing exact coordinates of where 22 collision took place. We are tying up some 23 loose ends and probing from WHSS and 24 should be able to confirm soon. It is highly 25 probable that it did occur outside BGTW. Page 81 Page 83 1 We are getting it plotted which will provide a 2 better understanding in terms of distanced 3 from BGTW. Page 81 Page 83 1 We are getting it plotted which will provide a 2 better understanding in terms of distanced 3 from BGTW. Page 81 Page 83 1 We are getting it plotted which will provide a 2 better understanding in terms of distanced 3 from BGTW. Page 81 Page 83 1 We are getting it plotted which will provide a 2 better understanding in terms of distanced 4 mr McGrail was answering my 6 questions prior to 11 March about the 10 coordinates of where collision took place as London are keen to know. I have informed him along the same lines that you advised CM, i.e. that it is alighly probable that it happened outside BGTW. This was a reference to a Whatsapp sent by the Attorney General saying that: "IHE, Nick, is asking pto the Attorney General saying that: "IHE, Nick, is asking pto twhere collision took place. Let at it is alighly probable that it happened outside BGTW. This was a reference to a Whatsapp sent by the Attorney General to the Chief Minister that it was virtually certain it was outside BGTW. This was a reference to a Whatsapp sent by the Attorney General to the Chief Minister that it was virtually certain it was outside BGTW. This was a reference to a Whatsapp sent by the Attorney General to the Chief Minister that it was virtually certain it was outside BGTW. This was a reference to a Whatsapp sent by the Attorney General to the Chief Minister that it was | | | | = |
| as to where the collision took place. London keen to know whether inside or outside BGTW and if latter by how far. Mr McGrail responded by email on the same day at 19.07 stating that: "We are getting there on establishing exact coordinates of where collision took place. We are tying up some collision took place. We are tying up some loose ends and probing from WHSS and should be able to confirm soon. It is highly probable that it did occur outside BGTW. Pagc 81 We are getting it plotted which will provide a better understanding in terms of distanced from BGTW. "My strong sense and suspicion at the time that Mr McGrail was answering my for questions prior to 11 March bout the location of the incident was that Mr McGrail was deliberately withholding from me important information about the nature of his understanding of the location of this incident, which were matters of prime importance to myself as Governor and to HMG in terms of lour responsibility for Gibraltar's external when I discovered from sight of the section load from had caused him to believe with phours after the incident, which suggested and that had caused him to believe with reasonable clarity that the incident had occurred well inside Spanish waters." Minister that it was virtually certain it was outside BGTW eastern side opposite runway. "Accordingly, Mr McGrail on 8 March, a few hours after the incident, and had communicated at the time to others, namely the Attorney General and the Chief Minister. He had thereby caused me to report to London on the basis of incomplete, indeed erroneous, information and less information than was available." In the Attorney General saying that: "HE, Nick, is asking for confirmation of where collision took place as London are keen to know. I have informed him along the same lines that you advised CM, i.e. that it is highly probable that it happened outside BGTW. BGTW. This was a reference to a Whatsapp sent by the Attorney General to the Chief Minister that it was virtually certain it was outside BGTW. I | | | | ** |
| 17 | | | | • |
| 18 BGTW and if latter by how far. Mr McGrail 19 responded by email on the same day at 19.07 20 stating that: 'We are getting there on 21 establishing exact coordinates of where 22 collision took place. We are tying up some 23 loose ends and probing from WHSS and 24 should be able to confirm soon. It is highly 25 probable that it did occur outside BGTW. Page 81 1 We are getting it plotted which will provide a 2 better understanding in terms of distanced 3 from BGTW. 4 "My strong sense and suspicion at the time 5 that Mr McGrail was answering my 6 questions prior to 11 March about the 7 location of the incident was that Mr McGrail 8 was deliberately withholding from me 9 important information about the nature of his 10 understanding of the location of this incident, 11 which were matters of prime importance to 12 myself as Governor and to HMG in terms of 13 our responsibility for Gibraltar's external 14 affairs. My suspicions were later confirmed 15 when I discovered from sight of the section 16 15 report prepared by Mr McGrail for the 17 Chief Minister that Mr McGrail had 18 information very early on 8 March, just a few 19 hours after the incident, which suggested and 20 that had caused him to believe with 21 reasonable clarity that the incident had 22 occurred well inside Spanish waters." 23 He refers to a menail timed at 8 March at 24 10.11 from Paul Richardson to Mr McGrail 25 discloses that a Gold command meeting 28 that: 29 He R. Nick, is asking for confirmation of where collision took place as London are keen to know. I have informed him along the when collision took place as London are keen to know. I have informed him along the when collision took place as London are keen to know. I have informed him along the seame lines that you advised CM, i.e. that it is highly probable that it happened outside BGTW. This was a reference to a Whatsapp sent by the Attorney General to the Chief Minister that it was virtually certain it was outside BGTW eastern side opposite runway. Minister copied to Mr McGrail on | | • | | |
| responded by email on the same day at 19.07 stating that: We are getting there on collision took place. We are tying up some collision took place. We are tying up some collision took place. We are tying up some collision took place as London are keen to know. I have informed him along the same lines that you advised CM, i.e. that it is highly probable that it happened outside BGTW. This was a reference to a Whatsapp sent by the Attorney General to the Chief Page 81 We are getting it plotted which will provide a better understanding in terms of distanced from BGTW. "My strong sense and suspicion at the time that Mr McGrail was answering my that Mr McGrail was answering my ending the same lines that you advised CM, i.e. that it is highly probable that it happened outside BGTW. This was a reference to a Whatsapp sent by the Attorney General to the Chief Minister that it was virtually certain it was outside BGTW eastern side opposite runway. "Accordingly, Mr McGrail's email to me of Harch at 7.07 hours referred to in paragraph 24.7 above was the first time, nearly three full days later, that Mr McGrail miportant information about the nature of his understanding of the location of this incident, when I discovered from sight of the section our responsibility for Gibraltar's external da affairs. My suspicions were later confirmed when I discovered from sight of the section for Drive and the Chief Minister. He had from Mr McGrail had information very early on 8 March, just a few hours after the incident, which suggested and that had caused him to believe with reasonable clarity that the incident had coccurred well inside Spanish waters." He refers to an email timed at 8 March at He refers to an email timed at 8 March at He refers to an email timed at 8 March at He refers to an email timed at 8 March at discloses that a Gold command meeting He refers to an email timed at 8 March at discloses that a Gold command meeting The provided that the variety and the chief same lines that you advised CM, i.e. that it is high | | | | |
| stating that: We are getting there on establishing exact coordinates of where collision took place as London are collision took place. We are tying up some loose ends and probing from WHSS and should be able to confirm soon. It is highly probable that it did occur outside BGTW. Page 81 We are getting it plotted which will provide a better understanding in terms of distanced from BGTW. "My strong sense and suspicion at the time that Mr McGrail was answering my for questions prior to 11 March about the location of the incident was that Mr McGrail was deliberately withholding from me important information about the nature of his understanding of the location of this incident, which were matters of prime importance to myself as Governor and to HMG in terms of location very early on 8 March, just a few hours after the incident, which suggested and information very early on 8 March, just a few hours after the incident, which suggested and that had caused him to believe with reasonable clarity that the incident had courred well inside Spanish waters." 20 Search tax for you advised CM, i.e. that it is same lines that you advised CM, i.e. that it is same lines that you advised CM, i.e. that it is highly probable that it happened outside BGTW. This was a reference to a Whatsapp sent by the Attorney General to the Chief Minister topical to Mr McGrail on 8 March at 11.40 in which the AG informed the Chief Minister topical to Mr McGrail on 8 March at 11.40 in which the AG informed the Chief Minister that it was virtually certain it was outside BGTW. This was a reference to a Whatsapp sent by the Attorney General to the Chief Minister that it was virtually certain it was outside BGTW. This was a reference to a Whatsapp sent by the Attorney General to the Chief Minister that it was virtually certain it was virtually certain it was virtually certain it was outside BGTW. This was a reference to a Mharch at 11.40 in which the AG informed the Chief Minister copied to Mr McGrail on Mr McGrail outside BGTW. This was a ref | | | | |
| 21 establishing exact coordinates of where 22 collision took place. We are tying up some 23 loose ends and probing from WHSS and 24 should be able to confirm soon. It is highly 25 probable that it did occur outside BGTW. Page 81 1 We are getting it plotted which will provide a 2 better understanding in terms of distanced 3 from BGTW. 4 "My strong sense and suspicion at the time 5 that Mr McGrail was answering my 6 questions prior to 11 March about the 7 location of the incident was that Mr McGrail 8 was deliberately withholding from me 9 important information about the nature of his 10 understanding of the location of this incident, 11 which were matters of prime importance to 12 myself as Governor and to HMG in terms of 13 our responsibility for Gibraltar's extermal 14 affairs. My suspicions were later confirmed 15 when I discovered from sight of the section 16 15 report prepared by Mr McGrail had 17 information very early on 8 March, just a few 18 hours after the incident, which suggested and 29 that had caused him to believe with 20 reasonable clarity that the incident had 21 coccurred well inside Spanish waters." 22 Spanish waters." 23 keen to know. I have informed him along the 22 same lines that you advised CM, i.e. that it is highly probable that it happened outside 18 highly probable that it you advised CM, i.e. that it is highly probable that it happened outside 18 BGTW. This was a reference to a Whatsapp 25 ms by the Attorney General to the Chief 26 Minister that it was virtually certain it was virtually cer | | • • | | |
| 22 collision took place. We are tying up some 23 loose ends and probing from WHSS and 24 should be able to confirm soon. It is highly 25 probable that it did occur outside BGTW. Page 81 1 We are getting it plotted which will provide a 2 better understanding in terms of distanced 3 from BGTW. 1 "My strong sense and suspicion at the time 4 that Mr McGrail was answering my 5 that Mr McGrail was answering my 6 questions prior to 11 March about the 7 location of the incident was that Mr McGrail 8 was deliberately withholding from me 9 important information about the nature of his 10 understanding of the location of this incident, 11 which were matters of prime importance to 12 myself as Governor and to HMG in terms of 13 our responsibility for Gibraltar's external 14 affairs. My suspicions were later confirmed 15 when I discovered from sight of the section 16 15 report prepared by Mr McGrail had 17 information very early on 8 March, just a few 18 hours after the incident, which suggested and 29 that had caused him to believe with 20 reasonable clarity that the incident had 21 coccurred well inside Spanish waters." 22 Same lines that you advised CM, i.e. that it is highly probable that it happened outside BGTW. This was a reference to a Whatsapp sent by the Attorney General to the Chief Minister that it was virtually certain it was outside BGTW eastern side opposite runway. 11 Minister that it was virtually certain it was outside BGTW eastern side opposite runway. 12 ""accordingly, Mr McGrail to me of 11 March at 7.07 hours referred to in 12 paragraph 24. 7 above was the first time, 13 nearly three full days later, that Mr McGrail 14 disclosed to me information that he had had 15 since 09.40 hours on 8 March, a few hours 16 disclosed to me information and less information that he had had 17 information and less information than was 18 information and less information than was 19 | | | | * |
| loose ends and probing from WHSS and should be able to confirm soon. It is highly probable that it happened outside BGTW. This was a reference to a Whatsapp sent by the Attorney General to the Chief Page 81 We are getting it plotted which will provide a better understanding in terms of distanced from BGTW. We are getting it plotted which will provide a better understanding in terms of distanced from BGTW. Was trong sense and suspicion at the time that Mr McGrail was answering my questions prior to 11 March about the location of the incident was that Mr McGrail was deliberately withholding from me important information about the nature of his understanding of the location of this incident, which were matters of prime importance to myself as Governor and to HMG in terms of our responsibility for Gibraltar's external affairs. My suspicions were later confirmed when I discovered from sight of the section 15 report prepared by Mr McGrail had information very early on 8 March, just a few hours after the incident, which suggested and that had caused him to believe with reasonable clarity that the incident had coccurred well inside Spanish waters." 23 He refers to an email timed at 8 March at 10.11 from Paul Richardson to Mr McGrail discloses that a Gold command meeting 25 ment by the Attorney sent by the Attorney General to the Chief Minister that it was virtually certain it was outside BGTW. This was a reference to a Whatsapp sent by the Attorney sent by the Attorney dent by the Attorney courside to the Chief Minister that it was virtually certain it was outside BGTW. 11 Minister topied to Mr McGrail on 8 March at 11.40 in which the AG informed the Chief Minister that it was virtually certain it was outside BGTW. 11 Minister topied to Mr McGrail on 8 March at 11.40 in which the AG informed the Chief Minister that it was virtually certain it was outside BGTW. 12 Minister that it was virtually certain it was outside BGTW. 13 Minister that it was virtually certain it was outside BGTW. 14 Il.40 in which the AG i | | | | • |
| should be able to confirm soon. It is highly probable that it did occur outside BGTW. Page 81 We are getting it plotted which will provide a better understanding in terms of distanced from BGTW. "My strong sense and suspicion at the time that Mr McGrail was answering my to questions prior to 11 March about the location of the incident was that Mr McGrail was deliberately withholding from me important information about the nature of his understanding of the location of this incident, which were matters of prime importance to myself as Governor and to HMG in terms of the when I discovered from sight of the section 15 report prepared by Mr McGrail for the Chief Minister that it was virtually certain it was outside BGTW eastern side opposite runway. "Accordingly, Mr McGrails email to me of 11 March at 7.07 hours referred to in paragraph 24.7 above was the first time, nearly three full days later, that Mr McGrail disclosed to me information that he had had since 09.40 hours on 8 March, a few hours after the incident, and had communicated at the time to others, namely the Attorney General and the Chief Minister. He had thereby caused me to report to London on the basis of incomplete, indeed erroneous, information and less information than was available." Name of Whatsapp sent by the Attorney General to the Chief Minister that it was virtually certain it was outside BGTW eastern side opposite runway. "Accordingly, Mr McGrail seriered to in paragraph 24.7 above was the first time, nearly three full days later, that Mr McGrail disclosed to me information that he had had since 09.40 hours on 8 March, a few hours after the incident, which suggested and the time to others, namely the Attorney General and the Chief Minister. He had thereby caused me to report to London on the basis of incomplete, indeed erroneous, information and less information than was available." No 12 March 2.020 I received an update from Mr McGrail which were matter the incident, which suggested and that had caused him to believe with conding t | | 1 , 5 1 | | |
| 25 probable that it did occur outside BGTW. Page 81 1 We are getting it plotted which will provide a better understanding in terms of distanced 3 from BGTW. 4 "My strong sense and suspicion at the time 4 outside BGTW eastern side opposite runway. 5 that Mr McGrail was answering my 6 questions prior to 11 March about the 7 location of the incident was that Mr McGrail 8 was deliberately withholding from me 9 important information about the nature of his 10 understanding of the location of this incident, which were matters of prime importance to 12 myself as Governor and to HMG in terms of 13 our responsibility for Gibraltar's external 14 affairs. My suspicions were later confirmed when I discovered from sight of the section 15 report prepared by Mr McGrail had 18 information very early on 8 March, just a few 19 hours after the incident, which suggested and 10 that had caused him to believe with 10 reasonable clarity that the incident had 20 occurred well inside Spanish waters." 25 sent by the Attorney General to the Chief Minister copied to Mr McGrail on 8 March at 11.40 in which the AG informed the Chief Minister that it was virtually certain it was outside BGTW. 3 Minister copied to Mr McGrail to which the AG informed the Chief Minister that it was virtually certain it was outside BGTW eastern side opposite runway. 5 "Accordingly, Mr McGrail's email to me of 11 March at 7.07 hours referred to in paragraph 24.7 above was the first time, nearly three full days later, that Mr McGrail disclosed to me information than had disclosed to me information that had ad had disclosed to me information that had ad had information very early on 8 March, just a few the time to others, namely the Attorney General and the Chief Minister. Ha had thereby caused me to report to London on the basis of incomplete, indeed erroneous, information and less information than was available." 16 On to the next paragraph: 17 On 12 March 2020 I received an update from Mr McGrail in which he confirmed that had caused him to believe with | | | | |
| Page 81 Page 83 We are getting it plotted which will provide a better understanding in terms of distanced from BGTW.' "My strong sense and suspicion at the time that Mr McGrail was answering my questions prior to 11 March about the location of the incident was that Mr McGrail was deliberately withholding from me important information about the nature of his understanding of the location of this incident, which were matters of prime importance to myself as Governor and to HMG in terms of our responsibility for Gibraltar's external affairs. My suspicions were later confirmed when I discovered from sight of the section 15 report prepared by Mr McGrail had information very early on 8 March, just a few hours after the incident, which suggested and that had caused him to believe with 20 occurred well inside Spanish waters." Page 83 Minister copied to Mr McGrail on 8 March at 11.40 in which the AG informed the Chief of Minister that it was virtually certain it was outside BGTW eastern it was virtually certain it was outside BGTW eastern it was outside | | | | |
| 1 We are getting it plotted which will provide a 2 better understanding in terms of distanced 3 from BGTW.' 3 Minister that it was virtually certain it was 4 "My strong sense and suspicion at the time 5 that Mr McGrail was answering my 6 questions prior to 11 March about the 7 location of the incident was that Mr McGrail 8 was deliberately withholding from me 9 important information about the nature of his 10 understanding of the location of this incident, 11 which were matters of prime importance to 12 myself as Governor and to HMG in terms of 13 our responsibility for Gibraltar's external 14 affairs. My suspicions were later confirmed 15 when I discovered from sight of the section 16 15 report prepared by Mr McGrail had 17 chief Minister that Mr McGrail had 18 information very early on 8 March, just a few 19 hours after the incident, which suggested and 20 that had caused him to believe with 21 reasonable clarity that the incident had 22 occurred well inside Spanish waters." 23 He refers to an email timed at 8 March at 24 discloses that a Gold command meeting 25 discloses that a Gold command meeting 26 meral and the Chief Minister. He had 27 the time to others, namely the Attorney 28 disclosed to me information that he had had 29 since 09.40 hours on 8 March, a few hours 29 disclosed to me information that he had had 20 the time to others, namely the Attorney 20 the time to others, namely the Attorney 21 the time to others, namely the Attorney 22 formation and less information than was 23 available." 24 Ton 10 March 2020 I received an update 25 from Mr McGrail in which he confirmed that 26 not only did the collision take place in 27 Spanish waters, so did the whole of the 28 pursuit that preceded it. No part of the 29 incident had taken place in British Gibraltar 29 territorial Waters." | 23 | probable that it did occur outside BOT w. | 23 | sent by the Attorney General to the Chief |
| better understanding in terms of distanced from BGTW.' "My strong sense and suspicion at the time that Mr McGrail was answering my questions prior to 11 March about the location of the incident was that Mr McGrail was deliberately withholding from me important information about the nature of his understanding of the location of this incident, which were matters of prime importance to myself as Governor and to HMG in terms of our responsibility for Gibraltar's external fafairs. My suspicions were later confirmed when I discovered from sight of the section Chief Minister that Mr McGrail for the chief Minister that Mr McGrail for the hours after the incident, which suggested and that had caused him to believe with from Paul Richardson to Mr McGrail discloses that a Gold command meeting 11.40 in which the AG informed the Chief Minister that it was virtually certain it was outside BGTW eastern side opposite runway. "Accordingly, Mr McGrail's email to me of 11 March at 7.07 hours referred to in paragraph 24.7 above was the first time, nearly three full days later, that Mr McGrail disclosed to me information that he had had since 09.40 hours on 8 March, a few hours after the incident, and had communicated at the time to others, namely the Attorney General and the Chief Minister. He had the time to others, namely the Attorney the time to others, namely the Attorney General and the Chief Minister. He had the time to others, namely the Attorney after the incident, and had communicated at the time to others, namely the Attorney To not the next paragraph: "On to the next paragraph: "On 12 March 2020 I received an update from Mr McGrail in which he confirmed that not only did the collision take place in paragraph 24.7 above was the first time, nearly three full days later, that Mr McGrail the time to others, namely the Attorney after the incident, and had communicated at the time to others, namely the Attorney Ceneral and the Chief Minister. He had the reby caused me to report to London on the basis of incomplete, inde | | Page 81 | | Page 83 |
| better understanding in terms of distanced from BGTW.' "My strong sense and suspicion at the time that Mr McGrail was answering my questions prior to 11 March about the location of the incident was that Mr McGrail was deliberately withholding from me important information about the nature of his understanding of the location of this incident, which were matters of prime importance to myself as Governor and to HMG in terms of our responsibility for Gibraltar's external fafairs. My suspicions were later confirmed when I discovered from sight of the section Chief Minister that Mr McGrail for the chief Minister that Mr McGrail for the hours after the incident, which suggested and that had caused him to believe with from Paul Richardson to Mr McGrail discloses that a Gold command meeting 11.40 in which the AG informed the Chief Minister that it was virtually certain it was outside BGTW eastern side opposite runway. "Accordingly, Mr McGrail's email to me of 11 March at 7.07 hours referred to in paragraph 24.7 above was the first time, nearly three full days later, that Mr McGrail disclosed to me information that he had had since 09.40 hours on 8 March, a few hours after the incident, and had communicated at the time to others, namely the Attorney General and the Chief Minister. He had the time to others, namely the Attorney the time to others, namely the Attorney General and the Chief Minister. He had the time to others, namely the Attorney after the incident, and had communicated at the time to others, namely the Attorney To not the next paragraph: "On to the next paragraph: "On 12 March 2020 I received an update from Mr McGrail in which he confirmed that not only did the collision take place in paragraph 24.7 above was the first time, nearly three full days later, that Mr McGrail the time to others, namely the Attorney after the incident, and had communicated at the time to others, namely the Attorney Ceneral and the Chief Minister. He had the reby caused me to report to London on the basis of incomplete, inde | | | | |
| from BGTW.' "My strong sense and suspicion at the time that Mr McGrail was answering my that Mr McGrail was answering my to coation of the incident was that Mr McGrail was deliberately withholding from me important information about the nature of his understanding of the location of this incident, which were matters of prime importance to myself as Governor and to HMG in terms of our responsibility for Gibraltar's external affairs. My suspicions were later confirmed when I discovered from sight of the section 15 report prepared by Mr McGrail for the Chief Minister that Mr McGrail had that had caused him to believe with that had caused him to believe with that Mr McGrail discloses that a Gold command meeting 13 Minister that it was virtually certain it was outside BGTW eastern side opposite runway. "Accordingly, Mr McGrail to me of 11 March at 7.07 hours referred to in paragraph 24.7 above was the first time, nearly three full days later, that Mr McGrail disclosed to me information that he had had since 09.40 hours on 8 March, a few hours after the incident, and had communicated at the time to others, namely the Attorney General and the Chief Minister. He had thereby caused me to report to London on the basis of incomplete, indeed erroneous, information and less information than was available." On to the next paragraph: "On 12 March 2020 I received an update from Mr McGrail in which he confirmed that not only did the collision take place in Spanish waters, so did the whole of the pursuit that preceded it. No part of the incident had discloses that a Gold command meeting 25 Territorial Waters." | 1 | We are getting it plotted which will provide a | 1 | Minister copied to Mr McGrail on 8 March at |
| that Mr McGrail was answering my that Mr McGrail was answering my questions prior to 11 March about the location of the incident was that Mr McGrail was deliberately withholding from me important information about the nature of his understanding of the location of this incident, which were matters of prime importance to myself as Governor and to HMG in terms of our responsibility for Gibraltar's external affairs. My suspicions were later confirmed when I discovered from sight of the section 15 report prepared by Mr McGrail had information very early on 8 March, just a few hours after the incident, which suggested and that had caused him to believe with coccurred well inside Spanish waters." 4 outside BGTW eastern side opposite runway. 5 "Accordingly, Mr McGrail to me of 11 March at 7.07 hours referred to in paragraph 24.7 above was the first time, nearly three full days later, that Mr McGrail disclosed to me information that he had had since 09.40 hours on 8 March, a few hours after the incident, and had communicated at the time to others, namely the Attorney 12 the time to others, namely the Attorney 13 General and the Chief Minister. He had 14 thereby caused me to report to London on the 15 basis of incomplete, indeed erroneous, 16 information and less information than was 17 available." 18 On to the next paragraph: 19 "On 12 March 2020 I received an update 19 "On 12 March 2020 I received an update 19 "On 12 March 2020 I received an update 19 from Mr McGrail in which he confirmed that 20 occurred well inside Spanish waters." 21 Spanish waters, so did the whole of the 22 occurred well inside Spanish waters." 23 He refers to an email timed at 8 March at 24 10.11 from Paul Richardson to Mr McGrail 25 discloses that a Gold command meeting 26 mearly three full days later, that Mr McGrail 27 the time to others, namely the Attorney 28 disclosed to me information that he had had 29 incident at 9 mearly three full days later, that Mr McGrail 29 occurred well inside spanish waters." 20 Treceived an update 21 from Mr M | 2 | better understanding in terms of distanced | 2 | 11.40 in which the AG informed the Chief |
| that Mr McGrail was answering my questions prior to 11 March about the location of the incident was that Mr McGrail was deliberately withholding from me important information about the nature of his understanding of the location of this incident, which were matters of prime importance to myself as Governor and to HMG in terms of our responsibility for Gibraltar's external affairs. My suspicions were later confirmed when I discovered from sight of the section formation very early on 8 March, just a few hours after the incident, which suggested and that had caused him to believe with hours after the incident, which suggested and that had caused him to believe with hereby caused me to report to London on the hours after the incident, which suggested and cocurred well inside Spanish waters." He refers to an email timed at 8 March at discloses that a Gold command meeting S "Accordingly, Mr McGrail to me of 11 March at 7.07 hours referred to in paragraph 24.7 above was the first time, nearly three full days later, that Mr McGrail disclosed to me information that he had had since 09.40 hours on 8 March, a few hours after the incident, and had communicated at the time to others, namely the Attorney General and the Chief Minister. He had thereby caused me to report to London on the basis of incomplete, indeed erroneous, information and less information than was available." On to the next paragraph: "On 12 March 2020 I received an update from Mr McGrail in which he confirmed that not only did the collision take place in Spanish waters, so did the whole of the pursuit that preceded it. No part of the incident had taken place in British Gibraltar Territorial Waters." | 3 | | | |
| questions prior to 11 March about the location of the incident was that Mr McGrail was deliberately withholding from me important information about the nature of his understanding of the location of this incident, which were matters of prime importance to myself as Governor and to HMG in terms of our responsibility for Gibraltar's external affairs. My suspicions were later confirmed when I discovered from sight of the section For Chief Minister that Mr McGrail had information very early on 8 March, just a few hours after the incident, which suggested and that had caused him to believe with reasonable clarity that the incident had cocurred well inside Spanish waters." He refers to an email timed at 8 March at discloses that a Gold command meeting 11 March at 7.07 hours referred to in paragraph 24.7 above was the first time, nearly three full days later, that Mr McGrail glasy later, that Mr McGrail for paragraph 24.7 above was the first time, nearly three full days later, that Mr McGrail disclosed to me information that he had had since 09.40 hours on 8 March, a few hours after the incident, and had communicated at the time to others, namely the Attorney General and the Chief Minister. He had thereby caused me to report to London on the basis of incomplete, indeed erroneous, information and less information than was available." On to the next paragraph: 'On 12 March 2020 I received an update from Mr McGrail in which he confirmed that not only did the collision take place in Spanish waters, so did the whole of the pursuit that preceded it. No part of the incident had taken place in British Gibraltar Territorial Waters." | 4 | | 4 | |
| paragraph 24.7 above was the first time, was deliberately withholding from me important information about the nature of his understanding of the location of this incident, which were matters of prime importance to myself as Governor and to HMG in terms of our responsibility for Gibraltar's external affairs. My suspicions were later confirmed when I discovered from sight of the section Chief Minister that Mr McGrail had information very early on 8 March, just a few hours after the incident, which suggested and that had caused him to believe with coccurred well inside Spanish waters." I location of the incident was that Mr McGrail disclosed to me information that he had had since 09.40 hours on 8 March, a few hours after the incident, and had communicated at the time to others, namely the Attorney General and the Chief Minister. He had thereby caused me to report to London on the basis of incomplete, indeed erroneous, information and less information than was available." On to the next paragraph: On to the next paragraph: On to the next paragraph: To hours after the incident, and had communicated at the time to others, namely the Attorney General and the Chief Minister. He had thereby caused me to report to London on the basis of incomplete, indeed erroneous, information and less information than was available." On to the next paragraph: To hours after the incident, and had communicated at the time to others, namely the Attorney General and the Chief Minister. He had thereby caused me to report to London on the basis of incomplete, indeed erroneous, information and less information than was available." On to the next paragraph: To hours after the incident, and had communicated at the time to others, namely the Attorney General and the Chief Minister. Basis of incomplete, indeed erroneous, information and less information than was available." So not the next paragraph: To hours after the incident, and had communicated at the time to others, namely the Attorney To hours after the incident, and had com | 5 | | | C . |
| was deliberately withholding from me important information about the nature of his understanding of the location of this incident, which were matters of prime importance to myself as Governor and to HMG in terms of our responsibility for Gibraltar's external affairs. My suspicions were later confirmed when I discovered from sight of the section I5 report prepared by Mr McGrail for the Chief Minister that Mr McGrail had information very early on 8 March, just a few hours after the incident, which suggested and chief the incident, which suggested and that had caused him to believe with coccurred well inside Spanish waters." Was deliberately withholding from me important information about the nature of his disclosed to me information that he had had since 09.40 hours on 8 March, a few hours after the incident, and had communicated at the time to others, namely the Attorney General and the Chief Minister. He had thereby caused me to report to London on the basis of incomplete, indeed erroneous, information and less information than was available." On to the next paragraph: "On 12 March 2020 I received an update from Mr McGrail in which he confirmed that reasonable clarity that the incident had coccurred well inside Spanish waters." Spanish waters, so did the whole of the He refers to an email timed at 8 March at discloses that a Gold command meeting Territorial Waters." | 6 | questions prior to 11 March about the | 6 | 11 March at 7.07 hours referred to in |
| 9 important information about the nature of his 10 understanding of the location of this incident, 11 which were matters of prime importance to 12 myself as Governor and to HMG in terms of 13 our responsibility for Gibraltar's external 14 affairs. My suspicions were later confirmed 15 when I discovered from sight of the section 16 15 report prepared by Mr McGrail for the 17 Chief Minister that Mr McGrail had 18 information very early on 8 March, just a few 19 hours after the incident, which suggested and 20 that had caused him to believe with 21 reasonable clarity that the incident had 22 occurred well inside Spanish waters." 23 He refers to an email timed at 8 March at 24 10.11 from Paul Richardson to Mr McGrail 25 discloses that a Gold command meeting 27 disclosed to me information that he had had 28 since 09.40 hours on 8 March, a few hours 10 after the incident, and had communicated at 11 the time to others, namely the Attorney 12 differ the incident, and had communicated at 12 the time to others, namely the Attorney 13 General and the Chief Minister. He had 14 thereby caused me to report to London on the 15 basis of incomplete, indeed erroneous, 16 information and less information than was 17 available." 18 On to the next paragraph: 19 "On 12 March 2020 I received an update 19 "On 12 March 2020 I received an update 19 Trom Mr McGrail in which he confirmed that 20 pursuit that preceded it. No part of the 21 incident had taken place in British Gibraltar 22 Territorial Waters." | 7 | | 7 | 1 6 1 |
| understanding of the location of this incident, which were matters of prime importance to myself as Governor and to HMG in terms of our responsibility for Gibraltar's external affairs. My suspicions were later confirmed when I discovered from sight of the section Chief Minister that Mr McGrail for the information very early on 8 March, just a few hours after the incident, which suggested and chat had caused him to believe with coccurred well inside Spanish waters." In understanding of the location of this incident, after the incident, and had communicated at the time to others, namely the Attorney General and the Chief Minister. He had thereby caused me to report to London on the basis of incomplete, indeed erroneous, information and less information than was available." On to the next paragraph: "On 12 March 2020 I received an update from Mr McGrail in which he confirmed that reasonable clarity that the incident had coccurred well inside Spanish waters." Evaluation of the incident, and had communicated at the time to others, namely the Attorney General and the Chief Minister. He had thereby caused me to report to London on the basis of incomplete, indeed erroneous, information and less information than was available." No not the next paragraph: "On 12 March 2020 I received an update from Mr McGrail in which he confirmed that coccurred well inside Spanish waters." Evaluation of the whole of the pursuit that preceded it. No part of the incident had taken place in British Gibraltar Territorial Waters." | 8 | was deliberately withholding from me | 8 | |
| which were matters of prime importance to myself as Governor and to HMG in terms of our responsibility for Gibraltar's external affairs. My suspicions were later confirmed thereby caused me to report to London on the when I discovered from sight of the section thereby caused me to report to London on the basis of incomplete, indeed erroneous, information and less information than was chief Minister that Mr McGrail had information very early on 8 March, just a few hours after the incident, which suggested and that had caused him to believe with that had caused him to believe with coccurred well inside Spanish waters." which were matters of prime importance to the time to others, namely the Attorney denoted the time to others, namely the Attorney and the Chief Minister. He had thereby caused me to report to London on the thereby caused me to report to London on the thereby caused me to report to London on the thereby caused me to report to London on the thereby caused me to report to London on the thereby caused me to report to London on the thereby caused me to report to London on the thereby caused me to report to London on the thereby caused me to report to London on the thereby caused me to report to London on the thereby caus | 9 | • | 9 | |
| myself as Governor and to HMG in terms of our responsibility for Gibraltar's external affairs. My suspicions were later confirmed when I discovered from sight of the section 15 report prepared by Mr McGrail for the information very early on 8 March, just a few hours after the incident, which suggested and that had caused him to believe with that had caused him to believe with coccurred well inside Spanish waters." 12 the time to others, namely the Attorney General and the Chief Minister. He had thereby caused me to report to London on the basis of incomplete, indeed erroneous, information and less information than was available." On to the next paragraph: "On 12 March 2020 I received an update from Mr McGrail in which he confirmed that not only did the collision take place in Spanish waters, so did the whole of the pursuit that preceded it. No part of the incident had taken place in British Gibraltar discloses that a Gold command meeting 12 the time to others, namely the Attorney General and the Chief Minister. He had thereby caused me to report to London on the basis of incomplete, indeed erroneous, information and less information than was available." 20 On to the next paragraph: "On 12 March 2020 I received an update from Mr McGrail in which he confirmed that not only did the collision take place in Spanish waters, so did the whole of the pursuit that preceded it. No part of the incident had taken place in British Gibraltar Territorial Waters." | 10 | understanding of the location of this incident, | 10 | since 09.40 hours on 8 March, a few hours |
| our responsibility for Gibraltar's external affairs. My suspicions were later confirmed when I discovered from sight of the section 15 report prepared by Mr McGrail for the Chief Minister that Mr McGrail had information very early on 8 March, just a few hours after the incident, which suggested and that had caused him to believe with that had caused him to believe with coccurred well inside Spanish waters." He refers to an email timed at 8 March at discloses that a Gold command meeting 13 General and the Chief Minister. He had thereby caused me to report to London on the basis of incomplete, indeed erroneous, information and less information than was available." On to the next paragraph: "On 12 March 2020 I received an update from Mr McGrail in which he confirmed that not only did the collision take place in Spanish waters, so did the whole of the uncident had taken place in British Gibraltar Territorial Waters." | 11 | which were matters of prime importance to | 11 | after the incident, and had communicated at |
| affairs. My suspicions were later confirmed when I discovered from sight of the section 15 report prepared by Mr McGrail for the Chief Minister that Mr McGrail had information very early on 8 March, just a few hours after the incident, which suggested and that had caused him to believe with reasonable clarity that the incident had occurred well inside Spanish waters." He refers to an email timed at 8 March at discloses that a Gold command meeting 14 thereby caused me to report to London on the basis of incomplete, indeed erroneous, information and less information than was available." No not the next paragraph: "On 12 March 2020 I received an update from Mr McGrail in which he confirmed that not only did the collision take place in Spanish waters, so did the whole of the pursuit that preceded it. No part of the incident had taken place in British Gibraltar Territorial Waters." | 12 | myself as Governor and to HMG in terms of | 12 | |
| when I discovered from sight of the section 15 report prepared by Mr McGrail for the 16 Chief Minister that Mr McGrail had 17 Chief Minister that Mr McGrail had 18 information very early on 8 March, just a few 19 hours after the incident, which suggested and 20 that had caused him to believe with 21 reasonable clarity that the incident had 22 occurred well inside Spanish waters." 23 He refers to an email timed at 8 March at 24 10.11 from Paul Richardson to Mr McGrail 25 discloses that a Gold command meeting 15 basis of incomplete, indeed erroneous, 16 information and less information than was 17 available." 18 On to the next paragraph: 19 "On 12 March 2020 I received an update 20 from Mr McGrail in which he confirmed that 21 not only did the collision take place in 22 Spanish waters, so did the whole of the 23 pursuit that preceded it. No part of the 24 incident had taken place in British Gibraltar 25 Territorial Waters." | 13 | our responsibility for Gibraltar's external | 13 | General and the Chief Minister. He had |
| 15 report prepared by Mr McGrail for the 16 Chief Minister that Mr McGrail had 17 Chief Minister that Mr McGrail had 18 information very early on 8 March, just a few 19 hours after the incident, which suggested and 20 that had caused him to believe with 21 reasonable clarity that the incident had 22 occurred well inside Spanish waters." 23 He refers to an email timed at 8 March at 24 10.11 from Paul Richardson to Mr McGrail 25 discloses that a Gold command meeting 26 information and less information than was available." 27 On to the next paragraph: 28 from Mr McGrail in which he confirmed that 29 not only did the collision take place in 20 Spanish waters, so did the whole of the 21 pursuit that preceded it. No part of the 22 incident had taken place in British Gibraltar 23 Territorial Waters." | 14 | • • | 14 | • |
| Chief Minister that Mr McGrail had information very early on 8 March, just a few hours after the incident, which suggested and that had caused him to believe with reasonable clarity that the incident had occurred well inside Spanish waters." He refers to an email timed at 8 March at 10.11 from Paul Richardson to Mr McGrail discloses that a Gold command meeting 17 available." 18 On to the next paragraph: 19 "On 12 March 2020 I received an update from Mr McGrail in which he confirmed that not only did the collision take place in Spanish waters, so did the whole of the incident had taken place in British Gibraltar Territorial Waters." | 15 | when I discovered from sight of the section | 15 | basis of incomplete, indeed erroneous, |
| information very early on 8 March, just a few hours after the incident, which suggested and that had caused him to believe with reasonable clarity that the incident had occurred well inside Spanish waters." He refers to an email timed at 8 March at 10.11 from Paul Richardson to Mr McGrail discloses that a Gold command meeting 18 On to the next paragraph: 19 "On 12 March 2020 I received an update from Mr McGrail in which he confirmed that not only did the collision take place in Spanish waters, so did the whole of the pursuit that preceded it. No part of the incident had taken place in British Gibraltar Territorial Waters." | 16 | | 16 | information and less information than was |
| hours after the incident, which suggested and that had caused him to believe with reasonable clarity that the incident had occurred well inside Spanish waters." He refers to an email timed at 8 March at 10.11 from Paul Richardson to Mr McGrail discloses that a Gold command meeting 19 "On 12 March 2020 I received an update from Mr McGrail in which he confirmed that not only did the collision take place in Spanish waters, so did the whole of the pursuit that preceded it. No part of the incident had taken place in British Gibraltar Territorial Waters." | 17 | Chief Minister that Mr McGrail had | 17 | available." |
| that had caused him to believe with reasonable clarity that the incident had occurred well inside Spanish waters." He refers to an email timed at 8 March at 10.11 from Paul Richardson to Mr McGrail discloses that a Gold command meeting from Mr McGrail in which he confirmed that not only did the collision take place in Spanish waters, so did the whole of the pursuit that preceded it. No part of the incident had taken place in British Gibraltar Territorial Waters." | 18 | information very early on 8 March, just a few | 18 | On to the next paragraph: |
| reasonable clarity that the incident had occurred well inside Spanish waters." Spanish waters, so did the whole of the pursuit that preceded it. No part of the incident had taken place in pursuit that preceded it. No part of the incident had taken place in British Gibraltar Territorial Waters." | 19 | hours after the incident, which suggested and | 19 | |
| occurred well inside Spanish waters." 22 Spanish waters, so did the whole of the 23 He refers to an email timed at 8 March at 24 10.11 from Paul Richardson to Mr McGrail 25 discloses that a Gold command meeting 26 Spanish waters, so did the whole of the 27 pursuit that preceded it. No part of the 28 incident had taken place in British Gibraltar 29 Territorial Waters." | 20 | that had caused him to believe with | 20 | from Mr McGrail in which he confirmed that |
| He refers to an email timed at 8 March at 10.11 from Paul Richardson to Mr McGrail discloses that a Gold command meeting 23 pursuit that preceded it. No part of the incident had taken place in British Gibraltar 25 Territorial Waters." | 21 | reasonable clarity that the incident had | 21 | not only did the collision take place in |
| He refers to an email timed at 8 March at 10.11 from Paul Richardson to Mr McGrail discloses that a Gold command meeting 23 pursuit that preceded it. No part of the incident had taken place in British Gibraltar Territorial Waters." | 22 | occurred well inside Spanish waters." | 22 | Spanish waters, so did the whole of the |
| 25 discloses that a Gold command meeting 25 Territorial Waters." | 23 | | 23 | pursuit that preceded it. No part of the |
| 25 discloses that a Gold command meeting 25 Territorial Waters." | 24 | 10.11 from Paul Richardson to Mr McGrail | 24 | |
| | 25 | discloses that a Gold command meeting | 25 | |
| Page 82 Page 84 | | | | |
| | | Page 82 | | Page 84 |

| 1 | The next paragraph: | 1 | the occurrence of the incident in Spanish |
|--|--|--|---|
| 2 | "I had in fact learned on either 18 or 19 | 2 | territorial waters in the early hours of 8 |
| 3 | March from a debrief by Acting Detective | 3 | March 2020. I was first alerted to the |
| 4 | Superintendent Gary Smith of the | 4 | incident by Mr McGrail himself by |
| 5 | Metropolitan Police that all indications were | 5 | Whatsapp message at 06.05," |
| 6 | that the incident happened in Spanish waters, | 6 | and the message reads: |
| 7 | possibly up to three miles out of BGTW." | 7 | "CM, we are dealing with a critical incident. |
| 8 | Then finally over the page Mr Pyle refers to | 8 | One of our boats has been involved in a |
| 9 | the Solis report: | 9 | collision with a smuggling RIB with four on |
| 10 | "The Solis report was commissioned by RGP | 10 | board. Two on the smuggling RIB are |
| 11 | | 11 | == = |
| 12 | to investigate the collision. The draft report to the Commissioner of Police is dated 30 | 12 | fatalities. Our crew are uninjured but clearly |
| | | 13 | shaken and shocked. I am invoking post- |
| 13 | April 2020. The report found among other | 1 | incident procedures and planning for |
| 14 | things that: (a) pursuit methods are therefore | 14 | consequence management. Once I have |
| 15 | developed and understood by the cockswains | 15 | further updates I will let you know." |
| 16 | but without RGP Marine Section | 16 | "I replied at 07.24 hours and further more |
| 17 | management standards or proper established | 17 | detailed Whatsapp exchange occurred |
| 18 | oversight in place; (b) Marine Section | 18 | between us that day as follows. I made clear |
| 19 | managers do not apply effective oversight | 19 | in my questions that I wanted to know if |
| 20 | into how their patrols are being carried out; | 20 | there was an involvement of Spanish law |
| 21 | and (c) there was no proper training in | 21 | enforcement." |
| 22 | pursuit of suspect vessels for the cockswain | 22 | Just looking at the message three from the |
| 23 | who would be required to take evasive | 23 | bottom at 07.41 from the Chief Minister, it |
| 24 | action." | 24 | reads: |
| 25 | It is also a matter which the Chief Minister | 25 | "Also, what time did it occur and was it |
| | Page 85 | | Page 87 |
| | 1 age 05 | | 1 age 07 |
| | | 1 | |
| 1 | refers to, albeit with a different emphasis. If | 1 | firmly within BGTW or questionable?" |
| 1 2 | refers to, albeit with a different emphasis. If we can turn to 194, at the bottom of the page, | 1 2 | firmly within BGTW or questionable?" Over the page, at 07.43, the third message |
| 2 | we can turn to 194, at the bottom of the page, | 2 | Over the page, at 07.43, the third message |
| 2 3 | we can turn to 194, at the bottom of the page, paragraph 56: | 2 3 | Over the page, at 07.43, the third message down, Mr McGrail responds: |
| 2 3 4 | we can turn to 194, at the bottom of the page, paragraph 56: "The matter of the collision at sea in Spanish | 2 3 4 | Over the page, at 07.43, the third message down, Mr McGrail responds: "Collision occurred at approximately 03.40 |
| 2 3 4 5 | we can turn to 194, at the bottom of the page, paragraph 56: "The matter of the collision at sea in Spanish territorial waters on 8 March 2020 between | 2 3 4 5 | Over the page, at 07.43, the third message down, Mr McGrail responds: "Collision occurred at approximately 03.40 hours. Location still to be confirmed." |
| 2 3 4 5 6 | we can turn to 194, at the bottom of the page, paragraph 56: "The matter of the collision at sea in Spanish territorial waters on 8 March 2020 between an RGP fast launch and a suspect vessel in | 2 3 4 5 6 | Over the page, at 07.43, the third message down, Mr McGrail responds: "Collision occurred at approximately 03.40 hours. Location still to be confirmed." In the next paragraph the Chief Minister |
| 2 3 4 5 6 7 | we can turn to 194, at the bottom of the page, paragraph 56: "The matter of the collision at sea in Spanish territorial waters on 8 March 2020 between an RGP fast launch and a suspect vessel in which two Spanish nationals died has caused | 2 3 4 5 6 7 | Over the page, at 07.43, the third message down, Mr McGrail responds: "Collision occurred at approximately 03.40 hours. Location still to be confirmed." In the next paragraph the Chief Minister says: |
| 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 | we can turn to 194, at the bottom of the page, paragraph 56: "The matter of the collision at sea in Spanish territorial waters on 8 March 2020 between an RGP fast launch and a suspect vessel in which two Spanish nationals died has caused serious financial, legal and political problems | 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 | Over the page, at 07.43, the third message down, Mr McGrail responds: "Collision occurred at approximately 03.40 hours. Location still to be confirmed." In the next paragraph the Chief Minister says: "In my above Whatsapp of 07.41 hours I had |
| 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 | we can turn to 194, at the bottom of the page, paragraph 56: "The matter of the collision at sea in Spanish territorial waters on 8 March 2020 between an RGP fast launch and a suspect vessel in which two Spanish nationals died has caused serious financial, legal and political problems and consequences for Gibraltar. I understand | 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 | Over the page, at 07.43, the third message down, Mr McGrail responds: "Collision occurred at approximately 03.40 hours. Location still to be confirmed." In the next paragraph the Chief Minister says: "In my above Whatsapp of 07.41 hours I had asked Mr McGrail specifically about the |
| 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 | we can turn to 194, at the bottom of the page, paragraph 56: "The matter of the collision at sea in Spanish territorial waters on 8 March 2020 between an RGP fast launch and a suspect vessel in which two Spanish nationals died has caused serious financial, legal and political problems and consequences for Gibraltar. I understand that this incident is referred to by the RGP as | 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 | Over the page, at 07.43, the third message down, Mr McGrail responds: "Collision occurred at approximately 03.40 hours. Location still to be confirmed." In the next paragraph the Chief Minister says: "In my above Whatsapp of 07.41 hours I had asked Mr McGrail specifically about the location of the events, asking if it was firmly |
| 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 | we can turn to 194, at the bottom of the page, paragraph 56: "The matter of the collision at sea in Spanish territorial waters on 8 March 2020 between an RGP fast launch and a suspect vessel in which two Spanish nationals died has caused serious financial, legal and political problems and consequences for Gibraltar. I understand that this incident is referred to by the RGP as Operation Kram." | 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 | Over the page, at 07.43, the third message down, Mr McGrail responds: "Collision occurred at approximately 03.40 hours. Location still to be confirmed." In the next paragraph the Chief Minister says: "In my above Whatsapp of 07.41 hours I had asked Mr McGrail specifically about the location of the events, asking if it was firmly within BGTW or questionable, and I set out |
| 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 | we can turn to 194, at the bottom of the page, paragraph 56: "The matter of the collision at sea in Spanish territorial waters on 8 March 2020 between an RGP fast launch and a suspect vessel in which two Spanish nationals died has caused serious financial, legal and political problems and consequences for Gibraltar. I understand that this incident is referred to by the RGP as Operation Kram." Just over the page and skipping to paragraph | 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 | Over the page, at 07.43, the third message down, Mr McGrail responds: "Collision occurred at approximately 03.40 hours. Location still to be confirmed." In the next paragraph the Chief Minister says: "In my above Whatsapp of 07.41 hours I had asked Mr McGrail specifically about the location of the events, asking if it was firmly within BGTW or questionable, and I set out specifically that we should be transparent |
| 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 | we can turn to 194, at the bottom of the page, paragraph 56: "The matter of the collision at sea in Spanish territorial waters on 8 March 2020 between an RGP fast launch and a suspect vessel in which two Spanish nationals died has caused serious financial, legal and political problems and consequences for Gibraltar. I understand that this incident is referred to by the RGP as Operation Kram." Just over the page and skipping to paragraph 58: | 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 | Over the page, at 07.43, the third message down, Mr McGrail responds: "Collision occurred at approximately 03.40 hours. Location still to be confirmed." In the next paragraph the Chief Minister says: "In my above Whatsapp of 07.41 hours I had asked Mr McGrail specifically about the location of the events, asking if it was firmly within BGTW or questionable, and I set out specifically that we should be transparent about what happened. With sensitive, |
| 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 | we can turn to 194, at the bottom of the page, paragraph 56: "The matter of the collision at sea in Spanish territorial waters on 8 March 2020 between an RGP fast launch and a suspect vessel in which two Spanish nationals died has caused serious financial, legal and political problems and consequences for Gibraltar. I understand that this incident is referred to by the RGP as Operation Kram." Just over the page and skipping to paragraph 58: "Since early in my tenure of office as Chief | 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 | Over the page, at 07.43, the third message down, Mr McGrail responds: "Collision occurred at approximately 03.40 hours. Location still to be confirmed." In the next paragraph the Chief Minister says: "In my above Whatsapp of 07.41 hours I had asked Mr McGrail specifically about the location of the events, asking if it was firmly within BGTW or questionable, and I set out specifically that we should be transparent about what happened. With sensitive, ongoing negotiations in Spain we could not |
| 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 | we can turn to 194, at the bottom of the page, paragraph 56: "The matter of the collision at sea in Spanish territorial waters on 8 March 2020 between an RGP fast launch and a suspect vessel in which two Spanish nationals died has caused serious financial, legal and political problems and consequences for Gibraltar. I understand that this incident is referred to by the RGP as Operation Kram." Just over the page and skipping to paragraph 58: "Since early in my tenure of office as Chief Minister, I have made it clear to successive | 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 | Over the page, at 07.43, the third message down, Mr McGrail responds: "Collision occurred at approximately 03.40 hours. Location still to be confirmed." In the next paragraph the Chief Minister says: "In my above Whatsapp of 07.41 hours I had asked Mr McGrail specifically about the location of the events, asking if it was firmly within BGTW or questionable, and I set out specifically that we should be transparent about what happened. With sensitive, ongoing negotiations in Spain we could not afford to have a situation where we failed to |
| 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 | we can turn to 194, at the bottom of the page, paragraph 56: "The matter of the collision at sea in Spanish territorial waters on 8 March 2020 between an RGP fast launch and a suspect vessel in which two Spanish nationals died has caused serious financial, legal and political problems and consequences for Gibraltar. I understand that this incident is referred to by the RGP as Operation Kram." Just over the page and skipping to paragraph 58: "Since early in my tenure of office as Chief Minister, I have made it clear to successive commissioners that I do not consider it | 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 | Over the page, at 07.43, the third message down, Mr McGrail responds: "Collision occurred at approximately 03.40 hours. Location still to be confirmed." In the next paragraph the Chief Minister says: "In my above Whatsapp of 07.41 hours I had asked Mr McGrail specifically about the location of the events, asking if it was firmly within BGTW or questionable, and I set out specifically that we should be transparent about what happened. With sensitive, ongoing negotiations in Spain we could not afford to have a situation where we failed to be transparent about what might have |
| 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 | we can turn to 194, at the bottom of the page, paragraph 56: "The matter of the collision at sea in Spanish territorial waters on 8 March 2020 between an RGP fast launch and a suspect vessel in which two Spanish nationals died has caused serious financial, legal and political problems and consequences for Gibraltar. I understand that this incident is referred to by the RGP as Operation Kram." Just over the page and skipping to paragraph 58: "Since early in my tenure of office as Chief Minister, I have made it clear to successive commissioners that I do not consider it jurisdictionally appropriate for the RGP to | 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 | Over the page, at 07.43, the third message down, Mr McGrail responds: "Collision occurred at approximately 03.40 hours. Location still to be confirmed." In the next paragraph the Chief Minister says: "In my above Whatsapp of 07.41 hours I had asked Mr McGrail specifically about the location of the events, asking if it was firmly within BGTW or questionable, and I set out specifically that we should be transparent about what happened. With sensitive, ongoing negotiations in Spain we could not afford to have a situation where we failed to be transparent about what might have happened. Importantly, by 09.49 hours on |
| 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 | we can turn to 194, at the bottom of the page, paragraph 56: "The matter of the collision at sea in Spanish territorial waters on 8 March 2020 between an RGP fast launch and a suspect vessel in which two Spanish nationals died has caused serious financial, legal and political problems and consequences for Gibraltar. I understand that this incident is referred to by the RGP as Operation Kram." Just over the page and skipping to paragraph 58: "Since early in my tenure of office as Chief Minister, I have made it clear to successive commissioners that I do not consider it jurisdictionally appropriate for the RGP to operate outside of BGTW other than in the | 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 | Over the page, at 07.43, the third message down, Mr McGrail responds: "Collision occurred at approximately 03.40 hours. Location still to be confirmed." In the next paragraph the Chief Minister says: "In my above Whatsapp of 07.41 hours I had asked Mr McGrail specifically about the location of the events, asking if it was firmly within BGTW or questionable, and I set out specifically that we should be transparent about what happened. With sensitive, ongoing negotiations in Spain we could not afford to have a situation where we failed to be transparent about what might have happened. Importantly, by 09.49 hours on the day of the incident, some two and a half |
| 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 | we can turn to 194, at the bottom of the page, paragraph 56: "The matter of the collision at sea in Spanish territorial waters on 8 March 2020 between an RGP fast launch and a suspect vessel in which two Spanish nationals died has caused serious financial, legal and political problems and consequences for Gibraltar. I understand that this incident is referred to by the RGP as Operation Kram." Just over the page and skipping to paragraph 58: "Since early in my tenure of office as Chief Minister, I have made it clear to successive commissioners that I do not consider it jurisdictionally appropriate for the RGP to operate outside of BGTW other than in the instances already set out by me. I have | 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 | Over the page, at 07.43, the third message down, Mr McGrail responds: "Collision occurred at approximately 03.40 hours. Location still to be confirmed." In the next paragraph the Chief Minister says: "In my above Whatsapp of 07.41 hours I had asked Mr McGrail specifically about the location of the events, asking if it was firmly within BGTW or questionable, and I set out specifically that we should be transparent about what happened. With sensitive, ongoing negotiations in Spain we could not afford to have a situation where we failed to be transparent about what might have happened. Importantly, by 09.49 hours on the day of the incident, some two and a half hours after the first communication with me, |
| 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 | we can turn to 194, at the bottom of the page, paragraph 56: "The matter of the collision at sea in Spanish territorial waters on 8 March 2020 between an RGP fast launch and a suspect vessel in which two Spanish nationals died has caused serious financial, legal and political problems and consequences for Gibraltar. I understand that this incident is referred to by the RGP as Operation Kram." Just over the page and skipping to paragraph 58: "Since early in my tenure of office as Chief Minister, I have made it clear to successive commissioners that I do not consider it jurisdictionally appropriate for the RGP to operate outside of BGTW other than in the instances already set out by me. I have expressed similar sentiments to the collective | 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 | Over the page, at 07.43, the third message down, Mr McGrail responds: "Collision occurred at approximately 03.40 hours. Location still to be confirmed." In the next paragraph the Chief Minister says: "In my above Whatsapp of 07.41 hours I had asked Mr McGrail specifically about the location of the events, asking if it was firmly within BGTW or questionable, and I set out specifically that we should be transparent about what happened. With sensitive, ongoing negotiations in Spain we could not afford to have a situation where we failed to be transparent about what might have happened. Importantly, by 09.49 hours on the day of the incident, some two and a half hours after the first communication with me, I was told by Mr McGrail that the incident |
| 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 | we can turn to 194, at the bottom of the page, paragraph 56: "The matter of the collision at sea in Spanish territorial waters on 8 March 2020 between an RGP fast launch and a suspect vessel in which two Spanish nationals died has caused serious financial, legal and political problems and consequences for Gibraltar. I understand that this incident is referred to by the RGP as Operation Kram." Just over the page and skipping to paragraph 58: "Since early in my tenure of office as Chief Minister, I have made it clear to successive commissioners that I do not consider it jurisdictionally appropriate for the RGP to operate outside of BGTW other than in the instances already set out by me. I have expressed similar sentiments to the collective Customs in respect of the use of their | 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 | Over the page, at 07.43, the third message down, Mr McGrail responds: "Collision occurred at approximately 03.40 hours. Location still to be confirmed." In the next paragraph the Chief Minister says: "In my above Whatsapp of 07.41 hours I had asked Mr McGrail specifically about the location of the events, asking if it was firmly within BGTW or questionable, and I set out specifically that we should be transparent about what happened. With sensitive, ongoing negotiations in Spain we could not afford to have a situation where we failed to be transparent about what might have happened. Importantly, by 09.49 hours on the day of the incident, some two and a half hours after the first communication with me, I was told by Mr McGrail that the incident had occurred approximately 6 nautical miles |
| 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 | we can turn to 194, at the bottom of the page, paragraph 56: "The matter of the collision at sea in Spanish territorial waters on 8 March 2020 between an RGP fast launch and a suspect vessel in which two Spanish nationals died has caused serious financial, legal and political problems and consequences for Gibraltar. I understand that this incident is referred to by the RGP as Operation Kram." Just over the page and skipping to paragraph 58: "Since early in my tenure of office as Chief Minister, I have made it clear to successive commissioners that I do not consider it jurisdictionally appropriate for the RGP to operate outside of BGTW other than in the instances already set out by me. I have expressed similar sentiments to the collective Customs in respect of the use of their maritime assets for law enforcements. | 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 | Over the page, at 07.43, the third message down, Mr McGrail responds: "Collision occurred at approximately 03.40 hours. Location still to be confirmed." In the next paragraph the Chief Minister says: "In my above Whatsapp of 07.41 hours I had asked Mr McGrail specifically about the location of the events, asking if it was firmly within BGTW or questionable, and I set out specifically that we should be transparent about what happened. With sensitive, ongoing negotiations in Spain we could not afford to have a situation where we failed to be transparent about what might have happened. Importantly, by 09.49 hours on the day of the incident, some two and a half hours after the first communication with me, I was told by Mr McGrail that the incident had occurred approximately 6 nautical miles east of Gibraltar, north of the easterly |
| 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 | we can turn to 194, at the bottom of the page, paragraph 56: "The matter of the collision at sea in Spanish territorial waters on 8 March 2020 between an RGP fast launch and a suspect vessel in which two Spanish nationals died has caused serious financial, legal and political problems and consequences for Gibraltar. I understand that this incident is referred to by the RGP as Operation Kram." Just over the page and skipping to paragraph 58: "Since early in my tenure of office as Chief Minister, I have made it clear to successive commissioners that I do not consider it jurisdictionally appropriate for the RGP to operate outside of BGTW other than in the instances already set out by me. I have expressed similar sentiments to the collective Customs in respect of the use of their maritime assets for law enforcements. Customs had not had any instances reported | 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 | Over the page, at 07.43, the third message down, Mr McGrail responds: "Collision occurred at approximately 03.40 hours. Location still to be confirmed." In the next paragraph the Chief Minister says: "In my above Whatsapp of 07.41 hours I had asked Mr McGrail specifically about the location of the events, asking if it was firmly within BGTW or questionable, and I set out specifically that we should be transparent about what happened. With sensitive, ongoing negotiations in Spain we could not afford to have a situation where we failed to be transparent about what might have happened. Importantly, by 09.49 hours on the day of the incident, some two and a half hours after the first communication with me, I was told by Mr McGrail that the incident had occurred approximately 6 nautical miles east of Gibraltar, north of the easterly runway, i.e. clearly in Spanish territorial |
| 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24 | we can turn to 194, at the bottom of the page, paragraph 56: "The matter of the collision at sea in Spanish territorial waters on 8 March 2020 between an RGP fast launch and a suspect vessel in which two Spanish nationals died has caused serious financial, legal and political problems and consequences for Gibraltar. I understand that this incident is referred to by the RGP as Operation Kram." Just over the page and skipping to paragraph 58: "Since early in my tenure of office as Chief Minister, I have made it clear to successive commissioners that I do not consider it jurisdictionally appropriate for the RGP to operate outside of BGTW other than in the instances already set out by me. I have expressed similar sentiments to the collective Customs in respect of the use of their maritime assets for law enforcements. Customs had not had any instances reported to me of operations outside of BGTW. I was | 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24 | Over the page, at 07.43, the third message down, Mr McGrail responds: "Collision occurred at approximately 03.40 hours. Location still to be confirmed." In the next paragraph the Chief Minister says: "In my above Whatsapp of 07.41 hours I had asked Mr McGrail specifically about the location of the events, asking if it was firmly within BGTW or questionable, and I set out specifically that we should be transparent about what happened. With sensitive, ongoing negotiations in Spain we could not afford to have a situation where we failed to be transparent about what might have happened. Importantly, by 09.49 hours on the day of the incident, some two and a half hours after the first communication with me, I was told by Mr McGrail that the incident had occurred approximately 6 nautical miles east of Gibraltar, north of the easterly runway, i.e. clearly in Spanish territorial waters." |
| 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 | we can turn to 194, at the bottom of the page, paragraph 56: "The matter of the collision at sea in Spanish territorial waters on 8 March 2020 between an RGP fast launch and a suspect vessel in which two Spanish nationals died has caused serious financial, legal and political problems and consequences for Gibraltar. I understand that this incident is referred to by the RGP as Operation Kram." Just over the page and skipping to paragraph 58: "Since early in my tenure of office as Chief Minister, I have made it clear to successive commissioners that I do not consider it jurisdictionally appropriate for the RGP to operate outside of BGTW other than in the instances already set out by me. I have expressed similar sentiments to the collective Customs in respect of the use of their maritime assets for law enforcements. Customs had not had any instances reported | 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 | Over the page, at 07.43, the third message down, Mr McGrail responds: "Collision occurred at approximately 03.40 hours. Location still to be confirmed." In the next paragraph the Chief Minister says: "In my above Whatsapp of 07.41 hours I had asked Mr McGrail specifically about the location of the events, asking if it was firmly within BGTW or questionable, and I set out specifically that we should be transparent about what happened. With sensitive, ongoing negotiations in Spain we could not afford to have a situation where we failed to be transparent about what might have happened. Importantly, by 09.49 hours on the day of the incident, some two and a half hours after the first communication with me, I was told by Mr McGrail that the incident had occurred approximately 6 nautical miles east of Gibraltar, north of the easterly runway, i.e. clearly in Spanish territorial |
| 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24 | we can turn to 194, at the bottom of the page, paragraph 56: "The matter of the collision at sea in Spanish territorial waters on 8 March 2020 between an RGP fast launch and a suspect vessel in which two Spanish nationals died has caused serious financial, legal and political problems and consequences for Gibraltar. I understand that this incident is referred to by the RGP as Operation Kram." Just over the page and skipping to paragraph 58: "Since early in my tenure of office as Chief Minister, I have made it clear to successive commissioners that I do not consider it jurisdictionally appropriate for the RGP to operate outside of BGTW other than in the instances already set out by me. I have expressed similar sentiments to the collective Customs in respect of the use of their maritime assets for law enforcements. Customs had not had any instances reported to me of operations outside of BGTW. I was | 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24 | Over the page, at 07.43, the third message down, Mr McGrail responds: "Collision occurred at approximately 03.40 hours. Location still to be confirmed." In the next paragraph the Chief Minister says: "In my above Whatsapp of 07.41 hours I had asked Mr McGrail specifically about the location of the events, asking if it was firmly within BGTW or questionable, and I set out specifically that we should be transparent about what happened. With sensitive, ongoing negotiations in Spain we could not afford to have a situation where we failed to be transparent about what might have happened. Importantly, by 09.49 hours on the day of the incident, some two and a half hours after the first communication with me, I was told by Mr McGrail that the incident had occurred approximately 6 nautical miles east of Gibraltar, north of the easterly runway, i.e. clearly in Spanish territorial waters." |

1 first from Mr McGrail to the Chief Minister: 1 dealings with me. Now I had found out from 2 2 "CM, the information suggests that the a newspaper that there were claims being 3 collision took place outside BGTW 3 made in foreign courts, which was no 4 4 approximately 6 NM," surprise as I had expected they would come, 5 nautical miles, 5 involving the RGP and of which I had not 6 "east off the runway Santa Barbara beach," 6 been made aware of despite my 7 7 responsibilities for public finance. The self-8 "When a death arises from police contact it is 8 explanatory Whatsapp exchange is set out in 9 best practice to engage with independent 9 its entirety hereunder, as follows." 10 10 investigating team and I am studying how to I have already read that message out, but 11 achieve this." 11 relevantly it refers to - I will read the first bit, 12 The reply from the Chief Minister says: 12 which says: 13 "Okay. We need to liaise with AG on this 13 "This article has just appeared. A civil claim 14 14 and ensure we are transparent on this." has been filed in Spain in (Sotha?) by the families of the deceased in the incident with 15 15 "Yes, agreed." 16 "Any necessary additional expenditure will 16 the RGP off the east side. This is obviously 17 be approved," 17 going to cause us huge issues - damages, to which Mr McGrail replies: 18 18 claims, political problems, etc. I am totally 19 "Many thanks." 19 there to support the officers on the front line. 20 20 Over the page, the Chief Minister deals with I am starting to have huge concerns about the the point that he emphasises, which is claims 21 21 senior management of the RGP. I will alert 22 22 arising from the collision at sea and his to a particular matter when we meet but in 23 23 exchanges and meeting with the governor. terms of the past few months alone: (1) this 24 24 Just reading through this: case of deaths occasioned outside of BGTW 25 25 "On 14 May 2020, two days after the where the statute gives them no status as Page 89 Page 91 1 meeting in my office in respect of Operation 1 police officer." 2 Delhi, which had resulted in my loss of 2 He finishes, after listing other matters: 3 3 confidence in Mr McGrail, an article "I think I will be asking Ian McGrail to 4 appeared in a regional newspaper in (Sotha?), 4 provide more detail and in writing as to what 5 5 the home of one of the deceased in the happened here and what they are going to do 6 6 collision, which set out that claims were to engage with these claims before there is 7 7 being filed by the survivors and the any requirement that they do so. I am 8 8 relatives/dependants of the deceased and starting to lose confidence here. Best wishes, 9 9 homicide charges brought against the Fabian." 10 10 relevant serving officers of the RGP." Then he provides a link to the article. The 11 He provides a translation of that article. response by Mr Pyle says: 11 12 "The article appeared barely 48 hours after 12 "Agree. As we thought at the time, wrong 13 the meeting I held in my office with Mr 13 appointment. Remind me to tell you about 14 McGrail in which I had determined that he 14 the recruitment process, which was abject. 15 had lied to me over the issue of the advice he 15 Should we meet tomorrow after or before 16 had received from the DPP in relation to the 16 Platinum?" 17 17 search warrant executed at the home and The Chief Ministers responds: 18 office of James Levy. I wrote to the 18 "After Platinum best from my point of view. 19 19 Governor about this article and set out my I am also concerned about ensuring our 20 20 coroner gets this right. We cannot afford to concerns about it in a Whatsapp exchange 21 21 which resulted in our agreeing to meet. By be anything other than a hundred per cent 22 this stage I was very concerned about the 22 transparent on this and show that 23 23 leadership of the RGP. I had already had to accountability is the hallmark of what we do 24 think hard about my view of Ian McGrail and 24 as a government, even if that means dragging 25 his probity as a result of the integrity of his 25 RGP kicking and screaming to that higher Page 90 Page 92

1 standard. Who polices the police? is such 1 and all other aspects of this matter. In the 2 2 overused shorthand but it is important." interim I do not authorise the incurring of 3 3 Then if we skip over to page 202, paragraph any expenditure in free briefing out of this 4 4 75 at the bottom of that page: matter at this stage. Please refer both the 5 5 "On 20 May at 13.48 hours I was sent an GPP and Superintendent Yeats to my 6 email by the Attorney General forwarding to 6 response." 7 me a communication from the then 7 The Chief Minister also forwarded a copy of 8 8 that response to the Governor, Mr Pyle. He Superintendent Cathal Yeats. In that email 9 9 then says at 77: Mr Yeats is seeking funding for legal 10 10 representation for the RGP in respect of the "My response to the Attorney General was 11 damages claims communicated to the Force 11 forwarded by him to Mr Yeats and he forwards it on to Mr McGrail. Mr McGrail 12 and arising from the collision at sea. I 12 13 responded to that email by writing to the 13 responded to me some hours later at 1753 14 14 Attorney General within half an hour, 14.14 hours, also on 20 May and his email stated as 15 hours, setting out my concerns that, on a 15 follows: 16 matter as fundamental as that, Mr McGrail 16 'Dear CM. 17 17 I refer to the below thread which includes had not been in contact with me. 18 (12.00)18 your response to the AG and which has been 19 19 I stated the following specifically: forwarded to me. You are evidently very 20 20 'I think it is entirely inappropriate for this disappointed but I want to reassure you that it 21 matter not to have been raised with me in the 21 has never been my intention to withhold 22 22 first instance by the Commissioner. This anything from you concerning this very 23 23 matter raises issues of fundamental human serious matter. I provided you with an 24 24 rights, the right to life, potential payment of overview on the day of the incident and then 25 25 huge amounts of damages, the potential engaged with the AG as per your suggestion Page 93 Page 95 1 extradition and liberty of serving police 1 and have been doing so ever since. I will 2 officers being at stake, the issue of standard 2 hopefully be in a better position to brief you 3 3 operating procedures which may be in place on the full details of the incident once I 4 and the management thereof, all of that is in 4 receive the report of the findings of the 5 5 independent investigation team we called in. addition to the huge potential political 6 6 exposure that arises for Gibraltar as a result This team has to return early to the UK 7 7 because of the Covid-19 crisis and because of thereof and the concomitant and dangerous 8 8 issues of sovereignty and the United Nations the lockdown in the UK. They have been 9 9 Convention on the law of the sea. Indeed, it unable to progress the matter as 10 10 is difficult to think of an issue as expeditiously as we all would have wanted. 11 The letter from local counsel representing the fundamental as this affecting the RGP, 11 12 certainly in the time I have been in office.' 12 families and suggesting a future claim for 13 13 There is no consideration in the email below damages was only received a few days ago, 14 14 of claims or offences going beyond the which is what triggered our inquiry with the 15 15 officers crewing the vessel which is also, in DPP only yesterday concerning legal 16 16 my view, an issue that may also need further representation. I am of course available to 17 17 consideration. As you know, it comes discuss all the points you allude to at your 18 against the backdrop of the very unflattering 18 earliest convenience.' 19 19 report from the HMIC FRS. I am therefore It seemed to me that Mr McGrail was making 20 20 surprised and greatly disappointed that these excuses for not having provided me with 21 issues have not been the subject of a detailed 21 timely information about the claims and I 22 submission to me by the Commissioner in 22 was even more disappointed to learn that the 23 23 respect of the events in question and the RGP had received the damages claims some 24 issues which now arise. I shall therefore be 24 days earlier and I had not been told. In fact, I 25 writing directly to the Commissioner on this 25 had been left to read the start of the process Page 94 Page 96

| 1 | | | |
|--|--|--|---|
| 1 | of the potential claims in the newspaper | 1 | damages claims from the media before we |
| 2 | reports when the RGP had clearly already | 2 | were informed by the RGP. We also could |
| 3 | received notice of these. In the end, it would | 3 | see that whilst I had been told almost |
| 4 | be my responsibility as Minister of Public | 4 | immediately after the incident that it had |
| 5 | Finance to find the funding for the inevitable | 5 | occurred several nautical miles outside of the |
| 6 | payment of damages that would eventually | 6 | BGTW, the same information had been |
| 7 | likely result and to deal with the political | 7 | withheld from the Governor, despite the |
| 8 | fall-out and public reactions and | 8 | nature of this incident and his responsibility |
| 9 | explanations. Shortly after I received the | 9 | in respect of external relations." |
| 10 | email from Mr McGrail I forwarded it to the | 10 | Jumping one paragraph to 85: |
| 11 | Governor. In forwarding that email I added a | 11 | "I received the factual report I requested by |
| 12 | note which read as follows: | 12 | email on 28 May at 1621 hours within the |
| 13 | 'Please see below which I have just received | 13 | seven day period of time I had provided in |
| 14 | from the COP. Given the seriousness of the | 14 | |
| | | 1 | my letter of request." |
| 15 | matter, I would appreciate the opportunity to | 15 | Then to the next paragraph: "It is clear from this timeline of |
| 16 | discuss with you my intended response. I | 16 | |
| 17 | consider this is a trigger, the only appropriate | 17 | communications that I was told one thing |
| 18 | response to which will be the exercise of my | 18 | about the location of the incident hours after |
| 19 | powers under section 15(1)(a).' | 19 | it had occurred and the Governor was not |
| 20 | In the circumstances and having considered | 20 | given the same information until three days |
| 21 | the matter further, I concluded that I had no | 21 | later. As I set out in paragraph 6 above, |
| 22 | choice but to exercise my power under | 22 | matters of external relations remain the |
| 23 | section 15(1)(a) of the Police Act to seek a | 23 | formal responsibility of the Governor under |
| 24 | factual report from the RGP on the collision | 24 | the Gibraltar constitution subject to a |
| 25 | at sea. I was required by section 15(2) of the | 25 | requirement for consultation with the Chief |
| | Page 97 | | Page 99 |
| | 1 age 97 | | 1 age 99 |
| 1 | Police Act to keep the Governor informed of | 1 | Minister. In respect of this very serious |
| 2 | any exercise by me of that power which I did | 2 | matter, Mr McGrail was failing to provide |
| 3 | and discuss the exercise of the power with | 3 | information to the Governor on a matter of |
| 4 | him." | | |
| | | 1 | |
| 5 | | 4 | external relations and, to make matters |
| 5 6 | Jumping ahead to paragraph 82, reading from | 4 5 | external relations and, to make matters worse, was providing one version of the truth |
| 6 | Jumping ahead to paragraph 82, reading from the quotation of the section 15 request it | 4 5 6 | external relations and, to make matters worse, was providing one version of the truth to me and another to the Governor. This |
| 6 7 | Jumping ahead to paragraph 82, reading from the quotation of the section 15 request it states: | 4 5 6 7 | external relations and, to make matters worse, was providing one version of the truth to me and another to the Governor. This further sustained our loss of confidence in Mr |
| 6 7 8 | Jumping ahead to paragraph 82, reading from the quotation of the section 15 request it states: "As a result in the light of the above, I have | 4 5 6 7 8 | external relations and, to make matters worse, was providing one version of the truth to me and another to the Governor. This further sustained our loss of confidence in Mr McGrail as Commissioner of Police. |
| 6 7 8 9 | Jumping ahead to paragraph 82, reading from the quotation of the section 15 request it states: "As a result in the light of the above, I have no confidence that you have expeditiously | 4 5 6 7 8 9 | external relations and, to make matters worse, was providing one version of the truth to me and another to the Governor. This further sustained our loss of confidence in Mr McGrail as Commissioner of Police. Mr McGrail denies the criticism and says that |
| 6 7 8 9 10 | Jumping ahead to paragraph 82, reading from the quotation of the section 15 request it states: "As a result in the light of the above, I have no confidence that you have expeditiously provided me with all the information and | 4 5 6 7 8 9 | external relations and, to make matters worse, was providing one version of the truth to me and another to the Governor. This further sustained our loss of confidence in Mr McGrail as Commissioner of Police. Mr McGrail denies the criticism and says that Mr Pyle knew from very early on that the |
| 6 7 8 9 10 11 | Jumping ahead to paragraph 82, reading from the quotation of the section 15 request it states: "As a result in the light of the above, I have no confidence that you have expeditiously provided me with all the information and documentation that I should have been | 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 | external relations and, to make matters worse, was providing one version of the truth to me and another to the Governor. This further sustained our loss of confidence in Mr McGrail as Commissioner of Police. Mr McGrail denies the criticism and says that Mr Pyle knew from very early on that the collision had most likely occurred in Spanish |
| 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 | Jumping ahead to paragraph 82, reading from the quotation of the section 15 request it states: "As a result in the light of the above, I have no confidence that you have expeditiously provided me with all the information and documentation that I should have been provided with in the context of the | 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 | external relations and, to make matters worse, was providing one version of the truth to me and another to the Governor. This further sustained our loss of confidence in Mr McGrail as Commissioner of Police. Mr McGrail denies the criticism and says that Mr Pyle knew from very early on that the collision had most likely occurred in Spanish waters based on contact between Mr |
| 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 | Jumping ahead to paragraph 82, reading from the quotation of the section 15 request it states: "As a result in the light of the above, I have no confidence that you have expeditiously provided me with all the information and documentation that I should have been provided with in the context of the seriousness of the events in question. In | 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 | external relations and, to make matters worse, was providing one version of the truth to me and another to the Governor. This further sustained our loss of confidence in Mr McGrail as Commissioner of Police. Mr McGrail denies the criticism and says that Mr Pyle knew from very early on that the collision had most likely occurred in Spanish waters based on contact between Mr McGrail, Mr Pyle and the Attorney General. |
| 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 | Jumping ahead to paragraph 82, reading from the quotation of the section 15 request it states: "As a result in the light of the above, I have no confidence that you have expeditiously provided me with all the information and documentation that I should have been provided with in the context of the seriousness of the events in question. In particular, I have no confidence that either | 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 | external relations and, to make matters worse, was providing one version of the truth to me and another to the Governor. This further sustained our loss of confidence in Mr McGrail as Commissioner of Police. Mr McGrail denies the criticism and says that Mr Pyle knew from very early on that the collision had most likely occurred in Spanish waters based on contact between Mr McGrail, Mr Pyle and the Attorney General. In particular he makes the point that he was |
| 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 | Jumping ahead to paragraph 82, reading from the quotation of the section 15 request it states: "As a result in the light of the above, I have no confidence that you have expeditiously provided me with all the information and documentation that I should have been provided with in the context of the seriousness of the events in question. In particular, I have no confidence that either the Government or the office of the Governor | 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 | external relations and, to make matters worse, was providing one version of the truth to me and another to the Governor. This further sustained our loss of confidence in Mr McGrail as Commissioner of Police. Mr McGrail denies the criticism and says that Mr Pyle knew from very early on that the collision had most likely occurred in Spanish waters based on contact between Mr McGrail, Mr Pyle and the Attorney General. In particular he makes the point that he was in very regular contact with the Attorney |
| 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 | Jumping ahead to paragraph 82, reading from the quotation of the section 15 request it states: "As a result in the light of the above, I have no confidence that you have expeditiously provided me with all the information and documentation that I should have been provided with in the context of the seriousness of the events in question. In particular, I have no confidence that either the Government or the office of the Governor with whom I am discussed this matter at | 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 | external relations and, to make matters worse, was providing one version of the truth to me and another to the Governor. This further sustained our loss of confidence in Mr McGrail as Commissioner of Police. Mr McGrail denies the criticism and says that Mr Pyle knew from very early on that the collision had most likely occurred in Spanish waters based on contact between Mr McGrail, Mr Pyle and the Attorney General. In particular he makes the point that he was in very regular contact with the Attorney General who was feeding information |
| 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 | Jumping ahead to paragraph 82, reading from the quotation of the section 15 request it states: "As a result in the light of the above, I have no confidence that you have expeditiously provided me with all the information and documentation that I should have been provided with in the context of the seriousness of the events in question. In particular, I have no confidence that either the Government or the office of the Governor with whom I am discussed this matter at length, have had the timely candour and | 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 | external relations and, to make matters worse, was providing one version of the truth to me and another to the Governor. This further sustained our loss of confidence in Mr McGrail as Commissioner of Police. Mr McGrail denies the criticism and says that Mr Pyle knew from very early on that the collision had most likely occurred in Spanish waters based on contact between Mr McGrail, Mr Pyle and the Attorney General. In particular he makes the point that he was in very regular contact with the Attorney General who was feeding information upwards." |
| 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 | Jumping ahead to paragraph 82, reading from the quotation of the section 15 request it states: "As a result in the light of the above, I have no confidence that you have expeditiously provided me with all the information and documentation that I should have been provided with in the context of the seriousness of the events in question. In particular, I have no confidence that either the Government or the office of the Governor with whom I am discussed this matter at length, have had the timely candour and transparency we would have expected from | 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 | external relations and, to make matters worse, was providing one version of the truth to me and another to the Governor. This further sustained our loss of confidence in Mr McGrail as Commissioner of Police. Mr McGrail denies the criticism and says that Mr Pyle knew from very early on that the collision had most likely occurred in Spanish waters based on contact between Mr McGrail, Mr Pyle and the Attorney General. In particular he makes the point that he was in very regular contact with the Attorney General who was feeding information upwards." Mr Pyle's response to this is at A264. He |
| 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 | Jumping ahead to paragraph 82, reading from the quotation of the section 15 request it states: "As a result in the light of the above, I have no confidence that you have expeditiously provided me with all the information and documentation that I should have been provided with in the context of the seriousness of the events in question. In particular, I have no confidence that either the Government or the office of the Governor with whom I am discussed this matter at length, have had the timely candour and transparency we would have expected from you in the circumstances arising in respect of | 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 | external relations and, to make matters worse, was providing one version of the truth to me and another to the Governor. This further sustained our loss of confidence in Mr McGrail as Commissioner of Police. Mr McGrail denies the criticism and says that Mr Pyle knew from very early on that the collision had most likely occurred in Spanish waters based on contact between Mr McGrail, Mr Pyle and the Attorney General. In particular he makes the point that he was in very regular contact with the Attorney General who was feeding information upwards." Mr Pyle's response to this is at A264. He says at 19: |
| 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 | Jumping ahead to paragraph 82, reading from the quotation of the section 15 request it states: "As a result in the light of the above, I have no confidence that you have expeditiously provided me with all the information and documentation that I should have been provided with in the context of the seriousness of the events in question. In particular, I have no confidence that either the Government or the office of the Governor with whom I am discussed this matter at length, have had the timely candour and transparency we would have expected from you in the circumstances arising in respect of this incident. My discussions with the | 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 | external relations and, to make matters worse, was providing one version of the truth to me and another to the Governor. This further sustained our loss of confidence in Mr McGrail as Commissioner of Police. Mr McGrail denies the criticism and says that Mr Pyle knew from very early on that the collision had most likely occurred in Spanish waters based on contact between Mr McGrail, Mr Pyle and the Attorney General. In particular he makes the point that he was in very regular contact with the Attorney General who was feeding information upwards." Mr Pyle's response to this is at A264. He says at 19: "I note that a general theme running |
| 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 | Jumping ahead to paragraph 82, reading from the quotation of the section 15 request it states: "As a result in the light of the above, I have no confidence that you have expeditiously provided me with all the information and documentation that I should have been provided with in the context of the seriousness of the events in question. In particular, I have no confidence that either the Government or the office of the Governor with whom I am discussed this matter at length, have had the timely candour and transparency we would have expected from you in the circumstances arising in respect of this incident. My discussions with the Governor had led us both to conclude that we | 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 | external relations and, to make matters worse, was providing one version of the truth to me and another to the Governor. This further sustained our loss of confidence in Mr McGrail as Commissioner of Police. Mr McGrail denies the criticism and says that Mr Pyle knew from very early on that the collision had most likely occurred in Spanish waters based on contact between Mr McGrail, Mr Pyle and the Attorney General. In particular he makes the point that he was in very regular contact with the Attorney General who was feeding information upwards." Mr Pyle's response to this is at A264. He says at 19: "I note that a general theme running throughout Mr McGrail 3 is that Mr Llamas |
| 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 | Jumping ahead to paragraph 82, reading from the quotation of the section 15 request it states: "As a result in the light of the above, I have no confidence that you have expeditiously provided me with all the information and documentation that I should have been provided with in the context of the seriousness of the events in question. In particular, I have no confidence that either the Government or the office of the Governor with whom I am discussed this matter at length, have had the timely candour and transparency we would have expected from you in the circumstances arising in respect of this incident. My discussions with the Governor had led us both to conclude that we had no confidence that we were being | 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 | external relations and, to make matters worse, was providing one version of the truth to me and another to the Governor. This further sustained our loss of confidence in Mr McGrail as Commissioner of Police. Mr McGrail denies the criticism and says that Mr Pyle knew from very early on that the collision had most likely occurred in Spanish waters based on contact between Mr McGrail, Mr Pyle and the Attorney General. In particular he makes the point that he was in very regular contact with the Attorney General who was feeding information upwards." Mr Pyle's response to this is at A264. He says at 19: "I note that a general theme running throughout Mr McGrail 3 is that Mr Llamas the AG was my legal adviser and that Mr |
| 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 | Jumping ahead to paragraph 82, reading from the quotation of the section 15 request it states: "As a result in the light of the above, I have no confidence that you have expeditiously provided me with all the information and documentation that I should have been provided with in the context of the seriousness of the events in question. In particular, I have no confidence that either the Government or the office of the Governor with whom I am discussed this matter at length, have had the timely candour and transparency we would have expected from you in the circumstances arising in respect of this incident. My discussions with the Governor had led us both to conclude that we had no confidence that we were being provided with all information in respect of | 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 | external relations and, to make matters worse, was providing one version of the truth to me and another to the Governor. This further sustained our loss of confidence in Mr McGrail as Commissioner of Police. Mr McGrail denies the criticism and says that Mr Pyle knew from very early on that the collision had most likely occurred in Spanish waters based on contact between Mr McGrail, Mr Pyle and the Attorney General. In particular he makes the point that he was in very regular contact with the Attorney General who was feeding information upwards." Mr Pyle's response to this is at A264. He says at 19: "I note that a general theme running throughout Mr McGrail 3 is that Mr Llamas the AG was my legal adviser and that Mr McGrail therefore assumed that the AG was |
| 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24 | Jumping ahead to paragraph 82, reading from the quotation of the section 15 request it states: "As a result in the light of the above, I have no confidence that you have expeditiously provided me with all the information and documentation that I should have been provided with in the context of the seriousness of the events in question. In particular, I have no confidence that either the Government or the office of the Governor with whom I am discussed this matter at length, have had the timely candour and transparency we would have expected from you in the circumstances arising in respect of this incident. My discussions with the Governor had led us both to conclude that we had no confidence that we were being provided with all information in respect of the collision at sea. We now knew that we | 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24 | external relations and, to make matters worse, was providing one version of the truth to me and another to the Governor. This further sustained our loss of confidence in Mr McGrail as Commissioner of Police. Mr McGrail denies the criticism and says that Mr Pyle knew from very early on that the collision had most likely occurred in Spanish waters based on contact between Mr McGrail, Mr Pyle and the Attorney General. In particular he makes the point that he was in very regular contact with the Attorney General who was feeding information upwards." Mr Pyle's response to this is at A264. He says at 19: "I note that a general theme running throughout Mr McGrail 3 is that Mr Llamas the AG was my legal adviser and that Mr McGrail therefore assumed that the AG was relaying to me all of the information that he |
| 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 | Jumping ahead to paragraph 82, reading from the quotation of the section 15 request it states: "As a result in the light of the above, I have no confidence that you have expeditiously provided me with all the information and documentation that I should have been provided with in the context of the seriousness of the events in question. In particular, I have no confidence that either the Government or the office of the Governor with whom I am discussed this matter at length, have had the timely candour and transparency we would have expected from you in the circumstances arising in respect of this incident. My discussions with the Governor had led us both to conclude that we had no confidence that we were being provided with all information in respect of | 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 | external relations and, to make matters worse, was providing one version of the truth to me and another to the Governor. This further sustained our loss of confidence in Mr McGrail as Commissioner of Police. Mr McGrail denies the criticism and says that Mr Pyle knew from very early on that the collision had most likely occurred in Spanish waters based on contact between Mr McGrail, Mr Pyle and the Attorney General. In particular he makes the point that he was in very regular contact with the Attorney General who was feeding information upwards." Mr Pyle's response to this is at A264. He says at 19: "I note that a general theme running throughout Mr McGrail 3 is that Mr Llamas the AG was my legal adviser and that Mr McGrail therefore assumed that the AG was |
| 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24 | Jumping ahead to paragraph 82, reading from the quotation of the section 15 request it states: "As a result in the light of the above, I have no confidence that you have expeditiously provided me with all the information and documentation that I should have been provided with in the context of the seriousness of the events in question. In particular, I have no confidence that either the Government or the office of the Governor with whom I am discussed this matter at length, have had the timely candour and transparency we would have expected from you in the circumstances arising in respect of this incident. My discussions with the Governor had led us both to conclude that we had no confidence that we were being provided with all information in respect of the collision at sea. We now knew that we | 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24 | external relations and, to make matters worse, was providing one version of the truth to me and another to the Governor. This further sustained our loss of confidence in Mr McGrail as Commissioner of Police. Mr McGrail denies the criticism and says that Mr Pyle knew from very early on that the collision had most likely occurred in Spanish waters based on contact between Mr McGrail, Mr Pyle and the Attorney General. In particular he makes the point that he was in very regular contact with the Attorney General who was feeding information upwards." Mr Pyle's response to this is at A264. He says at 19: "I note that a general theme running throughout Mr McGrail 3 is that Mr Llamas the AG was my legal adviser and that Mr McGrail therefore assumed that the AG was relaying to me all of the information that he |

| 1 | about the location of the collision on a timely | 1 | collision and communication between the |
|--------|--|-----|--|
| 2 | basis. As to this I comment as follows. As | 2 | RGP, the Chief Minister and the Attorney |
| 3 | the evidence shows, I asked IM directly on | 3 | General and Mr Pyle about legal claims |
| 4 | numerous occasions if he was able to confirm | 4 | arising from the incident. The standard |
| 5 | whether the incident had taken place in | 5 | operating procedures at the time provided |
| 6 | Spanish waters. On 11 March 2020, three | 6 | that marine crews would only operate outside |
| 7 | days after the incident, he was still telling | 7 | BGTW when called upon to attend a |
| 8 | that he was getting there. The simple fact is | 8 | lifesaving situation. |
| 9 | that I repeatedly asked IM a simple and | 9 | If we can go to bundle C, page 135, this is an |
| 10 | direct question to which he did not reply | 10 | email from Inspector Albert Buhagiar on 8 |
| 11 | candidly with the best information available | 11 | June 2015. It is to the marine section and it |
| 12 | to him. He withheld highly relevant | 12 | says: |
| 13 | information from me. The first response I | 13 | "Gents, the following are the revised |
| 14 | was given by IM 'could be in could be out', | 14 | instructions to be adhered to forthwith. (1) |
| 15 | gave me the impression that it was on the | 15 | previous instructions allowing crews to leave |
| 16 | line, so in or out of BGTW by less than 100 | 16 | BGTW at the invitation of the Guardia Civil |
| 17 | yards. The fact is that it was out of BGTW | 17 | whilst in pursuit of a vessel and with the |
| 18 | by three miles so not even close." | 18 | authority of the duty inspector or other senior |
| 19 | Jumping one paragraph: | 19 | officers are revoked. RGP vessels will not |
| 20 | "Furthermore, the AG is not the Governor's | 20 | operate outside BGTW other than in support |
| 21 | lawyer in the sense of a solicitor/client | 21 | of a search and rescue operation led by the |
| 22 | relationship in a matter such that the | 22 | Gibraltar port authority. In summary, PMB |
| 23 | information conveyed to the solicitor is | 23 | will not operate outside BGTW in pursuit of |
| 24 | thereby conveyed to the client. The AG is a | 24 | criminal activity. PMB may operate outside |
| 25 | legal adviser to the Governor in the sense | 25 | BGTW in support of search and rescue |
| 23 | legal adviser to the Governor in the sense | 23 | BG1 w in support of search and rescue |
| | Page 101 | | Page 103 |
| 1 | | , | |
| 1 | that he provides legal advice to the Governor | 1 | operations coordinated by the Gibraltar Port |
| 2 | on matters of Gibraltar law and constitution | 2 | Authority." |
| 3 | as the Governor may request of him. The | 3 | If you can move now to bundle B, page 1703, |
| 4 | information conveyed to the AG is not | 4 | the second paragraph on that page which is |
| 5 6 | thereby conveyed to the Governor, nor can anybody reasonably assume that whatever is | 5 6 | from the Solis Report, records another email sent by Inspector Buhagiar on 17 February |
| 7 | said to the AG will be conveyed by him to | 7 | 2016 which says: |
| | the Governor. IM knew that I was repeatedly | | "I would like to remind all of the current and |
| 8 | 1 , | 8 | |
| 9 | myself asking him for this information | 9 | existing instructions that under no |
| 10 | directly." | 10 | circumstances are you allowed to police |
| 11 | Mr McGrail also makes the point that the | 11 | patrol outside the limits of BGTW. The only |
| 12 | Metropolitan Police investigation team did | 12 | exception would be in a GPA led SAR |
| 13 | not criticise him or uncover any management | 13 | (search and rescue) operation or of a vessel |
| 14 | failings. The detailed factual history relating | 14 | or persons in distress. In any case, you |
| 15 | to this issue has been addressed most fully in | 15 | should first seek authority from either |
| 16 | the undisputed facts agreed by core | 16 | myself, Sergeant Stone or the duty officer. |
| 17 | participants and what we did in our written | 17 | Furthermore, the AIS on the vessel being |
| 18 | submissions was to focus on the three matters | 18 | used will be switched on at all times." |
| 19 | that are identified in the list of issues, namely | 19 | Then if you can go to C5251, this is a Marine |
| 20 | whether faults or failings in operational | 20 | Section Instructions published on 8 July 2016 |
| 21 | instructions or procedures of the RGP | 21 | and it says at number 3: |
| 22 | contributed to the collision, the | 22 | "International waters high seas, officer not |
| 23 | communication between the RGP and the | 23 | authorised to operate outside BGTW and in |
| 24 | Chief Minister, the Attorney General and Mr | 24 | international waters unless when responding |
| 25 | Pyle about the location of the chase and | 25 | to a situation as described in paragraph 3(a) |
| | | | |
| | Page 102 | | Page 104 |

| | | Г | |
|----------------|---|----------------|--|
| 1 | or (b) - | 1 | with in private. This is a redaction made at |
| 2 | (a) participating in a search and rescue | 2 | the request of the RGP, which is not |
| 3 | operation; | 3 | controversial and agreed by everybody, but I |
| 4 | (b) responding to an incident where there is | 4 | will not deal with it as it is redacted. |
| | an imminent and serious risk to life. | | |
| 5 | | 5 | If we can move to 1705, 2.10.7: |
| 6 | 4. Spanish territorial waters. Officers are | 6 | "Anecdotal evidence from the RGP Marine |
| 7 | not authorised to operate outside BGTW and | 7 | Support Unit's senior marine mechanic stated |
| 8 | in Spanish waters unless when responding to | 8 | that hot pursuits into Spanish waters could be |
| 9 | a situation as described in paragraph 4(a) - | 9 | permitted with the approval of the Guardia |
| 10 | (a) participating in a search and rescue | 10 | Civil." |
| 11 | operation at the invitation of Spanish | 11 | I should say that in the final version of this |
| 12 | authorities. | 12 | report, this was amended to "had historically |
| 13 | This was sent to the Marine Section by | 13 | been permitted with the approval of the |
| 14 | Sergeant Stone on 16 September 2016." | 14 | Guardia Civil, however this was not the case |
| 15 | The Misconduct Report prepared by | 15 | at the time of the incident." |
| 16 | Detective Chief Inspector Smith states that | 16 | Then, if we go to 1713, 3.2.3, the final |
| 17 | Marine Sections officers were reminded of | 17 | sentence says: |
| 18 | the instructions on 21 January 2020. There is | 18 | "It would also have been clear to the officers |
| 19 | also a record of a daily taskings group | 19 | with significant experience of operating in |
| 20 | meeting on 19 April 2017 which says | 20 | the area that they were in Spanish waters and |
| 21 | "Marine Section only use vessels with AIS." | 21 | well to the north of BGTW." |
| 22 | Given the position of the collision and | 22 | Then 1716; |
| 23 | pursuit, it appears clear that the RGP vessel | 23 | "While the limits of BGTW were known to |
| 24 | was contravening the formal policy position, | 24 | the crew of Sir John Chapple, the |
| 25 | but an important question for questioning is | 25 | engagement chase and collision with the |
| | | | 8.8 |
| | Page 105 | | Page 107 |
| | | | |
| 1 | whether those officers' actions reflected a de | 1 | suspect RIB were all carried out at least 1.5 |
| 2 | facto practice of RGP vessels entering | 2 | nautical miles beyond the limits of BGTW in |
| 3 | Spanish waters for pursuits and, if so, | 3 | Spanish waters. While the limits of BGTW |
| 4 | whether Mr McGrail knew or ought to have | 4 | were not visible to the coxswain on the chart |
| 5 | known about this practice, and if he knew, | 5 | plotter, the area of the northern limit of |
| 6 | whether he sanctioned the practice. The draft | 6 | BGTW is generally indicated by reference |
| 7 | Solis Report dated 30 April 2020 made | 7 | the lights from Gibraltar Airport. As Sir |
| 8 | several relevant findings. If we can look at it | 8 | John Chapple was significantly to the north |
| 9 | at bundle B1692, at 1.8.6 reads as follows: | 9 | of the airport and off the Spanish port, it |
| 10 | "The radar was turned on and the GPS chart | 10 | would have been clear to the officers with |
| 11 | plotter was left off as officer one stated that | 11 | significant experience of operating in the |
| 12 | the equipment reduced his night vision. The | 12 | area that they were in Spanish waters and |
| 13 | chart plotter also activated the vessel's AIS | 13 | well to the north of BGTW." |
| 14 | which was therefore also not turned on." | 14 | Then 1731 please, just at the bottom: |
| 15 | Then over to page 1700, 2.3.1: | 15 | "There has been no evidence produced to |
| 16 | "Sir John Chapple was fitted with chart | 16 | support officer one's statement that the |
| 17 | plotter, however the GPS that provided the | 17 | brightness of the chart plotter interfered with |
| 18 | navigation data to the radar plotter and the | 18 | night vision or that the alleged issue had |
| 19 | chart plotter was turned off. No navigation | 19 | previously been reported to managers. There |
| 20 | data was recovered from the vessel. No AIS | 20 | was a clear instruction that the vessel's AIS |
| 21 | 1-4 4 | 21 | system should always be turned on when in |
| 21 | data was transmitted and therefore the GPS | | |
| 22 | position, speed over the ground, heading and | 22 | service and neither officer one nor officer |
| | | | service and neither officer one nor officer two complied with that instruction." |
| 22 | position, speed over the ground, heading and | 22 | |
| 22 23 | position, speed over the ground, heading and course over the ground were not recorded." | 22 23 | two complied with that instruction." |
| 22 23 24 | position, speed over the ground, heading and course over the ground were not recorded." Just jumping two pages to 1702 please, this is a matter which actually I will have to deal | 22 23 24 | two complied with that instruction." I should make clear that in the final Solis Report this was amended to read, "The |
| 22 23 24 | position, speed over the ground, heading and course over the ground were not recorded." Just jumping two pages to 1702 please, this is | 22 23 24 | two complied with that instruction." I should make clear that in the final Solis |

| dimming facility of the chart plotter was | 1 in pursuits was learned on the job, watching |
|--|---|
| tested and found to dim the display as would | 2 more experienced coxswain as they trained. |
| 3 be expected for use in nighttime navigation | 3 Pursuit methods are therefore developed and |
| 4 and would, if set correctly, not have | 4 understood by the coxswains but not without |
| 5 interfered with the coxswain's night vision." | 5 RGP marine section management standards |
| 6 Then over the page, 3.12.1: | 6 or proper established oversight in place." |
| 7 "The chart plotter and the GPS units that fed | 7 Then over the page to 3.17.5: |
| 8 the radar display were turned off for the | 8 "From the instruction provided to the marine |
| 9 duration of the deployment. With no GPS | 9 crews, the marine section senior officers |
| and no chart plotter displayed the two marine | were aware and accepted that the high speed |
| officers were reliant on visual navigation and | 11 pursuits were being routinely carried out. |
| 12 the radar picture." | 12 Instructions had been issued for the use of |
| 13 Then the final sentence: | 13 PPE when faced with missiles being thrown. |
| 14 "There were apparently no guidance | 14 They must also have been aware that pursuits |
| 15 instruction orders as to what navigation | 15 also strayed into Spanish waters and records |
| 16 equipment was to be used when on patrol | 16 should exist internally or with the Guardia |
| either in daylight or at night." | 17 Civil of any previous operations taking place |
| 18 Then 3.12.3: | 18 where boundaries were crossed." |
| 19 "By not using the available navigation | 19 That sentence was changed in the final |
| 20 equipment while navigating at night with no | 20 version, it was deleted and replaced with a |
| 21 position monitoring other than by eye, the | 21 sentence that read: |
| 22 crew of Sir John Chapple showed that a poor | 22 "The RGP maintained a database of police |
| 23 standard of navigation was being practised at | 23 actions which included when chases of |
| 24 the material time. The instructions were | 24 suspect vessels occurred and recorded |
| 25 clear that the area of operation for law | 25 whether these events were inside or outside |
| 23 Clear that the area of operation for law | 23 whether these events were hiside of outside |
| Page 109 | Page 111 |
| | |
| 1 enforcement was solely within BGTW. It is | 1 of BGTW. An internal review by the RGP |
| 2 not known why the coxswain and the two | 2 showed that between 1 April 2017 and 1 June |
| 3 officers headed into Spanish waters to | 3 2020 of the 59 entries that involved a chase, |
| 4 intercept suspect RIB and to continue to | 4 two, including this case, had concluded |
| 5 chase the RIB in Spanish waters until the | 5 outside BGTW." |
| 6 time of the collision. The instructions stated | 6 The report continues: |
| 7 that they will pursue suspect vessels in a | 7 "From the evidence reviewed to date, it |
| 8 determined though safe manner within our | 8 appears that the marine section managers did |
| 9 territorial waters and liaise with our Spanish | 9 not apply effective oversight into how their |
| 10 counterparts. The instructions also stated | 10 patrols were being carried out." |
| that the safety of the crew was a priority, | Then over the page, 4.2: |
| 12 however the crew of Sir John Chapple placed | 12 "Management Oversight |
| themselves so close to the suspect RIB as to | 13 The RGP's marine section's management |
| place themselves and the crew of suspect | structure and operation requires further |
| 15 RIB in considerable danger. The crew of Sir | examination. With the instructions and |
| 16 John Chappel did not comply with | guidance provided to the response teams |
| instructions that were issued." | 17 oversight of operations, patrols and high |
| 18 Over the page 3.15.1: | speed pursuits and the management's review |
| 19 "The two qualified marine crew had training | 19 processes should be better understood. The |
| in professional skills and for pacing its speed. | 20 operational arrangements, both formal and |
| However, there was no training in carrying | 21 informal, that exist between the RGP and the |
| out pursuits of suspect vessels who would be | 22 Guardia Civil requires further investigation." |
| taking evasive action to avoid being | Both of those paragraphs were deleted in the |
| 24 apprehended. While numerous pursuits have | final reports. Then further down, 4.3.1, the |
| been carried out, the coxswain's experience | 25 second sentence: |
| | |
| Page 110 | Page 112 |

1 "A study of AIS data over a period of several 1 agencies in the area have a degree of 2 2 months would provide an insight into the professional cooperation, primarily regarding 3 3 operating patterns of these vessels and the tackling organised criminal networks 4 4 frequency at which they operate outside (OCNs). This is evidenced by the fact that 5 BGTW. A preliminary analysis has 5 the Guardia Civil are able to communicate 6 identified that AIS data is available to 6 directly with the RGP marine section." 7 provide an effective study." 7 Skipping a paragraph: 8 Then 1738, finally: 5.11: 8 "RGP instructions regarding BGTW are very 9 "From the evidence reviewed to date, it 9 clear. RGP vessels must only enter Spanish 10 appears that marine section managers did not 10 territorial waters at the invitation of the Spanish authorities and only for the intention 11 have an effective oversight of how their 11 12 patrols were being carried out." 12 of search and rescue." 13 But that was replaced in the final version 13 Then 2919, towards the bottom: 14 14 "Gibraltar. Both officers are qualified RGP 15 15 "Marine section managers could have had a mariners and evidence shows that they knew 16 16 more effective oversight of how their patrols or ought to have known that there were 17 17 were being carried out." standing orders to use the navigational 18 The summary of evidence prepared by 18 equipment on board marine section vessels 19 Detective Chief Inspector Smith on 1 19 when deployed at sea." 20 20 December 2020 is at B2891. Again on this Then over the page, half way down, 2920: 21 page actually, all that I refer to is the 21 "The manner in which the SJC was navigated 22 22 penultimate paragraph which says: whilst in pursuit of the RIB is considered to 23 23 "The GPS chart plotter was left off due to the be far below the standard expected of trained 24 24 bright backlight which is safer not to have on mariners." 25 25 in order to be able to see more totally at The next paragraph: Page 113 Page 115 1 night." 1 "Following the collision, no first aid was 2 That is the evidence of officer one. Then, if 2 provided to the crew of the RIB and no 3 3 distress signal was sent, May-Day." we can go to 2910, previous pursuits: 4 "A review was conducted on a number of 4 The following day, 2921: 5 5 chases at sea which took place involving "The relevant acts we are concerned with 6 RGP marine vessels between 1 April 2017 6 here appear to be the wilful failure to follow 7 7 and 1 April 2020. This identified 192 OB the correct procedures by not using the 8 8 entries. Of these 59 entries involved a chase navigation equipment on board the SJC." 9 9 at sea. With regard to BGTW, 57 of the Then 2924, these are organisational learning 10 10 chases were terminated due to arriving at the recommendations. Number 3 says: 11 limit of territorial waters. One officer was "It is recommended Royal Gibraltar Police 11 known to be involved in 18 of the chases, 12 12 ensure their police marine vessel's automated 13 13 identification system and global positioning though it should be noted that these are only 14 reports were made by him or on which he 14 system equipment is always activated when 15 was mentioned. It is possible that colleagues 15 the vessels are deployed at sea in accordance 16 have recorded chases he was involved in but 16 with relevant laws. 17 17 not named. Based on these figures, it is clear 4. It is recommended Royal Gibraltar Police 18 that the officer was aware of his obligation to 18 introduce additional or updated training for 19 19 remain inside BGTW, as many of the chases police marine section officers, staff, crew, to 20 20 he was involved in were terminated prior to include pursuit scenarios. 21 21 leaving territorial waters." Then 2915 please: 22 22 6. It is recommended Royal Gibraltar Police 23 23 "While there are no formal arrangements issue renewed instructions to the police 24 between the Governments of Spain and 24 marine section officers, staff, crew to not 25 Gibraltar, it is clear that the law enforcement 25 leave British Gibraltar territorial waters Page 114 Page 116

| 1 | | | |
|---|--|---|--|
| 1 | unless for search and rescue missions, life- | 1 | reading to the words) stating that |
| 2 | saving." | 2 | according to COS radar tracing of the |
| 3 | Similar findings were made in the | 3 | incident, the approximate coordinates of the |
| 4 | Misconduct Report dated 4 June 2021 and a | 4 | collision were 36O9N 512W, which was |
| 5 | new Police Vessel Patrol and Pursuit Policy | 5 | approximately 6.54 miles east of Santa |
| 6 | was issued on 23 October 2020, reiterating | 6 | Barbara Beach. GC stated that this data was |
| 7 | that officers are not authorised to enter | 7 | subject to confirmation by technical |
| 8 | Spanish waters except for search and rescue | 8 | extraction from their SIV system. DCI Field |
| 9 | at the invitation of Spanish authorities and | 9 | contacted and informed of this." |
| 10 | only when incidents are being coordinated by | 10 | Then the next entry is at 0940 hours: |
| 11 | the port authority. | 11 | "DCI Field advises that collision occurred at |
| 12 | At the Coroner's Inquest, the officers | 12 | 36 degrees 9 minutes north, 5 degrees 12 |
| 13 | maintained that they believed at all times that | 13 | minutes west. Approximately 6.54 east of |
| 14 | they were within BGTW. That Inquest | 14 | Playa de Santa Barbara." |
| 15 | resulted in a finding of unlawful killing and | 15 | Which is said to be from Superintendent |
| 16 | has subsequently been the subject of a | 16 | Richardson's notes dated 8 March 2020 at |
| 17 | judicial review which was dismissed, but is | 17 | 1011 hours. |
| 18 | now pending a judgment in the Court of | 18 | (12.30) |
| 19 | Appeal. | 19 | Can we go to 1680 now, please. This is an |
| 20 | Looking at the location of the chase and | 20 | email of 1011 in the morning which was |
| 21 | collision and the history of facts relating to | 21 | referred to by Mr Pyle in his evidence. It is |
| 22 | that and in particular the communications | 22 | an email from Superintendent Richardson to |
| 23 | between the CPs, the collision, as I say, | 23 | Mr McGrail, Mr Ullger, Mr and DCI |
| 24 | occurred on the early morning of 8 March | 24 | Field. It says that a Go Meeting was |
| 25 | 2020 and was first reported to the RGP via | 25 | convened at the Commissioner's office on 8 |
| | • | | |
| | Page 117 | | Page 119 |
| 1 | the duty inspector at New Mole House at | 1 | March at five in the morning attended by the |
| 2 | 3.48. Mr McGrail's evidence is that the | 2 | Commissioner of Police, Superintendent |
| 3 | command team met at 5 in the morning in Mr | 3 | Richardson and DCI Field and the brief is "a |
| 4 | McGrail's office and DCI Field provided a | 4 | collision at sea occurred at approximately |
| 5 | verbal briefing. At 6.05 Mr McGrail sent | 5 | 0240 today between the RGP Bravo and |
| 6 | identical WhatsApp messages to the CM and | 6 | suspect vessel following a chase. Incident |
| | | | |
| | | | |
| 7 | to Mr Pyle. If we can go to B86 we will find | 7 | believed to have occurred at approximately 3 |
| 7 8 | to Mr Pyle. If we can go to B86 we will find them. The first message there at 605, which I | 7 8 | believed to have occurred at approximately 3 nm within BGTW." Then under "actions," |
| 7 8 9 | to Mr Pyle. If we can go to B86 we will find them. The first message there at 605, which I have already read out, notifying the Chief | 7 8 9 | believed to have occurred at approximately 3 nm within BGTW." Then under "actions," number 1, "critical incident declared." Two, |
| 7 8 9 10 | to Mr Pyle. If we can go to B86 we will find them. The first message there at 605, which I have already read out, notifying the Chief Minister of the incident. If we jump ahead to | 7 8 9 10 | believed to have occurred at approximately 3 nm within BGTW." Then under "actions," number 1, "critical incident declared." Two, "COP consider calling UK force to |
| 7 8 9 10 11 | to Mr Pyle. If we can go to B86 we will find them. The first message there at 605, which I have already read out, notifying the Chief Minister of the incident. If we jump ahead to the next page, there is that message that Mr | 7 8 9 10 11 | believed to have occurred at approximately 3 nm within BGTW." Then under "actions," number 1, "critical incident declared." Two, "COP consider calling UK force to investigate." Six, "Advise (a) CM, (b) HE," |
| 7 8 9 10 11 12 | to Mr Pyle. If we can go to B86 we will find them. The first message there at 605, which I have already read out, notifying the Chief Minister of the incident. If we jump ahead to the next page, there is that message that Mr Picardo, the Chief Minister, refers to: | 7 8 9 10 11 12 | believed to have occurred at approximately 3 nm within BGTW." Then under "actions," number 1, "critical incident declared." Two, "COP consider calling UK force to investigate." Six, "Advise (a) CM, (b) HE," so acknowledging the need to advise both of |
| 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 | to Mr Pyle. If we can go to B86 we will find them. The first message there at 605, which I have already read out, notifying the Chief Minister of the incident. If we jump ahead to the next page, there is that message that Mr Picardo, the Chief Minister, refers to: "Also what time did it occur and was it | 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 | believed to have occurred at approximately 3 nm within BGTW." Then under "actions," number 1, "critical incident declared." Two, "COP consider calling UK force to investigate." Six, "Advise (a) CM, (b) HE," so acknowledging the need to advise both of those parties as well as others. Then 7, |
| 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 | to Mr Pyle. If we can go to B86 we will find them. The first message there at 605, which I have already read out, notifying the Chief Minister of the incident. If we jump ahead to the next page, there is that message that Mr Picardo, the Chief Minister, refers to: "Also what time did it occur and was it firmly within BGTW or questionable?" | 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 | believed to have occurred at approximately 3 nm within BGTW." Then under "actions," number 1, "critical incident declared." Two, "COP consider calling UK force to investigate." Six, "Advise (a) CM, (b) HE," so acknowledging the need to advise both of those parties as well as others. Then 7, "Advise Windmill Hill and port to secure |
| 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 | to Mr Pyle. If we can go to B86 we will find them. The first message there at 605, which I have already read out, notifying the Chief Minister of the incident. If we jump ahead to the next page, there is that message that Mr Picardo, the Chief Minister, refers to: "Also what time did it occur and was it firmly within BGTW or questionable?" And the answer: | 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 | believed to have occurred at approximately 3 nm within BGTW." Then under "actions," number 1, "critical incident declared." Two, "COP consider calling UK force to investigate." Six, "Advise (a) CM, (b) HE," so acknowledging the need to advise both of those parties as well as others. Then 7, "Advise Windmill Hill and port to secure evidence." |
| 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 | to Mr Pyle. If we can go to B86 we will find them. The first message there at 605, which I have already read out, notifying the Chief Minister of the incident. If we jump ahead to the next page, there is that message that Mr Picardo, the Chief Minister, refers to: "Also what time did it occur and was it firmly within BGTW or questionable?" And the answer: "Collision occurred at approximately 0340 | 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 | believed to have occurred at approximately 3 nm within BGTW." Then under "actions," number 1, "critical incident declared." Two, "COP consider calling UK force to investigate." Six, "Advise (a) CM, (b) HE," so acknowledging the need to advise both of those parties as well as others. Then 7, "Advise Windmill Hill and port to secure evidence." |
| 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 | to Mr Pyle. If we can go to B86 we will find them. The first message there at 605, which I have already read out, notifying the Chief Minister of the incident. If we jump ahead to the next page, there is that message that Mr Picardo, the Chief Minister, refers to: "Also what time did it occur and was it firmly within BGTW or questionable?" And the answer: "Collision occurred at approximately 0340 hours location to be confirmed." | 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 | believed to have occurred at approximately 3 nm within BGTW." Then under "actions," number 1, "critical incident declared." Two, "COP consider calling UK force to investigate." Six, "Advise (a) CM, (b) HE," so acknowledging the need to advise both of those parties as well as others. Then 7, "Advise Windmill Hill and port to secure evidence." Then over the page at 13, "Need to determine location of incident ASAP," and then 14, |
| 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 | to Mr Pyle. If we can go to B86 we will find them. The first message there at 605, which I have already read out, notifying the Chief Minister of the incident. If we jump ahead to the next page, there is that message that Mr Picardo, the Chief Minister, refers to: "Also what time did it occur and was it firmly within BGTW or questionable?" And the answer: "Collision occurred at approximately 0340 hours location to be confirmed." If we can go to B1303 now, this is Mr | 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 | believed to have occurred at approximately 3 nm within BGTW." Then under "actions," number 1, "critical incident declared." Two, "COP consider calling UK force to investigate." Six, "Advise (a) CM, (b) HE," so acknowledging the need to advise both of those parties as well as others. Then 7, "Advise Windmill Hill and port to secure evidence." Then over the page at 13, "Need to determine location of incident ASAP," and then 14, "Slower time actions, extract training records |
| 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 | to Mr Pyle. If we can go to B86 we will find them. The first message there at 605, which I have already read out, notifying the Chief Minister of the incident. If we jump ahead to the next page, there is that message that Mr Picardo, the Chief Minister, refers to: "Also what time did it occur and was it firmly within BGTW or questionable?" And the answer: "Collision occurred at approximately 0340 hours location to be confirmed." If we can go to B1303 now, this is Mr McGrail's timeline that he prepared as part of | 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 | believed to have occurred at approximately 3 nm within BGTW." Then under "actions," number 1, "critical incident declared." Two, "COP consider calling UK force to investigate." Six, "Advise (a) CM, (b) HE," so acknowledging the need to advise both of those parties as well as others. Then 7, "Advise Windmill Hill and port to secure evidence." Then over the page at 13, "Need to determine location of incident ASAP," and then 14, "Slower time actions, extract training records for PNB crew, extract standing instructions |
| 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 | to Mr Pyle. If we can go to B86 we will find them. The first message there at 605, which I have already read out, notifying the Chief Minister of the incident. If we jump ahead to the next page, there is that message that Mr Picardo, the Chief Minister, refers to: "Also what time did it occur and was it firmly within BGTW or questionable?" And the answer: "Collision occurred at approximately 0340 hours location to be confirmed." If we can go to B1303 now, this is Mr McGrail's timeline that he prepared as part of the section 15 report. If we now go to 1319, | 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 | believed to have occurred at approximately 3 nm within BGTW." Then under "actions," number 1, "critical incident declared." Two, "COP consider calling UK force to investigate." Six, "Advise (a) CM, (b) HE," so acknowledging the need to advise both of those parties as well as others. Then 7, "Advise Windmill Hill and port to secure evidence." Then over the page at 13, "Need to determine location of incident ASAP," and then 14, "Slower time actions, extract training records for PNB crew, extract standing instructions for chase at sea." |
| 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 | to Mr Pyle. If we can go to B86 we will find them. The first message there at 605, which I have already read out, notifying the Chief Minister of the incident. If we jump ahead to the next page, there is that message that Mr Picardo, the Chief Minister, refers to: "Also what time did it occur and was it firmly within BGTW or questionable?" And the answer: "Collision occurred at approximately 0340 hours location to be confirmed." If we can go to B1303 now, this is Mr McGrail's timeline that he prepared as part of the section 15 report. If we now go to 1319, entry 125 is a message on 8 March at 0935 | 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 | believed to have occurred at approximately 3 nm within BGTW." Then under "actions," number 1, "critical incident declared." Two, "COP consider calling UK force to investigate." Six, "Advise (a) CM, (b) HE," so acknowledging the need to advise both of those parties as well as others. Then 7, "Advise Windmill Hill and port to secure evidence." Then over the page at 13, "Need to determine location of incident ASAP," and then 14, "Slower time actions, extract training records for PNB crew, extract standing instructions for chase at sea." Then there is a log which says that the Go |
| 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 | to Mr Pyle. If we can go to B86 we will find them. The first message there at 605, which I have already read out, notifying the Chief Minister of the incident. If we jump ahead to the next page, there is that message that Mr Picardo, the Chief Minister, refers to: "Also what time did it occur and was it firmly within BGTW or questionable?" And the answer: "Collision occurred at approximately 0340 hours location to be confirmed." If we can go to B1303 now, this is Mr McGrail's timeline that he prepared as part of the section 15 report. If we now go to 1319, entry 125 is a message on 8 March at 0935 hours, and its source is said to be a file note | 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 | believed to have occurred at approximately 3 nm within BGTW." Then under "actions," number 1, "critical incident declared." Two, "COP consider calling UK force to investigate." Six, "Advise (a) CM, (b) HE," so acknowledging the need to advise both of those parties as well as others. Then 7, "Advise Windmill Hill and port to secure evidence." Then over the page at 13, "Need to determine location of incident ASAP," and then 14, "Slower time actions, extract training records for PNB crew, extract standing instructions for chase at sea." Then there is a log which says that the Go group was convened at five and at 0605 |
| 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 | to Mr Pyle. If we can go to B86 we will find them. The first message there at 605, which I have already read out, notifying the Chief Minister of the incident. If we jump ahead to the next page, there is that message that Mr Picardo, the Chief Minister, refers to: "Also what time did it occur and was it firmly within BGTW or questionable?" And the answer: "Collision occurred at approximately 0340 hours location to be confirmed." If we can go to B1303 now, this is Mr McGrail's timeline that he prepared as part of the section 15 report. If we now go to 1319, entry 125 is a message on 8 March at 0935 hours, and its source is said to be a file note from Detective Inspector Chipolina. It says | 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 | believed to have occurred at approximately 3 nm within BGTW." Then under "actions," number 1, "critical incident declared." Two, "COP consider calling UK force to investigate." Six, "Advise (a) CM, (b) HE," so acknowledging the need to advise both of those parties as well as others. Then 7, "Advise Windmill Hill and port to secure evidence." Then over the page at 13, "Need to determine location of incident ASAP," and then 14, "Slower time actions, extract training records for PNB crew, extract standing instructions for chase at sea." Then there is a log which says that the Go group was convened at five and at 0605 there is reference to the Commission of |
| 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24 | to Mr Pyle. If we can go to B86 we will find them. The first message there at 605, which I have already read out, notifying the Chief Minister of the incident. If we jump ahead to the next page, there is that message that Mr Picardo, the Chief Minister, refers to: "Also what time did it occur and was it firmly within BGTW or questionable?" And the answer: "Collision occurred at approximately 0340 hours location to be confirmed." If we can go to B1303 now, this is Mr McGrail's timeline that he prepared as part of the section 15 report. If we now go to 1319, entry 125 is a message on 8 March at 0935 hours, and its source is said to be a file note from Detective Inspector Chipolina. It says as follows: | 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24 | believed to have occurred at approximately 3 nm within BGTW." Then under "actions," number 1, "critical incident declared." Two, "COP consider calling UK force to investigate." Six, "Advise (a) CM, (b) HE," so acknowledging the need to advise both of those parties as well as others. Then 7, "Advise Windmill Hill and port to secure evidence." Then over the page at 13, "Need to determine location of incident ASAP," and then 14, "Slower time actions, extract training records for PNB crew, extract standing instructions for chase at sea." Then there is a log which says that the Go group was convened at five and at 0605 there is reference to the Commission of Police briefing his Excellency and the Chief |
| 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 | to Mr Pyle. If we can go to B86 we will find them. The first message there at 605, which I have already read out, notifying the Chief Minister of the incident. If we jump ahead to the next page, there is that message that Mr Picardo, the Chief Minister, refers to: "Also what time did it occur and was it firmly within BGTW or questionable?" And the answer: "Collision occurred at approximately 0340 hours location to be confirmed." If we can go to B1303 now, this is Mr McGrail's timeline that he prepared as part of the section 15 report. If we now go to 1319, entry 125 is a message on 8 March at 0935 hours, and its source is said to be a file note from Detective Inspector Chipolina. It says | 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 | believed to have occurred at approximately 3 nm within BGTW." Then under "actions," number 1, "critical incident declared." Two, "COP consider calling UK force to investigate." Six, "Advise (a) CM, (b) HE," so acknowledging the need to advise both of those parties as well as others. Then 7, "Advise Windmill Hill and port to secure evidence." Then over the page at 13, "Need to determine location of incident ASAP," and then 14, "Slower time actions, extract training records for PNB crew, extract standing instructions for chase at sea." Then there is a log which says that the Go group was convened at five and at 0605 there is reference to the Commission of |
| 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24 | to Mr Pyle. If we can go to B86 we will find them. The first message there at 605, which I have already read out, notifying the Chief Minister of the incident. If we jump ahead to the next page, there is that message that Mr Picardo, the Chief Minister, refers to: "Also what time did it occur and was it firmly within BGTW or questionable?" And the answer: "Collision occurred at approximately 0340 hours location to be confirmed." If we can go to B1303 now, this is Mr McGrail's timeline that he prepared as part of the section 15 report. If we now go to 1319, entry 125 is a message on 8 March at 0935 hours, and its source is said to be a file note from Detective Inspector Chipolina. It says as follows: | 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24 | believed to have occurred at approximately 3 nm within BGTW." Then under "actions," number 1, "critical incident declared." Two, "COP consider calling UK force to investigate." Six, "Advise (a) CM, (b) HE," so acknowledging the need to advise both of those parties as well as others. Then 7, "Advise Windmill Hill and port to secure evidence." Then over the page at 13, "Need to determine location of incident ASAP," and then 14, "Slower time actions, extract training records for PNB crew, extract standing instructions for chase at sea." Then there is a log which says that the Go group was convened at five and at 0605 there is reference to the Commission of Police briefing his Excellency and the Chief |

| 1 | which says, "JF," a reference to Field, DCI | 1 | and halfway down it records that the GC |
|--|--|--|--|
| 2 | Field, "advises the collision occurred 36 | 2 | stated that the approximate coordinates |
| 3 | degrees nine minutes north, five degrees 12 | 3 | supplied previously to DI Chipolina stood |
| 4 | minutes west, approximately 6.54 east of | 4 | and that the SIVE technicians had yet to |
| 5 | Playa de Santa Barbara." Then at 1010 the | 5 | extract and validate such data. They |
| 6 | Commission of Police briefs Michael Llamas | 6 | confirmed that the approximate collision |
| 7 | sorry, the AG, Michael Llamas. | 7 | location was 6 to 6.5 miles off Santa Barbara |
| 8 | DCI Field's evidence is that he briefed Mr | 8 | beach and again this emerges from a file note |
| 9 | McGrail, Paul Richardson and the AG on the | 9 | from DI Chipolina but I emphasise that that |
| 10 | suspected exact coordinates at 1105 although | 10 | is the following day at ten in the morning. |
| 11 | it appears clear from the email that we have | 11 | Going back to 8 March, with apologies for |
| 12 | seen that he must have told Mr McGrail at | 12 | that detour, at ten past ten Mr McGrail gave a |
| 13 | 0940 or, at any rate, by 1011 when the email | 13 | briefing to the Attorney General at New |
| 14 | was sent. Mr McGrail's evidence is that | 14 | Mole House. The Attorney General's |
| 15 | despite having those coordinates, he was | 15 | recollection is that Mr McGrail referred to |
| 16 | nonetheless working on a provisional | 16 | the fact that the chase had straddled BGTW |
| 17 | hypothesis that the pursuit had taken place in | 17 | and Spanish waters and it seemed highly |
| 18 | BGTW and that this was based on the | 18 | likely that the collision had occurred in |
| 19 | standing instructions in place at the time | 19 | Spanish waters but he was waiting for formal |
| 20 | which I have just referred to. | 20 | technical confirmation of this. |
| 21 | If we can go back now to B87, which is the | 21 | At B1345 towards the bottom, we have a |
| 22 | WhatsApp messages exchanged with the | 22 | message which was sent by the Attorney |
| 23 | Chief Minister, there we have at 0949, | 23 | General to Mr McGrail or it appears to have |
| 24 | halfway down the page, Mr McGrail to the | 24 | been intended for the Chief Minister. It is |
| 25 | Chief Minister, "CM the information | 25 | not clear whether it was indeed sent to the |
| 23 | Chief Whitister, CWI the information | 23 | not clear whether it was indeed sent to the |
| | Page 121 | | Page 123 |
| | | | - |
| 1 | | | |
| | suggests that the collision took place outside | 1 | Chief Minister but it reads as follows, "Been |
| 2 | BGTW, approximately 6 nm east off the | 2 | Chief Minister but it reads as follows, "Been in New Mole for the last hour or so, |
| | == | 1 | in New Mole for the last hour or so, cooperation RGP Spanish LEAs very good, |
| 2 | BGTW, approximately 6 nm east off the runway of Santa (Inaudible - Spanish) beach." That is at 0949. At 0953 he says, | 2 | in New Mole for the last hour or so, |
| 2 3 | BGTW, approximately 6 nm east off the runway of Santa (Inaudible - Spanish) | 2 3 | in New Mole for the last hour or so, cooperation RGP Spanish LEAs very good, |
| 2 3 4 | BGTW, approximately 6 nm east off the runway of Santa (Inaudible - Spanish) beach." That is at 0949. At 0953 he says, | 2 3 4 | in New Mole for the last hour or so, cooperation RGP Spanish LEAs very good, new RGP press release today, will say good |
| 2 3 4 5 | BGTW, approximately 6 nm east off the runway of Santa (Inaudible - Spanish) beach." That is at 0949. At 0953 he says, "When a death arises from police contact, it's | 2 3 4 5 | in New Mole for the last hour or so, cooperation RGP Spanish LEAs very good, new RGP press release today, will say good cooperation with ES, drug related activity, |
| 2 3 4 5 6 | BGTW, approximately 6 nm east off the runway of Santa (Inaudible - Spanish) beach." That is at 0949. At 0953 he says, "When a death arises from police contact, it's best practice to engage with an independent | 2 3 4 5 6 | in New Mole for the last hour or so, cooperation RGP Spanish LEAs very good, new RGP press release today, will say good cooperation with ES, drug related activity, two deaths are Spanish nationals of North |
| 2 3 4 5 6 7 | BGTW, approximately 6 nm east off the runway of Santa (Inaudible - Spanish) beach." That is at 0949. At 0953 he says, "When a death arises from police contact, it's best practice to engage with an independent investigating team and I am studying how to | 2 3 4 5 6 7 | in New Mole for the last hour or so, cooperation RGP Spanish LEAs very good, new RGP press release today, will say good cooperation with ES, drug related activity, two deaths are Spanish nationals of North African descent, investigation continues. PR |
| 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 | BGTW, approximately 6 nm east off the runway of Santa (Inaudible - Spanish) beach." That is at 0949. At 0953 he says, "When a death arises from police contact, it's best practice to engage with an independent investigating team and I am studying how to achieve this." The Chief Minister responds | 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 | in New Mole for the last hour or so, cooperation RGP Spanish LEAs very good, new RGP press release today, will say good cooperation with ES, drug related activity, two deaths are Spanish nationals of North African descent, investigation continues. PR [which is a reference to the press release] |
| 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 | BGTW, approximately 6 nm east off the runway of Santa (Inaudible - Spanish) beach." That is at 0949. At 0953 he says, "When a death arises from police contact, it's best practice to engage with an independent investigating team and I am studying how to achieve this." The Chief Minister responds very shortly afterwards, "Okay, we need to | 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 | in New Mole for the last hour or so, cooperation RGP Spanish LEAs very good, new RGP press release today, will say good cooperation with ES, drug related activity, two deaths are Spanish nationals of North African descent, investigation continues. PR [which is a reference to the press release] will not say where incident occurred, but it is |
| 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 | BGTW, approximately 6 nm east off the runway of Santa (Inaudible - Spanish) beach." That is at 0949. At 0953 he says, "When a death arises from police contact, it's best practice to engage with an independent investigating team and I am studying how to achieve this." The Chief Minister responds very shortly afterwards, "Okay, we need to liaise with AG on this and ensure we are | 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 | in New Mole for the last hour or so, cooperation RGP Spanish LEAs very good, new RGP press release today, will say good cooperation with ES, drug related activity, two deaths are Spanish nationals of North African descent, investigation continues. PR [which is a reference to the press release] will not say where incident occurred, but it is virtually certain it was outside BGTW |
| 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 | BGTW, approximately 6 nm east off the runway of Santa (Inaudible - Spanish) beach." That is at 0949. At 0953 he says, "When a death arises from police contact, it's best practice to engage with an independent investigating team and I am studying how to achieve this." The Chief Minister responds very shortly afterwards, "Okay, we need to liaise with AG on this and ensure we are transparent on this." "Yes." "Agreed, any | 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 | in New Mole for the last hour or so, cooperation RGP Spanish LEAs very good, new RGP press release today, will say good cooperation with ES, drug related activity, two deaths are Spanish nationals of North African descent, investigation continues. PR [which is a reference to the press release] will not say where incident occurred, but it is virtually certain it was outside BGTW eastern side opposite runway, it also seems |
| 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 | BGTW, approximately 6 nm east off the runway of Santa (Inaudible - Spanish) beach." That is at 0949. At 0953 he says, "When a death arises from police contact, it's best practice to engage with an independent investigating team and I am studying how to achieve this." The Chief Minister responds very shortly afterwards, "Okay, we need to liaise with AG on this and ensure we are transparent on this." "Yes." "Agreed, any additional expenditure will be approved," to | 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 | in New Mole for the last hour or so, cooperation RGP Spanish LEAs very good, new RGP press release today, will say good cooperation with ES, drug related activity, two deaths are Spanish nationals of North African descent, investigation continues. PR [which is a reference to the press release] will not say where incident occurred, but it is virtually certain it was outside BGTW eastern side opposite runway, it also seems that part of the chase was within BGTW." |
| 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 | BGTW, approximately 6 nm east off the runway of Santa (Inaudible - Spanish) beach." That is at 0949. At 0953 he says, "When a death arises from police contact, it's best practice to engage with an independent investigating team and I am studying how to achieve this." The Chief Minister responds very shortly afterwards, "Okay, we need to liaise with AG on this and ensure we are transparent on this." "Yes." "Agreed, any additional expenditure will be approved," to which Mr McGrail replies, "Many thanks." | 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 | in New Mole for the last hour or so, cooperation RGP Spanish LEAs very good, new RGP press release today, will say good cooperation with ES, drug related activity, two deaths are Spanish nationals of North African descent, investigation continues. PR [which is a reference to the press release] will not say where incident occurred, but it is virtually certain it was outside BGTW eastern side opposite runway, it also seems that part of the chase was within BGTW." Then over the page at 133 actually we will |
| 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 | BGTW, approximately 6 nm east off the runway of Santa (Inaudible - Spanish) beach." That is at 0949. At 0953 he says, "When a death arises from police contact, it's best practice to engage with an independent investigating team and I am studying how to achieve this." The Chief Minister responds very shortly afterwards, "Okay, we need to liaise with AG on this and ensure we are transparent on this." "Yes." "Agreed, any additional expenditure will be approved," to which Mr McGrail replies, "Many thanks." So here we have Mr McGrail, nine minutes | 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 | in New Mole for the last hour or so, cooperation RGP Spanish LEAs very good, new RGP press release today, will say good cooperation with ES, drug related activity, two deaths are Spanish nationals of North African descent, investigation continues. PR [which is a reference to the press release] will not say where incident occurred, but it is virtually certain it was outside BGTW eastern side opposite runway, it also seems that part of the chase was within BGTW." Then over the page at 133 actually we will come back to that shortly because the |
| 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 | BGTW, approximately 6 nm east off the runway of Santa (Inaudible - Spanish) beach." That is at 0949. At 0953 he says, "When a death arises from police contact, it's best practice to engage with an independent investigating team and I am studying how to achieve this." The Chief Minister responds very shortly afterwards, "Okay, we need to liaise with AG on this and ensure we are transparent on this." "Yes." "Agreed, any additional expenditure will be approved," to which Mr McGrail replies, "Many thanks." So here we have Mr McGrail, nine minutes after being briefed by DI Chipolina or DCI | 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 | in New Mole for the last hour or so, cooperation RGP Spanish LEAs very good, new RGP press release today, will say good cooperation with ES, drug related activity, two deaths are Spanish nationals of North African descent, investigation continues. PR [which is a reference to the press release] will not say where incident occurred, but it is virtually certain it was outside BGTW eastern side opposite runway, it also seems that part of the chase was within BGTW." Then over the page at 133 actually we will come back to that shortly because the Attorney General says he is not clear that he |
| 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 | BGTW, approximately 6 nm east off the runway of Santa (Inaudible - Spanish) beach." That is at 0949. At 0953 he says, "When a death arises from police contact, it's best practice to engage with an independent investigating team and I am studying how to achieve this." The Chief Minister responds very shortly afterwards, "Okay, we need to liaise with AG on this and ensure we are transparent on this." "Yes." "Agreed, any additional expenditure will be approved," to which Mr McGrail replies, "Many thanks." So here we have Mr McGrail, nine minutes after being briefed by DI Chipolina or DCI Field as to coordinates, informing the Chief | 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 | in New Mole for the last hour or so, cooperation RGP Spanish LEAs very good, new RGP press release today, will say good cooperation with ES, drug related activity, two deaths are Spanish nationals of North African descent, investigation continues. PR [which is a reference to the press release] will not say where incident occurred, but it is virtually certain it was outside BGTW eastern side opposite runway, it also seems that part of the chase was within BGTW." Then over the page at 133 actually we will come back to that shortly because the Attorney General says he is not clear that he actually sent that to the Chief Minister but it |
| 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 | BGTW, approximately 6 nm east off the runway of Santa (Inaudible - Spanish) beach." That is at 0949. At 0953 he says, "When a death arises from police contact, it's best practice to engage with an independent investigating team and I am studying how to achieve this." The Chief Minister responds very shortly afterwards, "Okay, we need to liaise with AG on this and ensure we are transparent on this." "Yes." "Agreed, any additional expenditure will be approved," to which Mr McGrail replies, "Many thanks." So here we have Mr McGrail, nine minutes after being briefed by DI Chipolina or DCI Field as to coordinates, informing the Chief Minister of the updated position. | 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 | in New Mole for the last hour or so, cooperation RGP Spanish LEAs very good, new RGP press release today, will say good cooperation with ES, drug related activity, two deaths are Spanish nationals of North African descent, investigation continues. PR [which is a reference to the press release] will not say where incident occurred, but it is virtually certain it was outside BGTW eastern side opposite runway, it also seems that part of the chase was within BGTW." Then over the page at 133 actually we will come back to that shortly because the Attorney General says he is not clear that he actually sent that to the Chief Minister but it does show the language that was used at the |
| 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 | BGTW, approximately 6 nm east off the runway of Santa (Inaudible - Spanish) beach." That is at 0949. At 0953 he says, "When a death arises from police contact, it's best practice to engage with an independent investigating team and I am studying how to achieve this." The Chief Minister responds very shortly afterwards, "Okay, we need to liaise with AG on this and ensure we are transparent on this." "Yes." "Agreed, any additional expenditure will be approved," to which Mr McGrail replies, "Many thanks." So here we have Mr McGrail, nine minutes after being briefed by DI Chipolina or DCI Field as to coordinates, informing the Chief Minister of the updated position. Then if we go to 1321, please, which at 145 | 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 | in New Mole for the last hour or so, cooperation RGP Spanish LEAs very good, new RGP press release today, will say good cooperation with ES, drug related activity, two deaths are Spanish nationals of North African descent, investigation continues. PR [which is a reference to the press release] will not say where incident occurred, but it is virtually certain it was outside BGTW eastern side opposite runway, it also seems that part of the chase was within BGTW." Then over the page at 133 actually we will come back to that shortly because the Attorney General says he is not clear that he actually sent that to the Chief Minister but it does show the language that was used at the briefing. Mr Pyle joined the briefing at 1215 |
| 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 | BGTW, approximately 6 nm east off the runway of Santa (Inaudible - Spanish) beach." That is at 0949. At 0953 he says, "When a death arises from police contact, it's best practice to engage with an independent investigating team and I am studying how to achieve this." The Chief Minister responds very shortly afterwards, "Okay, we need to liaise with AG on this and ensure we are transparent on this." "Yes." "Agreed, any additional expenditure will be approved," to which Mr McGrail replies, "Many thanks." So here we have Mr McGrail, nine minutes after being briefed by DI Chipolina or DCI Field as to coordinates, informing the Chief Minister of the updated position. Then if we go to 1321, please, which at 145 there is an entry at 10 for 9 March which is | 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 | in New Mole for the last hour or so, cooperation RGP Spanish LEAs very good, new RGP press release today, will say good cooperation with ES, drug related activity, two deaths are Spanish nationals of North African descent, investigation continues. PR [which is a reference to the press release] will not say where incident occurred, but it is virtually certain it was outside BGTW eastern side opposite runway, it also seems that part of the chase was within BGTW." Then over the page at 133 actually we will come back to that shortly because the Attorney General says he is not clear that he actually sent that to the Chief Minister but it does show the language that was used at the briefing. Mr Pyle joined the briefing at 1215 and he says in his statement that he just |
| 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 | BGTW, approximately 6 nm east off the runway of Santa (Inaudible - Spanish) beach." That is at 0949. At 0953 he says, "When a death arises from police contact, it's best practice to engage with an independent investigating team and I am studying how to achieve this." The Chief Minister responds very shortly afterwards, "Okay, we need to liaise with AG on this and ensure we are transparent on this." "Yes." "Agreed, any additional expenditure will be approved," to which Mr McGrail replies, "Many thanks." So here we have Mr McGrail, nine minutes after being briefed by DI Chipolina or DCI Field as to coordinates, informing the Chief Minister of the updated position. Then if we go to 1321, please, which at 145 there is an entry at 10 for 9 March which is the following day I have jumped ahead | 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 | in New Mole for the last hour or so, cooperation RGP Spanish LEAs very good, new RGP press release today, will say good cooperation with ES, drug related activity, two deaths are Spanish nationals of North African descent, investigation continues. PR [which is a reference to the press release] will not say where incident occurred, but it is virtually certain it was outside BGTW eastern side opposite runway, it also seems that part of the chase was within BGTW." Then over the page at 133 actually we will come back to that shortly because the Attorney General says he is not clear that he actually sent that to the Chief Minister but it does show the language that was used at the briefing. Mr Pyle joined the briefing at 1215 and he says in his statement that he just happened to be walking his dog past the |
| 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 | BGTW, approximately 6 nm east off the runway of Santa (Inaudible - Spanish) beach." That is at 0949. At 0953 he says, "When a death arises from police contact, it's best practice to engage with an independent investigating team and I am studying how to achieve this." The Chief Minister responds very shortly afterwards, "Okay, we need to liaise with AG on this and ensure we are transparent on this." "Yes." "Agreed, any additional expenditure will be approved," to which Mr McGrail replies, "Many thanks." So here we have Mr McGrail, nine minutes after being briefed by DI Chipolina or DCI Field as to coordinates, informing the Chief Minister of the updated position. Then if we go to 1321, please, which at 145 there is an entry at 10 for 9 March which is the following day I have jumped ahead but we may as well deal with it while we are | 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 | in New Mole for the last hour or so, cooperation RGP Spanish LEAs very good, new RGP press release today, will say good cooperation with ES, drug related activity, two deaths are Spanish nationals of North African descent, investigation continues. PR [which is a reference to the press release] will not say where incident occurred, but it is virtually certain it was outside BGTW eastern side opposite runway, it also seems that part of the chase was within BGTW." Then over the page at 133 actually we will come back to that shortly because the Attorney General says he is not clear that he actually sent that to the Chief Minister but it does show the language that was used at the briefing. Mr Pyle joined the briefing at 1215 and he says in his statement that he just happened to be walking his dog past the station at that time. Mr McGrail says that Mr |
| 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 | BGTW, approximately 6 nm east off the runway of Santa (Inaudible - Spanish) beach." That is at 0949. At 0953 he says, "When a death arises from police contact, it's best practice to engage with an independent investigating team and I am studying how to achieve this." The Chief Minister responds very shortly afterwards, "Okay, we need to liaise with AG on this and ensure we are transparent on this." "Yes." "Agreed, any additional expenditure will be approved," to which Mr McGrail replies, "Many thanks." So here we have Mr McGrail, nine minutes after being briefed by DI Chipolina or DCI Field as to coordinates, informing the Chief Minister of the updated position. Then if we go to 1321, please, which at 145 there is an entry at 10 for 9 March which is the following day I have jumped ahead but we may as well deal with it while we are here. That is the following day, a meeting | 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 | in New Mole for the last hour or so, cooperation RGP Spanish LEAs very good, new RGP press release today, will say good cooperation with ES, drug related activity, two deaths are Spanish nationals of North African descent, investigation continues. PR [which is a reference to the press release] will not say where incident occurred, but it is virtually certain it was outside BGTW eastern side opposite runway, it also seems that part of the chase was within BGTW." Then over the page at 133 actually we will come back to that shortly because the Attorney General says he is not clear that he actually sent that to the Chief Minister but it does show the language that was used at the briefing. Mr Pyle joined the briefing at 1215 and he says in his statement that he just happened to be walking his dog past the station at that time. Mr McGrail says that Mr Pyle did not raise any particular query and |
| 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 | BGTW, approximately 6 nm east off the runway of Santa (Inaudible - Spanish) beach." That is at 0949. At 0953 he says, "When a death arises from police contact, it's best practice to engage with an independent investigating team and I am studying how to achieve this." The Chief Minister responds very shortly afterwards, "Okay, we need to liaise with AG on this and ensure we are transparent on this." "Yes." "Agreed, any additional expenditure will be approved," to which Mr McGrail replies, "Many thanks." So here we have Mr McGrail, nine minutes after being briefed by DI Chipolina or DCI Field as to coordinates, informing the Chief Minister of the updated position. Then if we go to 1321, please, which at 145 there is an entry at 10 for 9 March which is the following day I have jumped ahead but we may as well deal with it while we are here. That is the following day, a meeting held at HQ between Comandante Paulo of | 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 | in New Mole for the last hour or so, cooperation RGP Spanish LEAs very good, new RGP press release today, will say good cooperation with ES, drug related activity, two deaths are Spanish nationals of North African descent, investigation continues. PR [which is a reference to the press release] will not say where incident occurred, but it is virtually certain it was outside BGTW eastern side opposite runway, it also seems that part of the chase was within BGTW." Then over the page at 133 actually we will come back to that shortly because the Attorney General says he is not clear that he actually sent that to the Chief Minister but it does show the language that was used at the briefing. Mr Pyle joined the briefing at 1215 and he says in his statement that he just happened to be walking his dog past the station at that time. Mr McGrail says that Mr Pyle did not raise any particular query and that Mr Pyle, on the other hand, says that this |
| 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24 | BGTW, approximately 6 nm east off the runway of Santa (Inaudible - Spanish) beach." That is at 0949. At 0953 he says, "When a death arises from police contact, it's best practice to engage with an independent investigating team and I am studying how to achieve this." The Chief Minister responds very shortly afterwards, "Okay, we need to liaise with AG on this and ensure we are transparent on this." "Yes." "Agreed, any additional expenditure will be approved," to which Mr McGrail replies, "Many thanks." So here we have Mr McGrail, nine minutes after being briefed by DI Chipolina or DCI Field as to coordinates, informing the Chief Minister of the updated position. Then if we go to 1321, please, which at 145 there is an entry at 10 for 9 March which is the following day I have jumped ahead but we may as well deal with it while we are here. That is the following day, a meeting held at HQ between Comandante Paulo of (Inaudible - Spanish) Captain Gomez (Inaudible) and DI Chipolina and DI Pereira, | 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24 | in New Mole for the last hour or so, cooperation RGP Spanish LEAs very good, new RGP press release today, will say good cooperation with ES, drug related activity, two deaths are Spanish nationals of North African descent, investigation continues. PR [which is a reference to the press release] will not say where incident occurred, but it is virtually certain it was outside BGTW eastern side opposite runway, it also seems that part of the chase was within BGTW." Then over the page at 133 actually we will come back to that shortly because the Attorney General says he is not clear that he actually sent that to the Chief Minister but it does show the language that was used at the briefing. Mr Pyle joined the briefing at 1215 and he says in his statement that he just happened to be walking his dog past the station at that time. Mr McGrail says that Mr Pyle did not raise any particular query and that Mr Pyle, on the other hand, says that this is a point where he asked about the location and whether it was inside or outside BGTW |
| 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24 | BGTW, approximately 6 nm east off the runway of Santa (Inaudible - Spanish) beach." That is at 0949. At 0953 he says, "When a death arises from police contact, it's best practice to engage with an independent investigating team and I am studying how to achieve this." The Chief Minister responds very shortly afterwards, "Okay, we need to liaise with AG on this and ensure we are transparent on this." "Yes." "Agreed, any additional expenditure will be approved," to which Mr McGrail replies, "Many thanks." So here we have Mr McGrail, nine minutes after being briefed by DI Chipolina or DCI Field as to coordinates, informing the Chief Minister of the updated position. Then if we go to 1321, please, which at 145 there is an entry at 10 for 9 March which is the following day I have jumped ahead but we may as well deal with it while we are here. That is the following day, a meeting held at HQ between Comandante Paulo of (Inaudible - Spanish) Captain Gomez | 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24 | in New Mole for the last hour or so, cooperation RGP Spanish LEAs very good, new RGP press release today, will say good cooperation with ES, drug related activity, two deaths are Spanish nationals of North African descent, investigation continues. PR [which is a reference to the press release] will not say where incident occurred, but it is virtually certain it was outside BGTW eastern side opposite runway, it also seems that part of the chase was within BGTW." Then over the page at 133 actually we will come back to that shortly because the Attorney General says he is not clear that he actually sent that to the Chief Minister but it does show the language that was used at the briefing. Mr Pyle joined the briefing at 1215 and he says in his statement that he just happened to be walking his dog past the station at that time. Mr McGrail says that Mr Pyle did not raise any particular query and that Mr Pyle, on the other hand, says that this is a point where he asked about the location |

| 1 and Mr McGrail replied with a slightly | 1 the previous evening. This will have to be |
|---|--|
| 2 flippant waving of his hands, "could be in | 2 clarified in questioning." |
| and could be out, it's difficult to tell at night." | 3 At 10.15 Mr Pyle messaged Mr McGrail |
| 4 The AG's evidence is that Mr McGrail told | 4 saying he had been with the AG the previous |
| 5 Mr Pyle he was still not certain where the | 5 night and requested an update saying that |
| 6 collision had occurred. | 6 they were keen to reach out to Spain, given |
| 7 Then we can go to this message that I have | 7 talks that week in London. Mr McGrail |
| 8 just referred to at 1346 which is on 8 March | 8 stated that it was clear to him that from very |
| 9 2020 where Mr Pyle messages the | 9 early on Mr Pyle knew that the collision most |
| 10 Commissioner of Police, "Thanks for the | likely occurred in Spanish waters as Mr Pyle |
| briefing, I'll do a quick note for London for | and the AG had been working together on the |
| when it hits the press. The line will be | 12 matter. Mr McGrail also states that during |
| 13 investigation ongoing. Spanish nationals | 13 the course of the morning he was informed |
| 14 from did you say one person was | that the GC was still of the view that the |
| 15 Portuguese. Not sure in whose waters | 15 collision had occurred in Spanish waters but |
| 16 incident took place. RGP seeking assistance | were waiting confirmation by technicians. |
| from UK police authorities. No assistance | 17 That is a reference to that entry in the |
| needed from FCO at this stage." In response, | 18 timeline that I took you to earlier. |
| 19 Mr Grail says, "Yes, all correct, indeed one | 19 At 1210 a meeting took place between Mr |
| 20 was Portuguese, trying to clarify exact | 20 McGrail, the AG and Mr Pyle. Mr McGrail |
| 21 position of the collision." "Okay, thanks," | 21 says that he informed both that the exact |
| 22 from the governor. | 22 coordinates had still not been confirmed but |
| 23 Then if we go to 1746, please, this is an | 23 cannot recall whether the provisional |
| 24 email from Mr Pyle to the FCDO on 8 March | 24 coordinates were discussed. He thinks that |
| 25 at 0209 he says, "I have just met with the | 25 they were mentioned but with a caveat that |
| 23 at 0209 he says, I have just hier with the | 25 they were mentioned but with a caveat that |
| Page 125 | Page 127 |
| | |
| 1 Commissioner of Police who kindly gave me | 1 they needed verification and he said that the |
| 2 a briefing on the incident. The facts have yet | 2 pursuit was believed to have lasted ten |
| 3 to be determined and the investigation is | 3 minutes in and around BGTW. Mr Pyle's |
| 4 ongoing but initial headlines are as follows. | 4 account is that Mr McGrail said he was still |
| 5 The incident happened at 0400 hours, though | 5 not sure about location and that the RGP's |
| 6 it is not yet known whether it took place in | 6 vessel, GPS AIS instruments had been |
| 7 BGTW waters or just outside." | 7 switched off which Mr McGrail attributed to |
| 8 Then if we go to 1748, two pages later, this is | 8 the officers being in the heat of the moment. |
| 9 a subsequent email at 0757 on the following | 9 Mr Pyle is clear that coordinates were not |
| day, 9 March and Mr Pyle says, "There may | 10 mentioned, otherwise he would have |
| be complications around yesterday's incident | immediately passed them on to the FCDO |
| in that it might have happened as much as six | 12 and the British Embassy in Madrid. There is |
| miles inside Spanish waters. If true, it's hard | a note by Superintendent Richardson of the |
| to fathom quite what the RGP were doing | meeting which reads, "Exact coordinates of |
| chasing a vessel so deep into Spanish waters | 15 collision still not determined, an element of |
| and one can only hope that it was at the | 16 chase within BGTW." |
| invitation of the Spanish but this may be why | Following that meeting Mr Pyle emailed the |
| 18 GOG have kept details very close and have | 18 FCDO twice but still conveying uncertainty |
| 19 asked for no social media speculation." | as to the location of the collision. Two days |
| Jumping one sentence, "Let's hope this is all | 20 later, on 11 March at 1858, if we go to 1351 |
| 21 resolved quickly between the agencies and | 21 this is back to the timeline and there is |
| there is no negative impact on Thursday's | 22 another exchange between Mr Pyle and Mr |
| talks with the Spanish. It is not clear from | 23 McGrail, "Ian, good to hear about progress re |
| whom Mr Pyle obtained this information and | 24 met help, are we any clearer as to where the |
| whether it came from the Attorney General | 25 collision took place? London are keen to |
| D 407 | D 420 |
| Page 126 | Page 128 |

| 1 | know whether it was inside or outside | 1 | message down is the Chief Minister's |
|--|--|--|--|
| 2 | BGTW and, if the latter, approximately by | 2 | response, "Thank you, Ian, location does not |
| 3 | how far, regards Nic." The response from | 3 | worry me so much, helps us in a way, will |
| 4 | Mr McGrail is, "Nic, we are getting there on | 4 | discuss directly with you." |
| 5 | establishing exact coordinates of where the | 5 | The Inquiry asked the Chief Minister to |
| 6 | collision took place. We are tying up some | 6 | explain this remark and he provided an |
| 7 | loose ends and probing further from WHSS | 7 | explanation at A230, paragraph 20, of his |
| 8 | and should be able to confirm soon. It is | 8 | second affidavit and he said, "The reason I |
| 9 | highly probable it did occur out BGTW. We | 9 | said that the location could help us was two- |
| 10 | are getting plotted which will provide us | 10 | fold; first, in demonstrating to the general |
| 11 | better understanding in terms of distance | 11 | public in Gibraltar that in some instances |
| 12 | from BGTW, best regards, Ian." | 12 | police cooperation involves cross-border |
| 13 | Then two minutes later, there is a message | 13 | activity and that our own police may stray |
| 14 | from Mr McGrail to the Attorney General | 14 | into Spanish waters in the same way as |
| 15 | which says, "HE, Nick, is asking for | 15 | Spanish police often stray into British |
| 16 | confirmation of where collision took place as | 16 | Gibraltan territorial waters. Secondly, I |
| 17 | London are keen to know. I have informed | 17 | thought that although it was to cause huge |
| 18 | him along the same lines that you advised | 18 | diplomatic issues in the negotiations on foot |
| 19 | CM; i.e., that it is highly probable that it | 19 | with Spain at the time, it would be helpful in |
| 20 | happened outside BGTW." The AG replies, | 20 | showing our Spanish counterparts that our |
| 21 | "Ian, that seems fine to me, factual whilst | 21 | police officers were seeking out illicit |
| 22 | being amenable to further precision once you | 22 | activity." Mr McGrail's evidence is that he |
| 23 | obtain further details," and the reply from Mr | 23 | then updated Mr Pyle in the same vein as the |
| 24 | McGrail, is "Okay," with a thumbs up emoji. | 24 | WhatsApp group and Mr Pyle confirmed |
| 25 | Those exchanges will have to be the subject | 25 | that this did indeed occur and he then |
| | | | |
| | Page 129 | | Page 131 |
| | | | |
| 1 | of questioning but according to Mr Pyle, this | 1 | undated the ECDO accordingly |
| 1 2 | of questioning but according to Mr Pyle, this | 1 2 | updated the FCDO accordingly. |
| 2 | was the first time that Mr McGrail disclosed | 2 | Turning to the legal claims, I will not go into |
| 2 3 | was the first time that Mr McGrail disclosed this information to him. Mr McGrail, on the | 2 3 | Turning to the legal claims, I will not go into as much detail but there was some discussion |
| 2 3 4 | was the first time that Mr McGrail disclosed this information to him. Mr McGrail, on the other hand, says that the WHSS had not | 2 3 4 | Turning to the legal claims, I will not go into as much detail but there was some discussion between Mr McGrail and the Attorney |
| 2 3 4 5 | was the first time that Mr McGrail disclosed this information to him. Mr McGrail, on the other hand, says that the WHSS had not confirmed their coordinates and the RGP | 2 3 4 5 | Turning to the legal claims, I will not go into as much detail but there was some discussion between Mr McGrail and the Attorney General as to possible civil claims for |
| 2 3 4 5 6 | was the first time that Mr McGrail disclosed this information to him. Mr McGrail, on the other hand, says that the WHSS had not confirmed their coordinates and the RGP were trying hard to plot the chase and | 2 3 4 5 6 | Turning to the legal claims, I will not go into as much detail but there was some discussion between Mr McGrail and the Attorney General as to possible civil claims for compensation at a meeting on 17 March 2020 |
| 2 3 4 5 6 7 | was the first time that Mr McGrail disclosed this information to him. Mr McGrail, on the other hand, says that the WHSS had not confirmed their coordinates and the RGP were trying hard to plot the chase and collision using non-technical means by this | 2 3 4 5 6 7 | Turning to the legal claims, I will not go into as much detail but there was some discussion between Mr McGrail and the Attorney General as to possible civil claims for compensation at a meeting on 17 March 2020 and a WhatsApp message exchange between |
| 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 | was the first time that Mr McGrail disclosed this information to him. Mr McGrail, on the other hand, says that the WHSS had not confirmed their coordinates and the RGP were trying hard to plot the chase and collision using non-technical means by this point with the aid of the port authority. | 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 | Turning to the legal claims, I will not go into as much detail but there was some discussion between Mr McGrail and the Attorney General as to possible civil claims for compensation at a meeting on 17 March 2020 and a WhatsApp message exchange between them on the following day, 18 March 2020 |
| 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 | was the first time that Mr McGrail disclosed this information to him. Mr McGrail, on the other hand, says that the WHSS had not confirmed their coordinates and the RGP were trying hard to plot the chase and collision using non-technical means by this point with the aid of the port authority. On 12 March there was an exchange on the | 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 | Turning to the legal claims, I will not go into as much detail but there was some discussion between Mr McGrail and the Attorney General as to possible civil claims for compensation at a meeting on 17 March 2020 and a WhatsApp message exchange between them on the following day, 18 March 2020 which Mr McGrail also sent to Dr Britto. On |
| 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 | was the first time that Mr McGrail disclosed this information to him. Mr McGrail, on the other hand, says that the WHSS had not confirmed their coordinates and the RGP were trying hard to plot the chase and collision using non-technical means by this point with the aid of the port authority. On 12 March there was an exchange on the maritime incident WhatsApp group which is | 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 | Turning to the legal claims, I will not go into as much detail but there was some discussion between Mr McGrail and the Attorney General as to possible civil claims for compensation at a meeting on 17 March 2020 and a WhatsApp message exchange between them on the following day, 18 March 2020 which Mr McGrail also sent to Dr Britto. On 22 April 2020 Mr McGrail met with the |
| 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 | was the first time that Mr McGrail disclosed this information to him. Mr McGrail, on the other hand, says that the WHSS had not confirmed their coordinates and the RGP were trying hard to plot the chase and collision using non-technical means by this point with the aid of the port authority. On 12 March there was an exchange on the maritime incident WhatsApp group which is at B100. This is a WhatsApp group between | 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 | Turning to the legal claims, I will not go into as much detail but there was some discussion between Mr McGrail and the Attorney General as to possible civil claims for compensation at a meeting on 17 March 2020 and a WhatsApp message exchange between them on the following day, 18 March 2020 which Mr McGrail also sent to Dr Britto. On 22 April 2020 Mr McGrail met with the Attorney General and the DPP to discuss a |
| 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 | was the first time that Mr McGrail disclosed this information to him. Mr McGrail, on the other hand, says that the WHSS had not confirmed their coordinates and the RGP were trying hard to plot the chase and collision using non-technical means by this point with the aid of the port authority. On 12 March there was an exchange on the maritime incident WhatsApp group which is at B100. This is a WhatsApp group between the Chief Minister, Dr Britto, Mr McGrail, | 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 | Turning to the legal claims, I will not go into as much detail but there was some discussion between Mr McGrail and the Attorney General as to possible civil claims for compensation at a meeting on 17 March 2020 and a WhatsApp message exchange between them on the following day, 18 March 2020 which Mr McGrail also sent to Dr Britto. On 22 April 2020 Mr McGrail met with the Attorney General and the DPP to discuss a letter from Robert Fischel KC suggesting a |
| 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 | was the first time that Mr McGrail disclosed this information to him. Mr McGrail, on the other hand, says that the WHSS had not confirmed their coordinates and the RGP were trying hard to plot the chase and collision using non-technical means by this point with the aid of the port authority. On 12 March there was an exchange on the maritime incident WhatsApp group which is at B100. This is a WhatsApp group between the Chief Minister, Dr Britto, Mr McGrail, Mr (Inaudible - Spanish) also of the GPA and | 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 | Turning to the legal claims, I will not go into as much detail but there was some discussion between Mr McGrail and the Attorney General as to possible civil claims for compensation at a meeting on 17 March 2020 and a WhatsApp message exchange between them on the following day, 18 March 2020 which Mr McGrail also sent to Dr Britto. On 22 April 2020 Mr McGrail met with the Attorney General and the DPP to discuss a letter from Robert Fischel KC suggesting a civil claim. Mr McGrail's evidence is that |
| 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 | was the first time that Mr McGrail disclosed this information to him. Mr McGrail, on the other hand, says that the WHSS had not confirmed their coordinates and the RGP were trying hard to plot the chase and collision using non-technical means by this point with the aid of the port authority. On 12 March there was an exchange on the maritime incident WhatsApp group which is at B100. This is a WhatsApp group between the Chief Minister, Dr Britto, Mr McGrail, Mr (Inaudible - Spanish) also of the GPA and Mr Greck, then the chief secretary. If we | 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 | Turning to the legal claims, I will not go into as much detail but there was some discussion between Mr McGrail and the Attorney General as to possible civil claims for compensation at a meeting on 17 March 2020 and a WhatsApp message exchange between them on the following day, 18 March 2020 which Mr McGrail also sent to Dr Britto. On 22 April 2020 Mr McGrail met with the Attorney General and the DPP to discuss a letter from Robert Fischel KC suggesting a civil claim. Mr McGrail's evidence is that the DPP and the AG advised him that there |
| 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 | was the first time that Mr McGrail disclosed this information to him. Mr McGrail, on the other hand, says that the WHSS had not confirmed their coordinates and the RGP were trying hard to plot the chase and collision using non-technical means by this point with the aid of the port authority. On 12 March there was an exchange on the maritime incident WhatsApp group which is at B100. This is a WhatsApp group between the Chief Minister, Dr Britto, Mr McGrail, Mr (Inaudible - Spanish) also of the GPA and Mr Greck, then the chief secretary. If we pick it up over halfway down the page, at | 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 | Turning to the legal claims, I will not go into as much detail but there was some discussion between Mr McGrail and the Attorney General as to possible civil claims for compensation at a meeting on 17 March 2020 and a WhatsApp message exchange between them on the following day, 18 March 2020 which Mr McGrail also sent to Dr Britto. On 22 April 2020 Mr McGrail met with the Attorney General and the DPP to discuss a letter from Robert Fischel KC suggesting a civil claim. Mr McGrail's evidence is that the DPP and the AG advised him that there was no need to appoint Crown counsel at that |
| 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 | was the first time that Mr McGrail disclosed this information to him. Mr McGrail, on the other hand, says that the WHSS had not confirmed their coordinates and the RGP were trying hard to plot the chase and collision using non-technical means by this point with the aid of the port authority. On 12 March there was an exchange on the maritime incident WhatsApp group which is at B100. This is a WhatsApp group between the Chief Minister, Dr Britto, Mr McGrail, Mr (Inaudible - Spanish) also of the GPA and Mr Greck, then the chief secretary. If we pick it up over halfway down the page, at 1613 there is an update provided by Mr | 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 | Turning to the legal claims, I will not go into as much detail but there was some discussion between Mr McGrail and the Attorney General as to possible civil claims for compensation at a meeting on 17 March 2020 and a WhatsApp message exchange between them on the following day, 18 March 2020 which Mr McGrail also sent to Dr Britto. On 22 April 2020 Mr McGrail met with the Attorney General and the DPP to discuss a letter from Robert Fischel KC suggesting a civil claim. Mr McGrail's evidence is that the DPP and the AG advised him that there was no need to appoint Crown counsel at that stage and the Attorney General undertook to |
| 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 | was the first time that Mr McGrail disclosed this information to him. Mr McGrail, on the other hand, says that the WHSS had not confirmed their coordinates and the RGP were trying hard to plot the chase and collision using non-technical means by this point with the aid of the port authority. On 12 March there was an exchange on the maritime incident WhatsApp group which is at B100. This is a WhatsApp group between the Chief Minister, Dr Britto, Mr McGrail, Mr (Inaudible - Spanish) also of the GPA and Mr Greck, then the chief secretary. If we pick it up over halfway down the page, at 1613 there is an update provided by Mr McGrail and at the bottom line it says, "In | 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 | Turning to the legal claims, I will not go into as much detail but there was some discussion between Mr McGrail and the Attorney General as to possible civil claims for compensation at a meeting on 17 March 2020 and a WhatsApp message exchange between them on the following day, 18 March 2020 which Mr McGrail also sent to Dr Britto. On 22 April 2020 Mr McGrail met with the Attorney General and the DPP to discuss a letter from Robert Fischel KC suggesting a civil claim. Mr McGrail's evidence is that the DPP and the AG advised him that there was no need to appoint Crown counsel at that stage and the Attorney General undertook to keep the matter alive with the Chief Minister. |
| 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 | was the first time that Mr McGrail disclosed this information to him. Mr McGrail, on the other hand, says that the WHSS had not confirmed their coordinates and the RGP were trying hard to plot the chase and collision using non-technical means by this point with the aid of the port authority. On 12 March there was an exchange on the maritime incident WhatsApp group which is at B100. This is a WhatsApp group between the Chief Minister, Dr Britto, Mr McGrail, Mr (Inaudible - Spanish) also of the GPA and Mr Greck, then the chief secretary. If we pick it up over halfway down the page, at 1613 there is an update provided by Mr McGrail and at the bottom line it says, "In terms of the investigation proper, the | 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 | Turning to the legal claims, I will not go into as much detail but there was some discussion between Mr McGrail and the Attorney General as to possible civil claims for compensation at a meeting on 17 March 2020 and a WhatsApp message exchange between them on the following day, 18 March 2020 which Mr McGrail also sent to Dr Britto. On 22 April 2020 Mr McGrail met with the Attorney General and the DPP to discuss a letter from Robert Fischel KC suggesting a civil claim. Mr McGrail's evidence is that the DPP and the AG advised him that there was no need to appoint Crown counsel at that stage and the Attorney General undertook to keep the matter alive with the Chief Minister. On 14 May 2020, as we have already seen, |
| 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 | was the first time that Mr McGrail disclosed this information to him. Mr McGrail, on the other hand, says that the WHSS had not confirmed their coordinates and the RGP were trying hard to plot the chase and collision using non-technical means by this point with the aid of the port authority. On 12 March there was an exchange on the maritime incident WhatsApp group which is at B100. This is a WhatsApp group between the Chief Minister, Dr Britto, Mr McGrail, Mr (Inaudible - Spanish) also of the GPA and Mr Greck, then the chief secretary. If we pick it up over halfway down the page, at 1613 there is an update provided by Mr McGrail and at the bottom line it says, "In terms of the investigation proper, the evidence points at the pursuit and collision | 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 | Turning to the legal claims, I will not go into as much detail but there was some discussion between Mr McGrail and the Attorney General as to possible civil claims for compensation at a meeting on 17 March 2020 and a WhatsApp message exchange between them on the following day, 18 March 2020 which Mr McGrail also sent to Dr Britto. On 22 April 2020 Mr McGrail met with the Attorney General and the DPP to discuss a letter from Robert Fischel KC suggesting a civil claim. Mr McGrail's evidence is that the DPP and the AG advised him that there was no need to appoint Crown counsel at that stage and the Attorney General undertook to keep the matter alive with the Chief Minister. On 14 May 2020, as we have already seen, there was the article in El Faro De (Inaudible |
| 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 | was the first time that Mr McGrail disclosed this information to him. Mr McGrail, on the other hand, says that the WHSS had not confirmed their coordinates and the RGP were trying hard to plot the chase and collision using non-technical means by this point with the aid of the port authority. On 12 March there was an exchange on the maritime incident WhatsApp group which is at B100. This is a WhatsApp group between the Chief Minister, Dr Britto, Mr McGrail, Mr (Inaudible - Spanish) also of the GPA and Mr Greck, then the chief secretary. If we pick it up over halfway down the page, at 1613 there is an update provided by Mr McGrail and at the bottom line it says, "In terms of the investigation proper, the evidence points at the pursuit and collision occurring outside BGTW, not the best news | 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 | Turning to the legal claims, I will not go into as much detail but there was some discussion between Mr McGrail and the Attorney General as to possible civil claims for compensation at a meeting on 17 March 2020 and a WhatsApp message exchange between them on the following day, 18 March 2020 which Mr McGrail also sent to Dr Britto. On 22 April 2020 Mr McGrail met with the Attorney General and the DPP to discuss a letter from Robert Fischel KC suggesting a civil claim. Mr McGrail's evidence is that the DPP and the AG advised him that there was no need to appoint Crown counsel at that stage and the Attorney General undertook to keep the matter alive with the Chief Minister. On 14 May 2020, as we have already seen, there was the article in El Faro De (Inaudible - Spanish), referring to a denuncia, or a |
| 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 | was the first time that Mr McGrail disclosed this information to him. Mr McGrail, on the other hand, says that the WHSS had not confirmed their coordinates and the RGP were trying hard to plot the chase and collision using non-technical means by this point with the aid of the port authority. On 12 March there was an exchange on the maritime incident WhatsApp group which is at B100. This is a WhatsApp group between the Chief Minister, Dr Britto, Mr McGrail, Mr (Inaudible - Spanish) also of the GPA and Mr Greck, then the chief secretary. If we pick it up over halfway down the page, at 1613 there is an update provided by Mr McGrail and at the bottom line it says, "In terms of the investigation proper, the evidence points at the pursuit and collision occurring outside BGTW, not the best news we wanted to hear." Then over the page | 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 | Turning to the legal claims, I will not go into as much detail but there was some discussion between Mr McGrail and the Attorney General as to possible civil claims for compensation at a meeting on 17 March 2020 and a WhatsApp message exchange between them on the following day, 18 March 2020 which Mr McGrail also sent to Dr Britto. On 22 April 2020 Mr McGrail met with the Attorney General and the DPP to discuss a letter from Robert Fischel KC suggesting a civil claim. Mr McGrail's evidence is that the DPP and the AG advised him that there was no need to appoint Crown counsel at that stage and the Attorney General undertook to keep the matter alive with the Chief Minister. On 14 May 2020, as we have already seen, there was the article in El Faro De (Inaudible - Spanish), referring to a denuncia, or a complaint in Spain against the Gibraltar |
| 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 | was the first time that Mr McGrail disclosed this information to him. Mr McGrail, on the other hand, says that the WHSS had not confirmed their coordinates and the RGP were trying hard to plot the chase and collision using non-technical means by this point with the aid of the port authority. On 12 March there was an exchange on the maritime incident WhatsApp group which is at B100. This is a WhatsApp group between the Chief Minister, Dr Britto, Mr McGrail, Mr (Inaudible - Spanish) also of the GPA and Mr Greck, then the chief secretary. If we pick it up over halfway down the page, at 1613 there is an update provided by Mr McGrail and at the bottom line it says, "In terms of the investigation proper, the evidence points at the pursuit and collision occurring outside BGTW, not the best news we wanted to hear." Then over the page firstly, I should say that it is unclear what | 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 | Turning to the legal claims, I will not go into as much detail but there was some discussion between Mr McGrail and the Attorney General as to possible civil claims for compensation at a meeting on 17 March 2020 and a WhatsApp message exchange between them on the following day, 18 March 2020 which Mr McGrail also sent to Dr Britto. On 22 April 2020 Mr McGrail met with the Attorney General and the DPP to discuss a letter from Robert Fischel KC suggesting a civil claim. Mr McGrail's evidence is that the DPP and the AG advised him that there was no need to appoint Crown counsel at that stage and the Attorney General undertook to keep the matter alive with the Chief Minister. On 14 May 2020, as we have already seen, there was the article in El Faro De (Inaudible - Spanish), referring to a denuncia, or a complaint in Spain against the Gibraltar police for the crime of reckless homicide in |
| 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 | was the first time that Mr McGrail disclosed this information to him. Mr McGrail, on the other hand, says that the WHSS had not confirmed their coordinates and the RGP were trying hard to plot the chase and collision using non-technical means by this point with the aid of the port authority. On 12 March there was an exchange on the maritime incident WhatsApp group which is at B100. This is a WhatsApp group between the Chief Minister, Dr Britto, Mr McGrail, Mr (Inaudible - Spanish) also of the GPA and Mr Greck, then the chief secretary. If we pick it up over halfway down the page, at 1613 there is an update provided by Mr McGrail and at the bottom line it says, "In terms of the investigation proper, the evidence points at the pursuit and collision occurring outside BGTW, not the best news we wanted to hear." Then over the page firstly, I should say that it is unclear what evidence prompted that description of "not | 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 | Turning to the legal claims, I will not go into as much detail but there was some discussion between Mr McGrail and the Attorney General as to possible civil claims for compensation at a meeting on 17 March 2020 and a WhatsApp message exchange between them on the following day, 18 March 2020 which Mr McGrail also sent to Dr Britto. On 22 April 2020 Mr McGrail met with the Attorney General and the DPP to discuss a letter from Robert Fischel KC suggesting a civil claim. Mr McGrail's evidence is that the DPP and the AG advised him that there was no need to appoint Crown counsel at that stage and the Attorney General undertook to keep the matter alive with the Chief Minister. On 14 May 2020, as we have already seen, there was the article in El Faro De (Inaudible - Spanish), referring to a denuncia, or a complaint in Spain against the Gibraltar police for the crime of reckless homicide in relation to the collision at sea and also |
| 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24 | was the first time that Mr McGrail disclosed this information to him. Mr McGrail, on the other hand, says that the WHSS had not confirmed their coordinates and the RGP were trying hard to plot the chase and collision using non-technical means by this point with the aid of the port authority. On 12 March there was an exchange on the maritime incident WhatsApp group which is at B100. This is a WhatsApp group between the Chief Minister, Dr Britto, Mr McGrail, Mr (Inaudible - Spanish) also of the GPA and Mr Greck, then the chief secretary. If we pick it up over halfway down the page, at 1613 there is an update provided by Mr McGrail and at the bottom line it says, "In terms of the investigation proper, the evidence points at the pursuit and collision occurring outside BGTW, not the best news we wanted to hear." Then over the page firstly, I should say that it is unclear what evidence prompted that description of "not the best news," is something to take up in | 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24 | Turning to the legal claims, I will not go into as much detail but there was some discussion between Mr McGrail and the Attorney General as to possible civil claims for compensation at a meeting on 17 March 2020 and a WhatsApp message exchange between them on the following day, 18 March 2020 which Mr McGrail also sent to Dr Britto. On 22 April 2020 Mr McGrail met with the Attorney General and the DPP to discuss a letter from Robert Fischel KC suggesting a civil claim. Mr McGrail's evidence is that the DPP and the AG advised him that there was no need to appoint Crown counsel at that stage and the Attorney General undertook to keep the matter alive with the Chief Minister. On 14 May 2020, as we have already seen, there was the article in El Faro De (Inaudible - Spanish), referring to a denuncia, or a complaint in Spain against the Gibraltar police for the crime of reckless homicide in relation to the collision at sea and also referred to a complaint being made in |
| 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 | was the first time that Mr McGrail disclosed this information to him. Mr McGrail, on the other hand, says that the WHSS had not confirmed their coordinates and the RGP were trying hard to plot the chase and collision using non-technical means by this point with the aid of the port authority. On 12 March there was an exchange on the maritime incident WhatsApp group which is at B100. This is a WhatsApp group between the Chief Minister, Dr Britto, Mr McGrail, Mr (Inaudible - Spanish) also of the GPA and Mr Greck, then the chief secretary. If we pick it up over halfway down the page, at 1613 there is an update provided by Mr McGrail and at the bottom line it says, "In terms of the investigation proper, the evidence points at the pursuit and collision occurring outside BGTW, not the best news we wanted to hear." Then over the page firstly, I should say that it is unclear what evidence prompted that description of "not | 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 | Turning to the legal claims, I will not go into as much detail but there was some discussion between Mr McGrail and the Attorney General as to possible civil claims for compensation at a meeting on 17 March 2020 and a WhatsApp message exchange between them on the following day, 18 March 2020 which Mr McGrail also sent to Dr Britto. On 22 April 2020 Mr McGrail met with the Attorney General and the DPP to discuss a letter from Robert Fischel KC suggesting a civil claim. Mr McGrail's evidence is that the DPP and the AG advised him that there was no need to appoint Crown counsel at that stage and the Attorney General undertook to keep the matter alive with the Chief Minister. On 14 May 2020, as we have already seen, there was the article in El Faro De (Inaudible - Spanish), referring to a denuncia, or a complaint in Spain against the Gibraltar police for the crime of reckless homicide in relation to the collision at sea and also |
| 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24 | was the first time that Mr McGrail disclosed this information to him. Mr McGrail, on the other hand, says that the WHSS had not confirmed their coordinates and the RGP were trying hard to plot the chase and collision using non-technical means by this point with the aid of the port authority. On 12 March there was an exchange on the maritime incident WhatsApp group which is at B100. This is a WhatsApp group between the Chief Minister, Dr Britto, Mr McGrail, Mr (Inaudible - Spanish) also of the GPA and Mr Greck, then the chief secretary. If we pick it up over halfway down the page, at 1613 there is an update provided by Mr McGrail and at the bottom line it says, "In terms of the investigation proper, the evidence points at the pursuit and collision occurring outside BGTW, not the best news we wanted to hear." Then over the page firstly, I should say that it is unclear what evidence prompted that description of "not the best news," is something to take up in | 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24 | Turning to the legal claims, I will not go into as much detail but there was some discussion between Mr McGrail and the Attorney General as to possible civil claims for compensation at a meeting on 17 March 2020 and a WhatsApp message exchange between them on the following day, 18 March 2020 which Mr McGrail also sent to Dr Britto. On 22 April 2020 Mr McGrail met with the Attorney General and the DPP to discuss a letter from Robert Fischel KC suggesting a civil claim. Mr McGrail's evidence is that the DPP and the AG advised him that there was no need to appoint Crown counsel at that stage and the Attorney General undertook to keep the matter alive with the Chief Minister. On 14 May 2020, as we have already seen, there was the article in El Faro De (Inaudible - Spanish), referring to a denuncia, or a complaint in Spain against the Gibraltar police for the crime of reckless homicide in relation to the collision at sea and also referred to a complaint being made in |

| 1 | 0936 to the Attorney General and this can be | 1 | serious matter. I provided you with an |
|--|---|--|--|
| 2 | found at B1417. Just to the bottom sorry, | 2 | overview on the day of the incident, then |
| 3 | the bottom section of the page there is the | 3 | engaged with the AG as per your suggestion |
| 4 | link being sent at 0936 and it is followed up | 4 | and have been doing so ever since. I will |
| 5 | by a message that says, "This has appeared | 5 | hopefully be in a better position to brief you |
| 6 | today." The response from the Attorney | 6 | on the full details of the incident once I |
| 7 | General was, "Couldn't make it up." Then | 7 | receive the report of the findings of the |
| 8 | the Chief Minister, "Hi, this article has just | 8 | independent investigation team we called in. |
| 9 | appeared." Well, this is 14 May 2020 | 9 | This team has had to return early to the UK |
| 10 | message which by now we are familiar with | 10 | and because of the Covid crisis and because |
| 11 | referring to the civil claim which he then sent | 11 | of the lockdown they have been unable to |
| 12 | or at the same time sent to Mr Pyle. | 12 | progress the matter as expeditiously as we all |
| 13 | On the same day, 14 May, Mr Fischel sent a | 13 | wanted. The letter from local counsel |
| 14 | letter to Mr McGrail on behalf of one of the | 14 | representing the families and suggesting a |
| 15 | injured crew notifying him a claim for | 15 | future claim for damages was only received a |
| 16 | damages and seeking information. At 1139 | 16 | few days ago, which is what triggered our |
| 17 | Superintendent Yeats emailed the DPP | 17 | enquiry with the DPP only yesterday |
| 18 | informing him of the official letter and | 18 | concerning legal representation." I have just |
| 19 | seeking a meeting the following week to | 19 | realised that I did read that one out earlier |
| 20 | discuss the defence of the claim and the | 20 | before, so there is no need to go through it |
| 21 | meeting was arranged for 19 May. On 18 | 21 | all. |
| 22 | May the DPP sent a WhatsApp message to | 22 | The Chief Minister considers that Mr |
| 23 | the Attorney General referring to the claim | 23 | McGrail was making excuses for not |
| 24 | and on 19 May Superintendent Yeats sent the | 24 | providing timely information about the |
| 25 | letter to the DPP and met him to discuss. | 25 | claims and was even more disappointed to |
| 23 | tetter to the D11 and met min to diseass. | 23 | ciams and was even more disuppointed to |
| | Page 133 | | Page 135 |
| | | | |
| | mi ppp i | . | |
| 1 | The DPP determined that Crown counsel | 1 | learn that the claims had been received some |
| 2 | could not act for conflict reasons and a | 2 | days earlier and he had not been notified. It |
| 2 3 | could not act for conflict reasons and a further letter was then received from Mr | 2 3 | days earlier and he had not been notified. It is fair to say, however, and the Chief |
| 2 3 4 | could not act for conflict reasons and a further letter was then received from Mr Fischel that day seeking further information. | 2 3 4 | days earlier and he had not been notified. It is fair to say, however, and the Chief Minister concedes that he had already lost |
| 2 3 4 5 | could not act for conflict reasons and a further letter was then received from Mr Fischel that day seeking further information. On 20 May the DPP asked Superintendent | 2 3 4 5 | days earlier and he had not been notified. It is fair to say, however, and the Chief Minister concedes that he had already lost confidence in Mr McGrail by the time of that |
| 2 3 4 5 6 | could not act for conflict reasons and a further letter was then received from Mr Fischel that day seeking further information. On 20 May the DPP asked Superintendent Yeats to email the Attorney General, seeking | 2 3 4 5 6 | days earlier and he had not been notified. It is fair to say, however, and the Chief Minister concedes that he had already lost confidence in Mr McGrail by the time of that email. |
| 2 3 4 5 6 7 | could not act for conflict reasons and a further letter was then received from Mr Fischel that day seeking further information. On 20 May the DPP asked Superintendent Yeats to email the Attorney General, seeking the Attorney General's views on | 2 3 4 5 6 7 | days earlier and he had not been notified. It is fair to say, however, and the Chief Minister concedes that he had already lost confidence in Mr McGrail by the time of that email. If we can now go to 4117, the Chief Minister |
| 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 | could not act for conflict reasons and a further letter was then received from Mr Fischel that day seeking further information. On 20 May the DPP asked Superintendent Yeats to email the Attorney General, seeking the Attorney General's views on representation which Superintendent Yeats | 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 | days earlier and he had not been notified. It is fair to say, however, and the Chief Minister concedes that he had already lost confidence in Mr McGrail by the time of that email. If we can now go to 4117, the Chief Minister forwards the exchange to the governor and |
| 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 | could not act for conflict reasons and a further letter was then received from Mr Fischel that day seeking further information. On 20 May the DPP asked Superintendent Yeats to email the Attorney General, seeking the Attorney General's views on representation which Superintendent Yeats did. The Attorney General then forwarded | 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 | days earlier and he had not been notified. It is fair to say, however, and the Chief Minister concedes that he had already lost confidence in Mr McGrail by the time of that email. If we can now go to 4117, the Chief Minister forwards the exchange to the governor and expresses his decision or his yes, his view |
| 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 | could not act for conflict reasons and a further letter was then received from Mr Fischel that day seeking further information. On 20 May the DPP asked Superintendent Yeats to email the Attorney General, seeking the Attorney General's views on representation which Superintendent Yeats did. The Attorney General then forwarded the email to the Chief Minister. We have | 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 | days earlier and he had not been notified. It is fair to say, however, and the Chief Minister concedes that he had already lost confidence in Mr McGrail by the time of that email. If we can now go to 4117, the Chief Minister forwards the exchange to the governor and expresses his decision or his yes, his view that he needed to seek the section 15 report. |
| 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 | could not act for conflict reasons and a further letter was then received from Mr Fischel that day seeking further information. On 20 May the DPP asked Superintendent Yeats to email the Attorney General, seeking the Attorney General's views on representation which Superintendent Yeats did. The Attorney General then forwarded the email to the Chief Minister. We have seen that email at C4090 and it is the email | 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 | days earlier and he had not been notified. It is fair to say, however, and the Chief Minister concedes that he had already lost confidence in Mr McGrail by the time of that email. If we can now go to 4117, the Chief Minister forwards the exchange to the governor and expresses his decision or his yes, his view that he needed to seek the section 15 report. Mr McGrail then expressed confusion to the |
| 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 | could not act for conflict reasons and a further letter was then received from Mr Fischel that day seeking further information. On 20 May the DPP asked Superintendent Yeats to email the Attorney General, seeking the Attorney General's views on representation which Superintendent Yeats did. The Attorney General then forwarded the email to the Chief Minister. We have seen that email at C4090 and it is the email where the Chief Minister complains well, | 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 | days earlier and he had not been notified. It is fair to say, however, and the Chief Minister concedes that he had already lost confidence in Mr McGrail by the time of that email. If we can now go to 4117, the Chief Minister forwards the exchange to the governor and expresses his decision or his yes, his view that he needed to seek the section 15 report. Mr McGrail then expressed confusion to the Attorney General as to why the Chief |
| 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 | could not act for conflict reasons and a further letter was then received from Mr Fischel that day seeking further information. On 20 May the DPP asked Superintendent Yeats to email the Attorney General, seeking the Attorney General's views on representation which Superintendent Yeats did. The Attorney General then forwarded the email to the Chief Minister. We have seen that email at C4090 and it is the email where the Chief Minister complains well, he opines that it is entirely inappropriate for | 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 | days earlier and he had not been notified. It is fair to say, however, and the Chief Minister concedes that he had already lost confidence in Mr McGrail by the time of that email. If we can now go to 4117, the Chief Minister forwards the exchange to the governor and expresses his decision or his yes, his view that he needed to seek the section 15 report. Mr McGrail then expressed confusion to the Attorney General as to why the Chief Minister had reacted as he had. |
| 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 | could not act for conflict reasons and a further letter was then received from Mr Fischel that day seeking further information. On 20 May the DPP asked Superintendent Yeats to email the Attorney General, seeking the Attorney General's views on representation which Superintendent Yeats did. The Attorney General then forwarded the email to the Chief Minister. We have seen that email at C4090 and it is the email where the Chief Minister complains well, he opines that it is entirely inappropriate for it not to have been raised with him. I will not | 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 | days earlier and he had not been notified. It is fair to say, however, and the Chief Minister concedes that he had already lost confidence in Mr McGrail by the time of that email. If we can now go to 4117, the Chief Minister forwards the exchange to the governor and expresses his decision or his yes, his view that he needed to seek the section 15 report. Mr McGrail then expressed confusion to the Attorney General as to why the Chief Minister had reacted as he had. Can we now go to B1249 this is the section |
| 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 | could not act for conflict reasons and a further letter was then received from Mr Fischel that day seeking further information. On 20 May the DPP asked Superintendent Yeats to email the Attorney General, seeking the Attorney General's views on representation which Superintendent Yeats did. The Attorney General then forwarded the email to the Chief Minister. We have seen that email at C4090 and it is the email where the Chief Minister complains well, he opines that it is entirely inappropriate for it not to have been raised with him. I will not re-read that. | 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 | days earlier and he had not been notified. It is fair to say, however, and the Chief Minister concedes that he had already lost confidence in Mr McGrail by the time of that email. If we can now go to 4117, the Chief Minister forwards the exchange to the governor and expresses his decision or his yes, his view that he needed to seek the section 15 report. Mr McGrail then expressed confusion to the Attorney General as to why the Chief Minister had reacted as he had. Can we now go to B1249 this is the section 15 report sent by the Chief Minister to Mr |
| 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 | could not act for conflict reasons and a further letter was then received from Mr Fischel that day seeking further information. On 20 May the DPP asked Superintendent Yeats to email the Attorney General, seeking the Attorney General's views on representation which Superintendent Yeats did. The Attorney General then forwarded the email to the Chief Minister. We have seen that email at C4090 and it is the email where the Chief Minister complains well, he opines that it is entirely inappropriate for it not to have been raised with him. I will not re-read that. The Chief Minister's position sorry, I | 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 | days earlier and he had not been notified. It is fair to say, however, and the Chief Minister concedes that he had already lost confidence in Mr McGrail by the time of that email. If we can now go to 4117, the Chief Minister forwards the exchange to the governor and expresses his decision or his yes, his view that he needed to seek the section 15 report. Mr McGrail then expressed confusion to the Attorney General as to why the Chief Minister had reacted as he had. Can we now go to B1249 this is the section 15 report sent by the Chief Minister to Mr McGrail. Mr McGrail says that this letter |
| 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 | could not act for conflict reasons and a further letter was then received from Mr Fischel that day seeking further information. On 20 May the DPP asked Superintendent Yeats to email the Attorney General, seeking the Attorney General's views on representation which Superintendent Yeats did. The Attorney General then forwarded the email to the Chief Minister. We have seen that email at C4090 and it is the email where the Chief Minister complains well, he opines that it is entirely inappropriate for it not to have been raised with him. I will not re-read that. The Chief Minister's position sorry, I should take you to the response from Mr | 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 | days earlier and he had not been notified. It is fair to say, however, and the Chief Minister concedes that he had already lost confidence in Mr McGrail by the time of that email. If we can now go to 4117, the Chief Minister forwards the exchange to the governor and expresses his decision or his yes, his view that he needed to seek the section 15 report. Mr McGrail then expressed confusion to the Attorney General as to why the Chief Minister had reacted as he had. Can we now go to B1249 this is the section 15 report sent by the Chief Minister to Mr McGrail. Mr McGrail says that this letter was completely at variance with his |
| 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 | could not act for conflict reasons and a further letter was then received from Mr Fischel that day seeking further information. On 20 May the DPP asked Superintendent Yeats to email the Attorney General, seeking the Attorney General's views on representation which Superintendent Yeats did. The Attorney General then forwarded the email to the Chief Minister. We have seen that email at C4090 and it is the email where the Chief Minister complains well, he opines that it is entirely inappropriate for it not to have been raised with him. I will not re-read that. The Chief Minister's position sorry, I should take you to the response from Mr McGrail which can be found a few pages on | 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 | days earlier and he had not been notified. It is fair to say, however, and the Chief Minister concedes that he had already lost confidence in Mr McGrail by the time of that email. If we can now go to 4117, the Chief Minister forwards the exchange to the governor and expresses his decision or his yes, his view that he needed to seek the section 15 report. Mr McGrail then expressed confusion to the Attorney General as to why the Chief Minister had reacted as he had. Can we now go to B1249 this is the section 15 report sent by the Chief Minister to Mr McGrail. Mr McGrail says that this letter was completely at variance with his WhatsApp exchanges with the Chief Minister |
| 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 | could not act for conflict reasons and a further letter was then received from Mr Fischel that day seeking further information. On 20 May the DPP asked Superintendent Yeats to email the Attorney General, seeking the Attorney General's views on representation which Superintendent Yeats did. The Attorney General then forwarded the email to the Chief Minister. We have seen that email at C4090 and it is the email where the Chief Minister complains well, he opines that it is entirely inappropriate for it not to have been raised with him. I will not re-read that. The Chief Minister's position sorry, I should take you to the response from Mr McGrail which can be found a few pages on at 4100. Mr McGrail says, "Dear CM, I refer | 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 | days earlier and he had not been notified. It is fair to say, however, and the Chief Minister concedes that he had already lost confidence in Mr McGrail by the time of that email. If we can now go to 4117, the Chief Minister forwards the exchange to the governor and expresses his decision or his yes, his view that he needed to seek the section 15 report. Mr McGrail then expressed confusion to the Attorney General as to why the Chief Minister had reacted as he had. Can we now go to B1249 this is the section 15 report sent by the Chief Minister to Mr McGrail. Mr McGrail says that this letter was completely at variance with his WhatsApp exchanges with the Chief Minister on the maritime group which were |
| 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 | could not act for conflict reasons and a further letter was then received from Mr Fischel that day seeking further information. On 20 May the DPP asked Superintendent Yeats to email the Attorney General, seeking the Attorney General's views on representation which Superintendent Yeats did. The Attorney General then forwarded the email to the Chief Minister. We have seen that email at C4090 and it is the email where the Chief Minister complains well, he opines that it is entirely inappropriate for it not to have been raised with him. I will not re-read that. The Chief Minister's position sorry, I should take you to the response from Mr McGrail which can be found a few pages on at 4100. Mr McGrail says, "Dear CM, I refer to the below thread which includes your | 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 | days earlier and he had not been notified. It is fair to say, however, and the Chief Minister concedes that he had already lost confidence in Mr McGrail by the time of that email. If we can now go to 4117, the Chief Minister forwards the exchange to the governor and expresses his decision or his yes, his view that he needed to seek the section 15 report. Mr McGrail then expressed confusion to the Attorney General as to why the Chief Minister had reacted as he had. Can we now go to B1249 this is the section 15 report sent by the Chief Minister to Mr McGrail. Mr McGrail says that this letter was completely at variance with his WhatsApp exchanges with the Chief Minister on the maritime group which were supportive. He sent his report back on 28 |
| 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 | could not act for conflict reasons and a further letter was then received from Mr Fischel that day seeking further information. On 20 May the DPP asked Superintendent Yeats to email the Attorney General, seeking the Attorney General's views on representation which Superintendent Yeats did. The Attorney General then forwarded the email to the Chief Minister. We have seen that email at C4090 and it is the email where the Chief Minister complains well, he opines that it is entirely inappropriate for it not to have been raised with him. I will not re-read that. The Chief Minister's position sorry, I should take you to the response from Mr McGrail which can be found a few pages on at 4100. Mr McGrail says, "Dear CM, I refer to the below thread which includes your response to the AG and which has been | 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 | days earlier and he had not been notified. It is fair to say, however, and the Chief Minister concedes that he had already lost confidence in Mr McGrail by the time of that email. If we can now go to 4117, the Chief Minister forwards the exchange to the governor and expresses his decision or his yes, his view that he needed to seek the section 15 report. Mr McGrail then expressed confusion to the Attorney General as to why the Chief Minister had reacted as he had. Can we now go to B1249 this is the section 15 report sent by the Chief Minister to Mr McGrail. Mr McGrail says that this letter was completely at variance with his WhatsApp exchanges with the Chief Minister on the maritime group which were supportive. He sent his report back on 28 May at 1621. There is some disagreement as |
| 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 | could not act for conflict reasons and a further letter was then received from Mr Fischel that day seeking further information. On 20 May the DPP asked Superintendent Yeats to email the Attorney General, seeking the Attorney General's views on representation which Superintendent Yeats did. The Attorney General then forwarded the email to the Chief Minister. We have seen that email at C4090 and it is the email where the Chief Minister complains well, he opines that it is entirely inappropriate for it not to have been raised with him. I will not re-read that. The Chief Minister's position sorry, I should take you to the response from Mr McGrail which can be found a few pages on at 4100. Mr McGrail says, "Dear CM, I refer to the below thread which includes your response to the AG and which has been forwarded to me. You are evidently very | 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 | days earlier and he had not been notified. It is fair to say, however, and the Chief Minister concedes that he had already lost confidence in Mr McGrail by the time of that email. If we can now go to 4117, the Chief Minister forwards the exchange to the governor and expresses his decision or his yes, his view that he needed to seek the section 15 report. Mr McGrail then expressed confusion to the Attorney General as to why the Chief Minister had reacted as he had. Can we now go to B1249 this is the section 15 report sent by the Chief Minister to Mr McGrail. Mr McGrail says that this letter was completely at variance with his WhatsApp exchanges with the Chief Minister on the maritime group which were supportive. He sent his report back on 28 May at 1621. There is some disagreement as to when it was actually received but that can |
| 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 | could not act for conflict reasons and a further letter was then received from Mr Fischel that day seeking further information. On 20 May the DPP asked Superintendent Yeats to email the Attorney General, seeking the Attorney General's views on representation which Superintendent Yeats did. The Attorney General then forwarded the email to the Chief Minister. We have seen that email at C4090 and it is the email where the Chief Minister complains well, he opines that it is entirely inappropriate for it not to have been raised with him. I will not re-read that. The Chief Minister's position sorry, I should take you to the response from Mr McGrail which can be found a few pages on at 4100. Mr McGrail says, "Dear CM, I refer to the below thread which includes your response to the AG and which has been forwarded to me. You are evidently very disappointed but I want to reassure you that it | 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 | days earlier and he had not been notified. It is fair to say, however, and the Chief Minister concedes that he had already lost confidence in Mr McGrail by the time of that email. If we can now go to 4117, the Chief Minister forwards the exchange to the governor and expresses his decision or his yes, his view that he needed to seek the section 15 report. Mr McGrail then expressed confusion to the Attorney General as to why the Chief Minister had reacted as he had. Can we now go to B1249 this is the section 15 report sent by the Chief Minister to Mr McGrail. Mr McGrail says that this letter was completely at variance with his WhatsApp exchanges with the Chief Minister on the maritime group which were supportive. He sent his report back on 28 May at 1621. There is some disagreement as to when it was actually received but that can be clarified in questioning. I will not go |
| 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24 | could not act for conflict reasons and a further letter was then received from Mr Fischel that day seeking further information. On 20 May the DPP asked Superintendent Yeats to email the Attorney General, seeking the Attorney General's views on representation which Superintendent Yeats did. The Attorney General then forwarded the email to the Chief Minister. We have seen that email at C4090 and it is the email where the Chief Minister complains well, he opines that it is entirely inappropriate for it not to have been raised with him. I will not re-read that. The Chief Minister's position sorry, I should take you to the response from Mr McGrail which can be found a few pages on at 4100. Mr McGrail says, "Dear CM, I refer to the below thread which includes your response to the AG and which has been forwarded to me. You are evidently very disappointed but I want to reassure you that it has never been my intention to withhold | 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24 | days earlier and he had not been notified. It is fair to say, however, and the Chief Minister concedes that he had already lost confidence in Mr McGrail by the time of that email. If we can now go to 4117, the Chief Minister forwards the exchange to the governor and expresses his decision or his yes, his view that he needed to seek the section 15 report. Mr McGrail then expressed confusion to the Attorney General as to why the Chief Minister had reacted as he had. Can we now go to B1249 this is the section 15 report sent by the Chief Minister to Mr McGrail. Mr McGrail says that this letter was completely at variance with his WhatsApp exchanges with the Chief Minister on the maritime group which were supportive. He sent his report back on 28 May at 1621. There is some disagreement as to when it was actually received but that can be clarified in questioning. I will not go through the report in its entirety but just |
| 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 | could not act for conflict reasons and a further letter was then received from Mr Fischel that day seeking further information. On 20 May the DPP asked Superintendent Yeats to email the Attorney General, seeking the Attorney General's views on representation which Superintendent Yeats did. The Attorney General then forwarded the email to the Chief Minister. We have seen that email at C4090 and it is the email where the Chief Minister complains well, he opines that it is entirely inappropriate for it not to have been raised with him. I will not re-read that. The Chief Minister's position sorry, I should take you to the response from Mr McGrail which can be found a few pages on at 4100. Mr McGrail says, "Dear CM, I refer to the below thread which includes your response to the AG and which has been forwarded to me. You are evidently very disappointed but I want to reassure you that it | 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 | days earlier and he had not been notified. It is fair to say, however, and the Chief Minister concedes that he had already lost confidence in Mr McGrail by the time of that email. If we can now go to 4117, the Chief Minister forwards the exchange to the governor and expresses his decision or his yes, his view that he needed to seek the section 15 report. Mr McGrail then expressed confusion to the Attorney General as to why the Chief Minister had reacted as he had. Can we now go to B1249 this is the section 15 report sent by the Chief Minister to Mr McGrail. Mr McGrail says that this letter was completely at variance with his WhatsApp exchanges with the Chief Minister on the maritime group which were supportive. He sent his report back on 28 May at 1621. There is some disagreement as to when it was actually received but that can be clarified in questioning. I will not go |
| 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24 | could not act for conflict reasons and a further letter was then received from Mr Fischel that day seeking further information. On 20 May the DPP asked Superintendent Yeats to email the Attorney General, seeking the Attorney General's views on representation which Superintendent Yeats did. The Attorney General then forwarded the email to the Chief Minister. We have seen that email at C4090 and it is the email where the Chief Minister complains well, he opines that it is entirely inappropriate for it not to have been raised with him. I will not re-read that. The Chief Minister's position sorry, I should take you to the response from Mr McGrail which can be found a few pages on at 4100. Mr McGrail says, "Dear CM, I refer to the below thread which includes your response to the AG and which has been forwarded to me. You are evidently very disappointed but I want to reassure you that it has never been my intention to withhold | 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24 | days earlier and he had not been notified. It is fair to say, however, and the Chief Minister concedes that he had already lost confidence in Mr McGrail by the time of that email. If we can now go to 4117, the Chief Minister forwards the exchange to the governor and expresses his decision or his yes, his view that he needed to seek the section 15 report. Mr McGrail then expressed confusion to the Attorney General as to why the Chief Minister had reacted as he had. Can we now go to B1249 this is the section 15 report sent by the Chief Minister to Mr McGrail. Mr McGrail says that this letter was completely at variance with his WhatsApp exchanges with the Chief Minister on the maritime group which were supportive. He sent his report back on 28 May at 1621. There is some disagreement as to when it was actually received but that can be clarified in questioning. I will not go through the report in its entirety but just |

| 1 section entitled, "The concerns of the | 1 background to this issue. Obviously there |
|---|---|
| 2 government," "First and foremost I am | 2 are disputes of fact and in particular as to |
| 3 concerned about the physical and mental | 3 communications and as to the legal claims |
| 4 welfare of the officers of the RGP in question | 4 that we can address in questioning. The |
| 5 that night and of the potential for multi- | 5 collision was identified in contemporaneous |
| 6 jurisdictional legal action against them. The | 6 documents as the reason for the Chief |
| 7 Government will agree to fund the legal | 7 Minister and Mr Pyle losing confidence and |
| 8 advice and representation that the individual | 8 the GPA's decision to invite retirement fairly |
| 9 officers may require on a without prejudice | 9 consistently. If Mr Pyle and the Chief |
| 10 basis and on such other bases or conditions | 10 Minister's evidence is accepted, then it is |
| 11 which the Attorney General may consider | plain that the incident at sea constituted not |
| 12 and advise may be appropriate. The | 12 just a circumstance but a reason leading to |
| 13 Government will also assist with any support | 13 Mr McGrail ceasing to be commissioner of |
| required in respect of the mental or physical | police but obviously there is, as I say, plenty |
| 15 health of officers in question." | of exploration to do through questioning. |
| 16 I am sorry, yes, I am told correctly that I | 16 So that deals with issue 3, the collision at sea |
| described it as a report but it is a request for | and I now move on to the HMIC report. I |
| the report. "I want to specifically record that | 18 see the time which is five to one. |
| the Government supports our frontline police | 19 THE CHAIRMAN: Yes, it obviously is a |
| 20 officers, especially those who risk their own | 20 convenient time to break. |
| 21 lives at sea in keeping Gibraltar safe and | 21 MR SANTOS: I am happy to break now and |
| 22 keeping drug traffickers from using our | 22 perhaps we can start five minutes earlier just |
| 23 waters to tranship narcotics. In particular, | 23 to make sure we do not |
| 24 however, the incident may give rise to | 24 THE CHAIRMAN: We will start at five to |
| 25 breaches of the Act and to large potential | |
| 25 breaches of the Act and to large potential | 25 two. |
| Page 137 | Page 139 |
| | |
| 1 claims in damages against HMGOG which | 1 MR SANTOS: Yes, thank you. |
| 2 would be funded by taxpayers of Gibraltar. | 2 (12.55) |
| 3 It raises serious issues as to the operational | 3 (Luncheon adjournment) |
| 4 welfare of officers of the RGP at sea and, | 4 (13.57) |
| 5 additionally, given the sensitivity of the | 5 MR SANTOS: Good afternoon, Mr |
| 6 relationship between Gibraltar, Spain and the | 6 Chairman. The next issue I was going to turn |
| 7 United Kingdom I am concerned that the | 7 to was the HMIC report, but it occurs to me |
| 8 events in question can provide grounds for a | 8 that Issue 5 (the conspiracy investigation) is |
| 9 serious setback for Gibraltar in the context of | 9 particularly lengthy and relied on heavily by |
| the relationship with our Spanish | all parties, so I have decided that it is perhaps |
| 11 counterparts at political level." | best to deal with that first, and then come |
| Over the page sorry, the next paragraph, | back and deal with HMIC with whatever |
| 13 "Moreover, given the contents of the | time is left in the afternoon. There is also, |
| paragraphs on territoriality above, the | obviously, the Police Federation and then |
| government is concerned that the officers of | issues 8, 9 and 10, both of which can be |
| the RGP who find themselves operating | taken a bit more briefly. So, Issue 5, the |
| 17 outside of the territory of Gibraltar may in | 17 conspiracy investigation. This issue revolves |
| fact not have the powers or protections | 18 around the RGP's Operation Delhi (an |
| 19 provided for them in the Act and, finally, the | investigation into the alleged hacking of the |
| government is concerned about the | 20 National Security Centralised Intelligence |
| 21 sovereignty implications for Gibraltar and the | 21 System, NSCIS) and search warrants |
| 22 United Kingdom. I will not further detail the | 22 obtained by the RGP in relation to the office |
| 23 nature of these concerns here as they are | 23 and home of Mr James Levy KC in the |
| 24 particularly sensitive." | 24 context of that investigation. To provide |
| 25 So that sets out as full as I can today the | some background, on 15 October 2018 the |
| 7 | |
| Page 138 | Page 140 |

| 1 | RGP commenced a criminal investigation | 1 | footage. The meeting was cordial, and Mr |
|----------|--|----------|---|
| 2 | into the alleged hacking and sabotage of the | 2 | Levy repeatedly thanked Superintendent |
| 3 | NSCIS, a platform designed to monitor and | 3 | Richardson for his sensitivity. During the |
| 4 | control Gibraltar's border with Spain. This | 4 | meeting, Superintendent Richardson handed |
| 5 | was alleged to be part of a wider conspiracy | 5 | Mr Levy a letter inviting him to a voluntary |
| 6 | with John Perez, Caine Sanchez and possibly | 6 | police interview under caution at 10 am on |
| 7 | others, to try to transfer the intellectual | 7 | 18 May 2020, six days later. Nine hours |
| 8 | property of the NSCIS from Bland Limited to | 8 | later, Mr Levy agreed to hand over his |
| 9 | a company called 36 North Limited. 36 | 9 | devices voluntarily so that the warrants did |
| 10 | North Limited was a company owned 33 | 10 | not need to be executed. In the days that |
| 11 | percent each by Mr Cornelio (through a | 11 | followed extensive correspondence passed |
| 12 | company called ICODE Limited), Mr Perez, | 12 | between the RGP, Hassans and the |
| 13 | and a company named Astelon Limited | 13 | magistrates' court, in which Hassans sought |
| 14 | whose beneficial owners were the partners of | 14 | the return of the devices and threatened a |
| 15 | Hassans Law Firm. That shareholding was | 15 | judicial review. The RGP later agreed to |
| 16 | given to Hassans in exchange for a loan of | 16 | accept a written statement from Mr Levy in |
| 17 | £476,000. Through his partnership of the | 17 | lieu of a proposed interview, and he |
| 18 | firm Mr Levy owned just over ten percent of | 18 | submitted that statement on 9 June 2020. Mr |
| 19 | 36 North, and the Chief Minister owned just | 19 | Levy was not ultimately charged, nor did he |
| 20 | under three percent. The Chief Minister | 20 | proceed with a judicial review of the search |
| 21 | describes Mr Levy KC in his evidence as "a | 21 | warrants. Mr Levy's personal devices were |
| 22 | mentor in my previous legal practice, a | 22 | later returned without being opened. In |
| 23 | supporter in my current political career and a | 23 | |
| | | 23 | September 2020 Mr Cornelio, Mr Perez and |
| 24 | close personal friend". The allegation at the | 25 | Mr Sanchez (to whom we will refer as the Op |
| 25 | centre of criminal investigation was that | 23 | Delhi defendants) were charged with |
| | Page 141 | | Page 143 |
| 1 | Thomas Cornelio had hacked and sabotaged | 1 | conspiracy to defraud. Mr Cornelio was |
| 2 | the NSCIS system. A dispute arose in the | 2 | further charged with 14 computer misuse |
| 3 | context of that investigation as to whether the | 3 | offences, and Mr Sanchez was charged with |
| 4 | intellectual property in the NSCIS was | 4 | misconduct in public office and aiding and |
| 5 | owned by Bland Limited or the Government. | 5 | abetting unauthorised access to computer |
| 6 | From late December 2018 Superintendent | 6 | material. On 21 January 2022 the Attorney |
| 7 | Paul Richardson was the Senior Investigating | 7 | General discontinued the proceedings against |
| 8 | Officer, and from May 2019 Detective | 8 | Mr Cornelio, Mr Perez and Mr Sanchez |
| 9 | Inspector Mark Wyan was the officer in | 9 | under Section 59(2)(c) of the Gibraltar |
| 10 | charge of the investigation. The complainant | 10 | Constitution Order 2006, citing the public |
| 11 | was Bland Limited, through its chairman Mr | 11 | interest. What are the main allegations in |
| 12 | James Gaggero. In May 2019 Mr Perez, Mr | 12 | relation to this issue? The Chief Minister's |
| 13 | Sanchez, Mr Cornelio and another individual | 13 | evidence as to why he lost confidence in |
| 13 | were arrested. On 7 May 2020 the RGP | 13 | relation to this issue can be picked up at |
| 15 | | 15 | <u> </u> |
| | applied for and obtained from the Stipendiary | | A190, paragraph 37. He says, "My only intervention in relation to this case has been |
| 16 17 | Magistrate warrants to search the home and | 16 | |
| 17 | office of Mr Levy, on the basis that there | 17 | to express my views to Mr McGrail about his |
| 18 | were grounds to suspect him of having | 18 | decision to obtain and execute search |
| 19 | committed conspiracy to defraud contrary to | 19 | warrants at the home and professional office |
| 20 | the common law. On 12 May 2020 a team of | 20 | at Hassans of James Levy CBE QC, and that |
| 21 | RGP officers led by Superintendent | 21 22 | was after the event." In 38 he explains his relationship with Mr Levy, which I have |
| 22 | D1.1 1 | | relationship with Mr Levy, which I have |
| 22 | Richardson attended Hassans to execute the | | • |
| 23 | warrants. Superintendent Richardson met | 23 | summarised. In 39 he says, "In the context |
| 23 24 | warrants. Superintendent Richardson met with Mr Levy in a Hassans boardroom; the | 23 24 | summarised. In 39 he says, "In the context of Operation Delhi, I became aware from Mr |
| 23 | warrants. Superintendent Richardson met | 23 | summarised. In 39 he says, "In the context |
| 23 24 | warrants. Superintendent Richardson met with Mr Levy in a Hassans boardroom; the | 23 24 | summarised. In 39 he says, "In the context of Operation Delhi, I became aware from Mr |

| 1 | who was of interest to investigators. On 12 | 1 | making the same point if any other senior |
|-------|--|----|---|
| 2 | May 2020 I received a WhatsApp message | 2 | member of the legal profession had been |
| 3 | from Mr McGrail that said, 'CM, before you | 3 | involved." Just jumping over to 45, he says, |
| 4 | hear it from anyone else I want to inform you | 4 | "I recall telling Mr McGrail that the |
| 5 | that detectives are executing a search warrant | 5 | communications devices of senior lawyers |
| 6 | at Hassans for JL in relation to the case | 6 | were likely to include legally privileged |
| 7 | against Perez, Cornelio and Sanchez. It's | 7 | material which would have to be sifted |
| 8 | been done in the most discreet of ways, and | 8 | through the RGP in a warrant type situation |
| 9 | we're hoping there is cooperation. Regards.' | 9 | such as this one they had brought about, an |
| 10 | Worthy of note is the fact that Mr McGrail | 10 | expertise which the RGP did not have in |
| 11 | • | 11 | <u> </u> |
| 12 | described the case as being against persons | 12 | dealing with white-collar crime. Then, |
| | that did not include Mr Levy. I responded | 1 | jumping to 47, "During the course of this |
| 13 | nine minutes later, also by WhatsApp, as | 13 | conversation I was both angry and seriously |
| 14 | follows, 'Ian, thank you for the courtesy of | 14 | concerned about the effect of the RGP's |
| 15 | this information. I think that is a bad | 15 | actions. I told Mr McGrail that I could |
| 16 | decision. A search warrant should only have | 16 | imagine that the government might face |
| 17 | been sought if you believed that the person in | 17 | financial consequences from claims for |
| 18 | question was not going to cooperate and will | 18 | damages for breaches of privacy, |
| 19 | try to destroy evidence. If as you say you are | 19 | confidentiality and other claims. I told Mr |
| 20 | hoping for cooperation, especially in a case | 20 | McGrail that Mr Levy and we were all |
| 21 | involving a senior silk and head of Gibraltar's | 21 | officers of the court. In circumstances such |
| 22 | largest legal firm, you should in my view | 22 | as these, the duties of an officer of the court |
| 23 | first have sought to contact that person and | 23 | would require us to cooperate and provide |
| 24 | obtain cooperation. Given my close personal | 24 | such information as we might have available |
| 25 | relationship with JL I won't comment further.' | 25 | on the basis of an order, be it a Production |
| | D 445 | | D 447 |
| | Page 145 | | Page 147 |
| 1 | Just after sending my response, I was | 1 | Order or another type of order, to disclose |
| 2 | informed that Mr McGrail was actually at | 2 | information or for discovery of documents |
| 3 | that moment in 6 Convent Place on an | 3 | and data. I added that I believed that Mr |
| 4 | unrelated matter. I therefore asked that he | 4 | McGrail knew that my position in respect of |
| 5 | should come up to my office to see me, | 5 | his investigation was that it should of course |
| 6 | which he did. The Attorney General, | 6 | continue, and that if evidence was found with |
| 7 | Michael Llamas QC, who I believe was with | 7 | corruption in public office of one of the |
| 8 | me at the time that I received the WhatsApp | 8 | persons being investigated, who was a civil |
| 9 | from Mr McGrail, was present during the | 9 | servant, I had been clear that the Government |
| 10 | whole of this meeting. Although that | 10 | would be the complainant in those |
| 11 | conversation was now two years ago, I | 11 | circumstances." Skipping over a paragraph, |
| 12 | believe I have a good recollection of it. I set | 12 | "Mr McGrail then retorted that he had taken |
| 13 | out in the following paragraphs my memory | 13 | the advice of the Attorney General on this |
| 14 | of that conversation, and the upshot of it for | 14 | matter. Mr Llamas, who was in the room |
| 15 | me." And I will just quote some parts of that, | 15 | with us throughout, stated that this was not |
| 16 | because it is rather lengthy, but at 44 he says, | 16 | true. Mr McGrail then insisted that he had |
| 17 | "I made clear in firm and forthright language | 17 | sought the advice of the Director of Public |
| 18 | to Mr McGrail that I considered that the RGP | 18 | Prosecutions on whether to obtain a search |
| 19 | had not acted properly in the execution of a | 19 | warrant or a production order for Mr Levy. |
| 20 | search warrant in respect of a senior lawyer | 20 | Mr McGrail then specifically told me that the |
| 21 | like Mr Levy. I repeated the points made in | 21 | advice of the DPP was that they should |
| 22 | my WhatsApp reply. In person, I robustly | 22 | proceed by way of a search warrant. The |
| 23 | told Mr McGrail that he should not think that | 23 | Attorney General said that he did not believe |
| 24 | I was making this point because I was close | 24 | that the DPP had given such advice; I |
| · /·+ | | | mai me Di i nad given such advice, i |
| | | 1 | responded by saving that I too did not believe |
| 25 | to Mr Levy. I told him that I would be | 25 | responded by saying that I too did not believe |
| | | 1 | responded by saying that I too did not believe Page 148 |

| 1 | that would have been the advice of the DPP, | 1 | the DPP had not in fact advised the RGP to |
|----|--|----|---|
| 2 | with whom I have never discussed the matter, | 2 | proceed by way of search warrant in respect |
| 3 | but if that was the advice of the DPP then I | 3 | of Mr Levy. Confirmation from the DPP that |
| 4 | would have to disagree with the DPP also. | 4 | he had not advised that the evidence from Mr |
| 5 | Further, the Attorney General made the point | 5 | Levy should have been obtained by search |
| 6 | (of which I was not aware until that moment) | 6 | warrant was confirmation that Mr McGrail, |
| 7 | that Mr McGrail had indeed sought his | 7 | the most senior law enforcement in Gibraltar, |
| 8 | advice in respect of this matter, and that he | 8 | had lied to me, the most senior elected |
| 9 | and Mr McGrail had agreed that there should | 9 | representative of the people of Gibraltar, in |
| 10 | be no further actions in that respect without | 10 | my office. The DPP's assertions were totally |
| 11 | them speaking further. The Attorney General | 11 | contrary to Mr McGrail's express statements |
| 12 | told Mr McGrail that he felt seriously let | 12 | to me, and on that day (12 May 2020) I lost |
| 13 | down by him as a result of the RGP's actions | 13 | all confidence in his probity and integrity in |
| 14 | being contrary to their latest agreed position | 14 | his dealings with me, and generally in him as |
| 15 | in respect of this very sensitive matter. I | 15 | a result." The Chief Minister makes no |
| 16 | believe I told Mr McGrail as that meeting | 16 | secret that his decision to express concerns to |
| 17 | ended that I was greatly disappointed by the | 17 | the GPA was principally for what he says was |
| 18 | manner in which the RGP had acted, and that | 18 | deception by Mr McGrail in respect of the |
| 19 | I believed that they had acted improperly and | 19 | warrants. He denies that he was interfering |
| 20 | outside the law. I was very angry about this | 20 | in the live criminal investigation, maintaining |
| 21 | turn of events and Mr McGrail's attitude in | 21 | that the extent of his intervention in the |
| 22 | the meeting, and used robust language | 22 | matter was to ensure that the contract |
| 23 | throughout the meeting, very likely laced | 23 | remained with Bland when the issues were |
| 24 | with expletives. At the end of that fractious | 24 | brought to his attention. He makes clear that |
| 25 | meeting with Mr McGrail I felt very | 25 | he gave a statement to the investigation on 25 |
| 23 | incetting with Mit McGraff Flett very | 23 | he gave a statement to the investigation on 23 |
| | Page 149 | | Page 151 |
| | | | |
| 1 | disappointed in him. I believed that he had | 1 | June 2021, over a year after Mr McGrail's |
| 2 | misled me over the question of the Attorney | 2 | retirement, and that the Government |
| 3 | General's position on the issue of the search | 3 | continued to provide information and |
| 4 | warrant. I also felt sure that the advice of the | 4 | statements to the police and the prosecution |
| 5 | DPP would not be as he had stated it to have | 5 | throughout, with charges being brought. He |
| 6 | been, and that he had lied to me. In fact, for | 6 | also makes clear that he intervened to ensure |
| 7 | me the meeting ended worse than it had | 7 | that the contract remained with Bland, |
| 8 | begun. I had not just established that the | 8 | despite Hassans' part-ownership of (and |
| 9 | totally incorrect procedure that had been | 9 | therefore his own interest in) 36 North |
| 10 | followed in a sensitive matter; I was left with | 10 | Limited. His evidence is that the sole |
| 11 | the feeling that Mr McGrail believed that the | 11 | consideration in his mind was the security of |
| 12 | RGP under his direction could act almost | 12 | Gibraltar and the well-being of the people of |
| 13 | with impunity and with no regard to | 13 | Gibraltar. The Attorney General gives a |
| 14 | established principles of criminal procedure | 14 | supportive account at A274. It starts at |
| 15 | that are designed to protect suspects and | 15 | paragraph 16, where he says, "My |
| 16 | others who may be able to assist the police | 16 | involvement in the criminal investigation was |
| 17 | with their inquiries. After Mr McGrail left | 17 | initiated by Mr McGrail himself, when on 11 |
| 18 | the short and ill-tempered meeting with us", | 18 | May 2019 he sent an email to the Chief |
| 19 | this is one paragraph later, "I subsequently | 19 | Minister, the Minister for Justice, the Chief |
| 20 | asked the Attorney General to confirm for me | 20 | Secretary, the Financial Secretary, the |
| 21 | whether or not the DPP had in fact agreed | 21 | Director of Public Prosecutions and myself, a |
| 22 | that a search warrant was the correct manner | 22 | copy of which is now produced and shown to |
| 23 | for the RGP to seek to obtain relevant | 23 | me, stating the following, 'Dear all, I believe |
| 24 | evidence from Mr Levy. The Attorney | 24 | you are aware of the investigation we are |
| 25 | General subsequently confirmed to me that | 25 | conducting following the complaint filed by |
| | | | |
| | Page 150 | | Page 152 |

| 1 | James Gaggero, Chairman of the Bland | 1 | rationalised, ideally after dealing with the |
|--|--|---|---|
| 2 | Group. Yesterday we carried out executive | 2 | issue of ownership of the NSCIS platform, |
| 3 | action on three ex-Bland Group employees, | 3 | which was still live and needed to be dealt |
| 4 | and they are now on police bail. Immediate | 4 | with. It seemed clear to both of us that the |
| 5 | inquiries post to our intervention have | 5 | ownership was a key to viability of a number |
| 6 | revealed issues of serious concern, which I | 6 | of the proposed charges, and that on one |
| 7 | require to brief you on. Please advise when | 7 | possible ownership outcome a number of the |
| 8 | we could meet, the sooner the better. I would | 8 | proposed charges would necessarily fall |
| 9 | ask that this request to meet is not shared | 9 | away. Each of the matters set out above, and |
| 10 | with anyone other than those copied in this | 10 | still more so all of them in combination, |
| 11 | email.' That meeting took place on 13 May | 11 | raised matters of considerable public |
| 12 | 2019." Just skipping over to paragraph 20, "I | 12 | importance, and also to my mind had the |
| 13 | myself had no further involvement with the | 13 | potential to cause serious reputational |
| 14 | criminal investigation until about 11 months | 14 | damage to Gibraltar, very especially at a time |
| 15 | later, even though I was aware that the | 15 | when negotiations were (and still and |
| 16 | investigation was continuing." Then, at 21, | 16 | remain) afoot with the EU and Spain in |
| 17 | "It was not until early April 2020 that the | 17 | relation to vital related matters for Gibraltar." |
| 18 | criminal investigation was brought to my | 18 | And then over the page, 26, "I considered |
| 19 | attention again, on this occasion it was as a | 19 | then, and still consider, that I have a |
| 20 | result of a call I received from the DPP, | 20 | legitimate public interest role and function, |
| 21 | Christian Rocca QC, who wished to discuss | 21 | indeed a responsibility, in respect of such |
| 22 | with me certain aspects of the RGP's | 22 | matters. Namely, the unwieldy number and |
| 23 | investigation. I would like to point out that | 23 | the viability (?) of proposed charges, |
| 24 | the DPP very rarely seeks to discuss criminal | 24 | particularly in relation to a case that exposed |
| 25 | cases with me, and typically acts completely | 25 | serious failures in the national security of |
| 23 | cases with me, and typicarry acts completely | 23 | serious fantites in the national security of |
| | Page 153 | | Page 155 |
| | | , | |
| 1 | independently from me. The fact that he | 1 | Gibraltar by the public agencies responsible, |
| 2 | called me gave me cause for concern that | 2 | and possible misfeasance by public officers. |
| 3 | there was something seriously wrong. | 3 | The DPP and I therefore agreed that I should |
| 4 | During our discussion the DPP confirmed to | 4 | seek a meeting with Mr McGrail about the |
| 5 | me that on the basis of the information that | 5 | quantity and rationalisation of the charges. |
| 6 | was available to the DPP at the time it was | 6 | Contrary to Mr McGrail's accusations against |
| 7 | clear that there had been serious failures of | 7 | me and the improper motives that he imputes |
| 8 | the national security system of Gibraltar, that | 1 0 | * * |
| | II 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 (2) | 8 | to me, I would not have known about this or |
| 9 | Hassans held shares in the rival company (36 | 9 | to me, I would not have known about this or intervened at all if the DPP had not himself |
| 10 | North Limited) and that Mr Levy was | 9 10 | to me, I would not have known about this or intervened at all if the DPP had not himself called this matter to my attention and |
| 10 11 | North Limited) and that Mr Levy was potentially a person of interest, that a senior | 9 10 11 | to me, I would not have known about this or intervened at all if the DPP had not himself called this matter to my attention and requested me to act as aforesaid." Turning to |
| 10 11 12 | North Limited) and that Mr Levy was potentially a person of interest, that a senior civil servant (Mr Sanchez) was one of the | 9 10 11 12 | to me, I would not have known about this or intervened at all if the DPP had not himself called this matter to my attention and requested me to act as aforesaid." Turning to 7 April, he refers to a meeting on the 7th with |
| 10 11 12 13 | North Limited) and that Mr Levy was potentially a person of interest, that a senior civil servant (Mr Sanchez) was one of the suspects, that the Chief Executive Officer of | 9 10 11 12 13 | to me, I would not have known about this or intervened at all if the DPP had not himself called this matter to my attention and requested me to act as aforesaid." Turning to 7 April, he refers to a meeting on the 7th with the senior legal advisor Mr Lloyd |
| 10 11 12 13 14 | North Limited) and that Mr Levy was potentially a person of interest, that a senior civil servant (Mr Sanchez) was one of the suspects, that the Chief Executive Officer of the Borders and Coastguard Agency may also | 9 10 11 12 13 14 | to me, I would not have known about this or intervened at all if the DPP had not himself called this matter to my attention and requested me to act as aforesaid." Turning to 7 April, he refers to a meeting on the 7th with the senior legal advisor Mr Lloyd DeVincenzi, Mr McGrail and DS |
| 10 11 12 13 14 15 | North Limited) and that Mr Levy was potentially a person of interest, that a senior civil servant (Mr Sanchez) was one of the suspects, that the Chief Executive Officer of the Borders and Coastguard Agency may also have been implicated, and that ownership of | 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 | to me, I would not have known about this or intervened at all if the DPP had not himself called this matter to my attention and requested me to act as aforesaid." Turning to 7 April, he refers to a meeting on the 7th with the senior legal advisor Mr Lloyd DeVincenzi, Mr McGrail and DS Richardson, which he says is the first time |
| 10 11 12 13 14 15 | North Limited) and that Mr Levy was potentially a person of interest, that a senior civil servant (Mr Sanchez) was one of the suspects, that the Chief Executive Officer of the Borders and Coastguard Agency may also have been implicated, and that ownership of the NSCIS platform was contested and there | 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 | to me, I would not have known about this or intervened at all if the DPP had not himself called this matter to my attention and requested me to act as aforesaid." Turning to 7 April, he refers to a meeting on the 7th with the senior legal advisor Mr Lloyd DeVincenzi, Mr McGrail and DS Richardson, which he says is the first time that he met with Mr McGrail and the RGP. |
| 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 | North Limited) and that Mr Levy was potentially a person of interest, that a senior civil servant (Mr Sanchez) was one of the suspects, that the Chief Executive Officer of the Borders and Coastguard Agency may also have been implicated, and that ownership of the NSCIS platform was contested and there was no formal written contract between the | 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 | to me, I would not have known about this or intervened at all if the DPP had not himself called this matter to my attention and requested me to act as aforesaid." Turning to 7 April, he refers to a meeting on the 7th with the senior legal advisor Mr Lloyd DeVincenzi, Mr McGrail and DS Richardson, which he says is the first time that he met with Mr McGrail and the RGP. And at 29 he says, "In that meeting Mr |
| 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 | North Limited) and that Mr Levy was potentially a person of interest, that a senior civil servant (Mr Sanchez) was one of the suspects, that the Chief Executive Officer of the Borders and Coastguard Agency may also have been implicated, and that ownership of the NSCIS platform was contested and there was no formal written contract between the Government and Bland Limited in this | 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 | to me, I would not have known about this or intervened at all if the DPP had not himself called this matter to my attention and requested me to act as aforesaid." Turning to 7 April, he refers to a meeting on the 7th with the senior legal advisor Mr Lloyd DeVincenzi, Mr McGrail and DS Richardson, which he says is the first time that he met with Mr McGrail and the RGP. And at 29 he says, "In that meeting Mr McGrail and I agreed that, as he had said in |
| 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 | North Limited) and that Mr Levy was potentially a person of interest, that a senior civil servant (Mr Sanchez) was one of the suspects, that the Chief Executive Officer of the Borders and Coastguard Agency may also have been implicated, and that ownership of the NSCIS platform was contested and there was no formal written contract between the Government and Bland Limited in this regard. The DPP also informed me that the | 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 | to me, I would not have known about this or intervened at all if the DPP had not himself called this matter to my attention and requested me to act as aforesaid." Turning to 7 April, he refers to a meeting on the 7th with the senior legal advisor Mr Lloyd DeVincenzi, Mr McGrail and DS Richardson, which he says is the first time that he met with Mr McGrail and the RGP. And at 29 he says, "In that meeting Mr McGrail and I agreed that, as he had said in his original meeting of 11 May 2019, the |
| 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 | North Limited) and that Mr Levy was potentially a person of interest, that a senior civil servant (Mr Sanchez) was one of the suspects, that the Chief Executive Officer of the Borders and Coastguard Agency may also have been implicated, and that ownership of the NSCIS platform was contested and there was no formal written contract between the Government and Bland Limited in this regard. The DPP also informed me that the RGP had drawn up a list of 76 charges | 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 | to me, I would not have known about this or intervened at all if the DPP had not himself called this matter to my attention and requested me to act as aforesaid." Turning to 7 April, he refers to a meeting on the 7th with the senior legal advisor Mr Lloyd DeVincenzi, Mr McGrail and DS Richardson, which he says is the first time that he met with Mr McGrail and the RGP. And at 29 he says, "In that meeting Mr McGrail and I agreed that, as he had said in his original meeting of 11 May 2019, the investigation did indeed raise issues of |
| 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 | North Limited) and that Mr Levy was potentially a person of interest, that a senior civil servant (Mr Sanchez) was one of the suspects, that the Chief Executive Officer of the Borders and Coastguard Agency may also have been implicated, and that ownership of the NSCIS platform was contested and there was no formal written contract between the Government and Bland Limited in this regard. The DPP also informed me that the RGP had drawn up a list of 76 charges against Messrs Cornelio, Perez and Sanchez; | 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 | to me, I would not have known about this or intervened at all if the DPP had not himself called this matter to my attention and requested me to act as aforesaid." Turning to 7 April, he refers to a meeting on the 7th with the senior legal advisor Mr Lloyd DeVincenzi, Mr McGrail and DS Richardson, which he says is the first time that he met with Mr McGrail and the RGP. And at 29 he says, "In that meeting Mr McGrail and I agreed that, as he had said in his original meeting of 11 May 2019, the investigation did indeed raise issues of serious concern. I therefore advised Mr |
| 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 | North Limited) and that Mr Levy was potentially a person of interest, that a senior civil servant (Mr Sanchez) was one of the suspects, that the Chief Executive Officer of the Borders and Coastguard Agency may also have been implicated, and that ownership of the NSCIS platform was contested and there was no formal written contract between the Government and Bland Limited in this regard. The DPP also informed me that the RGP had drawn up a list of 76 charges against Messrs Cornelio, Perez and Sanchez; this was news to me. The DPP told me that | 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 | to me, I would not have known about this or intervened at all if the DPP had not himself called this matter to my attention and requested me to act as aforesaid." Turning to 7 April, he refers to a meeting on the 7th with the senior legal advisor Mr Lloyd DeVincenzi, Mr McGrail and DS Richardson, which he says is the first time that he met with Mr McGrail and the RGP. And at 29 he says, "In that meeting Mr McGrail and I agreed that, as he had said in his original meeting of 11 May 2019, the investigation did indeed raise issues of serious concern. I therefore advised Mr McGrail that I considered it vital that the |
| 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 | North Limited) and that Mr Levy was potentially a person of interest, that a senior civil servant (Mr Sanchez) was one of the suspects, that the Chief Executive Officer of the Borders and Coastguard Agency may also have been implicated, and that ownership of the NSCIS platform was contested and there was no formal written contract between the Government and Bland Limited in this regard. The DPP also informed me that the RGP had drawn up a list of 76 charges against Messrs Cornelio, Perez and Sanchez; this was news to me. The DPP told me that the excessive number of charges seemed | 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 | to me, I would not have known about this or intervened at all if the DPP had not himself called this matter to my attention and requested me to act as aforesaid." Turning to 7 April, he refers to a meeting on the 7th with the senior legal advisor Mr Lloyd DeVincenzi, Mr McGrail and DS Richardson, which he says is the first time that he met with Mr McGrail and the RGP. And at 29 he says, "In that meeting Mr McGrail and I agreed that, as he had said in his original meeting of 11 May 2019, the investigation did indeed raise issues of serious concern. I therefore advised Mr McGrail that I considered it vital that the investigation should proceed, and be |
| 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24 | North Limited) and that Mr Levy was potentially a person of interest, that a senior civil servant (Mr Sanchez) was one of the suspects, that the Chief Executive Officer of the Borders and Coastguard Agency may also have been implicated, and that ownership of the NSCIS platform was contested and there was no formal written contract between the Government and Bland Limited in this regard. The DPP also informed me that the RGP had drawn up a list of 76 charges against Messrs Cornelio, Perez and Sanchez; this was news to me. The DPP told me that the excessive number of charges seemed wholly inappropriate and that he was of the | 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24 | to me, I would not have known about this or intervened at all if the DPP had not himself called this matter to my attention and requested me to act as aforesaid." Turning to 7 April, he refers to a meeting on the 7th with the senior legal advisor Mr Lloyd DeVincenzi, Mr McGrail and DS Richardson, which he says is the first time that he met with Mr McGrail and the RGP. And at 29 he says, "In that meeting Mr McGrail and I agreed that, as he had said in his original meeting of 11 May 2019, the investigation did indeed raise issues of serious concern. I therefore advised Mr McGrail that I considered it vital that the investigation should proceed, and be conducted prudently and with tremendous |
| 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 | North Limited) and that Mr Levy was potentially a person of interest, that a senior civil servant (Mr Sanchez) was one of the suspects, that the Chief Executive Officer of the Borders and Coastguard Agency may also have been implicated, and that ownership of the NSCIS platform was contested and there was no formal written contract between the Government and Bland Limited in this regard. The DPP also informed me that the RGP had drawn up a list of 76 charges against Messrs Cornelio, Perez and Sanchez; this was news to me. The DPP told me that the excessive number of charges seemed | 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 | to me, I would not have known about this or intervened at all if the DPP had not himself called this matter to my attention and requested me to act as aforesaid." Turning to 7 April, he refers to a meeting on the 7th with the senior legal advisor Mr Lloyd DeVincenzi, Mr McGrail and DS Richardson, which he says is the first time that he met with Mr McGrail and the RGP. And at 29 he says, "In that meeting Mr McGrail and I agreed that, as he had said in his original meeting of 11 May 2019, the investigation did indeed raise issues of serious concern. I therefore advised Mr McGrail that I considered it vital that the investigation should proceed, and be |
| 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24 | North Limited) and that Mr Levy was potentially a person of interest, that a senior civil servant (Mr Sanchez) was one of the suspects, that the Chief Executive Officer of the Borders and Coastguard Agency may also have been implicated, and that ownership of the NSCIS platform was contested and there was no formal written contract between the Government and Bland Limited in this regard. The DPP also informed me that the RGP had drawn up a list of 76 charges against Messrs Cornelio, Perez and Sanchez; this was news to me. The DPP told me that the excessive number of charges seemed wholly inappropriate and that he was of the | 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24 | to me, I would not have known about this or intervened at all if the DPP had not himself called this matter to my attention and requested me to act as aforesaid." Turning to 7 April, he refers to a meeting on the 7th with the senior legal advisor Mr Lloyd DeVincenzi, Mr McGrail and DS Richardson, which he says is the first time that he met with Mr McGrail and the RGP. And at 29 he says, "In that meeting Mr McGrail and I agreed that, as he had said in his original meeting of 11 May 2019, the investigation did indeed raise issues of serious concern. I therefore advised Mr McGrail that I considered it vital that the investigation should proceed, and be conducted prudently and with tremendous |

| | | l l | |
|----------|---|-----|---|
| 1 | McGrail that I was deeply concerned that the | 1 | investigation or change its course or |
| 2 | RGP were proceeding without first resolving | 2 | approach, or anything other than entirely |
| 3 | the ownership dispute, since it seemed to me | 3 | appropriate advice and assistance in the |
| 4 | that that issue would likely have an impact | 4 | context of those specific issues, and nor did |
| 5 | on some of the proposed charges. I told him | 5 | Mr McGrail suggest otherwise to me." Then, |
| 6 | that I was also concerned about the proposed | 6 | over the page he deals with 12 May 2020, |
| 7 | number of charges (76), which seemed | 7 | and I apologise for reading this out but it is a |
| 8 | wholly excessive. I reminded Mr McGrail of | 8 | very important meeting, he says, "Without |
| 9 | the general wisdom of focusing charges | 9 | any further communication between me and |
| 10 | appropriately. During this meeting, Mr | 10 | Mr McGrail or anyone else in the RGP in this |
| 11 | McGrail himself raised with me other matters | 11 | case, on 12 May 2020 the RGP executed |
| 12 | relating to this investigation; for instance, he | 12 | search warrants at the home and offices of |
| 13 | said that the Chief Minister, another minister, | 13 | Mr Levy. Mr McGrail informed me of this |
| 14 | a member of the Opposition and the | 14 | by WhatsApp, in terms very similar to the |
| 15 | Financial Secretary were all partners of | 15 | message he sent to the Chief Minister." And |
| 16 | Hassans. I interpreted Mr McGrail to mean | 16 | then, over the page he says, "This took me by |
| 17 | that, through their partnerships in that law | 17 | surprise, since it was a clear violation of what |
| 18 | firm and that law firm's shareholding in 36 | 18 | Mr McGrail and I had agreed in our meeting |
| 19 | North Limited, these persons had an indirect | 19 | of 7 April 2020. I was very disappointed |
| 20 | ownership interest in that company. | 20 | with his action, and I responded to him two |
| 21 | Although it did not appear to me that there | 21 | minutes later, also by WhatsApp, as follows, |
| 22 | was any suggestion being made of possible | 22 | 'Ian, we had agreed that you would come to |
| 23 | wrongdoing on their part, it was clear to me | 23 | me with a rationalisation of the charges |
| 24 | that there were obvious potential reputational | 24 | before doing anything.' We then had the |
| 25 | issues for Gibraltar." Just skipping a | 25 | following exchange, also by WhatsApp." Mr |
| 25 | issues for Giordina. Vast shipping a | =0 | renewing enemange, once of whater type that |
| | Page 157 | | Page 159 |
| 1 | paragraph well, I may as well read that | 1 | McGrail says, "We agreed we'd do that when |
| 1 2 | out, "I also recall that, possibly in the context | 2 | all the loose ends were tied up, and this |
| 3 | of his reference to Hassans, Mr McGrail also | 3 | included the inquiries with JL." The |
| 4 | made a reference to Mr Levy, and his hope | 4 | Attorney General replies, "No, that was not |
| 5 | that he would assist the investigation. I do | 5 | what we agreed." Mr McGrail says, "I am in |
| 6 | not recall engaging in any discussion with | 6 | the bunker. Will come around to the office as |
| 7 | him on this. After a long and from my | 7 | soon as I finish here." Then, skipping a |
| 8 | recollection amicable discussion we reached | 8 | paragraph, he says, "My recollection of the |
| 9 | what for me was a very clear understanding | 9 | meeting, which could not have lasted more |
| 10 | between us; namely, that the RGP would not | 10 | than around 20 minutes, is that the Chief |
| 11 | take any further action until they had: one, | 11 | Minister was angry, and expressed to Mr |
| 12 | clarified the question of the ownership of the | 12 | McGrail in robust and no uncertain terms his |
| 13 | NSCIS platform; two, rationalised the | 13 | view that the RGP's decision to execute the |
| 14 | charges, which the DPP had told me it was | 14 | search warrants on My Levy was wholly |
| 15 | extremely possible to do; and three, | 15 | inappropriate and ill-advised." Then over the |
| 16 | whereupon Mr McGrail would meet with me | 16 | |
| | and the DPP before taking any further steps. | 17 | page, skipping to 42, he says, "My recollection is that Mr McGrail defended his |
| 17 18 | It was clear beyond peradventure that | 18 | decision on two grounds. Firstly, he stated |
| 18 | nothing other than what we had agreed to | 19 | that the warrants had been granted by a |
| 20 | would happen until we met again. There was | 20 | judge, who must therefore have been |
| 20 | nothing in what I said or in the manner in | 20 | satisfied that the relevant threshold was met. |
| 21 | which I said it that Mr McGrail, DS | 22 | The Chief Minister replied that that did not |
| 23 | Richardson or anybody else in the RGP could | 23 | address the fact that the RGP had |
| 23 | reasonably or properly have interpreted as | 23 | conspicuously failed to ask Mr Levy to |
| 25 | interference or pressure to stop the | 25 | voluntarily produce the documents and |
| 23 | morrence of pressure to stop the | 23 | voluntarity produce the documents and |
| | | | |
| | Page 158 | | Page 160 |

| 1 | devices, and that warrants were in any event | 1 | down; a serious breach of trust has occurred." |
|--|--|--|---|
| 2 | normally granted without detailed legal | 2 | Mr McGrail replies, "I respect your view not |
| 3 | examination. Secondly, Mr McGrail sought | 3 | to meet, but totally refute any breach of trust. |
| 4 | to defend his decision by making two | 4 | We'll agree to disagree." Then, finally |
| 5 | comments which startled me. He at first said | 5 | turning to Mr McGrail's response to these |
| | | | · · |
| 6 | that he had been taking advice from me, and | 6 | accounts, if we can go to A9 first of all, |
| 7 | intimated that I had approved of the course of | 7 | please. Just picking it up from paragraph 32, |
| 8 | action the RGP had taken. This was totally | 8 | after the exchange of messages, Mr McGrail |
| 9 | untrue, and I said so. I could not believe he | 9 | says, "I was called out from the meeting I |
| 10 | had said that. In fact, we had only discussed | 10 | was in and requested to go to see the CM and |
| 11 | the criminal investigation once, in the | 11 | AG, who were asking to see me. I excused |
| 12 | meeting of 7 April 2020, during which we | 12 | myself from the meeting, and went up to see |
| 13 | had not discussed the issue of a search | 13 | the CM and AG. I was seen into the Cabinet |
| 14 | warrant on Mr Levy at all. When I refuted | 14 | Room, where I waited for a few minutes |
| 15 | this, Mr McGrail then said that he had been | 15 | before the CM and AG entered the room |
| 16 | taking advice from the DPP, and that the DPP | 16 | from the CM's office. I distinctly recall the |
| 17 | had advised him that the RGP should proceed | 17 | AG was wearing a t-shirt and jeans. There I |
| 18 | by way of a search warrant. The Chief | 18 | received the dressing-down of my 36-year |
| 19 | Minister and I told Mr McGrail that we | 19 | law enforcement career. I was asked by the |
| 20 | found that very difficult to believe that he | 20 | CM in a condescending tone what was I |
| 21 | could have received such advice from the | 21 | doing executing a warrant on JL. In what |
| 22 | DPP. In this meeting I referred to the | 22 | was a barrage of comments, the CM stated |
| 23 | understanding Mr McGrail and I had reached | 23 | words to the effect in both the English and |
| 24 | in our meeting of 7 April 2020: that he would | 24 | Spanish language: what are you doing, Ian, |
| 25 | | 25 | |
| 23 | take no further action until the charges had | 23 | this is a complete blunder, why go with a |
| | Page 161 | | Page 163 |
| | | | |
| 1 | been rationalised. I told Mr McGrail that | 1 | warrant? Do you suspect Heine (?) (JL) has |
| 2 | there had been a breach of trust between us, | 2 | committed a crime? Look, Heine (?) can be |
| 3 | since he had acted in complete disregard to | 3 | many things, and he has been in messes |
| 4 | what we had agreed. After Mr McGrail left | 4 | before, but he is not a criminal. He is a |
| 5 | the meeting, the Chief Minister asked me to | 5 | senior silk, head of the Jewish community, |
| 6 | ask the DPP whether or not it was true that he | 6 | helps out the RGP if needed. He is the head |
| 7 | had advised the RGP to proceed by way of a | 7 | of the biggest law firm in Gibraltar, and he |
| 8 | search warrant against Mr Levy. The DPP | 8 | has a very good reputation as a lawyer. Are |
| 9 | confirmed to me that he had never given such | 9 | you suggesting that Heine (?) would destroy |
| 10 | advice. I passed the information to the Chief | 10 | or dispose of evidence? You know Gibraltar, |
| 11 | Minister. I had a further exchange of | 11 | this will get out. You are managing this |
| 12 | WhatsApp messages with Mr McGrail later | 12 | investigation very, very wrongly. Why didn't |
| 13 | | | |
| | | 13 | you ask him to give you what you needed? |
| 14 | that same day, as follows". Mr McGrail says, | 13 14 | you ask him to give you what you needed? The CM's tone caused me serious concern. |
| 14 15 | that same day, as follows". Mr McGrail says, "Michael, we are both disappointed but I just | 14 | The CM's tone caused me serious concern, |
| 15 | that same day, as follows". Mr McGrail says, "Michael, we are both disappointed but I just can't leave the matter as it is. I'd like to meet | 14 15 | The CM's tone caused me serious concern, and I thought carefully of what I should be |
| 15 16 | that same day, as follows". Mr McGrail says, "Michael, we are both disappointed but I just can't leave the matter as it is. I'd like to meet face-to-face. We have to work together, and | 14 15 16 | The CM's tone caused me serious concern, and I thought carefully of what I should be responding with. I said that what the team |
| 15 16 17 | that same day, as follows". Mr McGrail says, "Michael, we are both disappointed but I just can't leave the matter as it is. I'd like to meet face-to-face. We have to work together, and your wrong impressions about me need | 14 15 16 17 | The CM's tone caused me serious concern, and I thought carefully of what I should be responding with. I said that what the team were after were devices which we knew JL |
| 15 16 17 18 | that same day, as follows". Mr McGrail says, "Michael, we are both disappointed but I just can't leave the matter as it is. I'd like to meet face-to-face. We have to work together, and your wrong impressions about me need clearing up." The AG responds, "Ian, it | 14 15 16 17 18 | The CM's tone caused me serious concern, and I thought carefully of what I should be responding with. I said that what the team were after were devices which we knew JL would not hand over unless compelled to do |
| 15 16 17 18 19 | that same day, as follows". Mr McGrail says, "Michael, we are both disappointed but I just can't leave the matter as it is. I'd like to meet face-to-face. We have to work together, and your wrong impressions about me need clearing up." The AG responds, "Ian, it would not be constructive to meet, at least | 14 15 16 17 18 19 | The CM's tone caused me serious concern, and I thought carefully of what I should be responding with. I said that what the team were after were devices which we knew JL would not hand over unless compelled to do so with a warrant. CM said words to the |
| 15 16 17 18 19 20 | that same day, as follows". Mr McGrail says, "Michael, we are both disappointed but I just can't leave the matter as it is. I'd like to meet face-to-face. We have to work together, and your wrong impressions about me need clearing up." The AG responds, "Ian, it would not be constructive to meet, at least not for now. For me it was abundantly clear | 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 | The CM's tone caused me serious concern, and I thought carefully of what I should be responding with. I said that what the team were after were devices which we knew JL would not hand over unless compelled to do so with a warrant. CM said words to the effect that: have you asked him? I felt the |
| 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 | that same day, as follows". Mr McGrail says, "Michael, we are both disappointed but I just can't leave the matter as it is. I'd like to meet face-to-face. We have to work together, and your wrong impressions about me need clearing up." The AG responds, "Ian, it would not be constructive to meet, at least not for now. For me it was abundantly clear what we had agreed, and there is therefore | 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 | The CM's tone caused me serious concern, and I thought carefully of what I should be responding with. I said that what the team were after were devices which we knew JL would not hand over unless compelled to do so with a warrant. CM said words to the effect that: have you asked him? I felt the CM was questioning an operational decision |
| 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 | that same day, as follows". Mr McGrail says, "Michael, we are both disappointed but I just can't leave the matter as it is. I'd like to meet face-to-face. We have to work together, and your wrong impressions about me need clearing up." The AG responds, "Ian, it would not be constructive to meet, at least not for now. For me it was abundantly clear what we had agreed, and there is therefore very little to discuss about that. All I have | 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 | The CM's tone caused me serious concern, and I thought carefully of what I should be responding with. I said that what the team were after were devices which we knew JL would not hand over unless compelled to do so with a warrant. CM said words to the effect that: have you asked him? I felt the CM was questioning an operational decision on a live criminal matter, and that this was |
| 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 | that same day, as follows". Mr McGrail says, "Michael, we are both disappointed but I just can't leave the matter as it is. I'd like to meet face-to-face. We have to work together, and your wrong impressions about me need clearing up." The AG responds, "Ian, it would not be constructive to meet, at least not for now. For me it was abundantly clear what we had agreed, and there is therefore very little to discuss about that. All I have tried to do is help you in all of this, and to | 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 | The CM's tone caused me serious concern, and I thought carefully of what I should be responding with. I said that what the team were after were devices which we knew JL would not hand over unless compelled to do so with a warrant. CM said words to the effect that: have you asked him? I felt the CM was questioning an operational decision on a live criminal matter, and that this was not appropriate. He stated that he would be |
| 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24 | that same day, as follows". Mr McGrail says, "Michael, we are both disappointed but I just can't leave the matter as it is. I'd like to meet face-to-face. We have to work together, and your wrong impressions about me need clearing up." The AG responds, "Ian, it would not be constructive to meet, at least not for now. For me it was abundantly clear what we had agreed, and there is therefore very little to discuss about that. All I have tried to do is help you in all of this, and to protect Gibraltar PLC which is what I have | 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24 | The CM's tone caused me serious concern, and I thought carefully of what I should be responding with. I said that what the team were after were devices which we knew JL would not hand over unless compelled to do so with a warrant. CM said words to the effect that: have you asked him? I felt the CM was questioning an operational decision on a live criminal matter, and that this was not appropriate. He stated that he would be calling in the RGP's senior command team to |
| 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 | that same day, as follows". Mr McGrail says, "Michael, we are both disappointed but I just can't leave the matter as it is. I'd like to meet face-to-face. We have to work together, and your wrong impressions about me need clearing up." The AG responds, "Ian, it would not be constructive to meet, at least not for now. For me it was abundantly clear what we had agreed, and there is therefore very little to discuss about that. All I have tried to do is help you in all of this, and to | 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 | The CM's tone caused me serious concern, and I thought carefully of what I should be responding with. I said that what the team were after were devices which we knew JL would not hand over unless compelled to do so with a warrant. CM said words to the effect that: have you asked him? I felt the CM was questioning an operational decision on a live criminal matter, and that this was not appropriate. He stated that he would be |
| 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24 | that same day, as follows". Mr McGrail says, "Michael, we are both disappointed but I just can't leave the matter as it is. I'd like to meet face-to-face. We have to work together, and your wrong impressions about me need clearing up." The AG responds, "Ian, it would not be constructive to meet, at least not for now. For me it was abundantly clear what we had agreed, and there is therefore very little to discuss about that. All I have tried to do is help you in all of this, and to protect Gibraltar PLC which is what I have | 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24 | The CM's tone caused me serious concern, and I thought carefully of what I should be responding with. I said that what the team were after were devices which we knew JL would not hand over unless compelled to do so with a warrant. CM said words to the effect that: have you asked him? I felt the CM was questioning an operational decision on a live criminal matter, and that this was not appropriate. He stated that he would be calling in the RGP's senior command team to |

| 1 | at investigating white-collar crime. I advised | 1 | previously stated in this statement, I did not |
|----|---|-------|---|
| 2 | him that the warrant had been signed by a | 2 | enter into any agreement with the AG to |
| 3 | judge who was satisfied with the information | 3 | suspend the carrying out of further inquiries |
| 4 | which had been laid before him, and that all | 4 | until after we had discussed charges that |
| 5 | the grounds (?) to deal with JL had been | 5 | could be proffered. The AG appeared to |
| 6 | consulted with the DPP. The CM arrogantly | 6 | have misunderstood what we arranged: yes, I |
| 7 | exclaimed that it was very easy to obtain a | 7 | had agreed to revert (?) to him with the |
| 8 | search warrant, and (?) that we had been | 8 | proposed charges, but certainly not before all |
| 9 | wrongly advised. It was evident that the CM | 9 | the key inquiries were completed. It would |
| 10 | was very angry, and that we had obtained the | 10 | not make any sense to do so beforehand, and |
| 11 | warrant without considering the voluntary | 11 | I would have expected the AG for Gibraltar |
| 12 | handing over of the material we were after. I | 12 | to have understood this. I felt totally |
| 13 | posed the question whether he genuinely | 13 | cornered and hounded, having to explain a |
| 14 | believed JL would be handing over the | 14 | tactical decision on a live criminal |
| 15 | material if asked without a warrant. CM said | 15 | investigation. The AG said words to the |
| 16 | he would not, and that if he represented JL he | 16 | effect: Ian, I liked you and how you worked, |
| 17 | | 17 | |
| | would advise him not to make any comment | 18 | but as from today I cannot entertain you |
| 18 | during interview. There was a heated debate on whether the actions of the team were | 19 | again. This really shocked and hurt me. The |
| 19 | | | AG could not be more mistaken; it was not a |
| 20 | proper or not, with me saying they were and | 20 21 | position that the RGP had put itself in, we |
| 21 | the CM saying they were not. I stated that it should be left for the courts to decide who | | had been following proper lines of inquiry |
| 22 | | 22 | and the team had acted appropriately without |
| 23 | was right or wrong. I said this because CM | 23 | fear or favour. I was fully cognisant of the |
| 24 | said that JL should not hand over his mobile | 24 | potential reputational damage in a number of |
| 25 | device to the RGP but should do so to a | 25 | quarters, but stood by the investigating team |
| | Page 165 | | Page 167 |
| | | | |
| 1 | court. He said he hoped that I was right and | 1 | in what I considered to be a thorough and |
| 2 | that he was wrong, as there would be | 2 | worthwhile investigation that they were |
| 3 | consequences if he was found to be right in | 3 | doing." Skipping a paragraph, "I left the |
| 4 | that we had not conducted ourselves properly | 4 | Cabinet Room quite shaken, and in utter |
| 5 | in this matter. I took this as a sort of threat | 5 | disbelief. I had somehow expected there to |
| 6 | from the CM. I was struggling to understand | 6 | be reactions post to the search warrant's |
| 7 | how the CM was seemingly aware of parts of | 7 | being executed on JL, but never did I |
| 8 | the evidence gathered in Op Delhi, eg he was | 8 | anticipate the level of chastisement I was |
| 9 | challenging the need to obtain JL's devices | 9 | subjected to. I have had a few previous |
| 10 | when, he claimed, the investigating team | 10 | unpleasant encounters with the CM, but none |
| 11 | already had the data we needed from other | 11 | reached the levels I experienced on that day." |
| 12 | suspects." Just jumping to 35, "I was further | 12 | If we can now jump to page 119. This is Mr |
| 13 | reprimanded by the CM for not having made | 13 | McGrail's third statement, just one paragraph |
| 14 | the AG aware of the team's intentions." If we | 14 | there, subparagraph E, where there is a |
| 15 | can then move forward to 13, paragraph 43, | 15 | reference to the Chief Minister's letter to the |
| 16 | "For his part the AG stated in a highly | 16 | GPA. Mr McGrail says, "The CM insists in |
| 17 | emotional tone that I had betrayed him, | 17 | his letter that I told him that the Op Delhi |
| 18 | because the action carried out by the team | 18 | investigation team had executed the search |
| 19 | was not what had been agreed with him. | 19 | warrant on the advice of the DPP. This was |
| 20 | Notwithstanding that what the AG stated was | 20 | not the case. What I was referring to was |
| 21 | incorrect, the AG has no operational remit | 21 | that the status of suspect for JL had been the |
| 22 | and his address to me in this regard was | 22 | subject of a consultation and agreement with |
| 23 | | 23 | the DPP, who had advised the team generally |
| | wholly improper. More so when he had on a | | |
| 24 | previous date said that he was steering clear | 24 | on the investigation throughout. |
| | | | |
| 24 | previous date said that he was steering clear | 24 | on the investigation throughout. |

| 1 | my account and the letter in question that the | 1 | Once I'd pieced together all of the AG's |
|---|--|--|--|
| 2 | CM raised a number of operational issues | 2 | involvement, I formed the view that the AG |
| 3 | with me concerning Operation Delhi, but yet | 3 | was effectively improperly interfering with |
| 4 | in Parliament claimed he had not." 165 next, | 4 | the Op Delhi investigation." Can we now |
| 5 | please. This is the fifth statement from Mr | 5 | turn to B7, please. Seven four, sorry, thank |
| 6 | McGrail, and it is in response to the Chief | 6 | you. This is an email sent by Mr McGrail to |
| 7 | Minister's position, which is that he only | 7 | himself on the evening of 12 May at 10.05. I |
| 8 | addressed the search warrant after the event. | 8 | do not propose to go to any part of that, |
| 9 | Mr McGrail says, "This statement by the | 9 | because his statement draws heavily from it; |
| 10 | Chief Minister is totally misleading. The fact | 10 | I just propose to refer to the fact that he |
| 11 | is that FP did interfere with the investigation, | 11 | emailed himself that evening with an account |
| 12 | not before or after the warrant but more | 12 | of what had occurred. |
| 13 | worrying during its execution. The | 13 | (14.30) |
| 14 | investigating team hadn't yet not (?) asserted | 14 | The Attorney General denies improperly |
| 15 | their authority under the warrant when I was | 15 | intervening in Operation Delhi, pointing out |
| 16 | called by FP and the AG and intemperately | 16 | that Mr McGrail wanted to remain in his post |
| 17 | rebuked for the team's actions. This was a | 17 | even by his lawyers' letter of 29 May which |
| 18 | totally inappropriate thing for FP and AG to | 18 | post-dated all of their conversations on |
| 19 | do." And then 179, this is in response to the | 19 | Operation Delhi. As to their exchanges on |
| 20 | Attorney General's affidavit. In paragraph | 20 | Delhi, the Attorney General addresses this |
| 21 | 180, "In paragraph 11 page 6 of his affidavit | 21 | matter further in his second affidavit, A 285. |
| 22 | the AG says that I did not at any stage | 22 | At 58 he says: "Mr McGrail appeared to take |
| 23 | complain to him or others that his | 23 | umbrage with what was being said to him." |
| 24 | interventions amounted to improper | 24 | This is in reference to a subsequent meeting, |
| 25 | interference. Discussions on criminal cases | 25 | the DPP telling the meeting at which Mr |
| | | | |
| | Page 169 | | Page 171 |
| | | | |
| 1 | is common before law officers and police. In | 1 | McGrail and the Attorney General were |
| 2 | my discussions with the AG I tried to steer | 2 | present that he had given the charging advice |
| 3 | these to what I felt was the correct | 3 | and given views on the evidential position |
| 4 | approaches the investigating team were | 4 | but had not on the operational side of things. |
| 5 | | _ | |
| - | taking, and convince/influence the AG | 5 | He says at 58: "Mr McGrail appeared to take |
| 6 | accordingly. And, as long as the investing | 6 | He says at 58: "Mr McGrail appeared to take umbrage with what was being said to him. I |
| 7 | accordingly. And, as long as the investing team were still doing the right thing I was | 6 7 | He says at 58: "Mr McGrail appeared to take umbrage with what was being said to him. I recall from the defensive nature of their |
| 7 8 | accordingly. And, as long as the investing team were still doing the right thing I was satisfied that the improper suggestions made | 6 7 8 | He says at 58: "Mr McGrail appeared to take umbrage with what was being said to him. I recall from the defensive nature of their replies later to be confirmed by the |
| 7 8 9 | accordingly. And, as long as the investing team were still doing the right thing I was satisfied that the improper suggestions made by the AG were not having a negative impact | 6 7 8 9 | He says at 58: "Mr McGrail appeared to take umbrage with what was being said to him. I recall from the defensive nature of their replies later to be confirmed by the statements made in the 29 May letter, that |
| 7 8 9 10 | accordingly. And, as long as the investing team were still doing the right thing I was satisfied that the improper suggestions made by the AG were not having a negative impact on the case. Equally, it got to the stage | 6 7 8 9 10 | He says at 58: "Mr McGrail appeared to take umbrage with what was being said to him. I recall from the defensive nature of their replies later to be confirmed by the statements made in the 29 May letter, that both he and DS Richardson appeared to think |
| 7 8 9 10 11 | accordingly. And, as long as the investing team were still doing the right thing I was satisfied that the improper suggestions made by the AG were not having a negative impact on the case. Equally, it got to the stage where I was trying to suss out the extent of | 6 7 8 9 10 11 | He says at 58: "Mr McGrail appeared to take umbrage with what was being said to him. I recall from the defensive nature of their replies later to be confirmed by the statements made in the 29 May letter, that both he and DS Richardson appeared to think that I, or the DPP and I, were seeking to |
| 7 8 9 10 11 12 | accordingly. And, as long as the investing team were still doing the right thing I was satisfied that the improper suggestions made by the AG were not having a negative impact on the case. Equally, it got to the stage where I was trying to suss out the extent of the AG's possible brief. I had to keep these | 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 | He says at 58: "Mr McGrail appeared to take umbrage with what was being said to him. I recall from the defensive nature of their replies later to be confirmed by the statements made in the 29 May letter, that both he and DS Richardson appeared to think that I, or the DPP and I, were seeking to interfere with the conduct of the criminal |
| 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 | accordingly. And, as long as the investing team were still doing the right thing I was satisfied that the improper suggestions made by the AG were not having a negative impact on the case. Equally, it got to the stage where I was trying to suss out the extent of the AG's possible brief. I had to keep these thoughts well close to my chest in order to | 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 | He says at 58: "Mr McGrail appeared to take umbrage with what was being said to him. I recall from the defensive nature of their replies later to be confirmed by the statements made in the 29 May letter, that both he and DS Richardson appeared to think that I, or the DPP and I, were seeking to interfere with the conduct of the criminal investigation in the sense of closing off |
| 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 | accordingly. And, as long as the investing team were still doing the right thing I was satisfied that the improper suggestions made by the AG were not having a negative impact on the case. Equally, it got to the stage where I was trying to suss out the extent of the AG's possible brief. I had to keep these thoughts well close to my chest in order to uphold operational security on the matter. It | 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 | He says at 58: "Mr McGrail appeared to take umbrage with what was being said to him. I recall from the defensive nature of their replies later to be confirmed by the statements made in the 29 May letter, that both he and DS Richardson appeared to think that I, or the DPP and I, were seeking to interfere with the conduct of the criminal investigation in the sense of closing off certain aspects of it. Alternatively or in |
| 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 | accordingly. And, as long as the investing team were still doing the right thing I was satisfied that the improper suggestions made by the AG were not having a negative impact on the case. Equally, it got to the stage where I was trying to suss out the extent of the AG's possible brief. I had to keep these thoughts well close to my chest in order to uphold operational security on the matter. It was not until the meeting on 13 May, when | 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 | He says at 58: "Mr McGrail appeared to take umbrage with what was being said to him. I recall from the defensive nature of their replies later to be confirmed by the statements made in the 29 May letter, that both he and DS Richardson appeared to think that I, or the DPP and I, were seeking to interfere with the conduct of the criminal investigation in the sense of closing off certain aspects of it. Alternatively or in addition, that we were questioning his |
| 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 | accordingly. And, as long as the investing team were still doing the right thing I was satisfied that the improper suggestions made by the AG were not having a negative impact on the case. Equally, it got to the stage where I was trying to suss out the extent of the AG's possible brief. I had to keep these thoughts well close to my chest in order to uphold operational security on the matter. It was not until the meeting on 13 May, when the AG asked me to remain behind after the | 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 | He says at 58: "Mr McGrail appeared to take umbrage with what was being said to him. I recall from the defensive nature of their replies later to be confirmed by the statements made in the 29 May letter, that both he and DS Richardson appeared to think that I, or the DPP and I, were seeking to interfere with the conduct of the criminal investigation in the sense of closing off certain aspects of it. Alternatively or in addition, that we were questioning his integrity. I recollect that Mr McGrail even |
| 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 | accordingly. And, as long as the investing team were still doing the right thing I was satisfied that the improper suggestions made by the AG were not having a negative impact on the case. Equally, it got to the stage where I was trying to suss out the extent of the AG's possible brief. I had to keep these thoughts well close to my chest in order to uphold operational security on the matter. It was not until the meeting on 13 May, when the AG asked me to remain behind after the others attending left his office, that I felt the | 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 | He says at 58: "Mr McGrail appeared to take umbrage with what was being said to him. I recall from the defensive nature of their replies later to be confirmed by the statements made in the 29 May letter, that both he and DS Richardson appeared to think that I, or the DPP and I, were seeking to interfere with the conduct of the criminal investigation in the sense of closing off certain aspects of it. Alternatively or in addition, that we were questioning his integrity. I recollect that Mr McGrail even referred to his high standards of integrity and |
| 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 | accordingly. And, as long as the investing team were still doing the right thing I was satisfied that the improper suggestions made by the AG were not having a negative impact on the case. Equally, it got to the stage where I was trying to suss out the extent of the AG's possible brief. I had to keep these thoughts well close to my chest in order to uphold operational security on the matter. It was not until the meeting on 13 May, when the AG asked me to remain behind after the others attending left his office, that I felt the AG was in a somewhat awkward and | 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 | He says at 58: "Mr McGrail appeared to take umbrage with what was being said to him. I recall from the defensive nature of their replies later to be confirmed by the statements made in the 29 May letter, that both he and DS Richardson appeared to think that I, or the DPP and I, were seeking to interfere with the conduct of the criminal investigation in the sense of closing off certain aspects of it. Alternatively or in addition, that we were questioning his integrity. I recollect that Mr McGrail even referred to his high standards of integrity and said something along the lines that if he had |
| 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 | accordingly. And, as long as the investing team were still doing the right thing I was satisfied that the improper suggestions made by the AG were not having a negative impact on the case. Equally, it got to the stage where I was trying to suss out the extent of the AG's possible brief. I had to keep these thoughts well close to my chest in order to uphold operational security on the matter. It was not until the meeting on 13 May, when the AG asked me to remain behind after the others attending left his office, that I felt the AG was in a somewhat awkward and compromised position with Op Delhi, and I | 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 | He says at 58: "Mr McGrail appeared to take umbrage with what was being said to him. I recall from the defensive nature of their replies later to be confirmed by the statements made in the 29 May letter, that both he and DS Richardson appeared to think that I, or the DPP and I, were seeking to interfere with the conduct of the criminal investigation in the sense of closing off certain aspects of it. Alternatively or in addition, that we were questioning his integrity. I recollect that Mr McGrail even referred to his high standards of integrity and said something along the lines that if he had to leave his post he would do so with his |
| 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 | accordingly. And, as long as the investing team were still doing the right thing I was satisfied that the improper suggestions made by the AG were not having a negative impact on the case. Equally, it got to the stage where I was trying to suss out the extent of the AG's possible brief. I had to keep these thoughts well close to my chest in order to uphold operational security on the matter. It was not until the meeting on 13 May, when the AG asked me to remain behind after the others attending left his office, that I felt the AG was in a somewhat awkward and compromised position with Op Delhi, and I told him as much. By this, I meant that the | 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 | He says at 58: "Mr McGrail appeared to take umbrage with what was being said to him. I recall from the defensive nature of their replies later to be confirmed by the statements made in the 29 May letter, that both he and DS Richardson appeared to think that I, or the DPP and I, were seeking to interfere with the conduct of the criminal investigation in the sense of closing off certain aspects of it. Alternatively or in addition, that we were questioning his integrity. I recollect that Mr McGrail even referred to his high standards of integrity and said something along the lines that if he had to leave his post he would do so with his head held high. I listened to this with |
| 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 | accordingly. And, as long as the investing team were still doing the right thing I was satisfied that the improper suggestions made by the AG were not having a negative impact on the case. Equally, it got to the stage where I was trying to suss out the extent of the AG's possible brief. I had to keep these thoughts well close to my chest in order to uphold operational security on the matter. It was not until the meeting on 13 May, when the AG asked me to remain behind after the others attending left his office, that I felt the AG was in a somewhat awkward and compromised position with Op Delhi, and I told him as much. By this, I meant that the AG seemingly held the brief to ensure the | 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 | He says at 58: "Mr McGrail appeared to take umbrage with what was being said to him. I recall from the defensive nature of their replies later to be confirmed by the statements made in the 29 May letter, that both he and DS Richardson appeared to think that I, or the DPP and I, were seeking to interfere with the conduct of the criminal investigation in the sense of closing off certain aspects of it. Alternatively or in addition, that we were questioning his integrity. I recollect that Mr McGrail even referred to his high standards of integrity and said something along the lines that if he had to leave his post he would do so with his head held high. I listened to this with disbelief. I could not understand why he said |
| 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 | accordingly. And, as long as the investing team were still doing the right thing I was satisfied that the improper suggestions made by the AG were not having a negative impact on the case. Equally, it got to the stage where I was trying to suss out the extent of the AG's possible brief. I had to keep these thoughts well close to my chest in order to uphold operational security on the matter. It was not until the meeting on 13 May, when the AG asked me to remain behind after the others attending left his office, that I felt the AG was in a somewhat awkward and compromised position with Op Delhi, and I told him as much. By this, I meant that the AG seemingly held the brief to ensure the case was not progressed further. However, I | 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 | He says at 58: "Mr McGrail appeared to take umbrage with what was being said to him. I recall from the defensive nature of their replies later to be confirmed by the statements made in the 29 May letter, that both he and DS Richardson appeared to think that I, or the DPP and I, were seeking to interfere with the conduct of the criminal investigation in the sense of closing off certain aspects of it. Alternatively or in addition, that we were questioning his integrity. I recollect that Mr McGrail even referred to his high standards of integrity and said something along the lines that if he had to leave his post he would do so with his head held high. I listened to this with disbelief. I could not understand why he said that or reacted in this way to what the DPP |
| 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 | accordingly. And, as long as the investing team were still doing the right thing I was satisfied that the improper suggestions made by the AG were not having a negative impact on the case. Equally, it got to the stage where I was trying to suss out the extent of the AG's possible brief. I had to keep these thoughts well close to my chest in order to uphold operational security on the matter. It was not until the meeting on 13 May, when the AG asked me to remain behind after the others attending left his office, that I felt the AG was in a somewhat awkward and compromised position with Op Delhi, and I told him as much. By this, I meant that the AG seemingly held the brief to ensure the case was not progressed further. However, I had to be diplomatic, but on one reading of | 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 | He says at 58: "Mr McGrail appeared to take umbrage with what was being said to him. I recall from the defensive nature of their replies later to be confirmed by the statements made in the 29 May letter, that both he and DS Richardson appeared to think that I, or the DPP and I, were seeking to interfere with the conduct of the criminal investigation in the sense of closing off certain aspects of it. Alternatively or in addition, that we were questioning his integrity. I recollect that Mr McGrail even referred to his high standards of integrity and said something along the lines that if he had to leave his post he would do so with his head held high. I listened to this with disbelief. I could not understand why he said that or reacted in this way to what the DPP and I were saying to him at that meeting, |
| 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24 | accordingly. And, as long as the investing team were still doing the right thing I was satisfied that the improper suggestions made by the AG were not having a negative impact on the case. Equally, it got to the stage where I was trying to suss out the extent of the AG's possible brief. I had to keep these thoughts well close to my chest in order to uphold operational security on the matter. It was not until the meeting on 13 May, when the AG asked me to remain behind after the others attending left his office, that I felt the AG was in a somewhat awkward and compromised position with Op Delhi, and I told him as much. By this, I meant that the AG seemingly held the brief to ensure the case was not progressed further. However, I had to be diplomatic, but on one reading of what was happening the AG appeared to be | 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24 | He says at 58: "Mr McGrail appeared to take umbrage with what was being said to him. I recall from the defensive nature of their replies later to be confirmed by the statements made in the 29 May letter, that both he and DS Richardson appeared to think that I, or the DPP and I, were seeking to interfere with the conduct of the criminal investigation in the sense of closing off certain aspects of it. Alternatively or in addition, that we were questioning his integrity. I recollect that Mr McGrail even referred to his high standards of integrity and said something along the lines that if he had to leave his post he would do so with his head held high. I listened to this with disbelief. I could not understand why he said that or reacted in this way to what the DPP and I were saying to him at that meeting, none of which warranted any such reaction. I |
| 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 | accordingly. And, as long as the investing team were still doing the right thing I was satisfied that the improper suggestions made by the AG were not having a negative impact on the case. Equally, it got to the stage where I was trying to suss out the extent of the AG's possible brief. I had to keep these thoughts well close to my chest in order to uphold operational security on the matter. It was not until the meeting on 13 May, when the AG asked me to remain behind after the others attending left his office, that I felt the AG was in a somewhat awkward and compromised position with Op Delhi, and I told him as much. By this, I meant that the AG seemingly held the brief to ensure the case was not progressed further. However, I had to be diplomatic, but on one reading of | 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 | He says at 58: "Mr McGrail appeared to take umbrage with what was being said to him. I recall from the defensive nature of their replies later to be confirmed by the statements made in the 29 May letter, that both he and DS Richardson appeared to think that I, or the DPP and I, were seeking to interfere with the conduct of the criminal investigation in the sense of closing off certain aspects of it. Alternatively or in addition, that we were questioning his integrity. I recollect that Mr McGrail even referred to his high standards of integrity and said something along the lines that if he had to leave his post he would do so with his head held high. I listened to this with disbelief. I could not understand why he said that or reacted in this way to what the DPP and I were saying to him at that meeting, |
| 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24 | accordingly. And, as long as the investing team were still doing the right thing I was satisfied that the improper suggestions made by the AG were not having a negative impact on the case. Equally, it got to the stage where I was trying to suss out the extent of the AG's possible brief. I had to keep these thoughts well close to my chest in order to uphold operational security on the matter. It was not until the meeting on 13 May, when the AG asked me to remain behind after the others attending left his office, that I felt the AG was in a somewhat awkward and compromised position with Op Delhi, and I told him as much. By this, I meant that the AG seemingly held the brief to ensure the case was not progressed further. However, I had to be diplomatic, but on one reading of what was happening the AG appeared to be | 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24 | He says at 58: "Mr McGrail appeared to take umbrage with what was being said to him. I recall from the defensive nature of their replies later to be confirmed by the statements made in the 29 May letter, that both he and DS Richardson appeared to think that I, or the DPP and I, were seeking to interfere with the conduct of the criminal investigation in the sense of closing off certain aspects of it. Alternatively or in addition, that we were questioning his integrity. I recollect that Mr McGrail even referred to his high standards of integrity and said something along the lines that if he had to leave his post he would do so with his head held high. I listened to this with disbelief. I could not understand why he said that or reacted in this way to what the DPP and I were saying to him at that meeting, none of which warranted any such reaction. I |

| 1 | to his meeting with the Chief Minister the | 1 | strongly advised against a search warrant." |
|--|---|--|---|
| 2 | previous day. What became clear to me, as I | 2 | The Chief Minister responds [speaks |
| 3 | already said in my reply of 5 June 2020 to | 3 | Spanish], which means in English: "Well |
| 4 | the GPA, was that Mr McGrail considered | 4 | then, he lied to both of us." The Attorney |
| 5 | that he was immune to having his actions | 5 | General replied: "Exactly. He certainly gave |
| 6 | disapproved of or criticised and that he | 6 | us the impression that SW decision was |
| 7 | equated both to improper interference with | 7 | sanctioned by DPP." Then he says at the |
| 8 | the conduct of a criminal investigation and a | 8 | same time, he follows that up with another |
| 9 | violation of police independence. The reality | 9 | message that says: "COP has since called |
| 10 | is that while the RGP is undoubtedly entitled, | 10 | DPP trying to cover his back with him. I've |
| 11 | indeed required, to investigate the possible | 11 | told DPPP not to say or do anything without |
| 12 | commission of crimes independently and | 12 | speaking to me first." The Chief Minister |
| 13 | without improper interference from others | 13 | replies: "Incredible. There is some game |
| 14 | that does not exempt it from comment or | 14 | afoot here." Then at the bottom actually are |
| 15 | criticism, still less from being tendered | 15 | two messages which the Attorney General |
| 16 | advice by the Attorney General and the DPP, | 16 | had exchanged with Mr McGrail which I |
| 17 | and indeed in respect of comment and | 17 | referred to earlier which he was forwarding |
| 18 | criticism from anyone else. In this regard, it | 18 | to the Chief Minister. |
| 19 | is ironic that Mr McGrail should cite against | 19 | There are some important documents to go to |
| 20 | me paragraph 15 of the Council of Europe | 20 | as background to Operation Delhi. The first |
| 21 | Code of Police Ethics which states that the | 21 | of these is the National Decision Model |
| 22 | police shall enjoy sufficient operational | 22 | Assessment regarding the involvement of Mr |
| 23 | independence from other State bodies in | 23 | Levy with 36 North, which was sent by |
| 24 | carrying out its given police tasks for which | 24 | Superintendent Richardson to Mr McGrail on |
| 25 | it should be fully accountable." | 25 | 25 February 2020, and that is at B3453. Just |
| | • | | |
| | Page 173 | | Page 175 |
| | | | |
| 1 | T1 (14 14 (1 () C | 1 | 111 14 415 14 11 11 11 |
| 1 | I have tried to read the most relevant parts of | 1 | picking it up at 15, it says: "An examination |
| 2 | that. No doubt all parties will think that I | 2 | of the messages between TC, JP and CS has |
| 2 3 | that. No doubt all parties will think that I have missed out some important parts and | 2 3 | of the messages between TC, JP and CS has shown that each has been communicating |
| 2 3 4 | that. No doubt all parties will think that I have missed out some important parts and they can add to those in their openings. | 2 3 4 | of the messages between TC, JP and CS has shown that each has been communicating with JL with regard to the NSCIS platform. |
| 2 3 4 5 | that. No doubt all parties will think that I have missed out some important parts and they can add to those in their openings. Just to complete this, the DPP, Christian | 2 3 4 5 | of the messages between TC, JP and CS has shown that each has been communicating with JL with regard to the NSCIS platform. JL's knowledge of the plan to remove the |
| 2 3 4 5 6 | that. No doubt all parties will think that I have missed out some important parts and they can add to those in their openings. Just to complete this, the DPP, Christian Rocca KC's evidence is that he did not advise | 2 3 4 5 6 | of the messages between TC, JP and CS has shown that each has been communicating with JL with regard to the NSCIS platform. JL's knowledge of the plan to remove the NSCIS platform management from Blands in |
| 2 3 4 5 6 7 | that. No doubt all parties will think that I have missed out some important parts and they can add to those in their openings. Just to complete this, the DPP, Christian Rocca KC's evidence is that he did not advise the RGP on the use of a search warrant and it | 2 3 4 5 6 7 | of the messages between TC, JP and CS has shown that each has been communicating with JL with regard to the NSCIS platform. JL's knowledge of the plan to remove the NSCIS platform management from Blands in favour of 36N predates the departure of TC |
| 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 | that. No doubt all parties will think that I have missed out some important parts and they can add to those in their openings. Just to complete this, the DPP, Christian Rocca KC's evidence is that he did not advise the RGP on the use of a search warrant and it is unlikely that the RGP would ever seek | 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 | of the messages between TC, JP and CS has shown that each has been communicating with JL with regard to the NSCIS platform. JL's knowledge of the plan to remove the NSCIS platform management from Blands in favour of 36N predates the departure of TC and JP from Blands and even the set-up of |
| 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 | that. No doubt all parties will think that I have missed out some important parts and they can add to those in their openings. Just to complete this, the DPP, Christian Rocca KC's evidence is that he did not advise the RGP on the use of a search warrant and it is unlikely that the RGP would ever seek advice on operational matters which were for | 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 | of the messages between TC, JP and CS has shown that each has been communicating with JL with regard to the NSCIS platform. JL's knowledge of the plan to remove the NSCIS platform management from Blands in favour of 36N predates the departure of TC and JP from Blands and even the set-up of 36N itself. Emails recovered forensically |
| 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 | that. No doubt all parties will think that I have missed out some important parts and they can add to those in their openings. Just to complete this, the DPP, Christian Rocca KC's evidence is that he did not advise the RGP on the use of a search warrant and it is unlikely that the RGP would ever seek advice on operational matters which were for the RGP. His view is that it would have been | 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 | of the messages between TC, JP and CS has shown that each has been communicating with JL with regard to the NSCIS platform. JL's knowledge of the plan to remove the NSCIS platform management from Blands in favour of 36N predates the departure of TC and JP from Blands and even the set-up of 36N itself. Emails recovered forensically show that EA had drafted a business proposal |
| 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 | that. No doubt all parties will think that I have missed out some important parts and they can add to those in their openings. Just to complete this, the DPP, Christian Rocca KC's evidence is that he did not advise the RGP on the use of a search warrant and it is unlikely that the RGP would ever seek advice on operational matters which were for the RGP. His view is that it would have been more suitable and appropriate to seek a | 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 | of the messages between TC, JP and CS has shown that each has been communicating with JL with regard to the NSCIS platform. JL's knowledge of the plan to remove the NSCIS platform management from Blands in favour of 36N predates the departure of TC and JP from Blands and even the set-up of 36N itself. Emails recovered forensically show that EA had drafted a business proposal for 36N and intended for JL as far back as |
| 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 | that. No doubt all parties will think that I have missed out some important parts and they can add to those in their openings. Just to complete this, the DPP, Christian Rocca KC's evidence is that he did not advise the RGP on the use of a search warrant and it is unlikely that the RGP would ever seek advice on operational matters which were for the RGP. His view is that it would have been more suitable and appropriate to seek a product order against Mr Levy. | 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 | of the messages between TC, JP and CS has shown that each has been communicating with JL with regard to the NSCIS platform. JL's knowledge of the plan to remove the NSCIS platform management from Blands in favour of 36N predates the departure of TC and JP from Blands and even the set-up of 36N itself. Emails recovered forensically show that EA had drafted a business proposal for 36N and intended for JL as far back as February 2018 in which the revenue streams |
| 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 | that. No doubt all parties will think that I have missed out some important parts and they can add to those in their openings. Just to complete this, the DPP, Christian Rocca KC's evidence is that he did not advise the RGP on the use of a search warrant and it is unlikely that the RGP would ever seek advice on operational matters which were for the RGP. His view is that it would have been more suitable and appropriate to seek a product order against Mr Levy. Nevertheless, he considered the RGP's | 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 | of the messages between TC, JP and CS has shown that each has been communicating with JL with regard to the NSCIS platform. JL's knowledge of the plan to remove the NSCIS platform management from Blands in favour of 36N predates the departure of TC and JP from Blands and even the set-up of 36N itself. Emails recovered forensically show that EA had drafted a business proposal for 36N and intended for JL as far back as February 2018 in which the revenue streams include the maintenance of the NSCIS |
| 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 | that. No doubt all parties will think that I have missed out some important parts and they can add to those in their openings. Just to complete this, the DPP, Christian Rocca KC's evidence is that he did not advise the RGP on the use of a search warrant and it is unlikely that the RGP would ever seek advice on operational matters which were for the RGP. His view is that it would have been more suitable and appropriate to seek a product order against Mr Levy. Nevertheless, he considered the RGP's position would be defensible on judicial | 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 | of the messages between TC, JP and CS has shown that each has been communicating with JL with regard to the NSCIS platform. JL's knowledge of the plan to remove the NSCIS platform management from Blands in favour of 36N predates the departure of TC and JP from Blands and even the set-up of 36N itself. Emails recovered forensically show that EA had drafted a business proposal for 36N and intended for JL as far back as February 2018 in which the revenue streams include the maintenance of the NSCIS platform. Evidence of communications from |
| 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 | that. No doubt all parties will think that I have missed out some important parts and they can add to those in their openings. Just to complete this, the DPP, Christian Rocca KC's evidence is that he did not advise the RGP on the use of a search warrant and it is unlikely that the RGP would ever seek advice on operational matters which were for the RGP. His view is that it would have been more suitable and appropriate to seek a product order against Mr Levy. Nevertheless, he considered the RGP's position would be defensible on judicial review. | 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 | of the messages between TC, JP and CS has shown that each has been communicating with JL with regard to the NSCIS platform. JL's knowledge of the plan to remove the NSCIS platform management from Blands in favour of 36N predates the departure of TC and JP from Blands and even the set-up of 36N itself. Emails recovered forensically show that EA had drafted a business proposal for 36N and intended for JL as far back as February 2018 in which the revenue streams include the maintenance of the NSCIS platform. Evidence of communications from CS to JL have shown that a civil servant was |
| 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 | that. No doubt all parties will think that I have missed out some important parts and they can add to those in their openings. Just to complete this, the DPP, Christian Rocca KC's evidence is that he did not advise the RGP on the use of a search warrant and it is unlikely that the RGP would ever seek advice on operational matters which were for the RGP. His view is that it would have been more suitable and appropriate to seek a product order against Mr Levy. Nevertheless, he considered the RGP's position would be defensible on judicial review. At 3.43 in the afternoon, after that meeting | 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 | of the messages between TC, JP and CS has shown that each has been communicating with JL with regard to the NSCIS platform. JL's knowledge of the plan to remove the NSCIS platform management from Blands in favour of 36N predates the departure of TC and JP from Blands and even the set-up of 36N itself. Emails recovered forensically show that EA had drafted a business proposal for 36N and intended for JL as far back as February 2018 in which the revenue streams include the maintenance of the NSCIS platform. Evidence of communications from CS to JL have shown that a civil servant was passing on confidential information to him |
| 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 | that. No doubt all parties will think that I have missed out some important parts and they can add to those in their openings. Just to complete this, the DPP, Christian Rocca KC's evidence is that he did not advise the RGP on the use of a search warrant and it is unlikely that the RGP would ever seek advice on operational matters which were for the RGP. His view is that it would have been more suitable and appropriate to seek a product order against Mr Levy. Nevertheless, he considered the RGP's position would be defensible on judicial review. At 3.43 in the afternoon, after that meeting on 12 May 2020, the Attorney General | 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 | of the messages between TC, JP and CS has shown that each has been communicating with JL with regard to the NSCIS platform. JL's knowledge of the plan to remove the NSCIS platform management from Blands in favour of 36N predates the departure of TC and JP from Blands and even the set-up of 36N itself. Emails recovered forensically show that EA had drafted a business proposal for 36N and intended for JL as far back as February 2018 in which the revenue streams include the maintenance of the NSCIS platform. Evidence of communications from CS to JL have shown that a civil servant was passing on confidential information to him about NSCIS and offering him good |
| 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 | that. No doubt all parties will think that I have missed out some important parts and they can add to those in their openings. Just to complete this, the DPP, Christian Rocca KC's evidence is that he did not advise the RGP on the use of a search warrant and it is unlikely that the RGP would ever seek advice on operational matters which were for the RGP. His view is that it would have been more suitable and appropriate to seek a product order against Mr Levy. Nevertheless, he considered the RGP's position would be defensible on judicial review. At 3.43 in the afternoon, after that meeting on 12 May 2020, the Attorney General reported back to the Chief Minister after | 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 | of the messages between TC, JP and CS has shown that each has been communicating with JL with regard to the NSCIS platform. JL's knowledge of the plan to remove the NSCIS platform management from Blands in favour of 36N predates the departure of TC and JP from Blands and even the set-up of 36N itself. Emails recovered forensically show that EA had drafted a business proposal for 36N and intended for JL as far back as February 2018 in which the revenue streams include the maintenance of the NSCIS platform. Evidence of communications from CS to JL have shown that a civil servant was passing on confidential information to him about NSCIS and offering him good proposals for investment. Evidence of |
| 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 | that. No doubt all parties will think that I have missed out some important parts and they can add to those in their openings. Just to complete this, the DPP, Christian Rocca KC's evidence is that he did not advise the RGP on the use of a search warrant and it is unlikely that the RGP would ever seek advice on operational matters which were for the RGP. His view is that it would have been more suitable and appropriate to seek a product order against Mr Levy. Nevertheless, he considered the RGP's position would be defensible on judicial review. At 3.43 in the afternoon, after that meeting on 12 May 2020, the Attorney General reported back to the Chief Minister after speaking with the DPP, and that was in an | 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 | of the messages between TC, JP and CS has shown that each has been communicating with JL with regard to the NSCIS platform. JL's knowledge of the plan to remove the NSCIS platform management from Blands in favour of 36N predates the departure of TC and JP from Blands and even the set-up of 36N itself. Emails recovered forensically show that EA had drafted a business proposal for 36N and intended for JL as far back as February 2018 in which the revenue streams include the maintenance of the NSCIS platform. Evidence of communications from CS to JL have shown that a civil servant was passing on confidential information to him about NSCIS and offering him good proposals for investment. Evidence of communication from TC and JP to JL |
| 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 | that. No doubt all parties will think that I have missed out some important parts and they can add to those in their openings. Just to complete this, the DPP, Christian Rocca KC's evidence is that he did not advise the RGP on the use of a search warrant and it is unlikely that the RGP would ever seek advice on operational matters which were for the RGP. His view is that it would have been more suitable and appropriate to seek a product order against Mr Levy. Nevertheless, he considered the RGP's position would be defensible on judicial review. At 3.43 in the afternoon, after that meeting on 12 May 2020, the Attorney General reported back to the Chief Minister after speaking with the DPP, and that was in an exchange of messages at B 1417. At the top | 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 | of the messages between TC, JP and CS has shown that each has been communicating with JL with regard to the NSCIS platform. JL's knowledge of the plan to remove the NSCIS platform management from Blands in favour of 36N predates the departure of TC and JP from Blands and even the set-up of 36N itself. Emails recovered forensically show that EA had drafted a business proposal for 36N and intended for JL as far back as February 2018 in which the revenue streams include the maintenance of the NSCIS platform. Evidence of communications from CS to JL have shown that a civil servant was passing on confidential information to him about NSCIS and offering him good proposals for investment. Evidence of communication from TC and JP to JL suggests that JL is in a position of influence |
| 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 | that. No doubt all parties will think that I have missed out some important parts and they can add to those in their openings. Just to complete this, the DPP, Christian Rocca KC's evidence is that he did not advise the RGP on the use of a search warrant and it is unlikely that the RGP would ever seek advice on operational matters which were for the RGP. His view is that it would have been more suitable and appropriate to seek a product order against Mr Levy. Nevertheless, he considered the RGP's position would be defensible on judicial review. At 3.43 in the afternoon, after that meeting on 12 May 2020, the Attorney General reported back to the Chief Minister after speaking with the DPP, and that was in an exchange of messages at B 1417. At the top of that page: "Are you free two minutes?" | 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 | of the messages between TC, JP and CS has shown that each has been communicating with JL with regard to the NSCIS platform. JL's knowledge of the plan to remove the NSCIS platform management from Blands in favour of 36N predates the departure of TC and JP from Blands and even the set-up of 36N itself. Emails recovered forensically show that EA had drafted a business proposal for 36N and intended for JL as far back as February 2018 in which the revenue streams include the maintenance of the NSCIS platform. Evidence of communications from CS to JL have shown that a civil servant was passing on confidential information to him about NSCIS and offering him good proposals for investment. Evidence of communication from TC and JP to JL suggests that JL is in a position of influence with the CM and he has often requested to |
| 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 | that. No doubt all parties will think that I have missed out some important parts and they can add to those in their openings. Just to complete this, the DPP, Christian Rocca KC's evidence is that he did not advise the RGP on the use of a search warrant and it is unlikely that the RGP would ever seek advice on operational matters which were for the RGP. His view is that it would have been more suitable and appropriate to seek a product order against Mr Levy. Nevertheless, he considered the RGP's position would be defensible on judicial review. At 3.43 in the afternoon, after that meeting on 12 May 2020, the Attorney General reported back to the Chief Minister after speaking with the DPP, and that was in an exchange of messages at B 1417. At the top of that page: "Are you free two minutes?" That is at 12.30. It is the next message, | 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 | of the messages between TC, JP and CS has shown that each has been communicating with JL with regard to the NSCIS platform. JL's knowledge of the plan to remove the NSCIS platform management from Blands in favour of 36N predates the departure of TC and JP from Blands and even the set-up of 36N itself. Emails recovered forensically show that EA had drafted a business proposal for 36N and intended for JL as far back as February 2018 in which the revenue streams include the maintenance of the NSCIS platform. Evidence of communications from CS to JL have shown that a civil servant was passing on confidential information to him about NSCIS and offering him good proposals for investment. Evidence of communication from TC and JP to JL suggests that JL is in a position of influence with the CM and he has often requested to arrange meetings or disclose or find out what |
| 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 | that. No doubt all parties will think that I have missed out some important parts and they can add to those in their openings. Just to complete this, the DPP, Christian Rocca KC's evidence is that he did not advise the RGP on the use of a search warrant and it is unlikely that the RGP would ever seek advice on operational matters which were for the RGP. His view is that it would have been more suitable and appropriate to seek a product order against Mr Levy. Nevertheless, he considered the RGP's position would be defensible on judicial review. At 3.43 in the afternoon, after that meeting on 12 May 2020, the Attorney General reported back to the Chief Minister after speaking with the DPP, and that was in an exchange of messages at B 1417. At the top of that page: "Are you free two minutes?" That is at 12.30. It is the next message, 15.41: "Spoken to DPP. He is categorical | 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 | of the messages between TC, JP and CS has shown that each has been communicating with JL with regard to the NSCIS platform. JL's knowledge of the plan to remove the NSCIS platform management from Blands in favour of 36N predates the departure of TC and JP from Blands and even the set-up of 36N itself. Emails recovered forensically show that EA had drafted a business proposal for 36N and intended for JL as far back as February 2018 in which the revenue streams include the maintenance of the NSCIS platform. Evidence of communications from CS to JL have shown that a civil servant was passing on confidential information to him about NSCIS and offering him good proposals for investment. Evidence of communication from TC and JP to JL suggests that JL is in a position of influence with the CM and he has often requested to arrange meetings or disclose or find out what is being decided with regard to 36 North's bid |
| 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24 | that. No doubt all parties will think that I have missed out some important parts and they can add to those in their openings. Just to complete this, the DPP, Christian Rocca KC's evidence is that he did not advise the RGP on the use of a search warrant and it is unlikely that the RGP would ever seek advice on operational matters which were for the RGP. His view is that it would have been more suitable and appropriate to seek a product order against Mr Levy. Nevertheless, he considered the RGP's position would be defensible on judicial review. At 3.43 in the afternoon, after that meeting on 12 May 2020, the Attorney General reported back to the Chief Minister after speaking with the DPP, and that was in an exchange of messages at B 1417. At the top of that page: "Are you free two minutes?" That is at 12.30. It is the next message, 15.41: "Spoken to DPP. He is categorical that whilst he told RGP that an interview | 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24 | of the messages between TC, JP and CS has shown that each has been communicating with JL with regard to the NSCIS platform. JL's knowledge of the plan to remove the NSCIS platform management from Blands in favour of 36N predates the departure of TC and JP from Blands and even the set-up of 36N itself. Emails recovered forensically show that EA had drafted a business proposal for 36N and intended for JL as far back as February 2018 in which the revenue streams include the maintenance of the NSCIS platform. Evidence of communications from CS to JL have shown that a civil servant was passing on confidential information to him about NSCIS and offering him good proposals for investment. Evidence of communication from TC and JP to JL suggests that JL is in a position of influence with the CM and he has often requested to arrange meetings or disclose or find out what is being decided with regard to 36 North's bid to take over the NSCIS platform." |
| 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 | that. No doubt all parties will think that I have missed out some important parts and they can add to those in their openings. Just to complete this, the DPP, Christian Rocca KC's evidence is that he did not advise the RGP on the use of a search warrant and it is unlikely that the RGP would ever seek advice on operational matters which were for the RGP. His view is that it would have been more suitable and appropriate to seek a product order against Mr Levy. Nevertheless, he considered the RGP's position would be defensible on judicial review. At 3.43 in the afternoon, after that meeting on 12 May 2020, the Attorney General reported back to the Chief Minister after speaking with the DPP, and that was in an exchange of messages at B 1417. At the top of that page: "Are you free two minutes?" That is at 12.30. It is the next message, 15.41: "Spoken to DPP. He is categorical | 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 | of the messages between TC, JP and CS has shown that each has been communicating with JL with regard to the NSCIS platform. JL's knowledge of the plan to remove the NSCIS platform management from Blands in favour of 36N predates the departure of TC and JP from Blands and even the set-up of 36N itself. Emails recovered forensically show that EA had drafted a business proposal for 36N and intended for JL as far back as February 2018 in which the revenue streams include the maintenance of the NSCIS platform. Evidence of communications from CS to JL have shown that a civil servant was passing on confidential information to him about NSCIS and offering him good proposals for investment. Evidence of communication from TC and JP to JL suggests that JL is in a position of influence with the CM and he has often requested to arrange meetings or disclose or find out what is being decided with regard to 36 North's bid |
| 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24 | that. No doubt all parties will think that I have missed out some important parts and they can add to those in their openings. Just to complete this, the DPP, Christian Rocca KC's evidence is that he did not advise the RGP on the use of a search warrant and it is unlikely that the RGP would ever seek advice on operational matters which were for the RGP. His view is that it would have been more suitable and appropriate to seek a product order against Mr Levy. Nevertheless, he considered the RGP's position would be defensible on judicial review. At 3.43 in the afternoon, after that meeting on 12 May 2020, the Attorney General reported back to the Chief Minister after speaking with the DPP, and that was in an exchange of messages at B 1417. At the top of that page: "Are you free two minutes?" That is at 12.30. It is the next message, 15.41: "Spoken to DPP. He is categorical that whilst he told RGP that an interview | 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24 | of the messages between TC, JP and CS has shown that each has been communicating with JL with regard to the NSCIS platform. JL's knowledge of the plan to remove the NSCIS platform management from Blands in favour of 36N predates the departure of TC and JP from Blands and even the set-up of 36N itself. Emails recovered forensically show that EA had drafted a business proposal for 36N and intended for JL as far back as February 2018 in which the revenue streams include the maintenance of the NSCIS platform. Evidence of communications from CS to JL have shown that a civil servant was passing on confidential information to him about NSCIS and offering him good proposals for investment. Evidence of communication from TC and JP to JL suggests that JL is in a position of influence with the CM and he has often requested to arrange meetings or disclose or find out what is being decided with regard to 36 North's bid to take over the NSCIS platform." |

| 1 | of evidence that suggests that JL was acting | 1 | that an offence of conspiracy to defraud has |
|---|---|--|--|
| 2 | unethically in his dealings regarding the | 2 | been committed." |
| 3 | NSCIS platform. The question is whether | 3 | Just moving forwards to 25A, it says: "In |
| 4 | this unethical behaviour is dishonest and | 4 | order to investigate this matter it is necessary |
| 5 | crosses the line into the realms of criminality. | 5 | to obtain further evidence by interviewing |
| 6 | JL is a senior partner in Gibraltar's largest | 6 | JL, conducting a digital forensic examination |
| 7 | law firm. A summary of some of the key | 7 | of devices that he used to communicate with |
| 8 | facts that assist in determining this question | 8 | the other relevant parties. As we have |
| 9 | are found at appendix A." | 9 | reasonable grounds to suspect that JL has |
| 10 | Just jumping ahead to B3455 at the top of the | 10 | participated in the offence under |
| 11 | page: "The question is whether the agreement | 11 | investigation, the interview should be under |
| 12 | to deprive Bland Limited of the NSCIS | 12 | caution. I have considered whether JL |
| 13 | maintenance contract was to do so by | 13 | should be arrested and wider searches |
| 14 | dishonesty. The grounds to suspect that this | 14 | conducted, as was the case with TC, JP, EA |
| 15 | was the case are based on the following. JL | 15 | and CS." |
| 16 | was receiving business proposals/information | 16 | Just jumping to 30: "The necessity to arrest |
| 17 | directly from a civil servant, was aware that | 17 | JL will not be met in the event that he |
| 18 | businesses such as Carnival Cruises and STP | 18 | consents to a voluntary attendance police |
| 19 | initiated by Bland were being taken by 36N, | 19 | interview. In the absence of such consent, an |
| 20 | was aware that TC continued to access the | 20 | arrest would have to be made to secure his |
| 21 | National Security platform after TC had | 21 | attendance to allow the prompt and effective |
| 22 | terminated his consultancy and that this | 22 | investigation of the offence and secure |
| 23 | information was being withheld from Bland, | 23 | evidence by questioning. There is no longer |
| 24 | was aware that TC had access to the system | 24 | a need to prevent conferring between |
| 25 | and performed a full review of the National | 25 | defendants and a wider search of Hassans' |
| 23 | and performed a fair review of the reactorial | 23 | detendants and a wider search of Hussans |
| | Page 177 | | Page 179 |
| 1 | Saggests platforms describe the feet that 26N | 1 | local manipas would in my view be |
| 1 | Security platform despite the fact that 36N | 1 | legal premises would in my view be |
| 2 3 | were not contracted to maintain the platform, | 2 3 | disproportionate. The seizure of the digital |
| 4 | was contacting/facilitating access to the CM with a view to discussing 36N and NSCIS | 4 | devices referred to in paragraph 25B should be by search warrant obtained in advance of |
| 5 | platform. In October 2018 spoke to TC | 5 | approaching JL for interview." |
| 6 | about the forensic team investigating whether | 6 | 33 says: "The examination of any contents |
| 7 | he was tampering with the system. It is | 0 | 33 says. The examination of any contents |
| | | 7 | · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · |
| 0 | 1 0 | 7 | seized from JL may be complicated by |
| 8 | reasonable to suggest that TC informed him | 8 | seized from JL may be complicated by claims of legal privilege. In that event the |
| 9 | reasonable to suggest that TC informed him that he had been sabotaging the system. | 8 9 | seized from JL may be complicated by claims of legal privilege. In that event the material will be reviewed by a lawyer first |
| 9 10 | reasonable to suggest that TC informed him that he had been sabotaging the system. Despite this information, JL continued to | 8 9 10 | seized from JL may be complicated by claims of legal privilege. In that event the material will be reviewed by a lawyer first using key word searches provided. We do |
| 9 10 11 | reasonable to suggest that TC informed him that he had been sabotaging the system. Despite this information, JL continued to support TC and 36N in obtaining the | 8 9 10 11 | seized from JL may be complicated by claims of legal privilege. In that event the material will be reviewed by a lawyer first using key word searches provided. We do not, however, believe that JL maintained a |
| 9 10 11 12 | reasonable to suggest that TC informed him that he had been sabotaging the system. Despite this information, JL continued to support TC and 36N in obtaining the platform and did not distance himself from | 8 9 10 11 12 | seized from JL may be complicated by claims of legal privilege. In that event the material will be reviewed by a lawyer first using key word searches provided. We do not, however, believe that JL maintained a lawyer/client relationship with any other |
| 9 10 11 12 13 | reasonable to suggest that TC informed him that he had been sabotaging the system. Despite this information, JL continued to support TC and 36N in obtaining the platform and did not distance himself from this conduct." | 8 9 10 11 12 13 | seized from JL may be complicated by claims of legal privilege. In that event the material will be reviewed by a lawyer first using key word searches provided. We do not, however, believe that JL maintained a lawyer/client relationship with any other person linked to this investigation and his |
| 9 10 11 12 13 14 | reasonable to suggest that TC informed him that he had been sabotaging the system. Despite this information, JL continued to support TC and 36N in obtaining the platform and did not distance himself from this conduct." The conclusion at 24A is: "We have | 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 | seized from JL may be complicated by claims of legal privilege. In that event the material will be reviewed by a lawyer first using key word searches provided. We do not, however, believe that JL maintained a lawyer/client relationship with any other person linked to this investigation and his dealings with them appear to be restricted to |
| 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 | reasonable to suggest that TC informed him that he had been sabotaging the system. Despite this information, JL continued to support TC and 36N in obtaining the platform and did not distance himself from this conduct." The conclusion at 24A is: "We have reasonable grounds to suspect that JL has | 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 | seized from JL may be complicated by claims of legal privilege. In that event the material will be reviewed by a lawyer first using key word searches provided. We do not, however, believe that JL maintained a lawyer/client relationship with any other person linked to this investigation and his dealings with them appear to be restricted to a business relationship." |
| 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 | reasonable to suggest that TC informed him that he had been sabotaging the system. Despite this information, JL continued to support TC and 36N in obtaining the platform and did not distance himself from this conduct." The conclusion at 24A is: "We have reasonable grounds to suspect that JL has dishonestly used his influence with the CM, | 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 | seized from JL may be complicated by claims of legal privilege. In that event the material will be reviewed by a lawyer first using key word searches provided. We do not, however, believe that JL maintained a lawyer/client relationship with any other person linked to this investigation and his dealings with them appear to be restricted to a business relationship." 35: "Given the political sensitivities and |
| 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 | reasonable to suggest that TC informed him that he had been sabotaging the system. Despite this information, JL continued to support TC and 36N in obtaining the platform and did not distance himself from this conduct." The conclusion at 24A is: "We have reasonable grounds to suspect that JL has dishonestly used his influence with the CM, CS, and possibly AM the FS to induce the | 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 | seized from JL may be complicated by claims of legal privilege. In that event the material will be reviewed by a lawyer first using key word searches provided. We do not, however, believe that JL maintained a lawyer/client relationship with any other person linked to this investigation and his dealings with them appear to be restricted to a business relationship." 35: "Given the political sensitivities and potential reluctance for a JP to issue a |
| 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 | reasonable to suggest that TC informed him that he had been sabotaging the system. Despite this information, JL continued to support TC and 36N in obtaining the platform and did not distance himself from this conduct." The conclusion at 24A is: "We have reasonable grounds to suspect that JL has dishonestly used his influence with the CM, CS, and possibly AM the FS to induce the relevant persons to transfer the maintenance | 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 | seized from JL may be complicated by claims of legal privilege. In that event the material will be reviewed by a lawyer first using key word searches provided. We do not, however, believe that JL maintained a lawyer/client relationship with any other person linked to this investigation and his dealings with them appear to be restricted to a business relationship." 35: "Given the political sensitivities and potential reluctance for a JP to issue a warrant for Hassan Law Practice, the warrant |
| 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 | reasonable to suggest that TC informed him that he had been sabotaging the system. Despite this information, JL continued to support TC and 36N in obtaining the platform and did not distance himself from this conduct." The conclusion at 24A is: "We have reasonable grounds to suspect that JL has dishonestly used his influence with the CM, CS, and possibly AM the FS to induce the relevant persons to transfer the maintenance contract of the NSCIS platform from Blands | 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 | seized from JL may be complicated by claims of legal privilege. In that event the material will be reviewed by a lawyer first using key word searches provided. We do not, however, believe that JL maintained a lawyer/client relationship with any other person linked to this investigation and his dealings with them appear to be restricted to a business relationship." 35: "Given the political sensitivities and potential reluctance for a JP to issue a warrant for Hassan Law Practice, the warrant should be requested from the Chief Justice." |
| 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 | reasonable to suggest that TC informed him that he had been sabotaging the system. Despite this information, JL continued to support TC and 36N in obtaining the platform and did not distance himself from this conduct." The conclusion at 24A is: "We have reasonable grounds to suspect that JL has dishonestly used his influence with the CM, CS, and possibly AM the FS to induce the relevant persons to transfer the maintenance contract of the NSCIS platform from Blands to 36N, a company in which he holds a 10.56 | 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 | seized from JL may be complicated by claims of legal privilege. In that event the material will be reviewed by a lawyer first using key word searches provided. We do not, however, believe that JL maintained a lawyer/client relationship with any other person linked to this investigation and his dealings with them appear to be restricted to a business relationship." 35: "Given the political sensitivities and potential reluctance for a JP to issue a warrant for Hassan Law Practice, the warrant should be requested from the Chief Justice." Then at the final page, 3457: "Identify |
| 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 | reasonable to suggest that TC informed him that he had been sabotaging the system. Despite this information, JL continued to support TC and 36N in obtaining the platform and did not distance himself from this conduct." The conclusion at 24A is: "We have reasonable grounds to suspect that JL has dishonestly used his influence with the CM, CS, and possibly AM the FS to induce the relevant persons to transfer the maintenance contract of the NSCIS platform from Blands to 36N, a company in which he holds a 10.56 per cent personal stake. B. There is no | 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 | seized from JL may be complicated by claims of legal privilege. In that event the material will be reviewed by a lawyer first using key word searches provided. We do not, however, believe that JL maintained a lawyer/client relationship with any other person linked to this investigation and his dealings with them appear to be restricted to a business relationship." 35: "Given the political sensitivities and potential reluctance for a JP to issue a warrant for Hassan Law Practice, the warrant should be requested from the Chief Justice." Then at the final page, 3457: "Identify options and contingencies. Given the |
| 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 | reasonable to suggest that TC informed him that he had been sabotaging the system. Despite this information, JL continued to support TC and 36N in obtaining the platform and did not distance himself from this conduct." The conclusion at 24A is: "We have reasonable grounds to suspect that JL has dishonestly used his influence with the CM, CS, and possibly AM the FS to induce the relevant persons to transfer the maintenance contract of the NSCIS platform from Blands to 36N, a company in which he holds a 10.56 per cent personal stake. B. There is no evidence that the CM nor AM were aware | 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 | seized from JL may be complicated by claims of legal privilege. In that event the material will be reviewed by a lawyer first using key word searches provided. We do not, however, believe that JL maintained a lawyer/client relationship with any other person linked to this investigation and his dealings with them appear to be restricted to a business relationship." 35: "Given the political sensitivities and potential reluctance for a JP to issue a warrant for Hassan Law Practice, the warrant should be requested from the Chief Justice." Then at the final page, 3457: "Identify options and contingencies. Given the political sensitivities of the persons involved, |
| 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 | reasonable to suggest that TC informed him that he had been sabotaging the system. Despite this information, JL continued to support TC and 36N in obtaining the platform and did not distance himself from this conduct." The conclusion at 24A is: "We have reasonable grounds to suspect that JL has dishonestly used his influence with the CM, CS, and possibly AM the FS to induce the relevant persons to transfer the maintenance contract of the NSCIS platform from Blands to 36N, a company in which he holds a 10.56 per cent personal stake. B. There is no evidence that the CM nor AM were aware that TC had compromised the operation of | 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 | seized from JL may be complicated by claims of legal privilege. In that event the material will be reviewed by a lawyer first using key word searches provided. We do not, however, believe that JL maintained a lawyer/client relationship with any other person linked to this investigation and his dealings with them appear to be restricted to a business relationship." 35: "Given the political sensitivities and potential reluctance for a JP to issue a warrant for Hassan Law Practice, the warrant should be requested from the Chief Justice." Then at the final page, 3457: "Identify options and contingencies. Given the political sensitivities of the persons involved, the least disruptive and most diplomatic |
| 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24 | reasonable to suggest that TC informed him that he had been sabotaging the system. Despite this information, JL continued to support TC and 36N in obtaining the platform and did not distance himself from this conduct." The conclusion at 24A is: "We have reasonable grounds to suspect that JL has dishonestly used his influence with the CM, CS, and possibly AM the FS to induce the relevant persons to transfer the maintenance contract of the NSCIS platform from Blands to 36N, a company in which he holds a 10.56 per cent personal stake. B. There is no evidence that the CM nor AM were aware that TC had compromised the operation of the NSCIS platform by sabotage. We | 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24 | seized from JL may be complicated by claims of legal privilege. In that event the material will be reviewed by a lawyer first using key word searches provided. We do not, however, believe that JL maintained a lawyer/client relationship with any other person linked to this investigation and his dealings with them appear to be restricted to a business relationship." 35: "Given the political sensitivities and potential reluctance for a JP to issue a warrant for Hassan Law Practice, the warrant should be requested from the Chief Justice." Then at the final page, 3457: "Identify options and contingencies. Given the political sensitivities of the persons involved, the least disruptive and most diplomatic means of police intervention will be |
| 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 | reasonable to suggest that TC informed him that he had been sabotaging the system. Despite this information, JL continued to support TC and 36N in obtaining the platform and did not distance himself from this conduct." The conclusion at 24A is: "We have reasonable grounds to suspect that JL has dishonestly used his influence with the CM, CS, and possibly AM the FS to induce the relevant persons to transfer the maintenance contract of the NSCIS platform from Blands to 36N, a company in which he holds a 10.56 per cent personal stake. B. There is no evidence that the CM nor AM were aware that TC had compromised the operation of | 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 | seized from JL may be complicated by claims of legal privilege. In that event the material will be reviewed by a lawyer first using key word searches provided. We do not, however, believe that JL maintained a lawyer/client relationship with any other person linked to this investigation and his dealings with them appear to be restricted to a business relationship." 35: "Given the political sensitivities and potential reluctance for a JP to issue a warrant for Hassan Law Practice, the warrant should be requested from the Chief Justice." Then at the final page, 3457: "Identify options and contingencies. Given the political sensitivities of the persons involved, the least disruptive and most diplomatic |
| 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24 | reasonable to suggest that TC informed him that he had been sabotaging the system. Despite this information, JL continued to support TC and 36N in obtaining the platform and did not distance himself from this conduct." The conclusion at 24A is: "We have reasonable grounds to suspect that JL has dishonestly used his influence with the CM, CS, and possibly AM the FS to induce the relevant persons to transfer the maintenance contract of the NSCIS platform from Blands to 36N, a company in which he holds a 10.56 per cent personal stake. B. There is no evidence that the CM nor AM were aware that TC had compromised the operation of the NSCIS platform by sabotage. We | 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24 | seized from JL may be complicated by claims of legal privilege. In that event the material will be reviewed by a lawyer first using key word searches provided. We do not, however, believe that JL maintained a lawyer/client relationship with any other person linked to this investigation and his dealings with them appear to be restricted to a business relationship." 35: "Given the political sensitivities and potential reluctance for a JP to issue a warrant for Hassan Law Practice, the warrant should be requested from the Chief Justice." Then at the final page, 3457: "Identify options and contingencies. Given the political sensitivities of the persons involved, the least disruptive and most diplomatic means of police intervention will be |

| | | l l | |
|----------|---|----------|---|
| 1 | Then 39: "It is expected that any allegation of | 1 | advice. At the end of that report at 362 there |
| 2 | impropriety or legality will be vigorously | 2 | is a reference to the search warrants and |
| 3 | attacked using Hassans' considerable legal | 3 | arrests that had previously been carried out. |
| 4 | resources to protect the integrity of | 4 | Then at 3665 at the bottom of the page: "In |
| 5 | investigation and avoid any misconstruing on | 5 | light of the evidence proffered above, it is |
| 6 | the actual words said during the police | 6 | requested that the 76 proposed charges be |
| 7 | intervention, Hassan body worn footage will | 7 | considered in accordance with the Code for |
| 8 | be taken." | 8 | Prosecutors, these being" - and those are |
| 9 | Then we have the charging report sent by | 9 | listed on the following page. |
| 10 | Superintendent Richardson to the DPP on 1 | 10 | Then at 338: "In addition to the proposed |
| 11 | April 2020 to obtain legal advice on | 11 | charges, advice is also sought as to whether, |
| 12 | charging. That identified 76 possible | 12 | based on the above evidence, there are |
| 13 | charges. If we go to B 3630, we have there | 13 | reasonable grounds to suspect that Levy has |
| 14 | at 132, on 19 October Cornelio wrote to Levy | 14 | committed the offence of conspiracy to |
| 15 | saying: "Morning, James. Very confidential. | 15 | defraud and/or any other criminal offences." |
| 16 | Note Cajero(?) has brought in a forensic team | 16 | At 339: "In the event that there are |
| 17 | of six to look at anything John and I may | 17 | reasonable grounds to suspect Levy has |
| 18 | done to tamper with the system, etc. Cajero | 18 | committed any offence, the police will |
| 19 | is going all out, it seems." | 19 | consider whether it is necessary to conduct |
| 20 | At 133, in a text to Berres the same day, | 20 | further investigations in the form of search |
| 21 | Cornelio stated that he had spoken to Levy | 21 | warrants, interview under caution." |
| 22 | and was told not to worry. | 22 | Can we now turn to 3280. This is one further |
| 23 | Then 134: "The evidence indicates that Levy | 23 | document. If you just go up to 3278 first, |
| 24 | discussed the forensic team with Cornelio | 24 | this is what we can an options report. It is |
| 25 | and that he had given him advice about the | 25 | considering the options in terms of how best |
| 23 | and that he had given him device dood the | 23 | considering the options in terms of now best |
| | Page 181 | | Page 183 |
| 1 | situation." | 1 | to interview Mr Levy in the context of Covid |
| 2 | 135: "By 2019 Levy was in no doubt that | 2 | restrictions which were in place at the time. |
| 3 | Cornelio and 36 North had not been | 3 | It says: "Based on the advice offered by the |
| 4 | contracted to maintain the NSCIS platform. | 4 | DPP, it is our intention to interview Mr Levy |
| 5 | Despite this fact, he did not question | 5 | on the basis of a conspiracy to defraud." If |
| 6 | Cornelio accessing the system in April | 6 | we go forward to page 3280 which we were |
| 7 | 2019." | 7 | just looking at, at 15 it says: "Mr Levy could |
| 8 | Then 136: "On 11 April 2019 Cornelio wrote | 8 | be requested to attend a police station. In |
| 9 | to Levy, 'I am preparing a report for | 9 | doing so, he could be asked to bring any |
| 10 | (inaudible) with regards to the failures of the | 10 | devices for analysis and to submit to an |
| 11 | National Security platform. Leslie is | 11 | interview. However, this would notify Mr |
| 12 | preparing a legal letter for your review in an | 12 | Levy of our intentions and would thereby |
| 13 | attempt to speed up the process. This is | 13 | risk the loss of evidence. This would be |
| 14 | okay?' He went on to say, 'We are going to | 14 | contrary to the way we have dealt with the |
| 15 | have a field day on the National Security | 15 | other suspects, although we could argue that, |
| 16 | report. Just wait until you see it. For now, I | 16 | given the amount of time, he will be well |
| 17 | am reviewing every single module one by | 17 | aware of the arrests and of the police |
| 18 | one." | 18 | investigation. Moreover, we would still |
| 18 | | 19 | = |
| 20 | Finally at 137, on 23 April 2019 he wrote to | 20 | expose Mr Levy to a risk of exposure to the virus." We do not have to trouble ourselves |
| 20 | Levy: "Note, I provided Albert Mena with a | 20 | with that. |
| | report on the National Security system. Has | | |
| 22 | he made any comment to you about this? | 22 | Then the conclusions start at 18. The |
| 23 | The report would have been delivered to him | 23 | conclusion is to approach him at work. Then |
| 24 25 | via King." So that report was sent to the DPP for his | 24 25 | at 20, expediting the case is proposed, and I think that we can move on from that. |
| 23 | So that report was sent to the DPP for his | 23 | uniik mat we can move on from that. |
| | Page 182 | | Page 184 |
| | | | |

| | | T | |
|----|---|----|---|
| 1 | Can we now turn to 3808, please. "On 6 and | 1 | investigation. The evidence showed |
| 2 | 7 May 2020 DS Clarke applied for the | 2 | complete and incomplete exchanges between |
| 3 | warrants from the Stipendiary Magistrate | 3 | Mr Levy and his alleged co-conspirators |
| 4 | with Superintendent Richardson also present. | 4 | currently under investigation. Mr Levy being |
| 5 | The information laid before the magistrate | 5 | at this stage a suspect and the information |
| 6 | was predominantly taken from the charging | 6 | being sought concerns his involvement in an |
| 7 | report" [that we have already seen] and DS | 7 | alleged criminal conspiracy, I did not |
| 8 | Clarke says that he read it out to the | 8 | consider that the legal professional privilege |
| 9 | magistrate. | 9 | was engaged and that, for the same reason, |
| 10 | 3808 is the conclusion as to Mr Levy's | 10 | the material sought was not special procedure |
| 11 | involvement. At 319 it reads as follows: | 11 | material. Since that material sought is |
| 12 | "The above paragraphs demonstrate Levy | 12 | electronically digitally stored, I was further |
| 13 | | 13 | satisfied by the officers that means exist by |
| | was involved in a plan to remove the NSCIS | | |
| 14 | contract from Bland at an early stage. | 14 | which data is shifted so that only material |
| 15 | Messages between Levy and Sanchez show | 15 | relevant to the investigation is retrieved." |
| 16 | communication discussing moving the | 16 | So in terms of the search warrant procedure, |
| 17 | contract away from Bland in early 2018. | 17 | we as counsel to the Inquiry have conducted |
| 18 | Levy was instrumental in the creation of 36 | 18 | a detailed analysis of these documents and |
| 19 | North, firstly by owning 33 per cent of shares | 19 | have identified what we would say in our |
| 20 | of Astelon Limited, who in turn own 33 per | 20 | submission are two key deficiencies in the |
| 21 | cent of shares in 36 North. Of behalf of | 21 | basis put forward for the search warrants. |
| 22 | Hassans he injected a large sum of money | 22 | First, there were two alternative procedures |
| 23 | into 36 North. He was using his influence | 23 | open to the RGP under Schedule 1 of the |
| 24 | with the Chief Minister to the advantage of | 24 | Criminal Procedure and Evidence Act 2011, |
| 25 | 36 North. He was regularly contacting both | 25 | namely either (1) seeking a search warrant |
| | Dags 105 | | Dags 197 |
| | Page 185 | | Page 187 |
| 1 | Cornelio and Perez in relation to 36 North | 1 | which authorises a police officer to enter and |
| 2 | whilst they were still employed by Blands | 2 | search premises and seize material; or (2) a |
| 3 | and following their resignations. | 3 | production order which requires the person in |
| 4 | Communications show he was aware of the | 4 | possession of the material to produce it to a |
| 5 | computer misuse offences committed by | 5 | police officer within seven days. The reason |
| 6 | Cornelio." The warrants were granted. | 6 | provided by the RGP for seeking a warrant |
| 7 | Can we just look at 3809, at the bottom, 324: | 7 | was that, because Mr Levy was a suspect, he |
| 8 | "Other methods of obtaining the material | 8 | was highly likely to destroy evidence. That |
| 9 | have not been tried because it appeared they | 9 | is in our submission unsatisfactory and |
| 10 | were bound to fail. The material sought is | 10 | generic and indeed would apply to all |
| 11 | held by a subject in this case and it is feared | 11 | suspects and mean that production orders |
| 12 | if notice was given to the subject to provide | 12 | would never be obtained against suspects. |
| | | 13 | The information did not deal with the |
| 13 | this material to the OIC the subject would | | |
| 14 | destroy, alter, deface or conceal the material | 14 | pertinent point made by DI Wyan in the |
| 15 | sought." | 15 | options report, namely that Mr Levy had |
| 16 | The magistrate's reasons were recorded on 13 | 16 | been aware of the other arrests and |
| 17 | May 2020. That is at C6728. The operative | 17 | investigations for some time and therefore |
| 18 | parts of that say: "I was satisfied that the | 18 | the risk of deletion or destruction in defiance |
| 19 | evidence presented disclosed sufficient | 19 | of a production order could be said to be |
| 20 | grounds on which the warrants sought could | 20 | lessened. A similar point was made by the |
| 21 | be issued. The evidence pointed to the | 21 | DPP in the meeting of 15 May 2020. |
| 22 | existence of a conspiracy involving Mr Levy | 22 | Second, there is no power under the CPEA to |
| 23 | as a participant. That being so, issuing the | 23 | execute a search warrant authorising entry on |
| 24 | warrants was justified in order to obtain and | 24 | premises for the purposes of seizure of |
| 25 | preserve existence necessary for the police | 25 | legally privileged material or material |
| | Page 186 | | Page 188 |
| | 1 agc 100 | I | 1 age 100 |

| 1 | including legally privileged material, | 1 | considered view as to the basis of the |
|--|--|--|---|
| 2 | although the RGP may well have been | 2 | warrants. Similarly, I submit that it is |
| 3 | correct that the communications of interest to | 3 | necessary for the Inquiry to look into this |
| 4 | the investigation were not privileged. This | 4 | point too, given that the search warrants are |
| 5 | does not grapple with the fact that Mr Levy's | 5 | the context to some of the most important |
| 6 | devices would almost certainly have | 6 | exchanges in this Inquiry. |
| 7 | contained privileged material pertaining to | 7 | That said, I should make three matters clear. |
| 8 | his other clients. Mr Cruz for the RGP has | 8 | First, our submissions are just that, |
| 9 | kindly flagged in advance of today that his | 9 | submissions. Our considered view on the |
| 10 | client takes issue with my written | 10 | basis for the warrant obviously does not bind |
| 11 | submissions on this point and with the | 11 | you, sir. Second, we do not invite you to rule |
| 12 | principle of the Inquiry looking into the basis | 12 | upon or even arrive at a definitive |
| 13 | of the warrants which he argues are | 13 | determination as to the lawfulness of the |
| 14 | irrelevant. I am grateful to him for his | 14 | warrants. Third, I do not understand it to be |
| 15 | characteristic courtesy in raising it with me in | 15 | your intention to arrive at such a definitive |
| 16 | advance. However, I must respectfully | 16 | determination. |
| 17 | disagree with his position. The lawfulness of | 17 | Now, it is also clear that this Inquiry has no |
| 18 | the warrant is relevant in particular to the | 18 | power to and may not rule on or determine |
| 19 | conversation between the Chief Minister, the | 19 | criminal liability on anybody's part. It |
| 20 | Attorney General and Mr McGrail of 12 May | 20 | suffices to note that the Op Delhi defendants |
| 21 | 2020 and the ensuing conversations and | 21 | deny the charges raised against them, and |
| 22 | correspondence relating to the warrant. If | 22 | similarly Mr Levy denies any participation in |
| 23 | there were procedural defects or flaws in the | 23 | a conspiracy to defraud or any other criminal |
| 24 | basis for the warrant, that is relevant context | 24 | activity. There is also a question which arose |
| 25 | to, for example, the Chief Minister's and the | 25 | after the search warrants as to whether the |
| | - | | |
| | Page 189 | | Page 191 |
| | | | |
| 1 | Attorney General's conduct towards Mr | 1 | common law offence of conspiracy to |
| 1 2 | Attorney General's conduct towards Mr McGrail. However, I should make clear that | 1 2 | common law offence of conspiracy to defraud at common law was abolished by |
| 2 | McGrail. However, I should make clear that | 2 | defraud at common law was abolished by |
| 2 3 | McGrail. However, I should make clear that even if it were accepted that there were flaws | 2 3 | defraud at common law was abolished by section 35 of the Crimes Act 2011. Certainly |
| 2 3 4 | McGrail. However, I should make clear that even if it were accepted that there were flaws in the procedure, that is not necessarily a | 2 3 4 | defraud at common law was abolished by section 35 of the Crimes Act 2011. Certainly this is supported by the Crime and |
| 2 3 4 5 | McGrail. However, I should make clear that even if it were accepted that there were flaws in the procedure, that is not necessarily a justification of the Chief Minister's or the | 2 3 4 5 | defraud at common law was abolished by section 35 of the Crimes Act 2011. Certainly this is supported by the Crime and Miscellaneous Provisions Amendment Act |
| 2 3 4 5 6 | McGrail. However, I should make clear that even if it were accepted that there were flaws in the procedure, that is not necessarily a justification of the Chief Minister's or the Attorney General's subsequent actions. It is | 2 3 4 5 6 | defraud at common law was abolished by section 35 of the Crimes Act 2011. Certainly this is supported by the Crime and Miscellaneous Provisions Amendment Act 2023, but we would not invite you to resolve |
| 2 3 4 5 6 7 | McGrail. However, I should make clear that even if it were accepted that there were flaws in the procedure, that is not necessarily a justification of the Chief Minister's or the Attorney General's subsequent actions. It is only relevant context. Even if you form the | 2 3 4 5 6 7 | defraud at common law was abolished by section 35 of the Crimes Act 2011. Certainly this is supported by the Crime and Miscellaneous Provisions Amendment Act 2023, but we would not invite you to resolve this issue of law. |
| 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 | McGrail. However, I should make clear that even if it were accepted that there were flaws in the procedure, that is not necessarily a justification of the Chief Minister's or the Attorney General's subsequent actions. It is only relevant context. Even if you form the view that a production order was more | 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 | defraud at common law was abolished by section 35 of the Crimes Act 2011. Certainly this is supported by the Crime and Miscellaneous Provisions Amendment Act 2023, but we would not invite you to resolve this issue of law. It is impossible for me to give a detailed |
| 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 | McGrail. However, I should make clear that even if it were accepted that there were flaws in the procedure, that is not necessarily a justification of the Chief Minister's or the Attorney General's subsequent actions. It is only relevant context. Even if you form the view that a production order was more appropriate than a search warrant, it does not | 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 | defraud at common law was abolished by section 35 of the Crimes Act 2011. Certainly this is supported by the Crime and Miscellaneous Provisions Amendment Act 2023, but we would not invite you to resolve this issue of law. It is impossible for me to give a detailed account of the facts relating to the issue in |
| 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 | McGrail. However, I should make clear that even if it were accepted that there were flaws in the procedure, that is not necessarily a justification of the Chief Minister's or the Attorney General's subsequent actions. It is only relevant context. Even if you form the view that a production order was more appropriate than a search warrant, it does not necessarily follow, for example, that the | 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 | defraud at common law was abolished by section 35 of the Crimes Act 2011. Certainly this is supported by the Crime and Miscellaneous Provisions Amendment Act 2023, but we would not invite you to resolve this issue of law. It is impossible for me to give a detailed account of the facts relating to the issue in the time available to me today. The fullest |
| 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 | McGrail. However, I should make clear that even if it were accepted that there were flaws in the procedure, that is not necessarily a justification of the Chief Minister's or the Attorney General's subsequent actions. It is only relevant context. Even if you form the view that a production order was more appropriate than a search warrant, it does not necessarily follow, for example, that the Chief Minister was justified in all of his | 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 | defraud at common law was abolished by section 35 of the Crimes Act 2011. Certainly this is supported by the Crime and Miscellaneous Provisions Amendment Act 2023, but we would not invite you to resolve this issue of law. It is impossible for me to give a detailed account of the facts relating to the issue in the time available to me today. The fullest set of the facts is in the undisputed facts and |
| 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 | McGrail. However, I should make clear that even if it were accepted that there were flaws in the procedure, that is not necessarily a justification of the Chief Minister's or the Attorney General's subsequent actions. It is only relevant context. Even if you form the view that a production order was more appropriate than a search warrant, it does not necessarily follow, for example, that the Chief Minister was justified in all of his actions on 12 May 2020. It is plainly open to | 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 | defraud at common law was abolished by section 35 of the Crimes Act 2011. Certainly this is supported by the Crime and Miscellaneous Provisions Amendment Act 2023, but we would not invite you to resolve this issue of law. It is impossible for me to give a detailed account of the facts relating to the issue in the time available to me today. The fullest set of the facts is in the undisputed facts and in our written submissions we have focused |
| 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 | McGrail. However, I should make clear that even if it were accepted that there were flaws in the procedure, that is not necessarily a justification of the Chief Minister's or the Attorney General's subsequent actions. It is only relevant context. Even if you form the view that a production order was more appropriate than a search warrant, it does not necessarily follow, for example, that the Chief Minister was justified in all of his actions on 12 May 2020. It is plainly open to you that the Chief Minister raised valid | 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 | defraud at common law was abolished by section 35 of the Crimes Act 2011. Certainly this is supported by the Crime and Miscellaneous Provisions Amendment Act 2023, but we would not invite you to resolve this issue of law. It is impossible for me to give a detailed account of the facts relating to the issue in the time available to me today. The fullest set of the facts is in the undisputed facts and in our written submissions we have focused on three sub-issues, the three that feature in |
| 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 | McGrail. However, I should make clear that even if it were accepted that there were flaws in the procedure, that is not necessarily a justification of the Chief Minister's or the Attorney General's subsequent actions. It is only relevant context. Even if you form the view that a production order was more appropriate than a search warrant, it does not necessarily follow, for example, that the Chief Minister was justified in all of his actions on 12 May 2020. It is plainly open to you that the Chief Minister raised valid points and yet that his raising of those points | 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 | defraud at common law was abolished by section 35 of the Crimes Act 2011. Certainly this is supported by the Crime and Miscellaneous Provisions Amendment Act 2023, but we would not invite you to resolve this issue of law. It is impossible for me to give a detailed account of the facts relating to the issue in the time available to me today. The fullest set of the facts is in the undisputed facts and in our written submissions we have focused on three sub-issues, the three that feature in the list of issues which is very kindly put on |
| 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 | McGrail. However, I should make clear that even if it were accepted that there were flaws in the procedure, that is not necessarily a justification of the Chief Minister's or the Attorney General's subsequent actions. It is only relevant context. Even if you form the view that a production order was more appropriate than a search warrant, it does not necessarily follow, for example, that the Chief Minister was justified in all of his actions on 12 May 2020. It is plainly open to you that the Chief Minister raised valid points and yet that his raising of those points or the manner in which he raised them or his | 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 | defraud at common law was abolished by section 35 of the Crimes Act 2011. Certainly this is supported by the Crime and Miscellaneous Provisions Amendment Act 2023, but we would not invite you to resolve this issue of law. It is impossible for me to give a detailed account of the facts relating to the issue in the time available to me today. The fullest set of the facts is in the undisputed facts and in our written submissions we have focused on three sub-issues, the three that feature in the list of issues which is very kindly put on the screen by Mr Triay. Those are the advice |
| 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 | McGrail. However, I should make clear that even if it were accepted that there were flaws in the procedure, that is not necessarily a justification of the Chief Minister's or the Attorney General's subsequent actions. It is only relevant context. Even if you form the view that a production order was more appropriate than a search warrant, it does not necessarily follow, for example, that the Chief Minister was justified in all of his actions on 12 May 2020. It is plainly open to you that the Chief Minister raised valid points and yet that his raising of those points or the manner in which he raised them or his other actions on 12 May 2020 amounted to | 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 | defraud at common law was abolished by section 35 of the Crimes Act 2011. Certainly this is supported by the Crime and Miscellaneous Provisions Amendment Act 2023, but we would not invite you to resolve this issue of law. It is impossible for me to give a detailed account of the facts relating to the issue in the time available to me today. The fullest set of the facts is in the undisputed facts and in our written submissions we have focused on three sub-issues, the three that feature in the list of issues which is very kindly put on the screen by Mr Triay. Those are the advice from the DPP on the search warrants, the |
| 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 | McGrail. However, I should make clear that even if it were accepted that there were flaws in the procedure, that is not necessarily a justification of the Chief Minister's or the Attorney General's subsequent actions. It is only relevant context. Even if you form the view that a production order was more appropriate than a search warrant, it does not necessarily follow, for example, that the Chief Minister was justified in all of his actions on 12 May 2020. It is plainly open to you that the Chief Minister raised valid points and yet that his raising of those points or the manner in which he raised them or his other actions on 12 May 2020 amounted to inappropriate interference in the | 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 | defraud at common law was abolished by section 35 of the Crimes Act 2011. Certainly this is supported by the Crime and Miscellaneous Provisions Amendment Act 2023, but we would not invite you to resolve this issue of law. It is impossible for me to give a detailed account of the facts relating to the issue in the time available to me today. The fullest set of the facts is in the undisputed facts and in our written submissions we have focused on three sub-issues, the three that feature in the list of issues which is very kindly put on the screen by Mr Triay. Those are the advice from the DPP on the search warrants, the agreement between Mr McGrail and the |
| 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 | McGrail. However, I should make clear that even if it were accepted that there were flaws in the procedure, that is not necessarily a justification of the Chief Minister's or the Attorney General's subsequent actions. It is only relevant context. Even if you form the view that a production order was more appropriate than a search warrant, it does not necessarily follow, for example, that the Chief Minister was justified in all of his actions on 12 May 2020. It is plainly open to you that the Chief Minister raised valid points and yet that his raising of those points or the manner in which he raised them or his other actions on 12 May 2020 amounted to inappropriate interference in the investigation. These are matters which will | 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 | defraud at common law was abolished by section 35 of the Crimes Act 2011. Certainly this is supported by the Crime and Miscellaneous Provisions Amendment Act 2023, but we would not invite you to resolve this issue of law. It is impossible for me to give a detailed account of the facts relating to the issue in the time available to me today. The fullest set of the facts is in the undisputed facts and in our written submissions we have focused on three sub-issues, the three that feature in the list of issues which is very kindly put on the screen by Mr Triay. Those are the advice from the DPP on the search warrants, the agreement between Mr McGrail and the Attorney General regarding rationalisations |
| 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 | McGrail. However, I should make clear that even if it were accepted that there were flaws in the procedure, that is not necessarily a justification of the Chief Minister's or the Attorney General's subsequent actions. It is only relevant context. Even if you form the view that a production order was more appropriate than a search warrant, it does not necessarily follow, for example, that the Chief Minister was justified in all of his actions on 12 May 2020. It is plainly open to you that the Chief Minister raised valid points and yet that his raising of those points or the manner in which he raised them or his other actions on 12 May 2020 amounted to inappropriate interference in the investigation. These are matters which will need to be considered carefully at the main | 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 | defraud at common law was abolished by section 35 of the Crimes Act 2011. Certainly this is supported by the Crime and Miscellaneous Provisions Amendment Act 2023, but we would not invite you to resolve this issue of law. It is impossible for me to give a detailed account of the facts relating to the issue in the time available to me today. The fullest set of the facts is in the undisputed facts and in our written submissions we have focused on three sub-issues, the three that feature in the list of issues which is very kindly put on the screen by Mr Triay. Those are the advice from the DPP on the search warrants, the agreement between Mr McGrail and the Attorney General regarding rationalisations and resolving the ownership issue and |
| 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 | McGrail. However, I should make clear that even if it were accepted that there were flaws in the procedure, that is not necessarily a justification of the Chief Minister's or the Attorney General's subsequent actions. It is only relevant context. Even if you form the view that a production order was more appropriate than a search warrant, it does not necessarily follow, for example, that the Chief Minister was justified in all of his actions on 12 May 2020. It is plainly open to you that the Chief Minister raised valid points and yet that his raising of those points or the manner in which he raised them or his other actions on 12 May 2020 amounted to inappropriate interference in the investigation. These are matters which will need to be considered carefully at the main Inquiry hearing, including the Chief | 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 | defraud at common law was abolished by section 35 of the Crimes Act 2011. Certainly this is supported by the Crime and Miscellaneous Provisions Amendment Act 2023, but we would not invite you to resolve this issue of law. It is impossible for me to give a detailed account of the facts relating to the issue in the time available to me today. The fullest set of the facts is in the undisputed facts and in our written submissions we have focused on three sub-issues, the three that feature in the list of issues which is very kindly put on the screen by Mr Triay. Those are the advice from the DPP on the search warrants, the agreement between Mr McGrail and the Attorney General regarding rationalisations and resolving the ownership issue and whether that prevented any further action by |
| 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 | McGrail. However, I should make clear that even if it were accepted that there were flaws in the procedure, that is not necessarily a justification of the Chief Minister's or the Attorney General's subsequent actions. It is only relevant context. Even if you form the view that a production order was more appropriate than a search warrant, it does not necessarily follow, for example, that the Chief Minister was justified in all of his actions on 12 May 2020. It is plainly open to you that the Chief Minister raised valid points and yet that his raising of those points or the manner in which he raised them or his other actions on 12 May 2020 amounted to inappropriate interference in the investigation. These are matters which will need to be considered carefully at the main Inquiry hearing, including the Chief Minister's knowledge as to any alleged flaws. | 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 | defraud at common law was abolished by section 35 of the Crimes Act 2011. Certainly this is supported by the Crime and Miscellaneous Provisions Amendment Act 2023, but we would not invite you to resolve this issue of law. It is impossible for me to give a detailed account of the facts relating to the issue in the time available to me today. The fullest set of the facts is in the undisputed facts and in our written submissions we have focused on three sub-issues, the three that feature in the list of issues which is very kindly put on the screen by Mr Triay. Those are the advice from the DPP on the search warrants, the agreement between Mr McGrail and the Attorney General regarding rationalisations and resolving the ownership issue and whether that prevented any further action by the RGP until a further meeting, and the |
| 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 | McGrail. However, I should make clear that even if it were accepted that there were flaws in the procedure, that is not necessarily a justification of the Chief Minister's or the Attorney General's subsequent actions. It is only relevant context. Even if you form the view that a production order was more appropriate than a search warrant, it does not necessarily follow, for example, that the Chief Minister was justified in all of his actions on 12 May 2020. It is plainly open to you that the Chief Minister raised valid points and yet that his raising of those points or the manner in which he raised them or his other actions on 12 May 2020 amounted to inappropriate interference in the investigation. These are matters which will need to be considered carefully at the main Inquiry hearing, including the Chief Minister's knowledge as to any alleged flaws. But in my submission it would be a glaring | 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 | defraud at common law was abolished by section 35 of the Crimes Act 2011. Certainly this is supported by the Crime and Miscellaneous Provisions Amendment Act 2023, but we would not invite you to resolve this issue of law. It is impossible for me to give a detailed account of the facts relating to the issue in the time available to me today. The fullest set of the facts is in the undisputed facts and in our written submissions we have focused on three sub-issues, the three that feature in the list of issues which is very kindly put on the screen by Mr Triay. Those are the advice from the DPP on the search warrants, the agreement between Mr McGrail and the Attorney General regarding rationalisations and resolving the ownership issue and whether that prevented any further action by the RGP until a further meeting, and the alleged inappropriate pressure by the |
| 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 | McGrail. However, I should make clear that even if it were accepted that there were flaws in the procedure, that is not necessarily a justification of the Chief Minister's or the Attorney General's subsequent actions. It is only relevant context. Even if you form the view that a production order was more appropriate than a search warrant, it does not necessarily follow, for example, that the Chief Minister was justified in all of his actions on 12 May 2020. It is plainly open to you that the Chief Minister raised valid points and yet that his raising of those points or the manner in which he raised them or his other actions on 12 May 2020 amounted to inappropriate interference in the investigation. These are matters which will need to be considered carefully at the main Inquiry hearing, including the Chief Minister's knowledge as to any alleged flaws. But in my submission it would be a glaring omission on our part, as counsel to the | 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 | defraud at common law was abolished by section 35 of the Crimes Act 2011. Certainly this is supported by the Crime and Miscellaneous Provisions Amendment Act 2023, but we would not invite you to resolve this issue of law. It is impossible for me to give a detailed account of the facts relating to the issue in the time available to me today. The fullest set of the facts is in the undisputed facts and in our written submissions we have focused on three sub-issues, the three that feature in the list of issues which is very kindly put on the screen by Mr Triay. Those are the advice from the DPP on the search warrants, the agreement between Mr McGrail and the Attorney General regarding rationalisations and resolving the ownership issue and whether that prevented any further action by the RGP until a further meeting, and the alleged inappropriate pressure by the Attorney General or the Chief Minister on |
| 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24 | McGrail. However, I should make clear that even if it were accepted that there were flaws in the procedure, that is not necessarily a justification of the Chief Minister's or the Attorney General's subsequent actions. It is only relevant context. Even if you form the view that a production order was more appropriate than a search warrant, it does not necessarily follow, for example, that the Chief Minister was justified in all of his actions on 12 May 2020. It is plainly open to you that the Chief Minister raised valid points and yet that his raising of those points or the manner in which he raised them or his other actions on 12 May 2020 amounted to inappropriate interference in the investigation. These are matters which will need to be considered carefully at the main Inquiry hearing, including the Chief Minister's knowledge as to any alleged flaws. But in my submission it would be a glaring omission on our part, as counsel to the Inquiry, in our role and our duty to advise | 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24 | defraud at common law was abolished by section 35 of the Crimes Act 2011. Certainly this is supported by the Crime and Miscellaneous Provisions Amendment Act 2023, but we would not invite you to resolve this issue of law. It is impossible for me to give a detailed account of the facts relating to the issue in the time available to me today. The fullest set of the facts is in the undisputed facts and in our written submissions we have focused on three sub-issues, the three that feature in the list of issues which is very kindly put on the screen by Mr Triay. Those are the advice from the DPP on the search warrants, the agreement between Mr McGrail and the Attorney General regarding rationalisations and resolving the ownership issue and whether that prevented any further action by the RGP until a further meeting, and the alleged inappropriate pressure by the Attorney General or the Chief Minister on Mr McGrail or interference with the |
| 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 | McGrail. However, I should make clear that even if it were accepted that there were flaws in the procedure, that is not necessarily a justification of the Chief Minister's or the Attorney General's subsequent actions. It is only relevant context. Even if you form the view that a production order was more appropriate than a search warrant, it does not necessarily follow, for example, that the Chief Minister was justified in all of his actions on 12 May 2020. It is plainly open to you that the Chief Minister raised valid points and yet that his raising of those points or the manner in which he raised them or his other actions on 12 May 2020 amounted to inappropriate interference in the investigation. These are matters which will need to be considered carefully at the main Inquiry hearing, including the Chief Minister's knowledge as to any alleged flaws. But in my submission it would be a glaring omission on our part, as counsel to the | 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 | defraud at common law was abolished by section 35 of the Crimes Act 2011. Certainly this is supported by the Crime and Miscellaneous Provisions Amendment Act 2023, but we would not invite you to resolve this issue of law. It is impossible for me to give a detailed account of the facts relating to the issue in the time available to me today. The fullest set of the facts is in the undisputed facts and in our written submissions we have focused on three sub-issues, the three that feature in the list of issues which is very kindly put on the screen by Mr Triay. Those are the advice from the DPP on the search warrants, the agreement between Mr McGrail and the Attorney General regarding rationalisations and resolving the ownership issue and whether that prevented any further action by the RGP until a further meeting, and the alleged inappropriate pressure by the Attorney General or the Chief Minister on |
| 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24 | McGrail. However, I should make clear that even if it were accepted that there were flaws in the procedure, that is not necessarily a justification of the Chief Minister's or the Attorney General's subsequent actions. It is only relevant context. Even if you form the view that a production order was more appropriate than a search warrant, it does not necessarily follow, for example, that the Chief Minister was justified in all of his actions on 12 May 2020. It is plainly open to you that the Chief Minister raised valid points and yet that his raising of those points or the manner in which he raised them or his other actions on 12 May 2020 amounted to inappropriate interference in the investigation. These are matters which will need to be considered carefully at the main Inquiry hearing, including the Chief Minister's knowledge as to any alleged flaws. But in my submission it would be a glaring omission on our part, as counsel to the Inquiry, in our role and our duty to advise | 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24 | defraud at common law was abolished by section 35 of the Crimes Act 2011. Certainly this is supported by the Crime and Miscellaneous Provisions Amendment Act 2023, but we would not invite you to resolve this issue of law. It is impossible for me to give a detailed account of the facts relating to the issue in the time available to me today. The fullest set of the facts is in the undisputed facts and in our written submissions we have focused on three sub-issues, the three that feature in the list of issues which is very kindly put on the screen by Mr Triay. Those are the advice from the DPP on the search warrants, the agreement between Mr McGrail and the Attorney General regarding rationalisations and resolving the ownership issue and whether that prevented any further action by the RGP until a further meeting, and the alleged inappropriate pressure by the Attorney General or the Chief Minister on Mr McGrail or interference with the |

| 1 | The crux of the first two sub-issues is the | 1 | General contends was agreed. He accepts |
|--|---|--|---|
| 2 | interaction between Mr McGrail and the AG, | 2 | that the AG wanted to be consulted and that |
| 3 | the DPP and the Chief Minister. Sub-issue | 3 | at the end of the meeting the Attorney |
| 4 | 5.3 is not a reason for the Chief Minister or | 4 | General asked the police officers to revert to |
| 5 | the AG losing confidence in Mr McGrail, but | 5 | CM once they had listed all the charges that |
| 6 | rather a reason why Mr McGrail gives as to | 6 | had been uncovered. Mr De Vincenzi also |
| 7 | why he felt that he must retire. Mr McGrail | 7 | provides evidence as to that meeting, and that |
| 8 | also alleges that it is the true motive of the | 8 | will have to be considered in questioning. |
| 9 | Chief Minister in bringing out his retirement, | 9 | There are also notes of the meeting by |
| 10 | namely protecting Mr Levy and seeking | 10 | Superintendent Richardson. |
| 11 | retribution for the search warrants. An | 11 | A video meeting took place on the following |
| 12 | important aspect of that sub-issue is the | 12 | day on 8 April between the DPP and |
| 13 | <u>.</u> | 13 | |
| | allegation that the Chief Minister and the | 1 | Superintendent Richardson at which the DPP |
| 14 | Attorney General improperly communicated | 14 | is said to have agreed that there were |
| 15 | with Mr Levy and his lawyer, Lewis | 15 | reasonable grounds to question Mr Levy as |
| 16 | Baglietto KC, about Operation Delhi, the | 16 | there were questions which needed to be |
| 17 | search warrants, and indeed Mr McGrail's | 17 | answered and there was lingering doubt as to |
| 18 | position as Commissioner, which I will deal | 18 | involvement. There is also a record of that |
| 19 | with in due course. | 19 | meeting in Mr Richardson's papers. |
| 20 | In terms of 5.1 and 5.2, there does not appear | 20 | I have already summarised the differing |
| 21 | to be a dispute as to whether the Attorney | 21 | accounts of the meeting of 12 May. Then in |
| 22 | General or the DPP in fact advised on | 22 | terms of the aftermath of the 12 May |
| 23 | whether to obtain a search warrant. All | 23 | meeting, at 11.03 on the same day the |
| 24 | relevant CPs accept that that did not happen | 24 | Attorney General received an email from |
| 25 | and that the DPP subsequently made clear | 25 | Lewis Baglietto KC on behalf of Mr Levy. |
| | 1 7 | | · |
| | Page 193 | | Page 195 |
| | | | |
| 1 | that he would have preferred the RGP to | 1 | That is at B 1902 |
| 1 2 | that he would have preferred the RGP to | 1 2 | That is at B 1902. |
| 2 | have proceeded by way of production order | 2 | (15.01) |
| 2 3 | have proceeded by way of production order although he believed the search warrants | 2 3 | (15.01) This says: "Dear Attorney, I write on behalf |
| 2 3 4 | have proceeded by way of production order although he believed the search warrants were defensible against the judicial review. | 2 3 4 | (15.01) This says: "Dear Attorney, I write on behalf of my firm's senior partner, James Levy |
| 2 3 4 5 | have proceeded by way of production order although he believed the search warrants were defensible against the judicial review. The dispute is therefore as to whether Mr | 2 3 4 5 | (15.01) This says: "Dear Attorney, I write on behalf of my firm's senior partner, James Levy QC in relation to the attendance of the RGP |
| 2 3 4 5 6 | have proceeded by way of production order although he believed the search warrants were defensible against the judicial review. The dispute is therefore as to whether Mr McGrail in fact stated at the 12 May 2020 | 2 3 4 5 6 | (15.01) This says: "Dear Attorney, I write on behalf of my firm's senior partner, James Levy QC in relation to the attendance of the RGP at his home and office addresses earlier |
| 2 3 4 5 6 7 | have proceeded by way of production order although he believed the search warrants were defensible against the judicial review. The dispute is therefore as to whether Mr McGrail in fact stated at the 12 May 2020 meeting that the AG and/or the DPP had | 2 3 4 5 6 7 | (15.01) This says: "Dear Attorney, I write on behalf of my firm's senior partner, James Levy QC in relation to the attendance of the RGP at his home and office addresses earlier today. I am extremely concerned" |
| 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 | have proceeded by way of production order although he believed the search warrants were defensible against the judicial review. The dispute is therefore as to whether Mr McGrail in fact stated at the 12 May 2020 meeting that the AG and/or the DPP had advised them and that the advice of the DPP | 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 | (15.01) This says: "Dear Attorney, I write on behalf of my firm's senior partner, James Levy QC in relation to the attendance of the RGP at his home and office addresses earlier today. I am extremely concerned" just jumping to the second paragraph, |
| 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 | have proceeded by way of production order although he believed the search warrants were defensible against the judicial review. The dispute is therefore as to whether Mr McGrail in fact stated at the 12 May 2020 meeting that the AG and/or the DPP had advised them and that the advice of the DPP was that they should seek a warrant. | 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 | (15.01) This says: "Dear Attorney, I write on behalf of my firm's senior partner, James Levy QC in relation to the attendance of the RGP at his home and office addresses earlier today. I am extremely concerned" just jumping to the second paragraph, "I am extremely concerned by the apparent |
| 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 | have proceeded by way of production order although he believed the search warrants were defensible against the judicial review. The dispute is therefore as to whether Mr McGrail in fact stated at the 12 May 2020 meeting that the AG and/or the DPP had advised them and that the advice of the DPP was that they should seek a warrant. We have summarised the meetings and | 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 | (15.01) This says: "Dear Attorney, I write on behalf of my firm's senior partner, James Levy QC in relation to the attendance of the RGP at his home and office addresses earlier today. I am extremely concerned" just jumping to the second paragraph, "I am extremely concerned by the apparent gross abuse of power that this conduct |
| 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 | have proceeded by way of production order although he believed the search warrants were defensible against the judicial review. The dispute is therefore as to whether Mr McGrail in fact stated at the 12 May 2020 meeting that the AG and/or the DPP had advised them and that the advice of the DPP was that they should seek a warrant. We have summarised the meetings and communications that took place in the lead- | 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 | (15.01) This says: "Dear Attorney, I write on behalf of my firm's senior partner, James Levy QC in relation to the attendance of the RGP at his home and office addresses earlier today. I am extremely concerned" just jumping to the second paragraph, "I am extremely concerned by the apparent gross abuse of power that this conduct amounts to and that the RGP has seen fit to |
| 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 | have proceeded by way of production order although he believed the search warrants were defensible against the judicial review. The dispute is therefore as to whether Mr McGrail in fact stated at the 12 May 2020 meeting that the AG and/or the DPP had advised them and that the advice of the DPP was that they should seek a warrant. We have summarised the meetings and communications that took place in the leadup to 12 May 2020 in our written | 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 | (15.01) This says: "Dear Attorney, I write on behalf of my firm's senior partner, James Levy QC in relation to the attendance of the RGP at his home and office addresses earlier today. I am extremely concerned" just jumping to the second paragraph, "I am extremely concerned by the apparent gross abuse of power that this conduct amounts to and that the RGP has seen fit to proceed in this matter. Although Mr Levy |
| 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 | have proceeded by way of production order although he believed the search warrants were defensible against the judicial review. The dispute is therefore as to whether Mr McGrail in fact stated at the 12 May 2020 meeting that the AG and/or the DPP had advised them and that the advice of the DPP was that they should seek a warrant. We have summarised the meetings and communications that took place in the leadup to 12 May 2020 in our written submissions, and there is insufficient time to | 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 | (15.01) This says: "Dear Attorney, I write on behalf of my firm's senior partner, James Levy QC in relation to the attendance of the RGP at his home and office addresses earlier today. I am extremely concerned" just jumping to the second paragraph, "I am extremely concerned by the apparent gross abuse of power that this conduct amounts to and that the RGP has seen fit to proceed in this matter. Although Mr Levy has asked me to confirm that the officers in |
| 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 | have proceeded by way of production order although he believed the search warrants were defensible against the judicial review. The dispute is therefore as to whether Mr McGrail in fact stated at the 12 May 2020 meeting that the AG and/or the DPP had advised them and that the advice of the DPP was that they should seek a warrant. We have summarised the meetings and communications that took place in the leadup to 12 May 2020 in our written submissions, and there is insufficient time to deal with that today, but it will be addressed | 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 | (15.01) This says: "Dear Attorney, I write on behalf of my firm's senior partner, James Levy QC in relation to the attendance of the RGP at his home and office addresses earlier today. I am extremely concerned" just jumping to the second paragraph, "I am extremely concerned by the apparent gross abuse of power that this conduct amounts to and that the RGP has seen fit to proceed in this matter. Although Mr Levy has asked me to confirm that the officers in attendance were personally courteous to him |
| 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 | have proceeded by way of production order although he believed the search warrants were defensible against the judicial review. The dispute is therefore as to whether Mr McGrail in fact stated at the 12 May 2020 meeting that the AG and/or the DPP had advised them and that the advice of the DPP was that they should seek a warrant. We have summarised the meetings and communications that took place in the leadup to 12 May 2020 in our written submissions, and there is insufficient time to deal with that today, but it will be addressed in questioning of the various persons | 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 | (15.01) This says: "Dear Attorney, I write on behalf of my firm's senior partner, James Levy QC in relation to the attendance of the RGP at his home and office addresses earlier today. I am extremely concerned" just jumping to the second paragraph, "I am extremely concerned by the apparent gross abuse of power that this conduct amounts to and that the RGP has seen fit to proceed in this matter. Although Mr Levy has asked me to confirm that the officers in attendance were personally courteous to him at all times, it is absolutely unconscionable |
| 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 | have proceeded by way of production order although he believed the search warrants were defensible against the judicial review. The dispute is therefore as to whether Mr McGrail in fact stated at the 12 May 2020 meeting that the AG and/or the DPP had advised them and that the advice of the DPP was that they should seek a warrant. We have summarised the meetings and communications that took place in the lead-up to 12 May 2020 in our written submissions, and there is insufficient time to deal with that today, but it will be addressed in questioning of the various persons involved. | 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 | (15.01) This says: "Dear Attorney, I write on behalf of my firm's senior partner, James Levy QC in relation to the attendance of the RGP at his home and office addresses earlier today. I am extremely concerned" just jumping to the second paragraph, "I am extremely concerned by the apparent gross abuse of power that this conduct amounts to and that the RGP has seen fit to proceed in this matter. Although Mr Levy has asked me to confirm that the officers in attendance were personally courteous to him at all times, it is absolutely unconscionable that they should have threatened to execute a |
| 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 | have proceeded by way of production order although he believed the search warrants were defensible against the judicial review. The dispute is therefore as to whether Mr McGrail in fact stated at the 12 May 2020 meeting that the AG and/or the DPP had advised them and that the advice of the DPP was that they should seek a warrant. We have summarised the meetings and communications that took place in the lead-up to 12 May 2020 in our written submissions, and there is insufficient time to deal with that today, but it will be addressed in questioning of the various persons involved. As to the understanding between the AG and | 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 | (15.01) This says: "Dear Attorney, I write on behalf of my firm's senior partner, James Levy QC in relation to the attendance of the RGP at his home and office addresses earlier today. I am extremely concerned" just jumping to the second paragraph, "I am extremely concerned by the apparent gross abuse of power that this conduct amounts to and that the RGP has seen fit to proceed in this matter. Although Mr Levy has asked me to confirm that the officers in attendance were personally courteous to him at all times, it is absolutely unconscionable that they should have threatened to execute a warrant in order to secure entry so that police |
| 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 | have proceeded by way of production order although he believed the search warrants were defensible against the judicial review. The dispute is therefore as to whether Mr McGrail in fact stated at the 12 May 2020 meeting that the AG and/or the DPP had advised them and that the advice of the DPP was that they should seek a warrant. We have summarised the meetings and communications that took place in the leadup to 12 May 2020 in our written submissions, and there is insufficient time to deal with that today, but it will be addressed in questioning of the various persons involved. As to the understanding between the AG and Mr McGrail on the rationalisation of the | 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 | (15.01) This says: "Dear Attorney, I write on behalf of my firm's senior partner, James Levy QC in relation to the attendance of the RGP at his home and office addresses earlier today. I am extremely concerned" just jumping to the second paragraph, "I am extremely concerned by the apparent gross abuse of power that this conduct amounts to and that the RGP has seen fit to proceed in this matter. Although Mr Levy has asked me to confirm that the officers in attendance were personally courteous to him at all times, it is absolutely unconscionable that they should have threatened to execute a warrant in order to secure entry so that police search powers could be used. Moreover, it is |
| 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 | have proceeded by way of production order although he believed the search warrants were defensible against the judicial review. The dispute is therefore as to whether Mr McGrail in fact stated at the 12 May 2020 meeting that the AG and/or the DPP had advised them and that the advice of the DPP was that they should seek a warrant. We have summarised the meetings and communications that took place in the leadup to 12 May 2020 in our written submissions, and there is insufficient time to deal with that today, but it will be addressed in questioning of the various persons involved. As to the understanding between the AG and Mr McGrail on the rationalisation of the charges and the ownership issue, there was a | 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 | (15.01) This says: "Dear Attorney, I write on behalf of my firm's senior partner, James Levy QC in relation to the attendance of the RGP at his home and office addresses earlier today. I am extremely concerned" just jumping to the second paragraph, "I am extremely concerned by the apparent gross abuse of power that this conduct amounts to and that the RGP has seen fit to proceed in this matter. Although Mr Levy has asked me to confirm that the officers in attendance were personally courteous to him at all times, it is absolutely unconscionable that they should have threatened to execute a warrant in order to secure entry so that police search powers could be used. Moreover, it is completely inexplicable how the RGP could |
| 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 | have proceeded by way of production order although he believed the search warrants were defensible against the judicial review. The dispute is therefore as to whether Mr McGrail in fact stated at the 12 May 2020 meeting that the AG and/or the DPP had advised them and that the advice of the DPP was that they should seek a warrant. We have summarised the meetings and communications that took place in the leadup to 12 May 2020 in our written submissions, and there is insufficient time to deal with that today, but it will be addressed in questioning of the various persons involved. As to the understanding between the AG and Mr McGrail on the rationalisation of the charges and the ownership issue, there was a crucial meeting on 7 April or 4 May, and | 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 | (15.01) This says: "Dear Attorney, I write on behalf of my firm's senior partner, James Levy QC in relation to the attendance of the RGP at his home and office addresses earlier today. I am extremely concerned" just jumping to the second paragraph, "I am extremely concerned by the apparent gross abuse of power that this conduct amounts to and that the RGP has seen fit to proceed in this matter. Although Mr Levy has asked me to confirm that the officers in attendance were personally courteous to him at all times, it is absolutely unconscionable that they should have threatened to execute a warrant in order to secure entry so that police search powers could be used. Moreover, it is completely inexplicable how the RGP could have thought that any warrant was proper, let |
| 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 | have proceeded by way of production order although he believed the search warrants were defensible against the judicial review. The dispute is therefore as to whether Mr McGrail in fact stated at the 12 May 2020 meeting that the AG and/or the DPP had advised them and that the advice of the DPP was that they should seek a warrant. We have summarised the meetings and communications that took place in the leadup to 12 May 2020 in our written submissions, and there is insufficient time to deal with that today, but it will be addressed in questioning of the various persons involved. As to the understanding between the AG and Mr McGrail on the rationalisation of the charges and the ownership issue, there was a | 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 | (15.01) This says: "Dear Attorney, I write on behalf of my firm's senior partner, James Levy QC in relation to the attendance of the RGP at his home and office addresses earlier today. I am extremely concerned" just jumping to the second paragraph, "I am extremely concerned by the apparent gross abuse of power that this conduct amounts to and that the RGP has seen fit to proceed in this matter. Although Mr Levy has asked me to confirm that the officers in attendance were personally courteous to him at all times, it is absolutely unconscionable that they should have threatened to execute a warrant in order to secure entry so that police search powers could be used. Moreover, it is completely inexplicable how the RGP could |
| 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 | have proceeded by way of production order although he believed the search warrants were defensible against the judicial review. The dispute is therefore as to whether Mr McGrail in fact stated at the 12 May 2020 meeting that the AG and/or the DPP had advised them and that the advice of the DPP was that they should seek a warrant. We have summarised the meetings and communications that took place in the leadup to 12 May 2020 in our written submissions, and there is insufficient time to deal with that today, but it will be addressed in questioning of the various persons involved. As to the understanding between the AG and Mr McGrail on the rationalisation of the charges and the ownership issue, there was a crucial meeting on 7 April or 4 May, and | 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 | (15.01) This says: "Dear Attorney, I write on behalf of my firm's senior partner, James Levy QC in relation to the attendance of the RGP at his home and office addresses earlier today. I am extremely concerned" just jumping to the second paragraph, "I am extremely concerned by the apparent gross abuse of power that this conduct amounts to and that the RGP has seen fit to proceed in this matter. Although Mr Levy has asked me to confirm that the officers in attendance were personally courteous to him at all times, it is absolutely unconscionable that they should have threatened to execute a warrant in order to secure entry so that police search powers could be used. Moreover, it is completely inexplicable how the RGP could have thought that any warrant was proper, let alone that any court could have considered that the statutory preconditions for the issue |
| 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 | have proceeded by way of production order although he believed the search warrants were defensible against the judicial review. The dispute is therefore as to whether Mr McGrail in fact stated at the 12 May 2020 meeting that the AG and/or the DPP had advised them and that the advice of the DPP was that they should seek a warrant. We have summarised the meetings and communications that took place in the lead-up to 12 May 2020 in our written submissions, and there is insufficient time to deal with that today, but it will be addressed in questioning of the various persons involved. As to the understanding between the AG and Mr McGrail on the rationalisation of the charges and the ownership issue, there was a crucial meeting on 7 April or 4 May, and perhaps there were meetings on both dates, | 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 | (15.01) This says: "Dear Attorney, I write on behalf of my firm's senior partner, James Levy QC in relation to the attendance of the RGP at his home and office addresses earlier today. I am extremely concerned" just jumping to the second paragraph, "I am extremely concerned by the apparent gross abuse of power that this conduct amounts to and that the RGP has seen fit to proceed in this matter. Although Mr Levy has asked me to confirm that the officers in attendance were personally courteous to him at all times, it is absolutely unconscionable that they should have threatened to execute a warrant in order to secure entry so that police search powers could be used. Moreover, it is completely inexplicable how the RGP could have thought that any warrant was proper, let alone that any court could have considered |
| 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 | have proceeded by way of production order although he believed the search warrants were defensible against the judicial review. The dispute is therefore as to whether Mr McGrail in fact stated at the 12 May 2020 meeting that the AG and/or the DPP had advised them and that the advice of the DPP was that they should seek a warrant. We have summarised the meetings and communications that took place in the lead-up to 12 May 2020 in our written submissions, and there is insufficient time to deal with that today, but it will be addressed in questioning of the various persons involved. As to the understanding between the AG and Mr McGrail on the rationalisation of the charges and the ownership issue, there was a crucial meeting on 7 April or 4 May, and perhaps there were meetings on both dates, between the Attorney General and | 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 | (15.01) This says: "Dear Attorney, I write on behalf of my firm's senior partner, James Levy QC in relation to the attendance of the RGP at his home and office addresses earlier today. I am extremely concerned" just jumping to the second paragraph, "I am extremely concerned by the apparent gross abuse of power that this conduct amounts to and that the RGP has seen fit to proceed in this matter. Although Mr Levy has asked me to confirm that the officers in attendance were personally courteous to him at all times, it is absolutely unconscionable that they should have threatened to execute a warrant in order to secure entry so that police search powers could be used. Moreover, it is completely inexplicable how the RGP could have thought that any warrant was proper, let alone that any court could have considered that the statutory preconditions for the issue |
| 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 | have proceeded by way of production order although he believed the search warrants were defensible against the judicial review. The dispute is therefore as to whether Mr McGrail in fact stated at the 12 May 2020 meeting that the AG and/or the DPP had advised them and that the advice of the DPP was that they should seek a warrant. We have summarised the meetings and communications that took place in the leadup to 12 May 2020 in our written submissions, and there is insufficient time to deal with that today, but it will be addressed in questioning of the various persons involved. As to the understanding between the AG and Mr McGrail on the rationalisation of the charges and the ownership issue, there was a crucial meeting on 7 April or 4 May, and perhaps there were meetings on both dates, between the Attorney General and Superintendent Richardson with Lloyd De | 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 | (15.01) This says: "Dear Attorney, I write on behalf of my firm's senior partner, James Levy QC in relation to the attendance of the RGP at his home and office addresses earlier today. I am extremely concerned" just jumping to the second paragraph, "I am extremely concerned by the apparent gross abuse of power that this conduct amounts to and that the RGP has seen fit to proceed in this matter. Although Mr Levy has asked me to confirm that the officers in attendance were personally courteous to him at all times, it is absolutely unconscionable that they should have threatened to execute a warrant in order to secure entry so that police search powers could be used. Moreover, it is completely inexplicable how the RGP could have thought that any warrant was proper, let alone that any court could have considered that the statutory preconditions for the issue of a warrant were met. The issue of a |
| 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24 | have proceeded by way of production order although he believed the search warrants were defensible against the judicial review. The dispute is therefore as to whether Mr McGrail in fact stated at the 12 May 2020 meeting that the AG and/or the DPP had advised them and that the advice of the DPP was that they should seek a warrant. We have summarised the meetings and communications that took place in the lead-up to 12 May 2020 in our written submissions, and there is insufficient time to deal with that today, but it will be addressed in questioning of the various persons involved. As to the understanding between the AG and Mr McGrail on the rationalisation of the charges and the ownership issue, there was a crucial meeting on 7 April or 4 May, and perhaps there were meetings on both dates, between the Attorney General and Superintendent Richardson with Lloyd De Vincenzi also present. Mr McGrail disputes an agreement on the terms that the Attorney | 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24 | This says: "Dear Attorney, I write on behalf of my firm's senior partner, James Levy QC in relation to the attendance of the RGP at his home and office addresses earlier today. I am extremely concerned" just jumping to the second paragraph, "I am extremely concerned by the apparent gross abuse of power that this conduct amounts to and that the RGP has seen fit to proceed in this matter. Although Mr Levy has asked me to confirm that the officers in attendance were personally courteous to him at all times, it is absolutely unconscionable that they should have threatened to execute a warrant in order to secure entry so that police search powers could be used. Moreover, it is completely inexplicable how the RGP could have thought that any warrant was proper, let alone that any court could have considered that the statutory preconditions for the issue of a warrant was unnecessary, oppressive and highly distressing to Mr Levy and his family. |
| 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24 | have proceeded by way of production order although he believed the search warrants were defensible against the judicial review. The dispute is therefore as to whether Mr McGrail in fact stated at the 12 May 2020 meeting that the AG and/or the DPP had advised them and that the advice of the DPP was that they should seek a warrant. We have summarised the meetings and communications that took place in the leadup to 12 May 2020 in our written submissions, and there is insufficient time to deal with that today, but it will be addressed in questioning of the various persons involved. As to the understanding between the AG and Mr McGrail on the rationalisation of the charges and the ownership issue, there was a crucial meeting on 7 April or 4 May, and perhaps there were meetings on both dates, between the Attorney General and Superintendent Richardson with Lloyd De Vincenzi also present. Mr McGrail disputes | 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24 | (15.01) This says: "Dear Attorney, I write on behalf of my firm's senior partner, James Levy QC in relation to the attendance of the RGP at his home and office addresses earlier today. I am extremely concerned" just jumping to the second paragraph, "I am extremely concerned by the apparent gross abuse of power that this conduct amounts to and that the RGP has seen fit to proceed in this matter. Although Mr Levy has asked me to confirm that the officers in attendance were personally courteous to him at all times, it is absolutely unconscionable that they should have threatened to execute a warrant in order to secure entry so that police search powers could be used. Moreover, it is completely inexplicable how the RGP could have thought that any warrant was proper, let alone that any court could have considered that the statutory preconditions for the issue of a warrant was unnecessary, oppressive and |

| 1 | It directly impugned Mr Levy's reputation | 1 | maintains that it was a case of Mr McGrail |
|--|--|--|--|
| 2 | and dignity as an officer of the court, the | 2 | thinking he was immune to criticism, which |
| 3 | senior partner of Gibraltar's largest law firm | 3 | he equated with interference. Third, there are |
| 4 | and a highly respected member of the local | 4 | some notable references by the Attorney |
| 5 | community. | 5 | General to the involvement of the Chief |
| 6 | Putting aside the ridiculous notion that he is | 6 | Minister and the Chief Minister's office, |
| 7 | suspected of having been involved in this | 7 | which we will have to consider in |
| 8 | serious criminal activity, it is not even clear | 8 | questioning. In his second statement the |
| 9 | that a production order under section 13 | 9 | Attorney General stresses that he was |
| 10 | could have been properly obtained. How | 10 | referring to the office of the Chief Minister |
| 11 | could it even have been properly suggested | 11 | and not the person. |
| 12 | that the entry to the premises would not be | 12 | We will not have time to go through that |
| 13 | granted unless a warrant was produced or | 13 | because I am being told I have to speed up, |
| 14 | that the purpose of a search would be | 14 | but at the second meeting it was agreed that |
| 15 | frustrated or seriously prejudiced?" | 15 | Mr Levy would provide a statement before |
| 16 | Mr Baglietto proposed a meeting with the | 16 | considering whether to interview him. At the |
| 17 | Attorney General but Mr McGrail did not | 17 | same meeting the DPP expressed concern as |
| 18 | consider such a meeting appropriate. He, Mr | 18 | to whether Superintendent Richardson had |
| 19 | McGrail, prepared a substantive response to | 19 | misrepresented the position in terms of the |
| 20 | that email defending the RGP's actions and | 20 | DPP giving advice of the warrant which |
| 21 | the basis for the warrant. I am not going to | 21 | could taint the prosecution. |
| 22 | have time to go to that. There was further | 22 | On 20 May there was a further meeting and it |
| 23 | correspondence between the RGP, the | 23 | was agreed that they would allow Mr Levy |
| 24 | Magistrates' Court and Hassans, and then | 24 | seven days to provide a written voluntary |
| 25 | there were meetings on 13 May, 15 May and | 25 | statement, and on 28 October 2020 DI Wyan |
| 23 | there were meetings on 13 May, 13 May and | 23 | statement, and on 28 October 2020 DT wyan |
| | Page 197 | | Page 199 |
| 1 | 2037 1 | | |
| | 20 May between the Attorney General, the | 1 1 | emailed Mr Baglietto confirming that Mr |
| 1 2 | 20 May between the Attorney General, the DPP Mr McGrail and Superintendent | $\begin{vmatrix} 1 \\ 2 \end{vmatrix}$ | emailed Mr Baglietto confirming that Mr Levy was no longer a suspect in the matter. |
| 2 | DPP, Mr McGrail and Superintendent | 2 | Levy was no longer a suspect in the matter. |
| 2 3 | DPP, Mr McGrail and Superintendent Richardson. Mr DeVincenzi attended the | 2 3 | Levy was no longer a suspect in the matter. There is an email of 8 March 2021 which we |
| 2 3 4 | DPP, Mr McGrail and Superintendent Richardson. Mr DeVincenzi attended the first two of those and DI Wyan the second | 2 3 4 | Levy was no longer a suspect in the matter. There is an email of 8 March 2021 which we can go to briefly, C5871. This is an email |
| 2 3 4 5 | DPP, Mr McGrail and Superintendent Richardson. Mr DeVincenzi attended the first two of those and DI Wyan the second and the third. Unbeknownst to the Attorney | 2 3 4 5 | Levy was no longer a suspect in the matter. There is an email of 8 March 2021 which we can go to briefly, C5871. This is an email from the DPP to the Attorney General and it |
| 2 3 4 5 6 | DPP, Mr McGrail and Superintendent Richardson. Mr DeVincenzi attended the first two of those and DI Wyan the second and the third. Unbeknownst to the Attorney General and the DPP and perhaps others in | 2 3 4 5 6 | Levy was no longer a suspect in the matter. There is an email of 8 March 2021 which we can go to briefly, C5871. This is an email from the DPP to the Attorney General and it says: |
| 2 3 4 5 6 7 | DPP, Mr McGrail and Superintendent Richardson. Mr DeVincenzi attended the first two of those and DI Wyan the second and the third. Unbeknownst to the Attorney General and the DPP and perhaps others in attendance, Mr McGrail recorded those | 2 3 4 5 6 7 | Levy was no longer a suspect in the matter. There is an email of 8 March 2021 which we can go to briefly, C5871. This is an email from the DPP to the Attorney General and it says: "I set out below the matters that have been |
| 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 | DPP, Mr McGrail and Superintendent Richardson. Mr DeVincenzi attended the first two of those and DI Wyan the second and the third. Unbeknownst to the Attorney General and the DPP and perhaps others in attendance, Mr McGrail recorded those meetings, saying that he did so in order to | 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 | Levy was no longer a suspect in the matter. There is an email of 8 March 2021 which we can go to briefly, C5871. This is an email from the DPP to the Attorney General and it says: "I set out below the matters that have been highlighted expressly or implicitly by |
| 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 | DPP, Mr McGrail and Superintendent Richardson. Mr DeVincenzi attended the first two of those and DI Wyan the second and the third. Unbeknownst to the Attorney General and the DPP and perhaps others in attendance, Mr McGrail recorded those meetings, saying that he did so in order to safeguard himself from further issues and | 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 | Levy was no longer a suspect in the matter. There is an email of 8 March 2021 which we can go to briefly, C5871. This is an email from the DPP to the Attorney General and it says: "I set out below the matters that have been highlighted expressly or implicitly by defence counsel in this case," |
| 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 | DPP, Mr McGrail and Superintendent Richardson. Mr DeVincenzi attended the first two of those and DI Wyan the second and the third. Unbeknownst to the Attorney General and the DPP and perhaps others in attendance, Mr McGrail recorded those meetings, saying that he did so in order to safeguard himself from further issues and given the events of 12 May 2020. | 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 | Levy was no longer a suspect in the matter. There is an email of 8 March 2021 which we can go to briefly, C5871. This is an email from the DPP to the Attorney General and it says: "I set out below the matters that have been highlighted expressly or implicitly by defence counsel in this case," and he raises a number of matters, for |
| 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 | DPP, Mr McGrail and Superintendent Richardson. Mr DeVincenzi attended the first two of those and DI Wyan the second and the third. Unbeknownst to the Attorney General and the DPP and perhaps others in attendance, Mr McGrail recorded those meetings, saying that he did so in order to safeguard himself from further issues and given the events of 12 May 2020. Again it is impossible for me to summarise | 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 | Levy was no longer a suspect in the matter. There is an email of 8 March 2021 which we can go to briefly, C5871. This is an email from the DPP to the Attorney General and it says: "I set out below the matters that have been highlighted expressly or implicitly by defence counsel in this case," and he raises a number of matters, for example paragraph 1: |
| 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 | DPP, Mr McGrail and Superintendent Richardson. Mr DeVincenzi attended the first two of those and DI Wyan the second and the third. Unbeknownst to the Attorney General and the DPP and perhaps others in attendance, Mr McGrail recorded those meetings, saying that he did so in order to safeguard himself from further issues and given the events of 12 May 2020. Again it is impossible for me to summarise those meetings in this opening and we will | 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 | Levy was no longer a suspect in the matter. There is an email of 8 March 2021 which we can go to briefly, C5871. This is an email from the DPP to the Attorney General and it says: "I set out below the matters that have been highlighted expressly or implicitly by defence counsel in this case," and he raises a number of matters, for example paragraph 1: "The RGP is awaiting a witness statement |
| 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 | DPP, Mr McGrail and Superintendent Richardson. Mr DeVincenzi attended the first two of those and DI Wyan the second and the third. Unbeknownst to the Attorney General and the DPP and perhaps others in attendance, Mr McGrail recorded those meetings, saying that he did so in order to safeguard himself from further issues and given the events of 12 May 2020. Again it is impossible for me to summarise those meetings in this opening and we will have to examine them closely in questioning | 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 | Levy was no longer a suspect in the matter. There is an email of 8 March 2021 which we can go to briefly, C5871. This is an email from the DPP to the Attorney General and it says: "I set out below the matters that have been highlighted expressly or implicitly by defence counsel in this case," and he raises a number of matters, for example paragraph 1: "The RGP is awaiting a witness statement from the CM. His evidence is very important |
| 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 | DPP, Mr McGrail and Superintendent Richardson. Mr DeVincenzi attended the first two of those and DI Wyan the second and the third. Unbeknownst to the Attorney General and the DPP and perhaps others in attendance, Mr McGrail recorded those meetings, saying that he did so in order to safeguard himself from further issues and given the events of 12 May 2020. Again it is impossible for me to summarise those meetings in this opening and we will have to examine them closely in questioning because, first, there was further discussion | 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 | Levy was no longer a suspect in the matter. There is an email of 8 March 2021 which we can go to briefly, C5871. This is an email from the DPP to the Attorney General and it says: "I set out below the matters that have been highlighted expressly or implicitly by defence counsel in this case," and he raises a number of matters, for example paragraph 1: "The RGP is awaiting a witness statement from the CM. His evidence is very important in relation to the conspiracy charge, |
| 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 | DPP, Mr McGrail and Superintendent Richardson. Mr DeVincenzi attended the first two of those and DI Wyan the second and the third. Unbeknownst to the Attorney General and the DPP and perhaps others in attendance, Mr McGrail recorded those meetings, saying that he did so in order to safeguard himself from further issues and given the events of 12 May 2020. Again it is impossible for me to summarise those meetings in this opening and we will have to examine them closely in questioning because, first, there was further discussion between the Attorney General and Mr | 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 | Levy was no longer a suspect in the matter. There is an email of 8 March 2021 which we can go to briefly, C5871. This is an email from the DPP to the Attorney General and it says: "I set out below the matters that have been highlighted expressly or implicitly by defence counsel in this case," and he raises a number of matters, for example paragraph 1: "The RGP is awaiting a witness statement from the CM. His evidence is very important in relation to the conspiracy charge, particularly in light of the matters raised by |
| 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 | DPP, Mr McGrail and Superintendent Richardson. Mr DeVincenzi attended the first two of those and DI Wyan the second and the third. Unbeknownst to the Attorney General and the DPP and perhaps others in attendance, Mr McGrail recorded those meetings, saying that he did so in order to safeguard himself from further issues and given the events of 12 May 2020. Again it is impossible for me to summarise those meetings in this opening and we will have to examine them closely in questioning because, first, there was further discussion between the Attorney General and Mr McGrail about the understanding they had | 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 | Levy was no longer a suspect in the matter. There is an email of 8 March 2021 which we can go to briefly, C5871. This is an email from the DPP to the Attorney General and it says: "I set out below the matters that have been highlighted expressly or implicitly by defence counsel in this case," and he raises a number of matters, for example paragraph 1: "The RGP is awaiting a witness statement from the CM. His evidence is very important in relation to the conspiracy charge, particularly in light of the matters raised by the defence and also to deal with possible |
| 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 | DPP, Mr McGrail and Superintendent Richardson. Mr DeVincenzi attended the first two of those and DI Wyan the second and the third. Unbeknownst to the Attorney General and the DPP and perhaps others in attendance, Mr McGrail recorded those meetings, saying that he did so in order to safeguard himself from further issues and given the events of 12 May 2020. Again it is impossible for me to summarise those meetings in this opening and we will have to examine them closely in questioning because, first, there was further discussion between the Attorney General and Mr McGrail about the understanding they had reached prior to 12 May 2020. Second, Mr | 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 | Levy was no longer a suspect in the matter. There is an email of 8 March 2021 which we can go to briefly, C5871. This is an email from the DPP to the Attorney General and it says: "I set out below the matters that have been highlighted expressly or implicitly by defence counsel in this case," and he raises a number of matters, for example paragraph 1: "The RGP is awaiting a witness statement from the CM. His evidence is very important in relation to the conspiracy charge, particularly in light of the matters raised by the defence and also to deal with possible hearsay problems. Certainly the clear |
| 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 | DPP, Mr McGrail and Superintendent Richardson. Mr DeVincenzi attended the first two of those and DI Wyan the second and the third. Unbeknownst to the Attorney General and the DPP and perhaps others in attendance, Mr McGrail recorded those meetings, saying that he did so in order to safeguard himself from further issues and given the events of 12 May 2020. Again it is impossible for me to summarise those meetings in this opening and we will have to examine them closely in questioning because, first, there was further discussion between the Attorney General and Mr McGrail about the understanding they had reached prior to 12 May 2020. Second, Mr McGrail says that these are the meetings | 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 | Levy was no longer a suspect in the matter. There is an email of 8 March 2021 which we can go to briefly, C5871. This is an email from the DPP to the Attorney General and it says: "I set out below the matters that have been highlighted expressly or implicitly by defence counsel in this case," and he raises a number of matters, for example paragraph 1: "The RGP is awaiting a witness statement from the CM. His evidence is very important in relation to the conspiracy charge, particularly in light of the matters raised by the defence and also to deal with possible hearsay problems. Certainly the clear indication from the defence is that they |
| 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 | DPP, Mr McGrail and Superintendent Richardson. Mr DeVincenzi attended the first two of those and DI Wyan the second and the third. Unbeknownst to the Attorney General and the DPP and perhaps others in attendance, Mr McGrail recorded those meetings, saying that he did so in order to safeguard himself from further issues and given the events of 12 May 2020. Again it is impossible for me to summarise those meetings in this opening and we will have to examine them closely in questioning because, first, there was further discussion between the Attorney General and Mr McGrail about the understanding they had reached prior to 12 May 2020. Second, Mr McGrail says that these are the meetings where the Attorney General sought to | 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 | Levy was no longer a suspect in the matter. There is an email of 8 March 2021 which we can go to briefly, C5871. This is an email from the DPP to the Attorney General and it says: "I set out below the matters that have been highlighted expressly or implicitly by defence counsel in this case," and he raises a number of matters, for example paragraph 1: "The RGP is awaiting a witness statement from the CM. His evidence is very important in relation to the conspiracy charge, particularly in light of the matters raised by the defence and also to deal with possible hearsay problems. Certainly the clear indication from the defence is that they would be asking the CM to give live |
| 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 | DPP, Mr McGrail and Superintendent Richardson. Mr DeVincenzi attended the first two of those and DI Wyan the second and the third. Unbeknownst to the Attorney General and the DPP and perhaps others in attendance, Mr McGrail recorded those meetings, saying that he did so in order to safeguard himself from further issues and given the events of 12 May 2020. Again it is impossible for me to summarise those meetings in this opening and we will have to examine them closely in questioning because, first, there was further discussion between the Attorney General and Mr McGrail about the understanding they had reached prior to 12 May 2020. Second, Mr McGrail says that these are the meetings where the Attorney General sought to interfere with the investigation, enquiring | 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 | Levy was no longer a suspect in the matter. There is an email of 8 March 2021 which we can go to briefly, C5871. This is an email from the DPP to the Attorney General and it says: "I set out below the matters that have been highlighted expressly or implicitly by defence counsel in this case," and he raises a number of matters, for example paragraph 1: "The RGP is awaiting a witness statement from the CM. His evidence is very important in relation to the conspiracy charge, particularly in light of the matters raised by the defence and also to deal with possible hearsay problems. Certainly the clear indication from the defence is that they would be asking the CM to give live evidence at the trial. Equally, the Crown |
| 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 | DPP, Mr McGrail and Superintendent Richardson. Mr DeVincenzi attended the first two of those and DI Wyan the second and the third. Unbeknownst to the Attorney General and the DPP and perhaps others in attendance, Mr McGrail recorded those meetings, saying that he did so in order to safeguard himself from further issues and given the events of 12 May 2020. Again it is impossible for me to summarise those meetings in this opening and we will have to examine them closely in questioning because, first, there was further discussion between the Attorney General and Mr McGrail about the understanding they had reached prior to 12 May 2020. Second, Mr McGrail says that these are the meetings where the Attorney General sought to interfere with the investigation, enquiring whether Mr Levy could be interviewed not | 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 | Levy was no longer a suspect in the matter. There is an email of 8 March 2021 which we can go to briefly, C5871. This is an email from the DPP to the Attorney General and it says: "I set out below the matters that have been highlighted expressly or implicitly by defence counsel in this case," and he raises a number of matters, for example paragraph 1: "The RGP is awaiting a witness statement from the CM. His evidence is very important in relation to the conspiracy charge, particularly in light of the matters raised by the defence and also to deal with possible hearsay problems. Certainly the clear indication from the defence is that they would be asking the CM to give live evidence at the trial. Equally, the Crown would need to call him if his evidence was |
| 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 | DPP, Mr McGrail and Superintendent Richardson. Mr DeVincenzi attended the first two of those and DI Wyan the second and the third. Unbeknownst to the Attorney General and the DPP and perhaps others in attendance, Mr McGrail recorded those meetings, saying that he did so in order to safeguard himself from further issues and given the events of 12 May 2020. Again it is impossible for me to summarise those meetings in this opening and we will have to examine them closely in questioning because, first, there was further discussion between the Attorney General and Mr McGrail about the understanding they had reached prior to 12 May 2020. Second, Mr McGrail says that these are the meetings where the Attorney General sought to interfere with the investigation, enquiring whether Mr Levy could be interviewed not under caution and influencing the officers | 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 | Levy was no longer a suspect in the matter. There is an email of 8 March 2021 which we can go to briefly, C5871. This is an email from the DPP to the Attorney General and it says: "I set out below the matters that have been highlighted expressly or implicitly by defence counsel in this case," and he raises a number of matters, for example paragraph 1: "The RGP is awaiting a witness statement from the CM. His evidence is very important in relation to the conspiracy charge, particularly in light of the matters raised by the defence and also to deal with possible hearsay problems. Certainly the clear indication from the defence is that they would be asking the CM to give live evidence at the trial. Equally, the Crown would need to call him if his evidence was not accepted by the defence." |
| 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 | DPP, Mr McGrail and Superintendent Richardson. Mr DeVincenzi attended the first two of those and DI Wyan the second and the third. Unbeknownst to the Attorney General and the DPP and perhaps others in attendance, Mr McGrail recorded those meetings, saying that he did so in order to safeguard himself from further issues and given the events of 12 May 2020. Again it is impossible for me to summarise those meetings in this opening and we will have to examine them closely in questioning because, first, there was further discussion between the Attorney General and Mr McGrail about the understanding they had reached prior to 12 May 2020. Second, Mr McGrail says that these are the meetings where the Attorney General sought to interfere with the investigation, enquiring whether Mr Levy could be interviewed not under caution and influencing the officers present to consider ways to treat JL in a way | 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 | Levy was no longer a suspect in the matter. There is an email of 8 March 2021 which we can go to briefly, C5871. This is an email from the DPP to the Attorney General and it says: "I set out below the matters that have been highlighted expressly or implicitly by defence counsel in this case," and he raises a number of matters, for example paragraph 1: "The RGP is awaiting a witness statement from the CM. His evidence is very important in relation to the conspiracy charge, particularly in light of the matters raised by the defence and also to deal with possible hearsay problems. Certainly the clear indication from the defence is that they would be asking the CM to give live evidence at the trial. Equally, the Crown would need to call him if his evidence was not accepted by the defence." There is also references to communications, |
| 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24 | DPP, Mr McGrail and Superintendent Richardson. Mr DeVincenzi attended the first two of those and DI Wyan the second and the third. Unbeknownst to the Attorney General and the DPP and perhaps others in attendance, Mr McGrail recorded those meetings, saying that he did so in order to safeguard himself from further issues and given the events of 12 May 2020. Again it is impossible for me to summarise those meetings in this opening and we will have to examine them closely in questioning because, first, there was further discussion between the Attorney General and Mr McGrail about the understanding they had reached prior to 12 May 2020. Second, Mr McGrail says that these are the meetings where the Attorney General sought to interfere with the investigation, enquiring whether Mr Levy could be interviewed not under caution and influencing the officers present to consider ways to treat JL in a way other than as a suspect. This allegation is | 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24 | Levy was no longer a suspect in the matter. There is an email of 8 March 2021 which we can go to briefly, C5871. This is an email from the DPP to the Attorney General and it says: "I set out below the matters that have been highlighted expressly or implicitly by defence counsel in this case," and he raises a number of matters, for example paragraph 1: "The RGP is awaiting a witness statement from the CM. His evidence is very important in relation to the conspiracy charge, particularly in light of the matters raised by the defence and also to deal with possible hearsay problems. Certainly the clear indication from the defence is that they would be asking the CM to give live evidence at the trial. Equally, the Crown would need to call him if his evidence was not accepted by the defence." There is also references to communications, the fairness of Mr Levy's treatment, the |
| 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 | DPP, Mr McGrail and Superintendent Richardson. Mr DeVincenzi attended the first two of those and DI Wyan the second and the third. Unbeknownst to the Attorney General and the DPP and perhaps others in attendance, Mr McGrail recorded those meetings, saying that he did so in order to safeguard himself from further issues and given the events of 12 May 2020. Again it is impossible for me to summarise those meetings in this opening and we will have to examine them closely in questioning because, first, there was further discussion between the Attorney General and Mr McGrail about the understanding they had reached prior to 12 May 2020. Second, Mr McGrail says that these are the meetings where the Attorney General sought to interfere with the investigation, enquiring whether Mr Levy could be interviewed not under caution and influencing the officers present to consider ways to treat JL in a way | 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 | Levy was no longer a suspect in the matter. There is an email of 8 March 2021 which we can go to briefly, C5871. This is an email from the DPP to the Attorney General and it says: "I set out below the matters that have been highlighted expressly or implicitly by defence counsel in this case," and he raises a number of matters, for example paragraph 1: "The RGP is awaiting a witness statement from the CM. His evidence is very important in relation to the conspiracy charge, particularly in light of the matters raised by the defence and also to deal with possible hearsay problems. Certainly the clear indication from the defence is that they would be asking the CM to give live evidence at the trial. Equally, the Crown would need to call him if his evidence was not accepted by the defence." There is also references to communications, |
| 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24 | DPP, Mr McGrail and Superintendent Richardson. Mr DeVincenzi attended the first two of those and DI Wyan the second and the third. Unbeknownst to the Attorney General and the DPP and perhaps others in attendance, Mr McGrail recorded those meetings, saying that he did so in order to safeguard himself from further issues and given the events of 12 May 2020. Again it is impossible for me to summarise those meetings in this opening and we will have to examine them closely in questioning because, first, there was further discussion between the Attorney General and Mr McGrail about the understanding they had reached prior to 12 May 2020. Second, Mr McGrail says that these are the meetings where the Attorney General sought to interfere with the investigation, enquiring whether Mr Levy could be interviewed not under caution and influencing the officers present to consider ways to treat JL in a way other than as a suspect. This allegation is | 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24 | Levy was no longer a suspect in the matter. There is an email of 8 March 2021 which we can go to briefly, C5871. This is an email from the DPP to the Attorney General and it says: "I set out below the matters that have been highlighted expressly or implicitly by defence counsel in this case," and he raises a number of matters, for example paragraph 1: "The RGP is awaiting a witness statement from the CM. His evidence is very important in relation to the conspiracy charge, particularly in light of the matters raised by the defence and also to deal with possible hearsay problems. Certainly the clear indication from the defence is that they would be asking the CM to give live evidence at the trial. Equally, the Crown would need to call him if his evidence was not accepted by the defence." There is also references to communications, the fairness of Mr Levy's treatment, the |

| | | 1 | |
|----|---|----|--|
| 1 | reference to the Financial Secretary as a | 1 | May 2020 shows, it was IM himself who |
| 2 | witness: | 2 | raised the matter, not me, and I dismissed his |
| 3 | "Unfortunately the defence will of course | 3 | invitation to consider doing it. Further, in |
| 4 | raise the beneficial ownership issue, given | 4 | any event, the reasons why I entered the Noli |
| 5 | that the Financial Secretary was a partner of | 5 | two years later had nothing to do with |
| 6 | Hassans," | 6 | protecting the office of Chief Minister. My |
| 7 | parallel investigations and interrelated | 7 | decision was based on matters that were |
| 8 | investigations, and the final paragraph on that | 8 | brought to my attention over a year after the |
| 9 | page says: | 9 | events of May/June 2020." |
| 10 | "I hope the above gives you a flavour of the | 10 | So the discontinuance took place on 21 |
| 11 | issue and matters that are coming to the fore | 11 | January 2022 and the Attorney General |
| 12 | and most of which have been raised by | 12 | clarified at the time that he had been advised |
| 13 | counsel for Messrs Bevis and Cornelio in | 13 | by the DPP that there was enough evidence |
| 14 | their letter which has been copied to you, | 14 | for there to be a realistic prospect of |
| 15 | asking for you to consider whether this | 15 | conviction at trial, but there were matters in |
| 16 | matter should proceed. You have also been | 16 | the wider interest that required him to |
| 17 | provided with a copy of my response." | 17 | discontinue. |
| 18 | Then over the page: | 18 | I wonder whether that is a convenient |
| 19 | "Finally, I would say there is nothing in the | 19 | moment to pause for five minutes before we |
| 20 | communications that I have seen in relation | 20 | have the last session of the day? Thank you. |
| 21 | to," | 21 | (15.09) |
| 22 | it is just on 5872, sorry. (Pause) | 22 | (Adjourned for a short time) |
| 23 | Yes, | 23 | (15.18) |
| 24 | "Finally, I would say there is nothing in the | 24 | THE CHAIRMAN: Yes? |
| 25 | communications that I have seen in relation | 25 | MR SANTOS: One final factual inquiry, Mr |
| | D 404 | | D 404 |
| | Page 201 | | Page 203 |
| 1 | to the CM or FS that concern me." | 1 | Chairman, which relates to the interference |
| 2 | I wonder whether, before I go into - there is | 2 | allegation is that of communications between |
| 3 | just two points to make before I need to | 3 | the Chief Minister, the Attorney General and |
| 4 | suggest a break, sorry, from my note. | 4 | Mr Levy, including through Mr Levy's |
| 5 | Mr McGrail's case is that it was those | 5 | lawyer Mr Lewis Baglietto KC, from 12 May |
| 6 | concerns raised by the DPP and a desire to | 6 | 2020 onwards. |
| 7 | protect the Chief Minister rather than any | 7 | The Chief Minister's evidence is set out in a |
| 8 | genuine public interest concerns which gave | 8 | number of affidavits. His first affidavit states |
| 9 | rise to the Attorney General's discontinuance | 9 | that he became aware from Mr Levy himself |
| 10 | of the prosecution. The Attorney General | 10 | that he was one of the persons who was of |
| 11 | addresses that allegation that the nolle was on | 11 | interest to the investigators. His second |
| 12 | his mind at this time at A310. That is in | 12 | affidavit deals with this point at A224, |
| 13 | paragraph 47. He says: | 13 | paragraph 10: |
| 14 | "As to paragraph 18 and as I have already | 14 | "At paragraph 137 Mr McGrail says that he |
| 15 | stated above, all of my references to | 15 | was under threat of litigation mounted by |
| 16 | defending the Chief Minister were references | 16 | Hassans in relation to the James Levy |
| 17 | to the office of the Chief Minister and not to | 17 | warrant devices, with whom I knew he was |
| 18 | whoever the individual office holder may | 18 | in contact, in reference to me. The intended |
| 19 | happen to be, and that I would defend that | 19 | insinuation appears to be that I was in |
| 20 | office from any investigation that exposed | 20 | cahoots with Mr Levy in relation to the threat |
| 21 | the office on flimsy grounds because of the | 21 | by him to litigate against Mr McGrail in |
| 22 | vital importance of that office to the | 22 | relation to the warrant issue. I respond as |
| 23 | reputation of our jurisdiction. In any event, | 23 | follows. I recall I had communications with |
| 24 | nolle was nowhere near my mind at the time | 24 | Mr Levy about these claims. He was |
| 25 | and as the transcript of the meeting on 13 | 25 | incensed at what had occurred and what was |
| | | 1 | |
| | | | |
| | Page 202 | | Page 204 |

| 1 | very clear in his view that damages/claims | 1 | evidence, that is common ground between |
|--|--|--|---|
| 2 | would be made against the Government for | 2 | relevant CPs. I have considered from the |
| 3 | the RGP's failures under Mr McGrail's | 3 | first moment I was informed of it that a |
| 4 | leadership. None of these communications in | 4 | search warrant in respect of Mr Levy's home |
| 5 | any way amounted to be encouraging, | 5 | and offices were unnecessary and |
| 6 | supporting or otherwise promoting Mr Levy's | 6 | inappropriate. I was and remain entitled to |
| 7 | claims. What I did think was right was for | 7 | that view and to express it to the |
| 8 | Mr Levy to challenge the issue of the warrant | 8 | Commissioner of Police, to Mr Levy and |
| 9 | even though it had been granted and the | 9 | whomever else I pleased and I did so in the |
| 10 | procedure which had been followed in that | 10 | terms that I, as was also my right, considered |
| 11 | respect as, from what I could see, such a | 11 | appropriate. |
| 12 | warrant should never have been issued in | 12 | "The evidence before the Inquiry, in |
| 13 | respect of Mr Levy or any such similar | 13 | particular retired Superintendent Richardson |
| 14 | individual from whom information should | 14 | in his third statement, demonstrates that |
| 15 | have been sought by way of production order | 15 | Superintendent Richardson agreed that Mr |
| 16 | rather than search warrants." | 16 | Levy KC's status as suspect was borderline, |
| 17 | If we go to 233, contact with Mr James Levy | 17 | especially in the view of the DPP. |
| 18 | on his being a person of interest, the Chief | 18 | Additionally, the statement discloses that no |
| 19 | Minister in his second affidavit says: | 19 | careful consideration appears to have been |
| 20 | "I recall that I discussed with Mr James Levy | 20 | given to whether the threshold for obtaining a |
| 21 | on a very large number of occasions the fact | 21 | search warrant instead of a production order |
| 22 | that the RGP had suggested that he might be | 22 | had been met." |
| 23 | a person of interest in the investigation. He | 23 | 11: |
| 24 | raised this with me constantly when I spoke | 24 | "My frequent conversations with Mr Levy |
| 25 | to him on other matters. I consistently | 25 | KC about the search warrants were mostly |
| | · | | |
| | Page 205 | | Page 207 |
| | | | |
| 1 1 | replied to him that I was sure that the | 1 | telephonic As I have already said there is |
| 1 2 | replied to him that I was sure that the investigation would exonerate him given | $\begin{vmatrix} 1 \\ 2 \end{vmatrix}$ | telephonic. As I have already said, there is no record beyond those already disclosed." |
| 2 | investigation would exonerate him given | 2 | no record beyond those already disclosed." |
| 2 3 | investigation would exonerate him given that, from what I knew of him, I was sure | 2 3 | no record beyond those already disclosed." He says there are no other records, and then |
| 2 3 4 | investigation would exonerate him given that, from what I knew of him, I was sure that he would not have acted in a manner | 2 3 4 | no record beyond those already disclosed." He says there are no other records, and then at 12: |
| 2 3 4 5 | investigation would exonerate him given that, from what I knew of him, I was sure that he would not have acted in a manner which was contrary to law. In fact this was | 2 3 4 5 | no record beyond those already disclosed." He says there are no other records, and then at 12: "I recall because the date is noteworthy by |
| 2 3 4 | investigation would exonerate him given that, from what I knew of him, I was sure that he would not have acted in a manner | 2 3 4 | no record beyond those already disclosed." He says there are no other records, and then at 12: "I recall because the date is noteworthy by virtue of these events that I spoke to Mr Levy |
| 2 3 4 5 6 7 | investigation would exonerate him given that, from what I knew of him, I was sure that he would not have acted in a manner which was contrary to law. In fact this was also the conclusion reached by the police when they made the decisions about who to | 2 3 4 5 6 7 | no record beyond those already disclosed." He says there are no other records, and then at 12: "I recall because the date is noteworthy by virtue of these events that I spoke to Mr Levy on the telephone on 12 May. I do not recall |
| 2 3 4 5 6 | investigation would exonerate him given that, from what I knew of him, I was sure that he would not have acted in a manner which was contrary to law. In fact this was also the conclusion reached by the police when they made the decisions about who to charge in consequence of their Op Delhi | 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 | no record beyond those already disclosed." He says there are no other records, and then at 12: "I recall because the date is noteworthy by virtue of these events that I spoke to Mr Levy on the telephone on 12 May. I do not recall the time at which I spoke to him. I expressed |
| 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 | investigation would exonerate him given that, from what I knew of him, I was sure that he would not have acted in a manner which was contrary to law. In fact this was also the conclusion reached by the police when they made the decisions about who to | 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 | no record beyond those already disclosed." He says there are no other records, and then at 12: "I recall because the date is noteworthy by virtue of these events that I spoke to Mr Levy on the telephone on 12 May. I do not recall the time at which I spoke to him. I expressed to Mr Levy my consternation at how the |
| 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 | investigation would exonerate him given that, from what I knew of him, I was sure that he would not have acted in a manner which was contrary to law. In fact this was also the conclusion reached by the police when they made the decisions about who to charge in consequence of their Op Delhi investigation. "There are no notes of these discussions | 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 | no record beyond those already disclosed." He says there are no other records, and then at 12: "I recall because the date is noteworthy by virtue of these events that I spoke to Mr Levy on the telephone on 12 May. I do not recall the time at which I spoke to him. I expressed |
| 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 | investigation would exonerate him given that, from what I knew of him, I was sure that he would not have acted in a manner which was contrary to law. In fact this was also the conclusion reached by the police when they made the decisions about who to charge in consequence of their Op Delhi investigation. | 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 | no record beyond those already disclosed." He says there are no other records, and then at 12: "I recall because the date is noteworthy by virtue of these events that I spoke to Mr Levy on the telephone on 12 May. I do not recall the time at which I spoke to him. I expressed to Mr Levy my consternation at how the police had acted in executing a search warrant at his home. I do not recall the |
| 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 | investigation would exonerate him given that, from what I knew of him, I was sure that he would not have acted in a manner which was contrary to law. In fact this was also the conclusion reached by the police when they made the decisions about who to charge in consequence of their Op Delhi investigation. "There are no notes of these discussions between Mr Levy and me as this was an issue that was raised with him on the occasions | 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 | no record beyond those already disclosed." He says there are no other records, and then at 12: "I recall because the date is noteworthy by virtue of these events that I spoke to Mr Levy on the telephone on 12 May. I do not recall the time at which I spoke to him. I expressed to Mr Levy my consternation at how the police had acted in executing a search |
| 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 | investigation would exonerate him given that, from what I knew of him, I was sure that he would not have acted in a manner which was contrary to law. In fact this was also the conclusion reached by the police when they made the decisions about who to charge in consequence of their Op Delhi investigation. "There are no notes of these discussions between Mr Levy and me as this was an issue | 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 | no record beyond those already disclosed." He says there are no other records, and then at 12: "I recall because the date is noteworthy by virtue of these events that I spoke to Mr Levy on the telephone on 12 May. I do not recall the time at which I spoke to him. I expressed to Mr Levy my consternation at how the police had acted in executing a search warrant at his home. I do not recall the precise method by which we spoke. I may have been able to reach him on his home |
| 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 | investigation would exonerate him given that, from what I knew of him, I was sure that he would not have acted in a manner which was contrary to law. In fact this was also the conclusion reached by the police when they made the decisions about who to charge in consequence of their Op Delhi investigation. "There are no notes of these discussions between Mr Levy and me as this was an issue that was raised with him on the occasions when I spoke to him, which more often than not was during informal telephone | 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 | no record beyond those already disclosed." He says there are no other records, and then at 12: "I recall because the date is noteworthy by virtue of these events that I spoke to Mr Levy on the telephone on 12 May. I do not recall the time at which I spoke to him. I expressed to Mr Levy my consternation at how the police had acted in executing a search warrant at his home. I do not recall the precise method by which we spoke. I may |
| 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 | investigation would exonerate him given that, from what I knew of him, I was sure that he would not have acted in a manner which was contrary to law. In fact this was also the conclusion reached by the police when they made the decisions about who to charge in consequence of their Op Delhi investigation. "There are no notes of these discussions between Mr Levy and me as this was an issue that was raised with him on the occasions when I spoke to him, which more often than not was during informal telephone conversations. Any document or other | 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 | no record beyond those already disclosed." He says there are no other records, and then at 12: "I recall because the date is noteworthy by virtue of these events that I spoke to Mr Levy on the telephone on 12 May. I do not recall the time at which I spoke to him. I expressed to Mr Levy my consternation at how the police had acted in executing a search warrant at his home. I do not recall the precise method by which we spoke. I may have been able to reach him on his home number or the office number as Mr Levy has an office extension at his home. I also recall |
| 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 | investigation would exonerate him given that, from what I knew of him, I was sure that he would not have acted in a manner which was contrary to law. In fact this was also the conclusion reached by the police when they made the decisions about who to charge in consequence of their Op Delhi investigation. "There are no notes of these discussions between Mr Levy and me as this was an issue that was raised with him on the occasions when I spoke to him, which more often than not was during informal telephone conversations. Any document or other communication recorded in documentary | 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 | no record beyond those already disclosed." He says there are no other records, and then at 12: "I recall because the date is noteworthy by virtue of these events that I spoke to Mr Levy on the telephone on 12 May. I do not recall the time at which I spoke to him. I expressed to Mr Levy my consternation at how the police had acted in executing a search warrant at his home. I do not recall the precise method by which we spoke. I may have been able to reach him on his home number or the office number as Mr Levy has an office extension at his home. I also recall speaking to Mr Levy KC in addition to the |
| 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 | investigation would exonerate him given that, from what I knew of him, I was sure that he would not have acted in a manner which was contrary to law. In fact this was also the conclusion reached by the police when they made the decisions about who to charge in consequence of their Op Delhi investigation. "There are no notes of these discussions between Mr Levy and me as this was an issue that was raised with him on the occasions when I spoke to him, which more often than not was during informal telephone conversations. Any document or other communication recorded in documentary format which relates to any such discussion | 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 | no record beyond those already disclosed." He says there are no other records, and then at 12: "I recall because the date is noteworthy by virtue of these events that I spoke to Mr Levy on the telephone on 12 May. I do not recall the time at which I spoke to him. I expressed to Mr Levy my consternation at how the police had acted in executing a search warrant at his home. I do not recall the precise method by which we spoke. I may have been able to reach him on his home number or the office number as Mr Levy has an office extension at his home. I also recall speaking to Mr Levy KC in addition to the warrants about his position and concerns as |
| 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 | investigation would exonerate him given that, from what I knew of him, I was sure that he would not have acted in a manner which was contrary to law. In fact this was also the conclusion reached by the police when they made the decisions about who to charge in consequence of their Op Delhi investigation. "There are no notes of these discussions between Mr Levy and me as this was an issue that was raised with him on the occasions when I spoke to him, which more often than not was during informal telephone conversations. Any document or other communication recorded in documentary | 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 | no record beyond those already disclosed." He says there are no other records, and then at 12: "I recall because the date is noteworthy by virtue of these events that I spoke to Mr Levy on the telephone on 12 May. I do not recall the time at which I spoke to him. I expressed to Mr Levy my consternation at how the police had acted in executing a search warrant at his home. I do not recall the precise method by which we spoke. I may have been able to reach him on his home number or the office number as Mr Levy has an office extension at his home. I also recall speaking to Mr Levy KC in addition to the |
| 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 | investigation would exonerate him given that, from what I knew of him, I was sure that he would not have acted in a manner which was contrary to law. In fact this was also the conclusion reached by the police when they made the decisions about who to charge in consequence of their Op Delhi investigation. "There are no notes of these discussions between Mr Levy and me as this was an issue that was raised with him on the occasions when I spoke to him, which more often than not was during informal telephone conversations. Any document or other communication recorded in documentary format which relates to any such discussion would already have been disclosed in the | 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 | no record beyond those already disclosed." He says there are no other records, and then at 12: "I recall because the date is noteworthy by virtue of these events that I spoke to Mr Levy on the telephone on 12 May. I do not recall the time at which I spoke to him. I expressed to Mr Levy my consternation at how the police had acted in executing a search warrant at his home. I do not recall the precise method by which we spoke. I may have been able to reach him on his home number or the office number as Mr Levy has an office extension at his home. I also recall speaking to Mr Levy KC in addition to the warrants about his position and concerns as leader of the Jewish community on access to |
| 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 | investigation would exonerate him given that, from what I knew of him, I was sure that he would not have acted in a manner which was contrary to law. In fact this was also the conclusion reached by the police when they made the decisions about who to charge in consequence of their Op Delhi investigation. "There are no notes of these discussions between Mr Levy and me as this was an issue that was raised with him on the occasions when I spoke to him, which more often than not was during informal telephone conversations. Any document or other communication recorded in documentary format which relates to any such discussion would already have been disclosed in the context of the disclosure I have already | 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 | no record beyond those already disclosed." He says there are no other records, and then at 12: "I recall because the date is noteworthy by virtue of these events that I spoke to Mr Levy on the telephone on 12 May. I do not recall the time at which I spoke to him. I expressed to Mr Levy my consternation at how the police had acted in executing a search warrant at his home. I do not recall the precise method by which we spoke. I may have been able to reach him on his home number or the office number as Mr Levy has an office extension at his home. I also recall speaking to Mr Levy KC in addition to the warrants about his position and concerns as leader of the Jewish community on access to places of worship, which was then a thorny |
| 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 | investigation would exonerate him given that, from what I knew of him, I was sure that he would not have acted in a manner which was contrary to law. In fact this was also the conclusion reached by the police when they made the decisions about who to charge in consequence of their Op Delhi investigation. "There are no notes of these discussions between Mr Levy and me as this was an issue that was raised with him on the occasions when I spoke to him, which more often than not was during informal telephone conversations. Any document or other communication recorded in documentary format which relates to any such discussion would already have been disclosed in the context of the disclosure I have already provided and no additional records exist as | 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 | no record beyond those already disclosed." He says there are no other records, and then at 12: "I recall because the date is noteworthy by virtue of these events that I spoke to Mr Levy on the telephone on 12 May. I do not recall the time at which I spoke to him. I expressed to Mr Levy my consternation at how the police had acted in executing a search warrant at his home. I do not recall the precise method by which we spoke. I may have been able to reach him on his home number or the office number as Mr Levy has an office extension at his home. I also recall speaking to Mr Levy KC in addition to the warrants about his position and concerns as leader of the Jewish community on access to places of worship, which was then a thorny issue in the context of lockdown. I cannot |
| 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 | investigation would exonerate him given that, from what I knew of him, I was sure that he would not have acted in a manner which was contrary to law. In fact this was also the conclusion reached by the police when they made the decisions about who to charge in consequence of their Op Delhi investigation. "There are no notes of these discussions between Mr Levy and me as this was an issue that was raised with him on the occasions when I spoke to him, which more often than not was during informal telephone conversations. Any document or other communication recorded in documentary format which relates to any such discussion would already have been disclosed in the context of the disclosure I have already provided and no additional records exist as far as I am aware." | 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 | no record beyond those already disclosed." He says there are no other records, and then at 12: "I recall because the date is noteworthy by virtue of these events that I spoke to Mr Levy on the telephone on 12 May. I do not recall the time at which I spoke to him. I expressed to Mr Levy my consternation at how the police had acted in executing a search warrant at his home. I do not recall the precise method by which we spoke. I may have been able to reach him on his home number or the office number as Mr Levy has an office extension at his home. I also recall speaking to Mr Levy KC in addition to the warrants about his position and concerns as leader of the Jewish community on access to places of worship, which was then a thorny issue in the context of lockdown. I cannot recall the order in which these issues were |
| 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 | investigation would exonerate him given that, from what I knew of him, I was sure that he would not have acted in a manner which was contrary to law. In fact this was also the conclusion reached by the police when they made the decisions about who to charge in consequence of their Op Delhi investigation. "There are no notes of these discussions between Mr Levy and me as this was an issue that was raised with him on the occasions when I spoke to him, which more often than not was during informal telephone conversations. Any document or other communication recorded in documentary format which relates to any such discussion would already have been disclosed in the context of the disclosure I have already provided and no additional records exist as far as I am aware." Paragraph 8: | 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 | no record beyond those already disclosed." He says there are no other records, and then at 12: "I recall because the date is noteworthy by virtue of these events that I spoke to Mr Levy on the telephone on 12 May. I do not recall the time at which I spoke to him. I expressed to Mr Levy my consternation at how the police had acted in executing a search warrant at his home. I do not recall the precise method by which we spoke. I may have been able to reach him on his home number or the office number as Mr Levy has an office extension at his home. I also recall speaking to Mr Levy KC in addition to the warrants about his position and concerns as leader of the Jewish community on access to places of worship, which was then a thorny issue in the context of lockdown. I cannot recall the order in which these issues were discussed." |
| 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 | investigation would exonerate him given that, from what I knew of him, I was sure that he would not have acted in a manner which was contrary to law. In fact this was also the conclusion reached by the police when they made the decisions about who to charge in consequence of their Op Delhi investigation. "There are no notes of these discussions between Mr Levy and me as this was an issue that was raised with him on the occasions when I spoke to him, which more often than not was during informal telephone conversations. Any document or other communication recorded in documentary format which relates to any such discussion would already have been disclosed in the context of the disclosure I have already provided and no additional records exist as far as I am aware." Paragraph 8: "I have frequently discussed with Mr Levy | 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 | no record beyond those already disclosed." He says there are no other records, and then at 12: "I recall because the date is noteworthy by virtue of these events that I spoke to Mr Levy on the telephone on 12 May. I do not recall the time at which I spoke to him. I expressed to Mr Levy my consternation at how the police had acted in executing a search warrant at his home. I do not recall the precise method by which we spoke. I may have been able to reach him on his home number or the office number as Mr Levy has an office extension at his home. I also recall speaking to Mr Levy KC in addition to the warrants about his position and concerns as leader of the Jewish community on access to places of worship, which was then a thorny issue in the context of lockdown. I cannot recall the order in which these issues were discussed." |
| 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24 | investigation would exonerate him given that, from what I knew of him, I was sure that he would not have acted in a manner which was contrary to law. In fact this was also the conclusion reached by the police when they made the decisions about who to charge in consequence of their Op Delhi investigation. "There are no notes of these discussions between Mr Levy and me as this was an issue that was raised with him on the occasions when I spoke to him, which more often than not was during informal telephone conversations. Any document or other communication recorded in documentary format which relates to any such discussion would already have been disclosed in the context of the disclosure I have already provided and no additional records exist as far as I am aware." Paragraph 8: "I have frequently discussed with Mr Levy KC the issue of a search warrant in respect of him. As the Inquiry will now be aware from | 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24 | no record beyond those already disclosed." He says there are no other records, and then at 12: "I recall because the date is noteworthy by virtue of these events that I spoke to Mr Levy on the telephone on 12 May. I do not recall the time at which I spoke to him. I expressed to Mr Levy my consternation at how the police had acted in executing a search warrant at his home. I do not recall the precise method by which we spoke. I may have been able to reach him on his home number or the office number as Mr Levy has an office extension at his home. I also recall speaking to Mr Levy KC in addition to the warrants about his position and concerns as leader of the Jewish community on access to places of worship, which was then a thorny issue in the context of lockdown. I cannot recall the order in which these issues were discussed." He talks about looking at Gib Telecom logs and says that there were no records of calls to Mr Levy, and then that the data may have |
| 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24 | investigation would exonerate him given that, from what I knew of him, I was sure that he would not have acted in a manner which was contrary to law. In fact this was also the conclusion reached by the police when they made the decisions about who to charge in consequence of their Op Delhi investigation. "There are no notes of these discussions between Mr Levy and me as this was an issue that was raised with him on the occasions when I spoke to him, which more often than not was during informal telephone conversations. Any document or other communication recorded in documentary format which relates to any such discussion would already have been disclosed in the context of the disclosure I have already provided and no additional records exist as far as I am aware." Paragraph 8: "I have frequently discussed with Mr Levy KC the issue of a search warrant in respect of | 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24 | no record beyond those already disclosed." He says there are no other records, and then at 12: "I recall because the date is noteworthy by virtue of these events that I spoke to Mr Levy on the telephone on 12 May. I do not recall the time at which I spoke to him. I expressed to Mr Levy my consternation at how the police had acted in executing a search warrant at his home. I do not recall the precise method by which we spoke. I may have been able to reach him on his home number or the office number as Mr Levy has an office extension at his home. I also recall speaking to Mr Levy KC in addition to the warrants about his position and concerns as leader of the Jewish community on access to places of worship, which was then a thorny issue in the context of lockdown. I cannot recall the order in which these issues were discussed." He talks about looking at Gib Telecom logs and says that there were no records of calls to |

1 been lost. Then he says in the final sentence 1 of his human rights," 2 2 of that paragraph: and then at 12: 3 3 "I am, however, entirely content to confirm, "I spoke to Mr Baglietto KC repeatedly about 4 4 as I have done above, that such calls this and about how let down I felt by Mr 5 occurred." 5 McGrail and about the fact that I would 6 6 Then paragraph 17: never be able to trust him again because I 7 "Finally, I wish to say that I do not share Mr 7 believed he had, as I have already stated in 8 8 my earlier affidavits, lied to me about the McGrail's exaggerated and self-serving view 9 and descriptions of my having spoken and 9 advice he had taken and received about the 10 expressed my views to Mr Levy KC on the 10 appropriateness of the execution of the 11 day the search warrant had been executed at 11 search warrant as opposed to a production 12 his home. I do not consider that it was 12 order." 13 inappropriate behaviour to do so. To the 13 Just going on: 14 14 contrary, I believe and continue to believe "Mr Baglietto and I discussed at length how 15 15 that it was entirely proper, natural and best he should raise these issues in his 16 16 appropriate, not least given my very close representation of Mr Levy KC. We 17 17 friendship and relationship with him. The discussed whether Mr Levy KC should be 18 high office that I held and continue to hold 18 advised to judicially review the RGP's 19 19 does not disqualify me from doing so, still actions in this respect. In this context I 20 20 less that it require me to engage in an believe, though I have no precise recollection 21 unnatural omission to do so to avoid the 21 of the detail of discussion, that I would have 22 22 shared with Mr Baglietto KC also the fact speculative and reckless suspicions of Mr 23 23 McGrail or anyone else." that I was very open with the Gibraltar Police 24 24 Then if we can go to 1447, please. This is as Authority and the then Governor that Mr 25 25 to meetings with Mr Baglietto and Mr Levy McGrail no longer enjoyed my confidence Page 209 Page 211 1 KC. 1 and my views as to the mechanisms to see 2 "I am further asked in this inquiry letter to 2 Mr McGrail removed and the consequences 3 3 clarify certain matters by affidavit, namely thereof. 4 whether meetings took place with Mr 4 "I recall seeing Mr Levy KC also at this time 5 5 Baglietto, in particular whether meetings on one occasion with Mr Baglietto KC. I 6 6 took place on 12 May, and then what was believe I saw him at my home, the security of 7 7 which is incidentally provided by OSG who stated in those meetings." 8 8 Just moving to 9, it says: have live video feeds. I recall also that Mr 9 9 "As can be seen from the Whatsapp Levy KC was at this time both incensed but 10 10 messages disclosed, I met with Mr Baglietto also deeply embarrassed by the events of his 11 home and office being searched. At the KC on a number of occasions during that 11 12 period. Those meetings occurred nearly four 12 meeting with Mr Levy KC I remember we 13 13 discussed again how legally improper it had years ago and I cannot recall the detail of 14 14 what was discussed. I can, however, assisted been in our view for the RGP to have 15 by references in the Whatsapp messages I 15 proceeded by way of search warrant and not 16 have disclosed, recall the general tenor of the 16 production order, how outraged I was by the 17 17 discussion. In those meetings I believe that I fact that I believed that Mr McGrail had lied 18 shared with Mr Baglietto KC, who is 18 to me about the advice he had had in that 19 19 incidentally one of my closest personal respect and my subsequent complete loss of 20 20 friends, my outrage at the RGP in my view confidence in him. 21 21 improperly obtaining a search warrant in "The key issue in that meeting, however, was 22 respect of Mr Levy instead of a production 22 that Mr Levy KC, as a result of the acute 23 23 order. My view was that the mechanism embarrassment he had felt, had wanted to see 24 24 employed to seek documents and information me to offer me his resignation as the 25 had been inappropriate and had been a breach 25 Chairperson of Gibraltar Community Care Page 210 Page 212

| | | 1 | |
|----|---|----|---|
| 1 | Trust, a post he has held for over 30 years. I | 1 | the following day. He recalls speaking to the |
| 2 | told Mr Levy KC in that meeting that I | 2 | Attorney General on 15 May, when the |
| 3 | continued to have full confidence in him and | 3 | Attorney General confirmed that the RGP |
| 4 | his integrity, and I did not believe it was | 4 | would accept a voluntary statement. |
| 5 | necessary for him to resign from the | 5 | He acknowledges that his Whatsapp |
| 6 | chairmanship of Community Care Trust." | 6 | exchange with the Chief Minister suggests |
| 7 | That evidence confirms for the first time that | 7 | that they had arranged to meet on 17 May but |
| 8 | discussions with Mr Baglietto and Mr Levy | 8 | does not recall that meeting or the telephone |
| 9 | went beyond the search warrants and | 9 | conversation that appears to have happened |
| 10 | criminal investigation and also addressed the | 10 | on the same day, and does not recall the |
| 11 | Chief Minister's loss of confidence in Mr | 11 | contents of any other oral communications |
| 12 | McGrail and even, at least with Mr Baglietto, | 12 | with the Attorney General, although there |
| 13 | the mechanisms to see Mr McGrail removed. | 13 | appear to have been calls to both the AG and |
| 14 | This is consistent with the Whatsapp | 14 | the Chief Minister on 20 May. He does not |
| 15 | exchanges between the Chief Minister and | 15 | recall ever discussing Mr McGrail's position |
| 16 | Mr Baglietto. | 16 | with the Chief Minister or the Attorney |
| 17 | Mr Levy's evidence is that he voiced his | 17 | General or anyone else, and was not advising |
| 18 | objection to his treatment to the Attorney | 18 | Mr Levy or anyone else on that matter. |
| 19 | General on a single occasion, that he never | 19 | We have received some of the Whatsapp |
| 20 | discussed Mr McGrail's position as | 20 | communications at the time, although we are |
| 21 | Commissioner of Police and the decision to | 21 | told that not all of them are available, and we |
| 22 | invite him to retire with the Chief Minister or | 22 | should just look at them briefly. |
| 23 | the Attorney General, that he did not | 23 | Mr Levy called the Attorney General twice |
| 24 | communicate with the Chief Minister while | 24 | unsuccessfully on 12 May 2020. The |
| 25 | the RGP's officers were at his office, that he | 25 | Attorney General accepts that the did speak |
| 23 | the KOF's officers were at his office, that he | 23 | Attorney General accepts that the did speak |
| | Page 213 | | Page 215 |
| | | | |
| 1 | did not attend a meeting with the Chief | 1 | either late that day or the next day and that |
| 2 | Minister and Mr Baglietto on 12 May 2020. | 2 | the AG told Mr Levy that he should speak to |
| 3 | Mr Levy's evidence is that Mr Baglietto | 3 | the DPP who was handling the matter. |
| 4 | communicated with the Attorney General as | 4 | (15.31) |
| 5 | his legal representative, which was legitimate | 5 | If we go to B 1422, this is an exchange |
| 6 | and proper, and he did not seek to remove Mr | 6 | between the Chief Minister and Mr Baglietto |
| 7 | McGrail from his post and was not involved | 7 | which starts on 12 May. The first two |
| 8 | in the process. | 8 | messages are not relevant. 13 May is Mr |
| 9 | Mr Baglietto's evidence is that he has no | 9 | Baglietto asking to talk. The Chief Minister |
| 10 | recollection of the contents of his discussions | 10 | says: "Give me five." Then on 14 May the |
| 11 | with the Chief Minister about the warrants. | 11 | Chief Minister sets out dismissal or total loss |
| 12 | He recalls conversations with the Attorney | 12 | or reduction of pension benefit. That appears |
| 13 | General about the warrants and whether the | 13 | to be a reference to a disciplinary provision |
| 14 | RGP would accept a voluntary statement. It | 14 | on disciplinary regulations. They do not |
| 15 | is likely he would have called the Attorney | 15 | actually apply to the Commissioner of Police |
| 16 | General on 12 May to initially protest and | 16 | but it is a disciplinary measure that can be |
| 17 | express concerns and let him know Hassans | 17 | used against officers. Mr Baglietto replies |
| 18 | would be writing, and possibly seeking a | 18 | saying: "Many thanks." Then the Chief |
| 19 | meeting with the Attorney General and Mr | 19 | Minister refers to section 76 of the Police Act |
| 20 | McGrail. He does not recall the | 20 | and sets that out, and that is a power to make |
| 21 | conversations that appear to have happened | 21 | orders to return property taken by the police |
| 22 | with the Attorney General and the Chief | 22 | in a criminal investigation. Mr Baglietto |
| 23 | Minister on the following day. He notes | 23 | replies to that saying: "Thanks. We are |
| 24 | messages with the Chief Minister on 14 May, | 24 | drafting a letter. Let me think about this |
| 25 | which he believes to relate to a letter sent on | 25 | provision but we prefer not to have to go to |
| | | | |
| | Page 214 | | Page 216 |

| 1 | | | |
|--|--|---|--|
| 1 | court but for the CPO to return due to clear | 1 | personal reasons. |
| 2 | unlawfulness." The Chief Minister says: "I | 2 | Then at 09.51 on 17 May there is a reference |
| 3 | understand." | 3 | to: "12 noon, he says", and then a few missed |
| 4 | If we can go to C 6883, just at the bottom of | 4 | phone calls over the next few minutes. The |
| 5 | the page, these are the messages between Mr | 5 | Chief Minister then says: "Okay, let me |
| 6 | Baglietto and Mr Llamas where Mr Baglietto | 6 | know when you are on your way up." Mr |
| 7 | is asking to call, we are informing him that | 7 | Baglietto: "Okay." Chief Minister says: |
| 8 | they are delayed with the letter, and further | 8 | "How are you going?" Mr Baglietto picking |
| 9 | messages about calling on 20 May, as Mr | 9 | up now. That, the Chief Minister and Mr |
| 10 | Baglietto acknowledges in his statement. | 10 | Baglietto appear to accept, is a reference to |
| 11 | If we can go to A289, this is a message from | 11 | the meeting that they believe took place at |
| 12 | Mr Levy to Mr Llamas which is set out in Mr | 12 | the Chief Minister's residence. |
| 13 | Llamas's statement, his first affidavit, at | 13 | Later that evening there is some media which |
| 14 | paragraph 68 Mr Levy by WhatsApp at 20.57 | 14 | is sent which has been omitted from here, |
| 15 | on 13 May, which is the day after the search | 15 | and the Chief Minister says: "That is page 13 |
| 16 | warrants: "On the other matter, I feel I've | 16 | of the HMIC report published last week. |
| 17 | been hung out to dry, certainly not by you." | 17 | Look at the bit I have highlighted in red. |
| 18 | And the answer from Mr Llamas one minute | 18 | Boom." The response is: "Shocking but |
| 19 | later is set out below. I should say what Mr | 19 | sadly does not come as a surprise. Thanks |
| 20 | Llamas says here. He says: "I assume that he | 20 | for your time today bro, I think it reassured |
| 21 | was referring to the execution of the search | 21 | him a lot." Then the Chief Minister: "I think |
| 22 | warrants against him the previous day and I | 22 | the above is of major to the issues raised this |
| 23 | interpreted his statement that it was certainly | 23 | week. It will be important. Remember the |
| 24 | not by me to mean that he correctly assumed | 24 | HMIC report is public." Mr Baglietto: "Yes, |
| 25 | that I had not been involved in the decision to | 25 | excellent, we can put it to good use for sure." |
| | | 23 | excensing we can put it to good use for sure. |
| | Page 217 | | Page 219 |
| 1 | 14.2 1 41 1 | , | The Chi CM: interest Hill and the Health |
| 1 | obtain and execute the search warrants. As a | $\begin{vmatrix} 1 \\ 2 \end{vmatrix}$ | The Chief Minister: "I have sent to JL. Let |
| 2 | matter of courtesy to him, I replied but I | 2 | me know if he sees it", to which Mr Baglietto |
| 3 | wanted to do so without commenting or | 3 | replies with a thumbs up. |
| 4 | being drawn into conversation with him | 4 5 | The image that was sent is at C 6761. That is page 7 of the HMIC report. I do not know if |
| 5 | about the matter, so I replied one minute later | 5 | we can bring that down. There is clearly an |
| 6 7 | as follows, 'Don't worry.' I thereby sought to | 1 0 | |
| / | | 1 | |
| - | and did end the exchange. In fact, what I had | 7 | emphasis on this section on investigative |
| 8 | agreed with Mr McGrail in our meeting | 7 8 | emphasis on this section on investigative support which refers to officers using their |
| 8 | agreed with Mr McGrail in our meeting earlier that day was that the RGP would | 7 8 9 | emphasis on this section on investigative support which refers to officers using their personal devices to examine offenders' |
| 8 9 10 | agreed with Mr McGrail in our meeting earlier that day was that the RGP would continue to hold Mr Levy's devices and | 7 8 9 10 | emphasis on this section on investigative support which refers to officers using their personal devices to examine offenders' phones which HMIC considered was not |
| 8 9 10 11 | agreed with Mr McGrail in our meeting earlier that day was that the RGP would continue to hold Mr Levy's devices and would proceed with the interview under | 7 8 9 10 11 | emphasis on this section on investigative support which refers to officers using their personal devices to examine offenders' phones which HMIC considered was not good practice and did not meet best evidence |
| 8 9 10 11 12 | agreed with Mr McGrail in our meeting earlier that day was that the RGP would continue to hold Mr Levy's devices and would proceed with the interview under caution, the precise things that Mr Levy's | 7 8 9 10 11 12 | emphasis on this section on investigative support which refers to officers using their personal devices to examine offenders' phones which HMIC considered was not good practice and did not meet best evidence standards. |
| 8 9 10 11 12 13 | agreed with Mr McGrail in our meeting earlier that day was that the RGP would continue to hold Mr Levy's devices and would proceed with the interview under caution, the precise things that Mr Levy's lawyers were complaining about in their | 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 | emphasis on this section on investigative support which refers to officers using their personal devices to examine offenders' phones which HMIC considered was not good practice and did not meet best evidence standards. On 29 May there is another message between |
| 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 | agreed with Mr McGrail in our meeting earlier that day was that the RGP would continue to hold Mr Levy's devices and would proceed with the interview under caution, the precise things that Mr Levy's lawyers were complaining about in their letter of 12 May 2020." | 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 | emphasis on this section on investigative support which refers to officers using their personal devices to examine offenders' phones which HMIC considered was not good practice and did not meet best evidence standards. On 29 May there is another message between Mr Baglietto and the Attorney General |
| 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 | agreed with Mr McGrail in our meeting earlier that day was that the RGP would continue to hold Mr Levy's devices and would proceed with the interview under caution, the precise things that Mr Levy's lawyers were complaining about in their letter of 12 May 2020." If we go back to B 1422, please, there we | 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 | emphasis on this section on investigative support which refers to officers using their personal devices to examine offenders' phones which HMIC considered was not good practice and did not meet best evidence standards. On 29 May there is another message between Mr Baglietto and the Attorney General informing him that he had emailed him the |
| 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 | agreed with Mr McGrail in our meeting earlier that day was that the RGP would continue to hold Mr Levy's devices and would proceed with the interview under caution, the precise things that Mr Levy's lawyers were complaining about in their letter of 12 May 2020." If we go back to B 1422, please, there we have - we can pick it up again on 16 May | 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 | emphasis on this section on investigative support which refers to officers using their personal devices to examine offenders' phones which HMIC considered was not good practice and did not meet best evidence standards. On 29 May there is another message between Mr Baglietto and the Attorney General informing him that he had emailed him the article, and the Attorney General later |
| 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 | agreed with Mr McGrail in our meeting earlier that day was that the RGP would continue to hold Mr Levy's devices and would proceed with the interview under caution, the precise things that Mr Levy's lawyers were complaining about in their letter of 12 May 2020." If we go back to B 1422, please, there we have - we can pick it up again on 16 May towards the bottom of the page. It is from | 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 | emphasis on this section on investigative support which refers to officers using their personal devices to examine offenders' phones which HMIC considered was not good practice and did not meet best evidence standards. On 29 May there is another message between Mr Baglietto and the Attorney General informing him that he had emailed him the article, and the Attorney General later confirmed receipt, but no email has been |
| 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 | agreed with Mr McGrail in our meeting earlier that day was that the RGP would continue to hold Mr Levy's devices and would proceed with the interview under caution, the precise things that Mr Levy's lawyers were complaining about in their letter of 12 May 2020." If we go back to B 1422, please, there we have - we can pick it up again on 16 May towards the bottom of the page. It is from Mr Baglietto: "Bro, sorry to disturb but can | 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 | emphasis on this section on investigative support which refers to officers using their personal devices to examine offenders' phones which HMIC considered was not good practice and did not meet best evidence standards. On 29 May there is another message between Mr Baglietto and the Attorney General informing him that he had emailed him the article, and the Attorney General later confirmed receipt, but no email has been received by the Inquiry. We have not been |
| 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 | agreed with Mr McGrail in our meeting earlier that day was that the RGP would continue to hold Mr Levy's devices and would proceed with the interview under caution, the precise things that Mr Levy's lawyers were complaining about in their letter of 12 May 2020." If we go back to B 1422, please, there we have - we can pick it up again on 16 May towards the bottom of the page. It is from Mr Baglietto: "Bro, sorry to disturb but can we speak some time tomorrow morning?" | 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 | emphasis on this section on investigative support which refers to officers using their personal devices to examine offenders' phones which HMIC considered was not good practice and did not meet best evidence standards. On 29 May there is another message between Mr Baglietto and the Attorney General informing him that he had emailed him the article, and the Attorney General later confirmed receipt, but no email has been received by the Inquiry. We have not been provided with WhatsApp or other messages |
| 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 | agreed with Mr McGrail in our meeting earlier that day was that the RGP would continue to hold Mr Levy's devices and would proceed with the interview under caution, the precise things that Mr Levy's lawyers were complaining about in their letter of 12 May 2020." If we go back to B 1422, please, there we have - we can pick it up again on 16 May towards the bottom of the page. It is from Mr Baglietto: "Bro, sorry to disturb but can we speak some time tomorrow morning?" The Chief Minister replies: "Sure, what time | 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 | emphasis on this section on investigative support which refers to officers using their personal devices to examine offenders' phones which HMIC considered was not good practice and did not meet best evidence standards. On 29 May there is another message between Mr Baglietto and the Attorney General informing him that he had emailed him the article, and the Attorney General later confirmed receipt, but no email has been received by the Inquiry. We have not been provided with WhatsApp or other messages between the Chief Minister and Mr Levy. |
| 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 | agreed with Mr McGrail in our meeting earlier that day was that the RGP would continue to hold Mr Levy's devices and would proceed with the interview under caution, the precise things that Mr Levy's lawyers were complaining about in their letter of 12 May 2020." If we go back to B 1422, please, there we have - we can pick it up again on 16 May towards the bottom of the page. It is from Mr Baglietto: "Bro, sorry to disturb but can we speak some time tomorrow morning?" The Chief Minister replies: "Sure, what time is good for you?" Mr Baglietto: "Thanks, | 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 | emphasis on this section on investigative support which refers to officers using their personal devices to examine offenders' phones which HMIC considered was not good practice and did not meet best evidence standards. On 29 May there is another message between Mr Baglietto and the Attorney General informing him that he had emailed him the article, and the Attorney General later confirmed receipt, but no email has been received by the Inquiry. We have not been provided with WhatsApp or other messages between the Chief Minister and Mr Levy. That is something to address in questioning. |
| 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 | agreed with Mr McGrail in our meeting earlier that day was that the RGP would continue to hold Mr Levy's devices and would proceed with the interview under caution, the precise things that Mr Levy's lawyers were complaining about in their letter of 12 May 2020." If we go back to B 1422, please, there we have - we can pick it up again on 16 May towards the bottom of the page. It is from Mr Baglietto: "Bro, sorry to disturb but can we speak some time tomorrow morning?" The Chief Minister replies: "Sure, what time is good for you?" Mr Baglietto: "Thanks, any time and what's the best way? | 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 | emphasis on this section on investigative support which refers to officers using their personal devices to examine offenders' phones which HMIC considered was not good practice and did not meet best evidence standards. On 29 May there is another message between Mr Baglietto and the Attorney General informing him that he had emailed him the article, and the Attorney General later confirmed receipt, but no email has been received by the Inquiry. We have not been provided with WhatsApp or other messages between the Chief Minister and Mr Levy. That is something to address in questioning. It is clear from the evidence, particularly that |
| 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 | agreed with Mr McGrail in our meeting earlier that day was that the RGP would continue to hold Mr Levy's devices and would proceed with the interview under caution, the precise things that Mr Levy's lawyers were complaining about in their letter of 12 May 2020." If we go back to B 1422, please, there we have - we can pick it up again on 16 May towards the bottom of the page. It is from Mr Baglietto: "Bro, sorry to disturb but can we speak some time tomorrow morning?" The Chief Minister replies: "Sure, what time is good for you?" Mr Baglietto: "Thanks, any time and what's the best way? WhatsApp call or landline?" "I don't mind, | 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 | emphasis on this section on investigative support which refers to officers using their personal devices to examine offenders' phones which HMIC considered was not good practice and did not meet best evidence standards. On 29 May there is another message between Mr Baglietto and the Attorney General informing him that he had emailed him the article, and the Attorney General later confirmed receipt, but no email has been received by the Inquiry. We have not been provided with WhatsApp or other messages between the Chief Minister and Mr Levy. That is something to address in questioning. It is clear from the evidence, particularly that of the Chief Minister and the |
| 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24 | agreed with Mr McGrail in our meeting earlier that day was that the RGP would continue to hold Mr Levy's devices and would proceed with the interview under caution, the precise things that Mr Levy's lawyers were complaining about in their letter of 12 May 2020." If we go back to B 1422, please, there we have - we can pick it up again on 16 May towards the bottom of the page. It is from Mr Baglietto: "Bro, sorry to disturb but can we speak some time tomorrow morning?" The Chief Minister replies: "Sure, what time is good for you?" Mr Baglietto: "Thanks, any time and what's the best way? WhatsApp call or landline?" "I don't mind, I'll call you now." "Perfect, thanks. Mobile | 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24 | emphasis on this section on investigative support which refers to officers using their personal devices to examine offenders' phones which HMIC considered was not good practice and did not meet best evidence standards. On 29 May there is another message between Mr Baglietto and the Attorney General informing him that he had emailed him the article, and the Attorney General later confirmed receipt, but no email has been received by the Inquiry. We have not been provided with WhatsApp or other messages between the Chief Minister and Mr Levy. That is something to address in questioning. It is clear from the evidence, particularly that of the Chief Minister and the contemporaneous documents, that there was |
| 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 | agreed with Mr McGrail in our meeting earlier that day was that the RGP would continue to hold Mr Levy's devices and would proceed with the interview under caution, the precise things that Mr Levy's lawyers were complaining about in their letter of 12 May 2020." If we go back to B 1422, please, there we have - we can pick it up again on 16 May towards the bottom of the page. It is from Mr Baglietto: "Bro, sorry to disturb but can we speak some time tomorrow morning?" The Chief Minister replies: "Sure, what time is good for you?" Mr Baglietto: "Thanks, any time and what's the best way? WhatsApp call or landline?" "I don't mind, | 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 | emphasis on this section on investigative support which refers to officers using their personal devices to examine offenders' phones which HMIC considered was not good practice and did not meet best evidence standards. On 29 May there is another message between Mr Baglietto and the Attorney General informing him that he had emailed him the article, and the Attorney General later confirmed receipt, but no email has been received by the Inquiry. We have not been provided with WhatsApp or other messages between the Chief Minister and Mr Levy. That is something to address in questioning. It is clear from the evidence, particularly that of the Chief Minister and the |
| 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24 | agreed with Mr McGrail in our meeting earlier that day was that the RGP would continue to hold Mr Levy's devices and would proceed with the interview under caution, the precise things that Mr Levy's lawyers were complaining about in their letter of 12 May 2020." If we go back to B 1422, please, there we have - we can pick it up again on 16 May towards the bottom of the page. It is from Mr Baglietto: "Bro, sorry to disturb but can we speak some time tomorrow morning?" The Chief Minister replies: "Sure, what time is good for you?" Mr Baglietto: "Thanks, any time and what's the best way? WhatsApp call or landline?" "I don't mind, I'll call you now." "Perfect, thanks. Mobile | 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24 | emphasis on this section on investigative support which refers to officers using their personal devices to examine offenders' phones which HMIC considered was not good practice and did not meet best evidence standards. On 29 May there is another message between Mr Baglietto and the Attorney General informing him that he had emailed him the article, and the Attorney General later confirmed receipt, but no email has been received by the Inquiry. We have not been provided with WhatsApp or other messages between the Chief Minister and Mr Levy. That is something to address in questioning. It is clear from the evidence, particularly that of the Chief Minister and the contemporaneous documents, that there was |

| 1 | Chief Minister and the AG on the one hand. | 1 | public on 7 May 2020. The 2016 report |
|--|---|--|--|
| 2 | Well, the Chief Minister certainly and Mr | 2 | identified eight areas for improvement by the |
| 3 | Baglietto and Mr Levy and, in the AG's case, | 3 | RGP with seven addressed to the |
| 4 | there is that one exchange with Mr Levy and | 4 | Commissioner and an eighth for the Minister |
| 5 | then more with Mr Baglietto. | 5 | of Finance. Mr McGrail's application for the |
| 6 | As to where the conspiracy investigation now | 6 | Commissioner of Police made specific |
| 7 | was relied on to finish this issue off, it was | 7 | reference to this report and to setting up a |
| 8 | clearly the most important issue for the Chief | 8 | working group in order to address the report |
| 9 | Minister. We have already seen his 14 May | 9 | as part of his action plan. He assumed the |
| 10 | message that refers to a matter that he wanted | 10 | role of Commissioner of Police in May 2018 |
| 11 | to alert Mr Pyle to when they met, and he has | 11 | and in August and September 2018 he |
| 12 | explained in evidence that he was referring to | 12 | decided to ask the GPA to request a new |
| 13 | the issues of the execution of the search | 13 | report. He says that he was fully cognisant |
| 14 | warrant in respect of Mr Levy and his views | 14 | that they were pending recommendations but |
| 15 | in respect thereof. It was referred to again | 15 | it was imperative to demonstrate openness, |
| 16 | consistently in the meeting of 17 May, the | 16 | transparency and progress following |
| 17 | meeting of 18 May, the GPA meeting of 21 | 17 | criticism which the RGP had received in the |
| 18 | May. The letter of 22 May from the GPA to | 18 | Panorama newspaper and a survey conducted |
| 19 | Mr McGrail does not mention it explicitly | 19 | by the GPF which referred to discontent |
| 20 | but refers to the Chief Minister's dealings | 20 | among the rank and file complaints of |
| 21 | with Mr McGrail which I believe the Chief | 21 | bullying. Commissioner Ullger who was |
| 22 | Minister's case is that that was a reference to | 22 | assistant commissioner at the time and |
| 23 | it, but again that is a matter for questioning. | 23 | Assistant Commissioner Yeats who was a |
| 24 | And then the three letters also mention the | 24 | superintendent at the time stated that the |
| 25 | matter, obviously in different ways. | 25 | command team at the RGP all opposed this |
| 23 | matter, obviously in different ways. | 23 | command team at the RGT an opposed this |
| | Page 221 | | Page 223 |
| | | | |
| 1 | In conclusion, it is plain that this matter was | 1 | decision because they knew that while |
| 1 | In conclusion, it is plain that this matter was | 1 | decision because they knew that while |
| 2 | at the forefront of the Chief Minister and the | 2 | progress had been made, not enough had |
| 2 3 | at the forefront of the Chief Minister and the Attorney General's and Mr McGrail's minds | 2 3 | progress had been made, not enough had been done to meet those recommendations. |
| 2 3 4 | at the forefront of the Chief Minister and the Attorney General's and Mr McGrail's minds at the time of Mr McGrail's retirement. Mr | 2 3 4 | progress had been made, not enough had been done to meet those recommendations. They felt it would expose the RGP to |
| 2 3 4 5 | at the forefront of the Chief Minister and the Attorney General's and Mr McGrail's minds at the time of Mr McGrail's retirement. Mr Pyle sits apart giving entirely different | 2 3 4 5 | progress had been made, not enough had been done to meet those recommendations. They felt it would expose the RGP to renewed criticism and Dr Britto also |
| 2 3 4 5 6 | at the forefront of the Chief Minister and the Attorney General's and Mr McGrail's minds at the time of Mr McGrail's retirement. Mr Pyle sits apart giving entirely different reasons for his position but the Chief | 2 3 4 5 6 | progress had been made, not enough had been done to meet those recommendations. They felt it would expose the RGP to renewed criticism and Dr Britto also expressed concern about submitting the |
| 2 3 4 5 6 7 | at the forefront of the Chief Minister and the Attorney General's and Mr McGrail's minds at the time of Mr McGrail's retirement. Mr Pyle sits apart giving entirely different reasons for his position but the Chief Minister in particular obviously felt very | 2 3 4 5 6 7 | progress had been made, not enough had been done to meet those recommendations. They felt it would expose the RGP to renewed criticism and Dr Britto also expressed concern about submitting the workforce to two inspections at the same |
| 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 | at the forefront of the Chief Minister and the Attorney General's and Mr McGrail's minds at the time of Mr McGrail's retirement. Mr Pyle sits apart giving entirely different reasons for his position but the Chief Minister in particular obviously felt very strongly about it in one way and Mr McGrail | 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 | progress had been made, not enough had been done to meet those recommendations. They felt it would expose the RGP to renewed criticism and Dr Britto also expressed concern about submitting the workforce to two inspections at the same time because another private inspection was |
| 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 | at the forefront of the Chief Minister and the Attorney General's and Mr McGrail's minds at the time of Mr McGrail's retirement. Mr Pyle sits apart giving entirely different reasons for his position but the Chief Minister in particular obviously felt very strongly about it in one way and Mr McGrail obviously felt very strongly about it in | 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 | progress had been made, not enough had been done to meet those recommendations. They felt it would expose the RGP to renewed criticism and Dr Britto also expressed concern about submitting the workforce to two inspections at the same time because another private inspection was being carried out by AAP Associates. The |
| 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 | at the forefront of the Chief Minister and the Attorney General's and Mr McGrail's minds at the time of Mr McGrail's retirement. Mr Pyle sits apart giving entirely different reasons for his position but the Chief Minister in particular obviously felt very strongly about it in one way and Mr McGrail obviously felt very strongly about it in another way, feeling that he was being | 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 | progress had been made, not enough had been done to meet those recommendations. They felt it would expose the RGP to renewed criticism and Dr Britto also expressed concern about submitting the workforce to two inspections at the same time because another private inspection was being carried out by AAP Associates. The inspection was conducted on 14 to 18 |
| 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 | at the forefront of the Chief Minister and the Attorney General's and Mr McGrail's minds at the time of Mr McGrail's retirement. Mr Pyle sits apart giving entirely different reasons for his position but the Chief Minister in particular obviously felt very strongly about it in one way and Mr McGrail obviously felt very strongly about it in another way, feeling that he was being muscled out of an investigation. So that is a | 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 | progress had been made, not enough had been done to meet those recommendations. They felt it would expose the RGP to renewed criticism and Dr Britto also expressed concern about submitting the workforce to two inspections at the same time because another private inspection was being carried out by AAP Associates. The inspection was conducted on 14 to 18 October 2019. Both Mr McGrail and Mr |
| 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 | at the forefront of the Chief Minister and the Attorney General's and Mr McGrail's minds at the time of Mr McGrail's retirement. Mr Pyle sits apart giving entirely different reasons for his position but the Chief Minister in particular obviously felt very strongly about it in one way and Mr McGrail obviously felt very strongly about it in another way, feeling that he was being muscled out of an investigation. So that is a matter which will - certainly the meetings of | 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 | progress had been made, not enough had been done to meet those recommendations. They felt it would expose the RGP to renewed criticism and Dr Britto also expressed concern about submitting the workforce to two inspections at the same time because another private inspection was being carried out by AAP Associates. The inspection was conducted on 14 to 18 October 2019. Both Mr McGrail and Mr Ullger got the impression from the final |
| 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 | at the forefront of the Chief Minister and the Attorney General's and Mr McGrail's minds at the time of Mr McGrail's retirement. Mr Pyle sits apart giving entirely different reasons for his position but the Chief Minister in particular obviously felt very strongly about it in one way and Mr McGrail obviously felt very strongly about it in another way, feeling that he was being muscled out of an investigation. So that is a matter which will - certainly the meetings of 12 May and the subsequent meetings in May | 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 | progress had been made, not enough had been done to meet those recommendations. They felt it would expose the RGP to renewed criticism and Dr Britto also expressed concern about submitting the workforce to two inspections at the same time because another private inspection was being carried out by AAP Associates. The inspection was conducted on 14 to 18 October 2019. Both Mr McGrail and Mr Ullger got the impression from the final briefing that actually the inspection was |
| 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 | at the forefront of the Chief Minister and the Attorney General's and Mr McGrail's minds at the time of Mr McGrail's retirement. Mr Pyle sits apart giving entirely different reasons for his position but the Chief Minister in particular obviously felt very strongly about it in one way and Mr McGrail obviously felt very strongly about it in another way, feeling that he was being muscled out of an investigation. So that is a matter which will - certainly the meetings of 12 May and the subsequent meetings in May will have to be considered in questioning. | 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 | progress had been made, not enough had been done to meet those recommendations. They felt it would expose the RGP to renewed criticism and Dr Britto also expressed concern about submitting the workforce to two inspections at the same time because another private inspection was being carried out by AAP Associates. The inspection was conducted on 14 to 18 October 2019. Both Mr McGrail and Mr Ullger got the impression from the final briefing that actually the inspection was positive but the draft report came in February |
| 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 | at the forefront of the Chief Minister and the Attorney General's and Mr McGrail's minds at the time of Mr McGrail's retirement. Mr Pyle sits apart giving entirely different reasons for his position but the Chief Minister in particular obviously felt very strongly about it in one way and Mr McGrail obviously felt very strongly about it in another way, feeling that he was being muscled out of an investigation. So that is a matter which will - certainly the meetings of 12 May and the subsequent meetings in May will have to be considered in questioning. So that concludes issue five, the conspiracy | 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 | progress had been made, not enough had been done to meet those recommendations. They felt it would expose the RGP to renewed criticism and Dr Britto also expressed concern about submitting the workforce to two inspections at the same time because another private inspection was being carried out by AAP Associates. The inspection was conducted on 14 to 18 October 2019. Both Mr McGrail and Mr Ullger got the impression from the final briefing that actually the inspection was positive but the draft report came in February 2020 and Mr McGrail and Mr Ullger say that |
| 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 | at the forefront of the Chief Minister and the Attorney General's and Mr McGrail's minds at the time of Mr McGrail's retirement. Mr Pyle sits apart giving entirely different reasons for his position but the Chief Minister in particular obviously felt very strongly about it in one way and Mr McGrail obviously felt very strongly about it in another way, feeling that he was being muscled out of an investigation. So that is a matter which will - certainly the meetings of 12 May and the subsequent meetings in May will have to be considered in questioning. So that concludes issue five, the conspiracy investigation. | 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 | progress had been made, not enough had been done to meet those recommendations. They felt it would expose the RGP to renewed criticism and Dr Britto also expressed concern about submitting the workforce to two inspections at the same time because another private inspection was being carried out by AAP Associates. The inspection was conducted on 14 to 18 October 2019. Both Mr McGrail and Mr Ullger got the impression from the final briefing that actually the inspection was positive but the draft report came in February 2020 and Mr McGrail and Mr Ullger say that that was not consistent with the briefing that |
| 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 | at the forefront of the Chief Minister and the Attorney General's and Mr McGrail's minds at the time of Mr McGrail's retirement. Mr Pyle sits apart giving entirely different reasons for his position but the Chief Minister in particular obviously felt very strongly about it in one way and Mr McGrail obviously felt very strongly about it in another way, feeling that he was being muscled out of an investigation. So that is a matter which will - certainly the meetings of 12 May and the subsequent meetings in May will have to be considered in questioning. So that concludes issue five, the conspiracy investigation. (15.41) | 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 | progress had been made, not enough had been done to meet those recommendations. They felt it would expose the RGP to renewed criticism and Dr Britto also expressed concern about submitting the workforce to two inspections at the same time because another private inspection was being carried out by AAP Associates. The inspection was conducted on 14 to 18 October 2019. Both Mr McGrail and Mr Ullger got the impression from the final briefing that actually the inspection was positive but the draft report came in February 2020 and Mr McGrail and Mr Ullger say that that was not consistent with the briefing that they received. It was shared with Dr Britto |
| 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 | at the forefront of the Chief Minister and the Attorney General's and Mr McGrail's minds at the time of Mr McGrail's retirement. Mr Pyle sits apart giving entirely different reasons for his position but the Chief Minister in particular obviously felt very strongly about it in one way and Mr McGrail obviously felt very strongly about it in another way, feeling that he was being muscled out of an investigation. So that is a matter which will - certainly the meetings of 12 May and the subsequent meetings in May will have to be considered in questioning. So that concludes issue five, the conspiracy investigation. (15.41) Issue 4, which we dealt with which I have | 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 | progress had been made, not enough had been done to meet those recommendations. They felt it would expose the RGP to renewed criticism and Dr Britto also expressed concern about submitting the workforce to two inspections at the same time because another private inspection was being carried out by AAP Associates. The inspection was conducted on 14 to 18 October 2019. Both Mr McGrail and Mr Ullger got the impression from the final briefing that actually the inspection was positive but the draft report came in February 2020 and Mr McGrail and Mr Ullger say that that was not consistent with the briefing that they received. It was shared with Dr Britto who commented to the HMIC team that he |
| 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 | at the forefront of the Chief Minister and the Attorney General's and Mr McGrail's minds at the time of Mr McGrail's retirement. Mr Pyle sits apart giving entirely different reasons for his position but the Chief Minister in particular obviously felt very strongly about it in one way and Mr McGrail obviously felt very strongly about it in another way, feeling that he was being muscled out of an investigation. So that is a matter which will - certainly the meetings of 12 May and the subsequent meetings in May will have to be considered in questioning. So that concludes issue five, the conspiracy investigation. (15.41) Issue 4, which we dealt with which I have pushed back, is the HMIC report. This issue | 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 | progress had been made, not enough had been done to meet those recommendations. They felt it would expose the RGP to renewed criticism and Dr Britto also expressed concern about submitting the workforce to two inspections at the same time because another private inspection was being carried out by AAP Associates. The inspection was conducted on 14 to 18 October 2019. Both Mr McGrail and Mr Ullger got the impression from the final briefing that actually the inspection was positive but the draft report came in February 2020 and Mr McGrail and Mr Ullger say that that was not consistent with the briefing that they received. It was shared with Dr Britto who commented to the HMIC team that he found the language used to be "quite" |
| 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 | at the forefront of the Chief Minister and the Attorney General's and Mr McGrail's minds at the time of Mr McGrail's retirement. Mr Pyle sits apart giving entirely different reasons for his position but the Chief Minister in particular obviously felt very strongly about it in one way and Mr McGrail obviously felt very strongly about it in another way, feeling that he was being muscled out of an investigation. So that is a matter which will - certainly the meetings of 12 May and the subsequent meetings in May will have to be considered in questioning. So that concludes issue five, the conspiracy investigation. (15.41) Issue 4, which we dealt with which I have pushed back, is the HMIC report. This issue concerns two inspections and reports | 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 | progress had been made, not enough had been done to meet those recommendations. They felt it would expose the RGP to renewed criticism and Dr Britto also expressed concern about submitting the workforce to two inspections at the same time because another private inspection was being carried out by AAP Associates. The inspection was conducted on 14 to 18 October 2019. Both Mr McGrail and Mr Ullger got the impression from the final briefing that actually the inspection was positive but the draft report came in February 2020 and Mr McGrail and Mr Ullger say that that was not consistent with the briefing that they received. It was shared with Dr Britto who commented to the HMIC team that he found the language used to be "quite unfortunate" and believed the same message |
| 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 | at the forefront of the Chief Minister and the Attorney General's and Mr McGrail's minds at the time of Mr McGrail's retirement. Mr Pyle sits apart giving entirely different reasons for his position but the Chief Minister in particular obviously felt very strongly about it in one way and Mr McGrail obviously felt very strongly about it in another way, feeling that he was being muscled out of an investigation. So that is a matter which will - certainly the meetings of 12 May and the subsequent meetings in May will have to be considered in questioning. So that concludes issue five, the conspiracy investigation. (15.41) Issue 4, which we dealt with which I have pushed back, is the HMIC report. This issue concerns two inspections and reports conducted by Her Majesty's Inspectorate of | 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 | progress had been made, not enough had been done to meet those recommendations. They felt it would expose the RGP to renewed criticism and Dr Britto also expressed concern about submitting the workforce to two inspections at the same time because another private inspection was being carried out by AAP Associates. The inspection was conducted on 14 to 18 October 2019. Both Mr McGrail and Mr Ullger got the impression from the final briefing that actually the inspection was positive but the draft report came in February 2020 and Mr McGrail and Mr Ullger say that that was not consistent with the briefing that they received. It was shared with Dr Britto who commented to the HMIC team that he found the language used to be "quite unfortunate" and believed the same message could have been made in a more constructive |
| 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 | at the forefront of the Chief Minister and the Attorney General's and Mr McGrail's minds at the time of Mr McGrail's retirement. Mr Pyle sits apart giving entirely different reasons for his position but the Chief Minister in particular obviously felt very strongly about it in one way and Mr McGrail obviously felt very strongly about it in another way, feeling that he was being muscled out of an investigation. So that is a matter which will - certainly the meetings of 12 May and the subsequent meetings in May will have to be considered in questioning. So that concludes issue five, the conspiracy investigation. (15.41) Issue 4, which we dealt with which I have pushed back, is the HMIC report. This issue concerns two inspections and reports conducted by Her Majesty's Inspectorate of Constabulary and Fire Rescue Services on | 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 | progress had been made, not enough had been done to meet those recommendations. They felt it would expose the RGP to renewed criticism and Dr Britto also expressed concern about submitting the workforce to two inspections at the same time because another private inspection was being carried out by AAP Associates. The inspection was conducted on 14 to 18 October 2019. Both Mr McGrail and Mr Ullger got the impression from the final briefing that actually the inspection was positive but the draft report came in February 2020 and Mr McGrail and Mr Ullger say that that was not consistent with the briefing that they received. It was shared with Dr Britto who commented to the HMIC team that he found the language used to be "quite unfortunate" and believed the same message could have been made in a more constructive tone but committed to addressing the points |
| 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 | at the forefront of the Chief Minister and the Attorney General's and Mr McGrail's minds at the time of Mr McGrail's retirement. Mr Pyle sits apart giving entirely different reasons for his position but the Chief Minister in particular obviously felt very strongly about it in one way and Mr McGrail obviously felt very strongly about it in another way, feeling that he was being muscled out of an investigation. So that is a matter which will - certainly the meetings of 12 May and the subsequent meetings in May will have to be considered in questioning. So that concludes issue five, the conspiracy investigation. (15.41) Issue 4, which we dealt with which I have pushed back, is the HMIC report. This issue concerns two inspections and reports conducted by Her Majesty's Inspectorate of Constabulary and Fire Rescue Services on the RGP, one in October 2015 with a report | 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 | progress had been made, not enough had been done to meet those recommendations. They felt it would expose the RGP to renewed criticism and Dr Britto also expressed concern about submitting the workforce to two inspections at the same time because another private inspection was being carried out by AAP Associates. The inspection was conducted on 14 to 18 October 2019. Both Mr McGrail and Mr Ullger got the impression from the final briefing that actually the inspection was positive but the draft report came in February 2020 and Mr McGrail and Mr Ullger say that that was not consistent with the briefing that they received. It was shared with Dr Britto who commented to the HMIC team that he found the language used to be "quite unfortunate" and believed the same message could have been made in a more constructive tone but committed to addressing the points raised in the report. |
| 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24 | at the forefront of the Chief Minister and the Attorney General's and Mr McGrail's minds at the time of Mr McGrail's retirement. Mr Pyle sits apart giving entirely different reasons for his position but the Chief Minister in particular obviously felt very strongly about it in one way and Mr McGrail obviously felt very strongly about it in another way, feeling that he was being muscled out of an investigation. So that is a matter which will - certainly the meetings of 12 May and the subsequent meetings in May will have to be considered in questioning. So that concludes issue five, the conspiracy investigation. (15.41) Issue 4, which we dealt with which I have pushed back, is the HMIC report. This issue concerns two inspections and reports conducted by Her Majesty's Inspectorate of Constabulary and Fire Rescue Services on the RGP, one in October 2015 with a report in July 2016 and the other in October 2019 | 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24 | progress had been made, not enough had been done to meet those recommendations. They felt it would expose the RGP to renewed criticism and Dr Britto also expressed concern about submitting the workforce to two inspections at the same time because another private inspection was being carried out by AAP Associates. The inspection was conducted on 14 to 18 October 2019. Both Mr McGrail and Mr Ullger got the impression from the final briefing that actually the inspection was positive but the draft report came in February 2020 and Mr McGrail and Mr Ullger say that that was not consistent with the briefing that they received. It was shared with Dr Britto who commented to the HMIC team that he found the language used to be "quite unfortunate" and believed the same message could have been made in a more constructive tone but committed to addressing the points raised in the report. The final report was sent to the GPA and Mr |
| 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 | at the forefront of the Chief Minister and the Attorney General's and Mr McGrail's minds at the time of Mr McGrail's retirement. Mr Pyle sits apart giving entirely different reasons for his position but the Chief Minister in particular obviously felt very strongly about it in one way and Mr McGrail obviously felt very strongly about it in another way, feeling that he was being muscled out of an investigation. So that is a matter which will - certainly the meetings of 12 May and the subsequent meetings in May will have to be considered in questioning. So that concludes issue five, the conspiracy investigation. (15.41) Issue 4, which we dealt with which I have pushed back, is the HMIC report. This issue concerns two inspections and reports conducted by Her Majesty's Inspectorate of Constabulary and Fire Rescue Services on the RGP, one in October 2015 with a report | 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 | progress had been made, not enough had been done to meet those recommendations. They felt it would expose the RGP to renewed criticism and Dr Britto also expressed concern about submitting the workforce to two inspections at the same time because another private inspection was being carried out by AAP Associates. The inspection was conducted on 14 to 18 October 2019. Both Mr McGrail and Mr Ullger got the impression from the final briefing that actually the inspection was positive but the draft report came in February 2020 and Mr McGrail and Mr Ullger say that that was not consistent with the briefing that they received. It was shared with Dr Britto who commented to the HMIC team that he found the language used to be "quite unfortunate" and believed the same message could have been made in a more constructive tone but committed to addressing the points raised in the report. |
| 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24 | at the forefront of the Chief Minister and the Attorney General's and Mr McGrail's minds at the time of Mr McGrail's retirement. Mr Pyle sits apart giving entirely different reasons for his position but the Chief Minister in particular obviously felt very strongly about it in one way and Mr McGrail obviously felt very strongly about it in another way, feeling that he was being muscled out of an investigation. So that is a matter which will - certainly the meetings of 12 May and the subsequent meetings in May will have to be considered in questioning. So that concludes issue five, the conspiracy investigation. (15.41) Issue 4, which we dealt with which I have pushed back, is the HMIC report. This issue concerns two inspections and reports conducted by Her Majesty's Inspectorate of Constabulary and Fire Rescue Services on the RGP, one in October 2015 with a report in July 2016 and the other in October 2019 | 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24 | progress had been made, not enough had been done to meet those recommendations. They felt it would expose the RGP to renewed criticism and Dr Britto also expressed concern about submitting the workforce to two inspections at the same time because another private inspection was being carried out by AAP Associates. The inspection was conducted on 14 to 18 October 2019. Both Mr McGrail and Mr Ullger got the impression from the final briefing that actually the inspection was positive but the draft report came in February 2020 and Mr McGrail and Mr Ullger say that that was not consistent with the briefing that they received. It was shared with Dr Britto who commented to the HMIC team that he found the language used to be "quite unfortunate" and believed the same message could have been made in a more constructive tone but committed to addressing the points raised in the report. The final report was sent to the GPA and Mr |

| 1 | reading of the report, either two or one of the | 1 | that he did not think it should be published in |
|----|--|-----|---|
| 2 | areas of the report had been areas for | 2 | full and he communicated this to Dr Britto on |
| 3 | improvement had been met but the remaining | 3 | 29 April. The Chief Minister states that he |
| 4 | ones all remained areas for improvement and | 4 | was alerted to the quite damning nature of |
| 5 | nine additional areas of improvement were | 5 | the report by Mr Pyle on 30 April 2020. |
| 6 | identified, together with ten new | 6 | If we can go to C3344 Mr Pyle sends an |
| | recommendations. We have provided a | 7 | · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · |
| 7 | | 1 | email to the Chief Minister on 30 April |
| 8 | detailed account of those findings in our fact | 8 | saying the following from the second |
| 9 | schedule. I do not think I am going to have | 9 | paragraph, "Having studied the report I find |
| 10 | time to go to the reports, given how little | 10 | it to be quite damning and it will need careful |
| 11 | time we have today, but Mr McGrail | 11 | handling. In essence, HMIC found the RGP |
| 12 | recognised that the report is critical in places | 12 | to have only met two out of the eight areas |
| 13 | and made a number of points in response. | 13 | for improvement identified in 2016. My own |
| 14 | He says that there is no express criticism of | 14 | sense is that HMIC were very disappointed |
| 15 | him and the overview states that the force | 15 | indeed to find so little progress had been |
| 16 | offers a good level of service with a | 16 | made since their last inspection. This is a |
| 17 | professional, committed and enthusiastic | 17 | shame and their willingness to help the RGP |
| 18 | work force. The report identifies failings on | 18 | in the future may have diminished as a result. |
| 19 | the part of the government such as providing | 19 | This is something we must help correct but I |
| 20 | limited resources, a lack or legislation on | 20 | don't think the issue is as bad as the headline |
| 21 | domestic abuse and a failure by the Chief | 21 | suggests and believe it is an issue of culture |
| 22 | Minister as Minister of Finance to set out a | 22 | and leadership more than anything else. |
| 23 | funding plan. He says that the | 23 | Most of the issues should be relatively easy |
| 24 | recommendation on corruption was new and | 24 | to fix though it will take a collective effort |
| 25 | not outstanding and refers to examples of the | 25 | driven bottom up from within the RGP as |
| | | | 1 |
| | Page 225 | | Page 227 |
| 1 | 4. 4. DCN | 1 | |
| 1 | government intervening with the RGP's | 1 2 | much as from its leadership which needs to |
| 2 | attempts to set up an example with officers | 2 | be both more strategic and directive. Quite |
| 3 | who behaved corruptly and improperly. So | 3 | simply, as I see it, the RGP needs to |
| 4 | he rejects the assessment that the force was | 4 | modernise in all senses of the word." He was |
| 5 | not alive to corruption. He says he | 5 | very concerned about the publication of the |
| 6 | completed 16 out of 37 items on his action | 6 | report and, therefore, had proposed ideas as |
| 7 | plan and work had commenced on another | 7 | to how to deal with when it is published. He |
| 8 | ten. The plan noted that exigencies may | 8 | says, "This means being upfront and honest |
| 9 | warrant a review of the actions and the GPA | 9 | about the issues and challenges as well as |
| 10 | never reviewed his performance against the | 10 | displaying a commitment to put things right. |
| 11 | plan. Upon receipt of the report, he | 11 | If we do not, I think the credibility of the |
| 12 | immediately prepared a road map and | 12 | RGP is at risk." He also suggests that the |
| 13 | submitted it to the GPA and the Minister of | 13 | Commissioner make this report public at the |
| 14 | Justice to address all the recommendations. | 14 | same time as publishing his road map on the |
| 15 | The GPA and the Minister of Justice were | 15 | way forward. |
| 16 | content with his approach and he says that | 16 | The report was published on 7 May and Mr |
| 17 | initially Mr Pyle did not express any lack of | 17 | McGrail refers to messages of support he |
| 18 | confidence in him and his ability to see the | 18 | received on its publication from Dr Britto, |
| 19 | recommendations through. | 19 | the previous Minister of Justice, Neil Costa, |
| 20 | On 29 April 2020 the Minister for Justice, | 20 | Lieutenant General Davis and current |
| 21 | Samantha Sacramento, messaged Mr | 21 | Minister of Justice Samantha Sacramento. |
| 22 | McGrail stating, "The report is shocking | 22 | HMIC returned to Gibraltar in April 2022 for |
| 23 | reading on the face of it but if you analyse | 23 | a further inspection and according to |
| 24 | deeper it's not that bad and it has easy | 24 | Commissioner Ullger he gave the RGP a |
| 25 | solutions." Mr Pyle's initial response was | 25 | favourable outcome. Of the ten |
| | | =- | / |
| | | | |
| | Page 226 | | Page 228 |

| 1 | recommendations, six had been fully | 1 | senior officers were sometimes too ready to |
|--|--|--|--|
| 2 | achieved and four partially achieved. Of the | 2 | apportion blame when something goes |
| 3 | 15 areas for improvement, 14 had been met | 3 | wrong. This represented a deterioration |
| 4 | and one partially met. The Chief Minister, | 4 | rather than the expected progress and went |
| 5 | Mr Pyle and the GPA have all identified the | 5 | some way to validating the Gibraltar Police |
| 6 | HMIC report as a reason for losing | 6 | Federation's grievances stated above. I |
| 7 | confidence in Mr McGrail. It was mentioned | 7 | believe that these differences between the |
| 8 | consistently throughout the process. Mr Pyle | 8 | 2016 and 2020 reports reflected Mr |
| 9 | refers to the report in his evidence at 24.1 | 9 | McGrail's management style. Mr McGrail in |
| 10 | which is at A249. He says, "My concerns | 10 | response states that Mr Pyle is expressing a |
| 11 | grew with the 2020 HMIC report review | 11 | skewed negative opinion of him based on |
| 12 | of the RGP which had been called for by Mr | 12 | what others may have told him and has a |
| 13 | McGrail to demonstrate progress made the | 13 | deep rooted negative mindset towards him |
| 14 | 2016 report which had made a number of | 14 | without having ever brought those concerns |
| 15 | important recommendations that required to | 15 | to Mr McGrail's attention. The Chief |
| 16 | be implemented." Then the final paragraph, | 16 | Minister stated he found the report to be very |
| 17 | "It was, in my opinion, so damning that I sent | 17 | damning but it did not make him lose |
| 18 | an email on 29 April to the chair of the GPA | 18 | confidence in the integrity or probity of Mr |
| 19 | saying that it should not be published in full. | 19 | McGrail. It did, however, reflect on Mr |
| 20 | I sent a further email to the Chief Minister on | 20 | McGrail's ability to maintain the efficiency |
| 21 | 30 April saying the report was quite damning | 21 | and effectiveness of the RGP and he was not |
| 22 | and will need careful handling. I said I | 22 | confident that Mr McGrail could be the |
| 23 | thought it is an issue of culture and | 23 | person to address the recommendations. |
| 24 | leadership. I thought the RGP leadership | 24 | Given that he had demonstrably failed to act |
| 25 | needed to be more strategic and directive and | 25 | since 2018 and matters had deteriorated on |
| 23 | needed to be more strategic and directive and | 23 | since 2018 and matters had deteriorated on |
| | Page 229 | | Page 231 |
| | | | |
| 1 | | | |
| 1 | the RGP needed to modernise. One | 1 | his watch, he considered that it was |
| 2 | noteworthy feature of the 2020 report was the | 2 | important and a key issue for Mr Pyle but not |
| 2 3 | noteworthy feature of the 2020 report was the sharp contrast to the 2016 report insofar as | 2 3 | important and a key issue for Mr Pyle but not the key issue for him." |
| 2 3 4 | noteworthy feature of the 2020 report was the sharp contrast to the 2016 report insofar as concerns the leadership, management style | 2 3 4 | important and a key issue for Mr Pyle but not the key issue for him." There is no question that HMIC is a |
| 2 3 4 5 | noteworthy feature of the 2020 report was the sharp contrast to the 2016 report insofar as concerns the leadership, management style and culture issues within the RGP." | 2 3 4 5 | important and a key issue for Mr Pyle but not the key issue for him." There is no question that HMIC is a circumstance leading to Mr McGrail's early |
| 2 3 4 5 6 | noteworthy feature of the 2020 report was the sharp contrast to the 2016 report insofar as concerns the leadership, management style and culture issues within the RGP." He highlights in 24.5 that the 2020 report | 2 3 4 5 6 | important and a key issue for Mr Pyle but not the key issue for him." There is no question that HMIC is a circumstance leading to Mr McGrail's early retirement and a stated reason on the part of |
| 2 3 4 5 6 7 | noteworthy feature of the 2020 report was the sharp contrast to the 2016 report insofar as concerns the leadership, management style and culture issues within the RGP." He highlights in 24.5 that the 2020 report spoke of "told by less senior staff that the | 2 3 4 5 6 7 | important and a key issue for Mr Pyle but not the key issue for him." There is no question that HMIC is a circumstance leading to Mr McGrail's early retirement and a stated reason on the part of the Chief Minister or Mr Pyle, although it |
| 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 | noteworthy feature of the 2020 report was the sharp contrast to the 2016 report insofar as concerns the leadership, management style and culture issues within the RGP." He highlights in 24.5 that the 2020 report spoke of "told by less senior staff that the phrase 'firm leadership' is occasionally used | 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 | important and a key issue for Mr Pyle but not the key issue for him." There is no question that HMIC is a circumstance leading to Mr McGrail's early retirement and a stated reason on the part of the Chief Minister or Mr Pyle, although it certainly remains to be explored through |
| 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 | noteworthy feature of the 2020 report was the sharp contrast to the 2016 report insofar as concerns the leadership, management style and culture issues within the RGP." He highlights in 24.5 that the 2020 report spoke of "told by less senior staff that the phrase 'firm leadership' is occasionally used to describe management behaviours that in a | 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 | important and a key issue for Mr Pyle but not the key issue for him." There is no question that HMIC is a circumstance leading to Mr McGrail's early retirement and a stated reason on the part of the Chief Minister or Mr Pyle, although it certainly remains to be explored through questioning whether in fact it was a real |
| 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 | noteworthy feature of the 2020 report was the sharp contrast to the 2016 report insofar as concerns the leadership, management style and culture issues within the RGP." He highlights in 24.5 that the 2020 report spoke of "told by less senior staff that the phrase 'firm leadership' is occasionally used to describe management behaviours that in a small number of cases may have amounted to | 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 | important and a key issue for Mr Pyle but not the key issue for him." There is no question that HMIC is a circumstance leading to Mr McGrail's early retirement and a stated reason on the part of the Chief Minister or Mr Pyle, although it certainly remains to be explored through questioning whether in fact it was a real reason. |
| 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 | noteworthy feature of the 2020 report was the sharp contrast to the 2016 report insofar as concerns the leadership, management style and culture issues within the RGP." He highlights in 24.5 that the 2020 report spoke of "told by less senior staff that the phrase 'firm leadership' is occasionally used to describe management behaviours that in a small number of cases may have amounted to bullying. A perception exists among an | 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 | important and a key issue for Mr Pyle but not the key issue for him." There is no question that HMIC is a circumstance leading to Mr McGrail's early retirement and a stated reason on the part of the Chief Minister or Mr Pyle, although it certainly remains to be explored through questioning whether in fact it was a real reason. Issue 6 is the Federation complaints and this |
| 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 | noteworthy feature of the 2020 report was the sharp contrast to the 2016 report insofar as concerns the leadership, management style and culture issues within the RGP." He highlights in 24.5 that the 2020 report spoke of "told by less senior staff that the phrase 'firm leadership' is occasionally used to describe management behaviours that in a small number of cases may have amounted to bullying. A perception exists among an apparently large number of officers that some | 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 | important and a key issue for Mr Pyle but not the key issue for him." There is no question that HMIC is a circumstance leading to Mr McGrail's early retirement and a stated reason on the part of the Chief Minister or Mr Pyle, although it certainly remains to be explored through questioning whether in fact it was a real reason. Issue 6 is the Federation complaints and this deals with the complaints which were said to |
| 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 | noteworthy feature of the 2020 report was the sharp contrast to the 2016 report insofar as concerns the leadership, management style and culture issues within the RGP." He highlights in 24.5 that the 2020 report spoke of "told by less senior staff that the phrase 'firm leadership' is occasionally used to describe management behaviours that in a small number of cases may have amounted to bullying. A perception exists among an apparently large number of officers that some senior officers sometimes behave in an | 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 | important and a key issue for Mr Pyle but not the key issue for him." There is no question that HMIC is a circumstance leading to Mr McGrail's early retirement and a stated reason on the part of the Chief Minister or Mr Pyle, although it certainly remains to be explored through questioning whether in fact it was a real reason. Issue 6 is the Federation complaints and this deals with the complaints which were said to have been made by the Gibraltar Police |
| 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 | noteworthy feature of the 2020 report was the sharp contrast to the 2016 report insofar as concerns the leadership, management style and culture issues within the RGP." He highlights in 24.5 that the 2020 report spoke of "told by less senior staff that the phrase 'firm leadership' is occasionally used to describe management behaviours that in a small number of cases may have amounted to bullying. A perception exists among an apparently large number of officers that some senior officers sometimes behave in an unacceptable manner when dealing with their | 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 | important and a key issue for Mr Pyle but not the key issue for him." There is no question that HMIC is a circumstance leading to Mr McGrail's early retirement and a stated reason on the part of the Chief Minister or Mr Pyle, although it certainly remains to be explored through questioning whether in fact it was a real reason. Issue 6 is the Federation complaints and this deals with the complaints which were said to have been made by the Gibraltar Police Federation to the Gibraltar Police Authority |
| 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 | noteworthy feature of the 2020 report was the sharp contrast to the 2016 report insofar as concerns the leadership, management style and culture issues within the RGP." He highlights in 24.5 that the 2020 report spoke of "told by less senior staff that the phrase 'firm leadership' is occasionally used to describe management behaviours that in a small number of cases may have amounted to bullying. A perception exists among an apparently large number of officers that some senior officers sometimes behave in an unacceptable manner when dealing with their staff. Shortly before our inspection, an | 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 | important and a key issue for Mr Pyle but not the key issue for him." There is no question that HMIC is a circumstance leading to Mr McGrail's early retirement and a stated reason on the part of the Chief Minister or Mr Pyle, although it certainly remains to be explored through questioning whether in fact it was a real reason. Issue 6 is the Federation complaints and this deals with the complaints which were said to have been made by the Gibraltar Police Federation to the Gibraltar Police Authority about Mr McGrail including as to the |
| 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 | noteworthy feature of the 2020 report was the sharp contrast to the 2016 report insofar as concerns the leadership, management style and culture issues within the RGP." He highlights in 24.5 that the 2020 report spoke of "told by less senior staff that the phrase 'firm leadership' is occasionally used to describe management behaviours that in a small number of cases may have amounted to bullying. A perception exists among an apparently large number of officers that some senior officers sometimes behave in an unacceptable manner when dealing with their staff. Shortly before our inspection, an external review concluded that there wasn't | 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 | important and a key issue for Mr Pyle but not the key issue for him." There is no question that HMIC is a circumstance leading to Mr McGrail's early retirement and a stated reason on the part of the Chief Minister or Mr Pyle, although it certainly remains to be explored through questioning whether in fact it was a real reason. Issue 6 is the Federation complaints and this deals with the complaints which were said to have been made by the Gibraltar Police Federation to the Gibraltar Police Authority about Mr McGrail including as to the difficult relationship between Mr McGrail |
| 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 | noteworthy feature of the 2020 report was the sharp contrast to the 2016 report insofar as concerns the leadership, management style and culture issues within the RGP." He highlights in 24.5 that the 2020 report spoke of "told by less senior staff that the phrase 'firm leadership' is occasionally used to describe management behaviours that in a small number of cases may have amounted to bullying. A perception exists among an apparently large number of officers that some senior officers sometimes behave in an unacceptable manner when dealing with their staff. Shortly before our inspection, an external review concluded that there wasn't systematic bullying in their force but it did | 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 | important and a key issue for Mr Pyle but not the key issue for him." There is no question that HMIC is a circumstance leading to Mr McGrail's early retirement and a stated reason on the part of the Chief Minister or Mr Pyle, although it certainly remains to be explored through questioning whether in fact it was a real reason. Issue 6 is the Federation complaints and this deals with the complaints which were said to have been made by the Gibraltar Police Federation to the Gibraltar Police Authority about Mr McGrail including as to the difficult relationship between Mr McGrail and the Federation and any allegations of |
| 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 | noteworthy feature of the 2020 report was the sharp contrast to the 2016 report insofar as concerns the leadership, management style and culture issues within the RGP." He highlights in 24.5 that the 2020 report spoke of "told by less senior staff that the phrase 'firm leadership' is occasionally used to describe management behaviours that in a small number of cases may have amounted to bullying. A perception exists among an apparently large number of officers that some senior officers sometimes behave in an unacceptable manner when dealing with their staff. Shortly before our inspection, an external review concluded that there wasn't systematic bullying in their force but it did find some evidence of bullying and | 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 | important and a key issue for Mr Pyle but not the key issue for him." There is no question that HMIC is a circumstance leading to Mr McGrail's early retirement and a stated reason on the part of the Chief Minister or Mr Pyle, although it certainly remains to be explored through questioning whether in fact it was a real reason. Issue 6 is the Federation complaints and this deals with the complaints which were said to have been made by the Gibraltar Police Federation to the Gibraltar Police Authority about Mr McGrail including as to the difficult relationship between Mr McGrail and the Federation and any allegations of bullying and/or intimidation by Mr McGrail |
| 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 | noteworthy feature of the 2020 report was the sharp contrast to the 2016 report insofar as concerns the leadership, management style and culture issues within the RGP." He highlights in 24.5 that the 2020 report spoke of "told by less senior staff that the phrase 'firm leadership' is occasionally used to describe management behaviours that in a small number of cases may have amounted to bullying. A perception exists among an apparently large number of officers that some senior officers sometimes behave in an unacceptable manner when dealing with their staff. Shortly before our inspection, an external review concluded that there wasn't systematic bullying in their force but it did find some evidence of bullying and harassment by a minority of managers, | 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 | important and a key issue for Mr Pyle but not the key issue for him." There is no question that HMIC is a circumstance leading to Mr McGrail's early retirement and a stated reason on the part of the Chief Minister or Mr Pyle, although it certainly remains to be explored through questioning whether in fact it was a real reason. Issue 6 is the Federation complaints and this deals with the complaints which were said to have been made by the Gibraltar Police Federation to the Gibraltar Police Authority about Mr McGrail including as to the difficult relationship between Mr McGrail and the Federation and any allegations of bullying and/or intimidation by Mr McGrail discussed by the GPA. The GPF is a |
| 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 | noteworthy feature of the 2020 report was the sharp contrast to the 2016 report insofar as concerns the leadership, management style and culture issues within the RGP." He highlights in 24.5 that the 2020 report spoke of "told by less senior staff that the phrase 'firm leadership' is occasionally used to describe management behaviours that in a small number of cases may have amounted to bullying. A perception exists among an apparently large number of officers that some senior officers sometimes behave in an unacceptable manner when dealing with their staff. Shortly before our inspection, an external review concluded that there wasn't systematic bullying in their force but it did find some evidence of bullying and harassment by a minority of managers, supervisors and peers that was not being | 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 | important and a key issue for Mr Pyle but not the key issue for him." There is no question that HMIC is a circumstance leading to Mr McGrail's early retirement and a stated reason on the part of the Chief Minister or Mr Pyle, although it certainly remains to be explored through questioning whether in fact it was a real reason. Issue 6 is the Federation complaints and this deals with the complaints which were said to have been made by the Gibraltar Police Federation to the Gibraltar Police Authority about Mr McGrail including as to the difficult relationship between Mr McGrail and the Federation and any allegations of bullying and/or intimidation by Mr McGrail discussed by the GPA. The GPF is a representative body for members of the RGP |
| 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 | noteworthy feature of the 2020 report was the sharp contrast to the 2016 report insofar as concerns the leadership, management style and culture issues within the RGP." He highlights in 24.5 that the 2020 report spoke of "told by less senior staff that the phrase 'firm leadership' is occasionally used to describe management behaviours that in a small number of cases may have amounted to bullying. A perception exists among an apparently large number of officers that some senior officers sometimes behave in an unacceptable manner when dealing with their staff. Shortly before our inspection, an external review concluded that there wasn't systematic bullying in their force but it did find some evidence of bullying and harassment by a minority of managers, supervisors and peers that was not being reported and consequently not addressed. It | 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 | important and a key issue for Mr Pyle but not the key issue for him." There is no question that HMIC is a circumstance leading to Mr McGrail's early retirement and a stated reason on the part of the Chief Minister or Mr Pyle, although it certainly remains to be explored through questioning whether in fact it was a real reason. Issue 6 is the Federation complaints and this deals with the complaints which were said to have been made by the Gibraltar Police Federation to the Gibraltar Police Authority about Mr McGrail including as to the difficult relationship between Mr McGrail and the Federation and any allegations of bullying and/or intimidation by Mr McGrail discussed by the GPA. The GPF is a representative body for members of the RGP below the level of superintendent established |
| 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 | noteworthy feature of the 2020 report was the sharp contrast to the 2016 report insofar as concerns the leadership, management style and culture issues within the RGP." He highlights in 24.5 that the 2020 report spoke of "told by less senior staff that the phrase 'firm leadership' is occasionally used to describe management behaviours that in a small number of cases may have amounted to bullying. A perception exists among an apparently large number of officers that some senior officers sometimes behave in an unacceptable manner when dealing with their staff. Shortly before our inspection, an external review concluded that there wasn't systematic bullying in their force but it did find some evidence of bullying and harassment by a minority of managers, supervisors and peers that was not being reported and consequently not addressed. It made recommendations for the commissioner | 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 | important and a key issue for Mr Pyle but not the key issue for him." There is no question that HMIC is a circumstance leading to Mr McGrail's early retirement and a stated reason on the part of the Chief Minister or Mr Pyle, although it certainly remains to be explored through questioning whether in fact it was a real reason. Issue 6 is the Federation complaints and this deals with the complaints which were said to have been made by the Gibraltar Police Federation to the Gibraltar Police Authority about Mr McGrail including as to the difficult relationship between Mr McGrail and the Federation and any allegations of bullying and/or intimidation by Mr McGrail discussed by the GPA. The GPF is a representative body for members of the RGP below the level of superintendent established under the Police Act. It is important at the |
| 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 | noteworthy feature of the 2020 report was the sharp contrast to the 2016 report insofar as concerns the leadership, management style and culture issues within the RGP." He highlights in 24.5 that the 2020 report spoke of "told by less senior staff that the phrase 'firm leadership' is occasionally used to describe management behaviours that in a small number of cases may have amounted to bullying. A perception exists among an apparently large number of officers that some senior officers sometimes behave in an unacceptable manner when dealing with their staff. Shortly before our inspection, an external review concluded that there wasn't systematic bullying in their force but it did find some evidence of bullying and harassment by a minority of managers, supervisors and peers that was not being reported and consequently not addressed. It made recommendations for the commissioner to acknowledge that the force takes the | 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 | important and a key issue for Mr Pyle but not the key issue for him." There is no question that HMIC is a circumstance leading to Mr McGrail's early retirement and a stated reason on the part of the Chief Minister or Mr Pyle, although it certainly remains to be explored through questioning whether in fact it was a real reason. Issue 6 is the Federation complaints and this deals with the complaints which were said to have been made by the Gibraltar Police Federation to the Gibraltar Police Authority about Mr McGrail including as to the difficult relationship between Mr McGrail and the Federation and any allegations of bullying and/or intimidation by Mr McGrail discussed by the GPA. The GPF is a representative body for members of the RGP below the level of superintendent established under the Police Act. It is important at the outset on this issue that we do not take it too |
| 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24 | noteworthy feature of the 2020 report was the sharp contrast to the 2016 report insofar as concerns the leadership, management style and culture issues within the RGP." He highlights in 24.5 that the 2020 report spoke of "told by less senior staff that the phrase 'firm leadership' is occasionally used to describe management behaviours that in a small number of cases may have amounted to bullying. A perception exists among an apparently large number of officers that some senior officers sometimes behave in an unacceptable manner when dealing with their staff. Shortly before our inspection, an external review concluded that there wasn't systematic bullying in their force but it did find some evidence of bullying and harassment by a minority of managers, supervisors and peers that was not being reported and consequently not addressed. It made recommendations for the commissioner to acknowledge that the force takes the Federation's concerns about bullying | 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24 | important and a key issue for Mr Pyle but not the key issue for him." There is no question that HMIC is a circumstance leading to Mr McGrail's early retirement and a stated reason on the part of the Chief Minister or Mr Pyle, although it certainly remains to be explored through questioning whether in fact it was a real reason. Issue 6 is the Federation complaints and this deals with the complaints which were said to have been made by the Gibraltar Police Federation to the Gibraltar Police Authority about Mr McGrail including as to the difficult relationship between Mr McGrail and the Federation and any allegations of bullying and/or intimidation by Mr McGrail discussed by the GPA. The GPF is a representative body for members of the RGP below the level of superintendent established under the Police Act. It is important at the outset on this issue that we do not take it too widely because you, Mr Chairman, have |
| 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 | noteworthy feature of the 2020 report was the sharp contrast to the 2016 report insofar as concerns the leadership, management style and culture issues within the RGP." He highlights in 24.5 that the 2020 report spoke of "told by less senior staff that the phrase 'firm leadership' is occasionally used to describe management behaviours that in a small number of cases may have amounted to bullying. A perception exists among an apparently large number of officers that some senior officers sometimes behave in an unacceptable manner when dealing with their staff. Shortly before our inspection, an external review concluded that there wasn't systematic bullying in their force but it did find some evidence of bullying and harassment by a minority of managers, supervisors and peers that was not being reported and consequently not addressed. It made recommendations for the commissioner to acknowledge that the force takes the | 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 | important and a key issue for Mr Pyle but not the key issue for him." There is no question that HMIC is a circumstance leading to Mr McGrail's early retirement and a stated reason on the part of the Chief Minister or Mr Pyle, although it certainly remains to be explored through questioning whether in fact it was a real reason. Issue 6 is the Federation complaints and this deals with the complaints which were said to have been made by the Gibraltar Police Federation to the Gibraltar Police Authority about Mr McGrail including as to the difficult relationship between Mr McGrail and the Federation and any allegations of bullying and/or intimidation by Mr McGrail discussed by the GPA. The GPF is a representative body for members of the RGP below the level of superintendent established under the Police Act. It is important at the outset on this issue that we do not take it too |
| 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24 | noteworthy feature of the 2020 report was the sharp contrast to the 2016 report insofar as concerns the leadership, management style and culture issues within the RGP." He highlights in 24.5 that the 2020 report spoke of "told by less senior staff that the phrase 'firm leadership' is occasionally used to describe management behaviours that in a small number of cases may have amounted to bullying. A perception exists among an apparently large number of officers that some senior officers sometimes behave in an unacceptable manner when dealing with their staff. Shortly before our inspection, an external review concluded that there wasn't systematic bullying in their force but it did find some evidence of bullying and harassment by a minority of managers, supervisors and peers that was not being reported and consequently not addressed. It made recommendations for the commissioner to acknowledge that the force takes the Federation's concerns about bullying | 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24 | important and a key issue for Mr Pyle but not the key issue for him." There is no question that HMIC is a circumstance leading to Mr McGrail's early retirement and a stated reason on the part of the Chief Minister or Mr Pyle, although it certainly remains to be explored through questioning whether in fact it was a real reason. Issue 6 is the Federation complaints and this deals with the complaints which were said to have been made by the Gibraltar Police Federation to the Gibraltar Police Authority about Mr McGrail including as to the difficult relationship between Mr McGrail and the Federation and any allegations of bullying and/or intimidation by Mr McGrail discussed by the GPA. The GPF is a representative body for members of the RGP below the level of superintendent established under the Police Act. It is important at the outset on this issue that we do not take it too widely because you, Mr Chairman, have |

| 1 | narrowed to refer to the complaints made by | 1 | that they were rumours and anecdotal, as I |
|--|--|--|--|
| 2 | the GPF to the GPA about Mr McGrail or | 2 | say, they were not things on which he felt it |
| 3 | any allegations of bullying by Mr McGrail | 3 | was possible to act but, nevertheless, |
| 4 | discussed by the GPA, so it is not a carte | 4 | contributed to his growing unease. |
| 5 | blanche to explore the relationship between | 5 | The Chief Minister also refers to the |
| 6 | the GPF and Mr McGrail generally but the | 6 | relationship between Mr McGrail and the |
| 7 | relationship between Mr McGrail and the | 7 | GPF and in particular an occasion when he |
| 8 | GPF is mentioned by Mr Pyle and the Chief | 8 | wrote when Mr McGrail wrote to the |
| 9 | Minister and it is relevant background to this | 9 | governor to propose legislation limiting the |
| 10 | point which is raised by Mr Pyle, so I should | 10 | powers of the GPF. The Chief Minister |
| 11 | cover it so that the inquiry can then consider | 11 | recognises that this issue did not cause him to |
| 12 | whether these issues were the subject of | 12 | lose confidence in Mr McGrail but that this |
| 13 | complaint to the GPA. | 13 | was a demonstration of his very fractious and |
| 14 | According to Mr Pyle's evidence, the | 14 | difficult approach to relationships. The 14 |
| 15 | ongoing tension in the relationship between | 15 | May 2020 that the Chief Minister sent to Mr |
| 16 | Mr McGrail and the GPF, together with the | 16 | Pyle also refers to the Federation bullying |
| 17 | allegations of bullying and intimidation | 17 | allegations. Neither Mr McGrail nor |
| 18 | against him, was a concern, albeit of a lesser | 18 | members of the GPF who have given |
| 19 | order of gravity which fitted into the pattern | 19 | evidence to this Inquiry, Mr Morello, Mr |
| 20 | of behaviours which were causing him to | 20 | Simpson and Mr Bautista, dispute that they |
| 21 | begin to lose confidence in Mr McGrail. The | 21 | had a difficult and contentious working |
| 22 | rumours and anecdotes of bad practice and | 22 | relationship. Dr Britto confirmed that he was |
| 23 | behaviours in contrast were not things on | 23 | aware of the bad relations between Mr |
| 24 | which Mr Pyle felt it was possible to act, | 24 | McGrail and Mr Morello and that they had |
| 25 | although they contributed to his growing | 25 | disputes. This is echoed by RGP witnesses, |
| 23 | aranough they contained to mis growing | 25 | disputes. This is conced by Itel Willieses, |
| | Page 233 | | Page 235 |
| | | | |
| _ | | | |
| 1 | sense of unease. | 1 | Commissioner Ullger, Assistant |
| 2 | Mr Pyle's evidence referred to three related | 2 | Commissioner Yeats and DCI Field sorry, |
| 2 3 | Mr Pyle's evidence referred to three related matters which he said contributed to his loss | 2 3 | Commissioner Yeats and DCI Field sorry, Superintendent Field. |
| 2 3 4 | Mr Pyle's evidence referred to three related matters which he said contributed to his loss of confidence. First, that there was that | 2 3 4 | Commissioner Yeats and DCI Field sorry, Superintendent Field. Documents disclosed to the Inquiry |
| 2 3 4 5 | Mr Pyle's evidence referred to three related matters which he said contributed to his loss of confidence. First, that there was that fractured relationship. He said that Mr | 2 3 4 5 | Commissioner Yeats and DCI Field sorry, Superintendent Field. Documents disclosed to the Inquiry demonstrate that Mr McGrail and Mr |
| 2 3 4 5 6 | Mr Pyle's evidence referred to three related matters which he said contributed to his loss of confidence. First, that there was that fractured relationship. He said that Mr McGrail's management style resulted in a | 2 3 4 5 6 | Commissioner Yeats and DCI Field sorry, Superintendent Field. Documents disclosed to the Inquiry demonstrate that Mr McGrail and Mr Morello raised complaints about each other |
| 2 3 4 5 6 7 | Mr Pyle's evidence referred to three related matters which he said contributed to his loss of confidence. First, that there was that fractured relationship. He said that Mr McGrail's management style resulted in a fractured, almost hostile relationship with | 2 3 4 5 6 7 | Commissioner Yeats and DCI Field sorry, Superintendent Field. Documents disclosed to the Inquiry demonstrate that Mr McGrail and Mr Morello raised complaints about each other to the Chief Minister, to the Chief Secretary |
| 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 | Mr Pyle's evidence referred to three related matters which he said contributed to his loss of confidence. First, that there was that fractured relationship. He said that Mr McGrail's management style resulted in a fractured, almost hostile relationship with him and the Gibraltar Police Federation, the | 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 | Commissioner Yeats and DCI Field sorry, Superintendent Field. Documents disclosed to the Inquiry demonstrate that Mr McGrail and Mr Morello raised complaints about each other to the Chief Minister, to the Chief Secretary and to Dr Britto. For example, Mr McGrail |
| 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 | Mr Pyle's evidence referred to three related matters which he said contributed to his loss of confidence. First, that there was that fractured relationship. He said that Mr McGrail's management style resulted in a fractured, almost hostile relationship with him and the Gibraltar Police Federation, the representative body of the rank and file in the | 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 | Commissioner Yeats and DCI Field sorry, Superintendent Field. Documents disclosed to the Inquiry demonstrate that Mr McGrail and Mr Morello raised complaints about each other to the Chief Minister, to the Chief Secretary and to Dr Britto. For example, Mr McGrail complained to Dr Britto about what he |
| 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 | Mr Pyle's evidence referred to three related matters which he said contributed to his loss of confidence. First, that there was that fractured relationship. He said that Mr McGrail's management style resulted in a fractured, almost hostile relationship with him and the Gibraltar Police Federation, the representative body of the rank and file in the RGP. Second, he referred to formal | 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 | Commissioner Yeats and DCI Field sorry, Superintendent Field. Documents disclosed to the Inquiry demonstrate that Mr McGrail and Mr Morello raised complaints about each other to the Chief Minister, to the Chief Secretary and to Dr Britto. For example, Mr McGrail complained to Dr Britto about what he described as the incessant path of destruction |
| 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 | Mr Pyle's evidence referred to three related matters which he said contributed to his loss of confidence. First, that there was that fractured relationship. He said that Mr McGrail's management style resulted in a fractured, almost hostile relationship with him and the Gibraltar Police Federation, the representative body of the rank and file in the RGP. Second, he referred to formal complaints to the RGP saying that the | 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 | Commissioner Yeats and DCI Field sorry, Superintendent Field. Documents disclosed to the Inquiry demonstrate that Mr McGrail and Mr Morello raised complaints about each other to the Chief Minister, to the Chief Secretary and to Dr Britto. For example, Mr McGrail complained to Dr Britto about what he described as the incessant path of destruction that the Gibraltar Police Federation, Henry |
| 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 | Mr Pyle's evidence referred to three related matters which he said contributed to his loss of confidence. First, that there was that fractured relationship. He said that Mr McGrail's management style resulted in a fractured, almost hostile relationship with him and the Gibraltar Police Federation, the representative body of the rank and file in the RGP. Second, he referred to formal complaints to the RGP saying that the resulting tensions between the RGP | 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 | Commissioner Yeats and DCI Field sorry, Superintendent Field. Documents disclosed to the Inquiry demonstrate that Mr McGrail and Mr Morello raised complaints about each other to the Chief Minister, to the Chief Secretary and to Dr Britto. For example, Mr McGrail complained to Dr Britto about what he described as the incessant path of destruction that the Gibraltar Police Federation, Henry Bautista, is set on. I do not intend to go into |
| 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 | Mr Pyle's evidence referred to three related matters which he said contributed to his loss of confidence. First, that there was that fractured relationship. He said that Mr McGrail's management style resulted in a fractured, almost hostile relationship with him and the Gibraltar Police Federation, the representative body of the rank and file in the RGP. Second, he referred to formal complaints to the RGP saying that the resulting tensions between the RGP leadership and the GPF culminated in formal | 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 | Commissioner Yeats and DCI Field sorry, Superintendent Field. Documents disclosed to the Inquiry demonstrate that Mr McGrail and Mr Morello raised complaints about each other to the Chief Minister, to the Chief Secretary and to Dr Britto. For example, Mr McGrail complained to Dr Britto about what he described as the incessant path of destruction that the Gibraltar Police Federation, Henry Bautista, is set on. I do not intend to go into detail about the particular flash points in the |
| 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 | Mr Pyle's evidence referred to three related matters which he said contributed to his loss of confidence. First, that there was that fractured relationship. He said that Mr McGrail's management style resulted in a fractured, almost hostile relationship with him and the Gibraltar Police Federation, the representative body of the rank and file in the RGP. Second, he referred to formal complaints to the RGP saying that the resulting tensions between the RGP leadership and the GPF culminated in formal complaints from the Federation to the GPA | 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 | Commissioner Yeats and DCI Field sorry, Superintendent Field. Documents disclosed to the Inquiry demonstrate that Mr McGrail and Mr Morello raised complaints about each other to the Chief Minister, to the Chief Secretary and to Dr Britto. For example, Mr McGrail complained to Dr Britto about what he described as the incessant path of destruction that the Gibraltar Police Federation, Henry Bautista, is set on. I do not intend to go into detail about the particular flash points in the difficult relationship between Mr McGrail |
| 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 | Mr Pyle's evidence referred to three related matters which he said contributed to his loss of confidence. First, that there was that fractured relationship. He said that Mr McGrail's management style resulted in a fractured, almost hostile relationship with him and the Gibraltar Police Federation, the representative body of the rank and file in the RGP. Second, he referred to formal complaints to the RGP saying that the resulting tensions between the RGP leadership and the GPF culminated in formal complaints from the Federation to the GPA about Mr McGrail and the GPA regularly | 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 | Commissioner Yeats and DCI Field sorry, Superintendent Field. Documents disclosed to the Inquiry demonstrate that Mr McGrail and Mr Morello raised complaints about each other to the Chief Minister, to the Chief Secretary and to Dr Britto. For example, Mr McGrail complained to Dr Britto about what he described as the incessant path of destruction that the Gibraltar Police Federation, Henry Bautista, is set on. I do not intend to go into detail about the particular flash points in the difficult relationship between Mr McGrail and the GPF but I will briefly mention that |
| 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 | Mr Pyle's evidence referred to three related matters which he said contributed to his loss of confidence. First, that there was that fractured relationship. He said that Mr McGrail's management style resulted in a fractured, almost hostile relationship with him and the Gibraltar Police Federation, the representative body of the rank and file in the RGP. Second, he referred to formal complaints to the RGP saying that the resulting tensions between the RGP leadership and the GPF culminated in formal complaints from the Federation to the GPA about Mr McGrail and the GPA regularly spoke at its meetings about the allegations of | 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 | Commissioner Yeats and DCI Field sorry, Superintendent Field. Documents disclosed to the Inquiry demonstrate that Mr McGrail and Mr Morello raised complaints about each other to the Chief Minister, to the Chief Secretary and to Dr Britto. For example, Mr McGrail complained to Dr Britto about what he described as the incessant path of destruction that the Gibraltar Police Federation, Henry Bautista, is set on. I do not intend to go into detail about the particular flash points in the difficult relationship between Mr McGrail and the GPF but I will briefly mention that these included surveys organised by the GPF |
| 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 | Mr Pyle's evidence referred to three related matters which he said contributed to his loss of confidence. First, that there was that fractured relationship. He said that Mr McGrail's management style resulted in a fractured, almost hostile relationship with him and the Gibraltar Police Federation, the representative body of the rank and file in the RGP. Second, he referred to formal complaints to the RGP saying that the resulting tensions between the RGP leadership and the GPF culminated in formal complaints from the Federation to the GPA about Mr McGrail and the GPA regularly spoke at its meetings about the allegations of bullying and intimidation by Mr McGrail. | 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 | Commissioner Yeats and DCI Field sorry, Superintendent Field. Documents disclosed to the Inquiry demonstrate that Mr McGrail and Mr Morello raised complaints about each other to the Chief Minister, to the Chief Secretary and to Dr Britto. For example, Mr McGrail complained to Dr Britto about what he described as the incessant path of destruction that the Gibraltar Police Federation, Henry Bautista, is set on. I do not intend to go into detail about the particular flash points in the difficult relationship between Mr McGrail and the GPF but I will briefly mention that these included surveys organised by the GPF in 2018 and in August and September 2019, |
| 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 | Mr Pyle's evidence referred to three related matters which he said contributed to his loss of confidence. First, that there was that fractured relationship. He said that Mr McGrail's management style resulted in a fractured, almost hostile relationship with him and the Gibraltar Police Federation, the representative body of the rank and file in the RGP. Second, he referred to formal complaints to the RGP saying that the resulting tensions between the RGP leadership and the GPF culminated in formal complaints from the Federation to the GPA about Mr McGrail and the GPA regularly spoke at its meetings about the allegations of bullying and intimidation by Mr McGrail. Thirdly, he referred those rumours of bad | 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 | Commissioner Yeats and DCI Field sorry, Superintendent Field. Documents disclosed to the Inquiry demonstrate that Mr McGrail and Mr Morello raised complaints about each other to the Chief Minister, to the Chief Secretary and to Dr Britto. For example, Mr McGrail complained to Dr Britto about what he described as the incessant path of destruction that the Gibraltar Police Federation, Henry Bautista, is set on. I do not intend to go into detail about the particular flash points in the difficult relationship between Mr McGrail and the GPF but I will briefly mention that these included surveys organised by the GPF in 2018 and in August and September 2019, both of which had unfavourable results and |
| 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 | Mr Pyle's evidence referred to three related matters which he said contributed to his loss of confidence. First, that there was that fractured relationship. He said that Mr McGrail's management style resulted in a fractured, almost hostile relationship with him and the Gibraltar Police Federation, the representative body of the rank and file in the RGP. Second, he referred to formal complaints to the RGP saying that the resulting tensions between the RGP leadership and the GPF culminated in formal complaints from the Federation to the GPA about Mr McGrail and the GPA regularly spoke at its meetings about the allegations of bullying and intimidation by Mr McGrail. Thirdly, he referred those rumours of bad practice which he said he had often heard in | 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 | Commissioner Yeats and DCI Field sorry, Superintendent Field. Documents disclosed to the Inquiry demonstrate that Mr McGrail and Mr Morello raised complaints about each other to the Chief Minister, to the Chief Secretary and to Dr Britto. For example, Mr McGrail complained to Dr Britto about what he described as the incessant path of destruction that the Gibraltar Police Federation, Henry Bautista, is set on. I do not intend to go into detail about the particular flash points in the difficult relationship between Mr McGrail and the GPF but I will briefly mention that these included surveys organised by the GPF in 2018 and in August and September 2019, both of which had unfavourable results and raised concerns about bullying, disciplinary |
| 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 | Mr Pyle's evidence referred to three related matters which he said contributed to his loss of confidence. First, that there was that fractured relationship. He said that Mr McGrail's management style resulted in a fractured, almost hostile relationship with him and the Gibraltar Police Federation, the representative body of the rank and file in the RGP. Second, he referred to formal complaints to the RGP saying that the resulting tensions between the RGP leadership and the GPF culminated in formal complaints from the Federation to the GPA about Mr McGrail and the GPA regularly spoke at its meetings about the allegations of bullying and intimidation by Mr McGrail. Thirdly, he referred those rumours of bad practice which he said he had often heard in anecdotes and stories of bad practice and | 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 | Commissioner Yeats and DCI Field sorry, Superintendent Field. Documents disclosed to the Inquiry demonstrate that Mr McGrail and Mr Morello raised complaints about each other to the Chief Minister, to the Chief Secretary and to Dr Britto. For example, Mr McGrail complained to Dr Britto about what he described as the incessant path of destruction that the Gibraltar Police Federation, Henry Bautista, is set on. I do not intend to go into detail about the particular flash points in the difficult relationship between Mr McGrail and the GPF but I will briefly mention that these included surveys organised by the GPF in 2018 and in August and September 2019, both of which had unfavourable results and raised concerns about bullying, disciplinary proceedings that were opened by the RGP |
| 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 | Mr Pyle's evidence referred to three related matters which he said contributed to his loss of confidence. First, that there was that fractured relationship. He said that Mr McGrail's management style resulted in a fractured, almost hostile relationship with him and the Gibraltar Police Federation, the representative body of the rank and file in the RGP. Second, he referred to formal complaints to the RGP saying that the resulting tensions between the RGP leadership and the GPF culminated in formal complaints from the Federation to the GPA about Mr McGrail and the GPA regularly spoke at its meetings about the allegations of bullying and intimidation by Mr McGrail. Thirdly, he referred those rumours of bad practice which he said he had often heard in anecdotes and stories of bad practice and behaviours by the RGP that were hard to | 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 | Commissioner Yeats and DCI Field sorry, Superintendent Field. Documents disclosed to the Inquiry demonstrate that Mr McGrail and Mr Morello raised complaints about each other to the Chief Minister, to the Chief Secretary and to Dr Britto. For example, Mr McGrail complained to Dr Britto about what he described as the incessant path of destruction that the Gibraltar Police Federation, Henry Bautista, is set on. I do not intend to go into detail about the particular flash points in the difficult relationship between Mr McGrail and the GPF but I will briefly mention that these included surveys organised by the GPF in 2018 and in August and September 2019, both of which had unfavourable results and raised concerns about bullying, disciplinary proceedings that were opened by the RGP command against Sergeant Morello and PC |
| 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 | Mr Pyle's evidence referred to three related matters which he said contributed to his loss of confidence. First, that there was that fractured relationship. He said that Mr McGrail's management style resulted in a fractured, almost hostile relationship with him and the Gibraltar Police Federation, the representative body of the rank and file in the RGP. Second, he referred to formal complaints to the RGP saying that the resulting tensions between the RGP leadership and the GPF culminated in formal complaints from the Federation to the GPA about Mr McGrail and the GPA regularly spoke at its meetings about the allegations of bullying and intimidation by Mr McGrail. Thirdly, he referred those rumours of bad practice which he said he had often heard in anecdotes and stories of bad practice and behaviours by the RGP that were hard to ignore given their volume. He said these | 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 | Commissioner Yeats and DCI Field sorry, Superintendent Field. Documents disclosed to the Inquiry demonstrate that Mr McGrail and Mr Morello raised complaints about each other to the Chief Minister, to the Chief Secretary and to Dr Britto. For example, Mr McGrail complained to Dr Britto about what he described as the incessant path of destruction that the Gibraltar Police Federation, Henry Bautista, is set on. I do not intend to go into detail about the particular flash points in the difficult relationship between Mr McGrail and the GPF but I will briefly mention that these included surveys organised by the GPF in 2018 and in August and September 2019, both of which had unfavourable results and raised concerns about bullying, disciplinary proceedings that were opened by the RGP command against Sergeant Morello and PC Simpson on the basis that they had made |
| 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 | Mr Pyle's evidence referred to three related matters which he said contributed to his loss of confidence. First, that there was that fractured relationship. He said that Mr McGrail's management style resulted in a fractured, almost hostile relationship with him and the Gibraltar Police Federation, the representative body of the rank and file in the RGP. Second, he referred to formal complaints to the RGP saying that the resulting tensions between the RGP leadership and the GPF culminated in formal complaints from the Federation to the GPA about Mr McGrail and the GPA regularly spoke at its meetings about the allegations of bullying and intimidation by Mr McGrail. Thirdly, he referred those rumours of bad practice which he said he had often heard in anecdotes and stories of bad practice and behaviours by the RGP that were hard to ignore given their volume. He said these included stories of the RGP turning a blind | 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 | Commissioner Yeats and DCI Field sorry, Superintendent Field. Documents disclosed to the Inquiry demonstrate that Mr McGrail and Mr Morello raised complaints about each other to the Chief Minister, to the Chief Secretary and to Dr Britto. For example, Mr McGrail complained to Dr Britto about what he described as the incessant path of destruction that the Gibraltar Police Federation, Henry Bautista, is set on. I do not intend to go into detail about the particular flash points in the difficult relationship between Mr McGrail and the GPF but I will briefly mention that these included surveys organised by the GPF in 2018 and in August and September 2019, both of which had unfavourable results and raised concerns about bullying, disciplinary proceedings that were opened by the RGP command against Sergeant Morello and PC Simpson on the basis that they had made adverse comments about the RGP senior |
| 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24 | Mr Pyle's evidence referred to three related matters which he said contributed to his loss of confidence. First, that there was that fractured relationship. He said that Mr McGrail's management style resulted in a fractured, almost hostile relationship with him and the Gibraltar Police Federation, the representative body of the rank and file in the RGP. Second, he referred to formal complaints to the RGP saying that the resulting tensions between the RGP leadership and the GPF culminated in formal complaints from the Federation to the GPA about Mr McGrail and the GPA regularly spoke at its meetings about the allegations of bullying and intimidation by Mr McGrail. Thirdly, he referred those rumours of bad practice which he said he had often heard in anecdotes and stories of bad practice and behaviours by the RGP that were hard to ignore given their volume. He said these included stories of the RGP turning a blind eye with crimes committed by people they | 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24 | Commissioner Yeats and DCI Field sorry, Superintendent Field. Documents disclosed to the Inquiry demonstrate that Mr McGrail and Mr Morello raised complaints about each other to the Chief Minister, to the Chief Secretary and to Dr Britto. For example, Mr McGrail complained to Dr Britto about what he described as the incessant path of destruction that the Gibraltar Police Federation, Henry Bautista, is set on. I do not intend to go into detail about the particular flash points in the difficult relationship between Mr McGrail and the GPF but I will briefly mention that these included surveys organised by the GPF in 2018 and in August and September 2019, both of which had unfavourable results and raised concerns about bullying, disciplinary proceedings that were opened by the RGP command against Sergeant Morello and PC Simpson on the basis that they had made adverse comments about the RGP senior management to Panorama and disputes about |
| 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 | Mr Pyle's evidence referred to three related matters which he said contributed to his loss of confidence. First, that there was that fractured relationship. He said that Mr McGrail's management style resulted in a fractured, almost hostile relationship with him and the Gibraltar Police Federation, the representative body of the rank and file in the RGP. Second, he referred to formal complaints to the RGP saying that the resulting tensions between the RGP leadership and the GPF culminated in formal complaints from the Federation to the GPA about Mr McGrail and the GPA regularly spoke at its meetings about the allegations of bullying and intimidation by Mr McGrail. Thirdly, he referred those rumours of bad practice which he said he had often heard in anecdotes and stories of bad practice and behaviours by the RGP that were hard to ignore given their volume. He said these included stories of the RGP turning a blind | 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 | Commissioner Yeats and DCI Field sorry, Superintendent Field. Documents disclosed to the Inquiry demonstrate that Mr McGrail and Mr Morello raised complaints about each other to the Chief Minister, to the Chief Secretary and to Dr Britto. For example, Mr McGrail complained to Dr Britto about what he described as the incessant path of destruction that the Gibraltar Police Federation, Henry Bautista, is set on. I do not intend to go into detail about the particular flash points in the difficult relationship between Mr McGrail and the GPF but I will briefly mention that these included surveys organised by the GPF in 2018 and in August and September 2019, both of which had unfavourable results and raised concerns about bullying, disciplinary proceedings that were opened by the RGP command against Sergeant Morello and PC Simpson on the basis that they had made adverse comments about the RGP senior |
| 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24 | Mr Pyle's evidence referred to three related matters which he said contributed to his loss of confidence. First, that there was that fractured relationship. He said that Mr McGrail's management style resulted in a fractured, almost hostile relationship with him and the Gibraltar Police Federation, the representative body of the rank and file in the RGP. Second, he referred to formal complaints to the RGP saying that the resulting tensions between the RGP leadership and the GPF culminated in formal complaints from the Federation to the GPA about Mr McGrail and the GPA regularly spoke at its meetings about the allegations of bullying and intimidation by Mr McGrail. Thirdly, he referred those rumours of bad practice which he said he had often heard in anecdotes and stories of bad practice and behaviours by the RGP that were hard to ignore given their volume. He said these included stories of the RGP turning a blind eye with crimes committed by people they | 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24 | Commissioner Yeats and DCI Field sorry, Superintendent Field. Documents disclosed to the Inquiry demonstrate that Mr McGrail and Mr Morello raised complaints about each other to the Chief Minister, to the Chief Secretary and to Dr Britto. For example, Mr McGrail complained to Dr Britto about what he described as the incessant path of destruction that the Gibraltar Police Federation, Henry Bautista, is set on. I do not intend to go into detail about the particular flash points in the difficult relationship between Mr McGrail and the GPF but I will briefly mention that these included surveys organised by the GPF in 2018 and in August and September 2019, both of which had unfavourable results and raised concerns about bullying, disciplinary proceedings that were opened by the RGP command against Sergeant Morello and PC Simpson on the basis that they had made adverse comments about the RGP senior management to Panorama and disputes about |

| 1 | Mr McGrail raised concerns about this with | 1 | record of formal complaints against Mr |
|----|---|----|--|
| 2 | the Chief Minister and with the governor. As | 2 | McGrail being made. The minutes of a GPA |
| 3 | I mentioned, the key question in relation to | 3 | meeting on 6 February 2020 do refer at item |
| 4 | this issue is not the substantive allegations | 4 | 5 to a meeting with GPF and the |
| 5 | between the parties but whether these issues | 5 | Commissioner of Police but Dr Britto has |
| 6 | were reported by the GPF to the GPA or | 6 | said that this was a mistake as no such |
| 7 | discussed by the GPA. There is a clear | 7 | meeting was held with the GPF. However, |
| 8 | factual dispute here which will need to be | 8 | he says that Mr McGrail attended at the end |
| 9 | explored in the coming weeks. | 9 | of that meeting and has given a detailed |
| 10 | The evidence from Sergeant Morello and Mr | 10 | account which can be explored further in |
| 11 | Simpson on behalf of the GPF corroborates | 11 | questioning. |
| 12 | Mr Pyle's account that there were ultimately | 12 | Mr McGrail states that he was never |
| 13 | formal complaints to the GPA. According to | 13 | informed by anyone at the GPA or anyone |
| 14 | Mr Morello in late January or early February | 14 | else that complaints of bullying had been |
| 15 | 2020 he spoke with Dr Britto by phone and | 15 | made against him and similarly other senior |
| 16 | asked to address the GPA board not only in | 16 | RGP officers who have provided evidence |
| 17 | relation to the ongoing international sorry, | 17 | confirm that they were not aware of any such |
| 18 | the ongoing internal investigation but the | 18 | allegations, namely, Mr Ullger, Mr Yeats, Mr |
| 19 | general relationship with the GPF command | 19 | Field and Mr Wyan (?). Ultimately the |
| 20 | and the authoritarian style of leadership and | 20 | Inquiry has not received any document which |
| 21 | Mr Morello says that a meeting was held at | 21 | records formal complaints being made to the |
| 22 | the GPA offices with most of the GPA board | 22 | GPA against Mr McGrail concerning |
| 23 | in attendance where he asked how to file a | 23 | allegations of bullying or intimidation by the |
| 24 | complaint of bullying against the | 24 | GPF or even about the difficult relationship |
| 25 | Commissioner to which Dr Britto replied, | 25 | between Mr McGrail and the GPF but this |
| 23 | Commissioner to which Di Britto replied, | 23 | between wir wedian and the dr i but this |
| | Page 237 | | Page 239 |
| | | | |
| 1 | "No, please, no, that's all we need now." | 1 | means that witness evidence will be |
| 2 | Sergeant morello then pointed out that unlike | 2 | particularly important on this point. Over the |
| 3 | in the UK there was in fact no recourse in | 3 | next few weeks we will explore whether the |
| 4 | those circumstances. He then gave the board | 4 | relationship between Mr McGrail and the |
| 5 | a summary of events that had transpired since | 5 | GPF and any reports about it to the GPA |
| 6 | being elected as convenor at which point a | 6 | were a reason or a circumstance contributing |
| 7 | board member stated, "That is clearly | 7 | to Mr McGrail's early retirement. If Mr |
| 8 | bullying and the problem clearly here is Mr | 8 | Pyle's evidence is accepted, this was a |
| 9 | McGrail." | 9 | circumstance and a reason of lesser |
| 10 | Mr Simpson gives an almost identical | 10 | importance to Mr Pyle beginning to lose |
| 11 | account although he specifies that the | 11 | confidence in Mr McGrail and it, therefore, |
| 12 | meeting took place on 31 January 2020 and | 12 | contributed to some degree to Mr McGrail |
| 13 | that the board member who spoke was Frank | 13 | ceasing to be commissioner of police. |
| 14 | Perez (?). However, this version of events is | 14 | However, given the way that the Inquiry has |
| 15 | firmly rejected by both Mr McGrail and the | 15 | framed this issue in the list of issues, the |
| 16 | members of the GPA who have given | 16 | Inquiry does need to focus the investigation |
| 17 | evidence to the Inquiry. Dr Britto accepts | 17 | on complaints, if any, to the GPA. |
| 18 | that issues and disputes were raised with him | 18 | Turning, finally, to issues 8 to 10, I can take |
| 19 | by both sides but says that they were not | 19 | these together. Unlike the issues that I have |
| 20 | formal complaints. He does remember | 20 | addressed so far, which are more substantive |
| 21 | sorry, he does not recall Mr Morello | 21 | in their nature, these three issues are to do |
| 22 | attending a GPA meeting in January or | 22 | with the procedure by which Mr McGrail |
| 23 | February 2020 and nor do other members of | 23 | ultimately ceased to be commissioner of |
| 24 | the GPA. The members of the GPA also all | 24 | police and the events in those final days. It is |
| 25 | confirm that they have no recollection or | 25 | important to look at the legislation with |
| | D. 220 | | D. 240 |
| | Page 238 | | Page 240 |
| | | | |

| 1 | which we are dealing in this context. There | 1 | call for the resignation of the commissioner. |
|--|--|---|---|
| 2 | are two routes in the Police Act 2006 for the | 2 | The governor is required to keep the chief |
| 3 | Commissioner of Police to leave his position. | 3 | minister informed of any exercise by him of |
| 4 | The first is laid out in section 34 of the Police | 4 | such a power under subsection 2. At the |
| 5 | Act 2006 and that provides that the GPA, | 5 | beginning of my submissions today, I |
| 6 | acting after consultation with the governor | 6 | referred to the text sent by the chief minister |
| 7 | and the Chief Minister and with the | 7 | to Mr Pyle on 14 May 2020 which referred to |
| 8 | agreement of either of them, they may call | 8 | his huge concerns about the senior |
| 9 | upon the Commissioner to retire in the | 1 | _ |
| | • | 9 | management of the RGP and listed several |
| 10 | interests of efficiency, effectiveness, probity, | 10 | actors which were contributing to this. This |
| 11 | integrity or independence of policing in | 11 | was the first communication on the topic of |
| 12 | Gibraltar. The GPA is required by | 12 | Mr McGrail's position and initiated the rapid |
| 13 | subsection 2 to give the commissioner an | 13 | events which led to Mr McGrail applying for |
| 14 | opportunity to make representations and shall | 14 | early retirement on 9 June. I do not have |
| 15 | consider them before seeking the approval of | 15 | time to go through all of the events and |
| 16 | the governor and the chief minister and/or the | 16 | communications that went on through that |
| 17 | chief minister under section 34(1). A | 17 | period but it is helpful to sketch out a broad |
| 18 | commissioner called upon to retire under | 18 | timeline in order to show how events |
| 19 | section 34(1) must retire on a date specified | 19 | progressed. |
| 20 | by the GPA or on such earlier date as may be | 20 | After the WhatsApp message of 14 May the |
| 21 | agreed between them, so the process required | 21 | chief minister and Mr Pyle met the next day |
| 22 | by section 34 is, therefore, in the following | 22 | to share their concerns. That is a meeting |
| 23 | order. Stage 1, the GPA determines that it is | 23 | where Mr Pyle considered that it was a |
| 24 | considering calling upon the commissioner to | 24 | remarkable coincidence that the chief |
| 25 | retire in the interests of efficiency, | 25 | minister had raised this matter with him as |
| | • * | | |
| | Page 241 | | Page 243 |
| 1 | CC ations and its intermiter | 1 | there had heath in demandered and a devalue of |
| 1 | effectiveness, probity, integrity or | $\frac{1}{2}$ | they had both independently developed |
| 2 | independence of policing in Gibraltar. Stage | 2 | concerns about Mr McGrail. On 16 May |
| 3 | 2, the GPA gives the commissioner an | 3 | 2020, a Saturday, Mr Pyle invited Dr Britto |
| 4 | onnorthinity to make representations and | 1 | |
| _ | opportunity to make representations and | 4 | to attend a meeting with the chief minister on |
| 5 | considers those representations. Stage 3, | 5 | to attend a meeting with the chief minister on the Monday. Before their scheduled |
| 6 | considers those representations. Stage 3, having considered those representations, the | 5 6 | to attend a meeting with the chief minister on the Monday. Before their scheduled meeting, Mr Pyle and the chief minister |
| 6 7 | considers those representations. Stage 3, having considered those representations, the GPA seeks the approval of the governor and | 5 6 7 | to attend a meeting with the chief minister on the Monday. Before their scheduled meeting, Mr Pyle and the chief minister exchanged notes where they set out their |
| 6 7 8 | considers those representations. Stage 3, having considered those representations, the GPA seeks the approval of the governor and the chief minister to call upon the | 5 6 7 8 | to attend a meeting with the chief minister on the Monday. Before their scheduled meeting, Mr Pyle and the chief minister exchanged notes where they set out their preliminary position on the criteria in section |
| 6 7 8 9 | considers those representations. Stage 3, having considered those representations, the GPA seeks the approval of the governor and the chief minister to call upon the commissioner to retire. Stage 4, having | 5 6 7 8 9 | to attend a meeting with the chief minister on the Monday. Before their scheduled meeting, Mr Pyle and the chief minister exchanged notes where they set out their preliminary position on the criteria in section 34(1) of the Police Act, efficiency, |
| 6 7 8 9 10 | considers those representations. Stage 3, having considered those representations, the GPA seeks the approval of the governor and the chief minister to call upon the commissioner to retire. Stage 4, having obtained the approval of either of the | 5 6 7 8 9 10 | to attend a meeting with the chief minister on the Monday. Before their scheduled meeting, Mr Pyle and the chief minister exchanged notes where they set out their preliminary position on the criteria in section 34(1) of the Police Act, efficiency, effectiveness, probity, integrity and |
| 6 7 8 9 10 11 | considers those representations. Stage 3, having considered those representations, the GPA seeks the approval of the governor and the chief minister to call upon the commissioner to retire. Stage 4, having obtained the approval of either of the governor and the chief minister, the GPA | 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 | to attend a meeting with the chief minister on the Monday. Before their scheduled meeting, Mr Pyle and the chief minister exchanged notes where they set out their preliminary position on the criteria in section 34(1) of the Police Act, efficiency, effectiveness, probity, integrity and independence. The chief minister's lengthy |
| 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 | considers those representations. Stage 3, having considered those representations, the GPA seeks the approval of the governor and the chief minister to call upon the commissioner to retire. Stage 4, having obtained the approval of either of the governor and the chief minister, the GPA calls on the commissioner to retire and stage | 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 | to attend a meeting with the chief minister on the Monday. Before their scheduled meeting, Mr Pyle and the chief minister exchanged notes where they set out their preliminary position on the criteria in section 34(1) of the Police Act, efficiency, effectiveness, probity, integrity and independence. The chief minister's lengthy email referred to the HMIC report, Mr |
| 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 | considers those representations. Stage 3, having considered those representations, the GPA seeks the approval of the governor and the chief minister to call upon the commissioner to retire. Stage 4, having obtained the approval of either of the governor and the chief minister, the GPA calls on the commissioner to retire and stage 5, the commissioner retires on the date | 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 | to attend a meeting with the chief minister on the Monday. Before their scheduled meeting, Mr Pyle and the chief minister exchanged notes where they set out their preliminary position on the criteria in section 34(1) of the Police Act, efficiency, effectiveness, probity, integrity and independence. The chief minister's lengthy email referred to the HMIC report, Mr McGrail's reporting about the collision at sea |
| 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 | considers those representations. Stage 3, having considered those representations, the GPA seeks the approval of the governor and the chief minister to call upon the commissioner to retire. Stage 4, having obtained the approval of either of the governor and the chief minister, the GPA calls on the commissioner to retire and stage 5, the commissioner retires on the date specified or an earlier date if agreed. The | 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 | to attend a meeting with the chief minister on the Monday. Before their scheduled meeting, Mr Pyle and the chief minister exchanged notes where they set out their preliminary position on the criteria in section 34(1) of the Police Act, efficiency, effectiveness, probity, integrity and independence. The chief minister's lengthy email referred to the HMIC report, Mr McGrail's reporting about the collision at sea and the James Levy case search warrants |
| 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 | considers those representations. Stage 3, having considered those representations, the GPA seeks the approval of the governor and the chief minister to call upon the commissioner to retire. Stage 4, having obtained the approval of either of the governor and the chief minister, the GPA calls on the commissioner to retire and stage 5, the commissioner retires on the date specified or an earlier date if agreed. The extent to which the GPA properly followed | 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 | to attend a meeting with the chief minister on the Monday. Before their scheduled meeting, Mr Pyle and the chief minister exchanged notes where they set out their preliminary position on the criteria in section 34(1) of the Police Act, efficiency, effectiveness, probity, integrity and independence. The chief minister's lengthy email referred to the HMIC report, Mr McGrail's reporting about the collision at sea |
| 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 | considers those representations. Stage 3, having considered those representations, the GPA seeks the approval of the governor and the chief minister to call upon the commissioner to retire. Stage 4, having obtained the approval of either of the governor and the chief minister, the GPA calls on the commissioner to retire and stage 5, the commissioner retires on the date specified or an earlier date if agreed. The | 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 | to attend a meeting with the chief minister on the Monday. Before their scheduled meeting, Mr Pyle and the chief minister exchanged notes where they set out their preliminary position on the criteria in section 34(1) of the Police Act, efficiency, effectiveness, probity, integrity and independence. The chief minister's lengthy email referred to the HMIC report, Mr McGrail's reporting about the collision at sea and the James Levy case search warrants |
| 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 | considers those representations. Stage 3, having considered those representations, the GPA seeks the approval of the governor and the chief minister to call upon the commissioner to retire. Stage 4, having obtained the approval of either of the governor and the chief minister, the GPA calls on the commissioner to retire and stage 5, the commissioner retires on the date specified or an earlier date if agreed. The extent to which the GPA properly followed | 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 | to attend a meeting with the chief minister on the Monday. Before their scheduled meeting, Mr Pyle and the chief minister exchanged notes where they set out their preliminary position on the criteria in section 34(1) of the Police Act, efficiency, effectiveness, probity, integrity and independence. The chief minister's lengthy email referred to the HMIC report, Mr McGrail's reporting about the collision at sea and the James Levy case search warrants which he said was possibly the issue of |
| 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 | considers those representations. Stage 3, having considered those representations, the GPA seeks the approval of the governor and the chief minister to call upon the commissioner to retire. Stage 4, having obtained the approval of either of the governor and the chief minister, the GPA calls on the commissioner to retire and stage 5, the commissioner retires on the date specified or an earlier date if agreed. The extent to which the GPA properly followed this process is at the heart of one of these | 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 | to attend a meeting with the chief minister on the Monday. Before their scheduled meeting, Mr Pyle and the chief minister exchanged notes where they set out their preliminary position on the criteria in section 34(1) of the Police Act, efficiency, effectiveness, probity, integrity and independence. The chief minister's lengthy email referred to the HMIC report, Mr McGrail's reporting about the collision at sea and the James Levy case search warrants which he said was possibly the issue of deepest concern. On 18 May 2020 Dr Britto, |
| 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 | considers those representations. Stage 3, having considered those representations, the GPA seeks the approval of the governor and the chief minister to call upon the commissioner to retire. Stage 4, having obtained the approval of either of the governor and the chief minister, the GPA calls on the commissioner to retire and stage 5, the commissioner retires on the date specified or an earlier date if agreed. The extent to which the GPA properly followed this process is at the heart of one of these issues. | 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 | to attend a meeting with the chief minister on the Monday. Before their scheduled meeting, Mr Pyle and the chief minister exchanged notes where they set out their preliminary position on the criteria in section 34(1) of the Police Act, efficiency, effectiveness, probity, integrity and independence. The chief minister's lengthy email referred to the HMIC report, Mr McGrail's reporting about the collision at sea and the James Levy case search warrants which he said was possibly the issue of deepest concern. On 18 May 2020 Dr Britto, Mr Pyle, the interim governor and the chief |
| 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 | considers those representations. Stage 3, having considered those representations, the GPA seeks the approval of the governor and the chief minister to call upon the commissioner to retire. Stage 4, having obtained the approval of either of the governor and the chief minister, the GPA calls on the commissioner to retire and stage 5, the commissioner retires on the date specified or an earlier date if agreed. The extent to which the GPA properly followed this process is at the heart of one of these issues. The second method for the commissioner of | 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 | to attend a meeting with the chief minister on the Monday. Before their scheduled meeting, Mr Pyle and the chief minister exchanged notes where they set out their preliminary position on the criteria in section 34(1) of the Police Act, efficiency, effectiveness, probity, integrity and independence. The chief minister's lengthy email referred to the HMIC report, Mr McGrail's reporting about the collision at sea and the James Levy case search warrants which he said was possibly the issue of deepest concern. On 18 May 2020 Dr Britto, Mr Pyle, the interim governor and the chief minister met to discuss the issue. There was |
| 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 | considers those representations. Stage 3, having considered those representations, the GPA seeks the approval of the governor and the chief minister to call upon the commissioner to retire. Stage 4, having obtained the approval of either of the governor and the chief minister, the GPA calls on the commissioner to retire and stage 5, the commissioner retires on the date specified or an earlier date if agreed. The extent to which the GPA properly followed this process is at the heart of one of these issues. The second method for the commissioner of police to cease being commissioner of police | 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 | to attend a meeting with the chief minister on the Monday. Before their scheduled meeting, Mr Pyle and the chief minister exchanged notes where they set out their preliminary position on the criteria in section 34(1) of the Police Act, efficiency, effectiveness, probity, integrity and independence. The chief minister's lengthy email referred to the HMIC report, Mr McGrail's reporting about the collision at sea and the James Levy case search warrants which he said was possibly the issue of deepest concern. On 18 May 2020 Dr Britto, Mr Pyle, the interim governor and the chief minister met to discuss the issue. There was no contemporaneous note made of that |
| 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 | considers those representations. Stage 3, having considered those representations, the GPA seeks the approval of the governor and the chief minister to call upon the commissioner to retire. Stage 4, having obtained the approval of either of the governor and the chief minister, the GPA calls on the commissioner to retire and stage 5, the commissioner retires on the date specified or an earlier date if agreed. The extent to which the GPA properly followed this process is at the heart of one of these issues. The second method for the commissioner of police to cease being commissioner of police is laid out in section 13 of the Police Act 2006 and that says that where the authority | 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 | to attend a meeting with the chief minister on the Monday. Before their scheduled meeting, Mr Pyle and the chief minister exchanged notes where they set out their preliminary position on the criteria in section 34(1) of the Police Act, efficiency, effectiveness, probity, integrity and independence. The chief minister's lengthy email referred to the HMIC report, Mr McGrail's reporting about the collision at sea and the James Levy case search warrants which he said was possibly the issue of deepest concern. On 18 May 2020 Dr Britto, Mr Pyle, the interim governor and the chief minister met to discuss the issue. There was no contemporaneous note made of that meeting but the chief minister subsequently |
| 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 | considers those representations. Stage 3, having considered those representations, the GPA seeks the approval of the governor and the chief minister to call upon the commissioner to retire. Stage 4, having obtained the approval of either of the governor and the chief minister, the GPA calls on the commissioner to retire and stage 5, the commissioner retires on the date specified or an earlier date if agreed. The extent to which the GPA properly followed this process is at the heart of one of these issues. The second method for the commissioner of police to cease being commissioner of police is laid out in section 13 of the Police Act 2006 and that says that where the authority has failed to discharge or perform a | 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 | to attend a meeting with the chief minister on the Monday. Before their scheduled meeting, Mr Pyle and the chief minister exchanged notes where they set out their preliminary position on the criteria in section 34(1) of the Police Act, efficiency, effectiveness, probity, integrity and independence. The chief minister's lengthy email referred to the HMIC report, Mr McGrail's reporting about the collision at sea and the James Levy case search warrants which he said was possibly the issue of deepest concern. On 18 May 2020 Dr Britto, Mr Pyle, the interim governor and the chief minister met to discuss the issue. There was no contemporaneous note made of that meeting but the chief minister subsequently prepared and circulated a note. That is at C3988 and that is an informal record of the |
| 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 | considers those representations. Stage 3, having considered those representations, the GPA seeks the approval of the governor and the chief minister to call upon the commissioner to retire. Stage 4, having obtained the approval of either of the governor and the chief minister, the GPA calls on the commissioner to retire and stage 5, the commissioner retires on the date specified or an earlier date if agreed. The extent to which the GPA properly followed this process is at the heart of one of these issues. The second method for the commissioner of police to cease being commissioner of police is laid out in section 13 of the Police Act 2006 and that says that where the authority has failed to discharge or perform a responsibility imposed on it under the PA in | 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 | to attend a meeting with the chief minister on the Monday. Before their scheduled meeting, Mr Pyle and the chief minister exchanged notes where they set out their preliminary position on the criteria in section 34(1) of the Police Act, efficiency, effectiveness, probity, integrity and independence. The chief minister's lengthy email referred to the HMIC report, Mr McGrail's reporting about the collision at sea and the James Levy case search warrants which he said was possibly the issue of deepest concern. On 18 May 2020 Dr Britto, Mr Pyle, the interim governor and the chief minister met to discuss the issue. There was no contemporaneous note made of that meeting but the chief minister subsequently prepared and circulated a note. That is at C3988 and that is an informal record of the meeting with his Excellency, the Chief |
| 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24 | considers those representations. Stage 3, having considered those representations, the GPA seeks the approval of the governor and the chief minister to call upon the commissioner to retire. Stage 4, having obtained the approval of either of the governor and the chief minister, the GPA calls on the commissioner to retire and stage 5, the commissioner retires on the date specified or an earlier date if agreed. The extent to which the GPA properly followed this process is at the heart of one of these issues. The second method for the commissioner of police to cease being commissioner of police is laid out in section 13 of the Police Act 2006 and that says that where the authority has failed to discharge or perform a responsibility imposed on it under the PA in 2006 the governor is able to exercise certain | 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24 | to attend a meeting with the chief minister on the Monday. Before their scheduled meeting, Mr Pyle and the chief minister exchanged notes where they set out their preliminary position on the criteria in section 34(1) of the Police Act, efficiency, effectiveness, probity, integrity and independence. The chief minister's lengthy email referred to the HMIC report, Mr McGrail's reporting about the collision at sea and the James Levy case search warrants which he said was possibly the issue of deepest concern. On 18 May 2020 Dr Britto, Mr Pyle, the interim governor and the chief minister met to discuss the issue. There was no contemporaneous note made of that meeting but the chief minister subsequently prepared and circulated a note. That is at C3988 and that is an informal record of the meeting with his Excellency, the Chief Governor, and the Chief Minister on Monday |
| 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 | considers those representations. Stage 3, having considered those representations, the GPA seeks the approval of the governor and the chief minister to call upon the commissioner to retire. Stage 4, having obtained the approval of either of the governor and the chief minister, the GPA calls on the commissioner to retire and stage 5, the commissioner retires on the date specified or an earlier date if agreed. The extent to which the GPA properly followed this process is at the heart of one of these issues. The second method for the commissioner of police to cease being commissioner of police is laid out in section 13 of the Police Act 2006 and that says that where the authority has failed to discharge or perform a responsibility imposed on it under the PA in | 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 | to attend a meeting with the chief minister on the Monday. Before their scheduled meeting, Mr Pyle and the chief minister exchanged notes where they set out their preliminary position on the criteria in section 34(1) of the Police Act, efficiency, effectiveness, probity, integrity and independence. The chief minister's lengthy email referred to the HMIC report, Mr McGrail's reporting about the collision at sea and the James Levy case search warrants which he said was possibly the issue of deepest concern. On 18 May 2020 Dr Britto, Mr Pyle, the interim governor and the chief minister met to discuss the issue. There was no contemporaneous note made of that meeting but the chief minister subsequently prepared and circulated a note. That is at C3988 and that is an informal record of the meeting with his Excellency, the Chief |
| 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24 | considers those representations. Stage 3, having considered those representations, the GPA seeks the approval of the governor and the chief minister to call upon the commissioner to retire. Stage 4, having obtained the approval of either of the governor and the chief minister, the GPA calls on the commissioner to retire and stage 5, the commissioner retires on the date specified or an earlier date if agreed. The extent to which the GPA properly followed this process is at the heart of one of these issues. The second method for the commissioner of police to cease being commissioner of police is laid out in section 13 of the Police Act 2006 and that says that where the authority has failed to discharge or perform a responsibility imposed on it under the PA in 2006 the governor is able to exercise certain | 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24 | to attend a meeting with the chief minister on the Monday. Before their scheduled meeting, Mr Pyle and the chief minister exchanged notes where they set out their preliminary position on the criteria in section 34(1) of the Police Act, efficiency, effectiveness, probity, integrity and independence. The chief minister's lengthy email referred to the HMIC report, Mr McGrail's reporting about the collision at sea and the James Levy case search warrants which he said was possibly the issue of deepest concern. On 18 May 2020 Dr Britto, Mr Pyle, the interim governor and the chief minister met to discuss the issue. There was no contemporaneous note made of that meeting but the chief minister subsequently prepared and circulated a note. That is at C3988 and that is an informal record of the meeting with his Excellency, the Chief Governor, and the Chief Minister on Monday |

| 4 | | | |
|---|---|--|---|
| 1 | prepared for Dr Britto. The notes referred to | 1 | incident at sea and the HMIC report. In |
| 2 | the GPA's powers under section 34 and | 2 | response, Mr McGrail raised the issue of the |
| 3 | stated that the GRP, therefore, being invited | 3 | search warrants and stated that it had |
| 4 | by the governor and the chief minister | 4 | triggered the chief minister's reaction. Dr |
| 5 | together to consider whether they believed | 5 | Britto stated that he and the GPA members |
| 6 | that all or any of the Police Act criteria had | 6 | had been surprised by the events. Dr Britto |
| 7 | been impacted. They then go through the | 7 | handed Mr McGrail a letter inviting him to |
| 8 | criteria and in the course of doing so, refers | 8 | retire and repeatedly stated that Mr McGrail |
| 9 | to three substantive matters, two expressly, | 9 | was not being suspended or forced to retire. |
| 10 | the HMIC report and the filing of legal | 10 | Mr McGrail requested that Dr Britto put the |
| 11 | claims in Spain by relatives of the citizens | 11 | reasons in writing in a more detailed letter so |
| 12 | killed in the collision at sea. The note also | 12 | that he could prepare a response. |
| 13 | refers to a third issue, namely another event | 13 | In the hours that followed, Dr Britto prepared |
| 14 | occurring last week which had left the chief | 14 | a draft of the second letter to Mr McGrail |
| | minister also in a situation where the | 1 | which he sent to the chief minister. The |
| 15 | | 15 | |
| 16 | commissioner had expressly misled him and | 16 | chief minister edited this letter and if we look |
| 17 | which left him unable to believe the | 17 | at C4282 we can see sorry, C4282, we can |
| 18 | commissioner. It seems undisputed that this | 18 | see highlighted in yellow the sections that |
| 19 | was a reference to the search warrant. | 19 | were added by the chief minister which he |
| 20 | Dr Britto arranged the GPA meeting urgently | 20 | said he did to provide further information as |
| 21 | to consider the issue which was held on 21 | 21 | to the reasons for the loss of confidence on |
| 22 | May but there were two procedural | 22 | his part and on the interim governor's part. |
| 23 | deficiencies with that meeting. First, only Dr | 23 | Again this letter analysed the five criteria in |
| 24 | Britto and four other members were in | 24 | section 34 of the Police Act and referred to |
| 25 | attendance and, secondly, there was no | 25 | the HMIC report and the incident at sea. |
| | | | |
| | Page 245 | | Page 247 |
| 1 | contemporaneous note made of the meeting | 1 | There was no direct reference to the criminal |
| 2 | as required by the Police Act, although a | 2 | investigation but this is perhaps something to |
| 3 | retrospective one was later prepared. That | _ | investigation but this is perhaps something to |
| 5 | | 3 | |
| 1 | | 3 | clarify in questioning because it does appear |
| 4 5 | note records that Dr Britto read out the file | 4 | clarify in questioning because it does appear impliedly to that it may impliedly refer to |
| 5 | note records that Dr Britto read out the file note to the meeting which the Inquiry | 4 5 | clarify in questioning because it does appear impliedly to that it may impliedly refer to it in the sense that it refers to dealings with |
| 5 6 | note records that Dr Britto read out the file note to the meeting which the Inquiry understands to be the record prepared by the | 4 5 6 | clarify in questioning because it does appear impliedly to that it may impliedly refer to it in the sense that it refers to dealings with the chief minister previously. |
| 5 6 7 | note records that Dr Britto read out the file note to the meeting which the Inquiry understands to be the record prepared by the chief minister that I have just referred to. | 4 5 6 7 | clarify in questioning because it does appear impliedly to that it may impliedly refer to it in the sense that it refers to dealings with the chief minister previously. (16.11) |
| 5 6 7 8 | note records that Dr Britto read out the file note to the meeting which the Inquiry understands to be the record prepared by the chief minister that I have just referred to. The note states that the collision at sea was a | 4 5 6 7 8 | clarify in questioning because it does appear impliedly to that it may impliedly refer to it in the sense that it refers to dealings with the chief minister previously. (16.11) On 29 May 2020, Charles Gomez, the lawyer |
| 5 6 7 8 9 | note records that Dr Britto read out the file note to the meeting which the Inquiry understands to be the record prepared by the chief minister that I have just referred to. The note states that the collision at sea was a major factor in the GPA's decision but Dr | 4 5 6 7 8 9 | clarify in questioning because it does appear impliedly to that it may impliedly refer to it in the sense that it refers to dealings with the chief minister previously. (16.11) On 29 May 2020, Charles Gomez, the lawyer acting on behalf of Mr McGrail, wrote to the |
| 5 6 7 8 9 10 | note records that Dr Britto read out the file note to the meeting which the Inquiry understands to be the record prepared by the chief minister that I have just referred to. The note states that the collision at sea was a major factor in the GPA's decision but Dr Britto's evidence is that the search warrants | 4 5 6 7 8 9 | clarify in questioning because it does appear impliedly to that it may impliedly refer to it in the sense that it refers to dealings with the chief minister previously. (16.11) On 29 May 2020, Charles Gomez, the lawyer acting on behalf of Mr McGrail, wrote to the GPA with representations about the flaws in |
| 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 | note records that Dr Britto read out the file note to the meeting which the Inquiry understands to be the record prepared by the chief minister that I have just referred to. The note states that the collision at sea was a major factor in the GPA's decision but Dr Britto's evidence is that the search warrants were discussed and that he did I | 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 | clarify in questioning because it does appear impliedly to that it may impliedly refer to it in the sense that it refers to dealings with the chief minister previously. (16.11) On 29 May 2020, Charles Gomez, the lawyer acting on behalf of Mr McGrail, wrote to the GPA with representations about the flaws in the GPA's process, describing it as "grossly |
| 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 | note records that Dr Britto read out the file note to the meeting which the Inquiry understands to be the record prepared by the chief minister that I have just referred to. The note states that the collision at sea was a major factor in the GPA's decision but Dr Britto's evidence is that the search warrants were discussed and that he did I understand that he did refer to Mr Levy by | 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 | clarify in questioning because it does appear impliedly to that it may impliedly refer to it in the sense that it refers to dealings with the chief minister previously. (16.11) On 29 May 2020, Charles Gomez, the lawyer acting on behalf of Mr McGrail, wrote to the GPA with representations about the flaws in the GPA's process, describing it as "grossly procedurally unfair", for example because Dr |
| 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 | note records that Dr Britto read out the file note to the meeting which the Inquiry understands to be the record prepared by the chief minister that I have just referred to. The note states that the collision at sea was a major factor in the GPA's decision but Dr Britto's evidence is that the search warrants were discussed and that he did I understand that he did refer to Mr Levy by name at the meeting. The note records that | 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 | clarify in questioning because it does appear impliedly to that it may impliedly refer to it in the sense that it refers to dealings with the chief minister previously. (16.11) On 29 May 2020, Charles Gomez, the lawyer acting on behalf of Mr McGrail, wrote to the GPA with representations about the flaws in the GPA's process, describing it as "grossly procedurally unfair", for example because Dr Britto had told Mr McGrail that if he refused |
| 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 | note records that Dr Britto read out the file note to the meeting which the Inquiry understands to be the record prepared by the chief minister that I have just referred to. The note states that the collision at sea was a major factor in the GPA's decision but Dr Britto's evidence is that the search warrants were discussed and that he did I understand that he did refer to Mr Levy by name at the meeting. The note records that Dr Britto would consult with the members | 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 | clarify in questioning because it does appear impliedly to that it may impliedly refer to it in the sense that it refers to dealings with the chief minister previously. (16.11) On 29 May 2020, Charles Gomez, the lawyer acting on behalf of Mr McGrail, wrote to the GPA with representations about the flaws in the GPA's process, describing it as "grossly procedurally unfair", for example because Dr Britto had told Mr McGrail that if he refused to comply with invitation to retire, then the |
| 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 | note records that Dr Britto read out the file note to the meeting which the Inquiry understands to be the record prepared by the chief minister that I have just referred to. The note states that the collision at sea was a major factor in the GPA's decision but Dr Britto's evidence is that the search warrants were discussed and that he did I understand that he did refer to Mr Levy by name at the meeting. The note records that Dr Britto would consult with the members who were not in attendance and if they were | 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 | clarify in questioning because it does appear impliedly to that it may impliedly refer to it in the sense that it refers to dealings with the chief minister previously. (16.11) On 29 May 2020, Charles Gomez, the lawyer acting on behalf of Mr McGrail, wrote to the GPA with representations about the flaws in the GPA's process, describing it as "grossly procedurally unfair", for example because Dr Britto had told Mr McGrail that if he refused to comply with invitation to retire, then the Governor would use his powers under |
| 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 | note records that Dr Britto read out the file note to the meeting which the Inquiry understands to be the record prepared by the chief minister that I have just referred to. The note states that the collision at sea was a major factor in the GPA's decision but Dr Britto's evidence is that the search warrants were discussed and that he did I understand that he did refer to Mr Levy by name at the meeting. The note records that Dr Britto would consult with the members who were not in attendance and if they were in agreement the GPA would proceed with | 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 | clarify in questioning because it does appear impliedly to that it may impliedly refer to it in the sense that it refers to dealings with the chief minister previously. (16.11) On 29 May 2020, Charles Gomez, the lawyer acting on behalf of Mr McGrail, wrote to the GPA with representations about the flaws in the GPA's process, describing it as "grossly procedurally unfair", for example because Dr Britto had told Mr McGrail that if he refused to comply with invitation to retire, then the Governor would use his powers under section 13 of the 2006 Act, and |
| 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 | note records that Dr Britto read out the file note to the meeting which the Inquiry understands to be the record prepared by the chief minister that I have just referred to. The note states that the collision at sea was a major factor in the GPA's decision but Dr Britto's evidence is that the search warrants were discussed and that he did I understand that he did refer to Mr Levy by name at the meeting. The note records that Dr Britto would consult with the members who were not in attendance and if they were in agreement the GPA would proceed with section 34. | 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 | clarify in questioning because it does appear impliedly to that it may impliedly refer to it in the sense that it refers to dealings with the chief minister previously. (16.11) On 29 May 2020, Charles Gomez, the lawyer acting on behalf of Mr McGrail, wrote to the GPA with representations about the flaws in the GPA's process, describing it as "grossly procedurally unfair", for example because Dr Britto had told Mr McGrail that if he refused to comply with invitation to retire, then the Governor would use his powers under section 13 of the 2006 Act, and representations had not been sought before |
| 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 | note records that Dr Britto read out the file note to the meeting which the Inquiry understands to be the record prepared by the chief minister that I have just referred to. The note states that the collision at sea was a major factor in the GPA's decision but Dr Britto's evidence is that the search warrants were discussed and that he did I understand that he did refer to Mr Levy by name at the meeting. The note records that Dr Britto would consult with the members who were not in attendance and if they were in agreement the GPA would proceed with section 34. Dr Britto and Mr McGrail met in person the | 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 | clarify in questioning because it does appear impliedly to that it may impliedly refer to it in the sense that it refers to dealings with the chief minister previously. (16.11) On 29 May 2020, Charles Gomez, the lawyer acting on behalf of Mr McGrail, wrote to the GPA with representations about the flaws in the GPA's process, describing it as "grossly procedurally unfair", for example because Dr Britto had told Mr McGrail that if he refused to comply with invitation to retire, then the Governor would use his powers under section 13 of the 2006 Act, and representations had not been sought before the process was followed. |
| 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 | note records that Dr Britto read out the file note to the meeting which the Inquiry understands to be the record prepared by the chief minister that I have just referred to. The note states that the collision at sea was a major factor in the GPA's decision but Dr Britto's evidence is that the search warrants were discussed and that he did I understand that he did refer to Mr Levy by name at the meeting. The note records that Dr Britto would consult with the members who were not in attendance and if they were in agreement the GPA would proceed with section 34. Dr Britto and Mr McGrail met in person the next day. The meeting was secretly recorded | 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 | clarify in questioning because it does appear impliedly to that it may impliedly refer to it in the sense that it refers to dealings with the chief minister previously. (16.11) On 29 May 2020, Charles Gomez, the lawyer acting on behalf of Mr McGrail, wrote to the GPA with representations about the flaws in the GPA's process, describing it as "grossly procedurally unfair", for example because Dr Britto had told Mr McGrail that if he refused to comply with invitation to retire, then the Governor would use his powers under section 13 of the 2006 Act, and representations had not been sought before the process was followed. As to substantive matters, the letter queried |
| 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 | note records that Dr Britto read out the file note to the meeting which the Inquiry understands to be the record prepared by the chief minister that I have just referred to. The note states that the collision at sea was a major factor in the GPA's decision but Dr Britto's evidence is that the search warrants were discussed and that he did I understand that he did refer to Mr Levy by name at the meeting. The note records that Dr Britto would consult with the members who were not in attendance and if they were in agreement the GPA would proceed with section 34. Dr Britto and Mr McGrail met in person the next day. The meeting was secretly recorded by Mr McGrail so the Inquiry has a complete | 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 | clarify in questioning because it does appear impliedly to that it may impliedly refer to it in the sense that it refers to dealings with the chief minister previously. (16.11) On 29 May 2020, Charles Gomez, the lawyer acting on behalf of Mr McGrail, wrote to the GPA with representations about the flaws in the GPA's process, describing it as "grossly procedurally unfair", for example because Dr Britto had told Mr McGrail that if he refused to comply with invitation to retire, then the Governor would use his powers under section 13 of the 2006 Act, and representations had not been sought before the process was followed. As to substantive matters, the letter queried why there had been no reference to the |
| 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 | note records that Dr Britto read out the file note to the meeting which the Inquiry understands to be the record prepared by the chief minister that I have just referred to. The note states that the collision at sea was a major factor in the GPA's decision but Dr Britto's evidence is that the search warrants were discussed and that he did I understand that he did refer to Mr Levy by name at the meeting. The note records that Dr Britto would consult with the members who were not in attendance and if they were in agreement the GPA would proceed with section 34. Dr Britto and Mr McGrail met in person the next day. The meeting was secretly recorded by Mr McGrail so the Inquiry has a complete picture of what was said. At the meeting, Dr | 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 | clarify in questioning because it does appear impliedly to that it may impliedly refer to it in the sense that it refers to dealings with the chief minister previously. (16.11) On 29 May 2020, Charles Gomez, the lawyer acting on behalf of Mr McGrail, wrote to the GPA with representations about the flaws in the GPA's process, describing it as "grossly procedurally unfair", for example because Dr Britto had told Mr McGrail that if he refused to comply with invitation to retire, then the Governor would use his powers under section 13 of the 2006 Act, and representations had not been sought before the process was followed. As to substantive matters, the letter queried why there had been no reference to the search warrants in a second letter, and |
| 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 | note records that Dr Britto read out the file note to the meeting which the Inquiry understands to be the record prepared by the chief minister that I have just referred to. The note states that the collision at sea was a major factor in the GPA's decision but Dr Britto's evidence is that the search warrants were discussed and that he did I understand that he did refer to Mr Levy by name at the meeting. The note records that Dr Britto would consult with the members who were not in attendance and if they were in agreement the GPA would proceed with section 34. Dr Britto and Mr McGrail met in person the next day. The meeting was secretly recorded by Mr McGrail so the Inquiry has a complete | 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 | clarify in questioning because it does appear impliedly to that it may impliedly refer to it in the sense that it refers to dealings with the chief minister previously. (16.11) On 29 May 2020, Charles Gomez, the lawyer acting on behalf of Mr McGrail, wrote to the GPA with representations about the flaws in the GPA's process, describing it as "grossly procedurally unfair", for example because Dr Britto had told Mr McGrail that if he refused to comply with invitation to retire, then the Governor would use his powers under section 13 of the 2006 Act, and representations had not been sought before the process was followed. As to substantive matters, the letter queried why there had been no reference to the search warrants in a second letter, and accused the Attorney General and the Chief |
| 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 | note records that Dr Britto read out the file note to the meeting which the Inquiry understands to be the record prepared by the chief minister that I have just referred to. The note states that the collision at sea was a major factor in the GPA's decision but Dr Britto's evidence is that the search warrants were discussed and that he did I understand that he did refer to Mr Levy by name at the meeting. The note records that Dr Britto would consult with the members who were not in attendance and if they were in agreement the GPA would proceed with section 34. Dr Britto and Mr McGrail met in person the next day. The meeting was secretly recorded by Mr McGrail so the Inquiry has a complete picture of what was said. At the meeting, Dr | 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 | clarify in questioning because it does appear impliedly to that it may impliedly refer to it in the sense that it refers to dealings with the chief minister previously. (16.11) On 29 May 2020, Charles Gomez, the lawyer acting on behalf of Mr McGrail, wrote to the GPA with representations about the flaws in the GPA's process, describing it as "grossly procedurally unfair", for example because Dr Britto had told Mr McGrail that if he refused to comply with invitation to retire, then the Governor would use his powers under section 13 of the 2006 Act, and representations had not been sought before the process was followed. As to substantive matters, the letter queried why there had been no reference to the search warrants in a second letter, and |
| 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 | note records that Dr Britto read out the file note to the meeting which the Inquiry understands to be the record prepared by the chief minister that I have just referred to. The note states that the collision at sea was a major factor in the GPA's decision but Dr Britto's evidence is that the search warrants were discussed and that he did I understand that he did refer to Mr Levy by name at the meeting. The note records that Dr Britto would consult with the members who were not in attendance and if they were in agreement the GPA would proceed with section 34. Dr Britto and Mr McGrail met in person the next day. The meeting was secretly recorded by Mr McGrail so the Inquiry has a complete picture of what was said. At the meeting, Dr Britto relayed that the chief minister and Mr | 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 | clarify in questioning because it does appear impliedly to that it may impliedly refer to it in the sense that it refers to dealings with the chief minister previously. (16.11) On 29 May 2020, Charles Gomez, the lawyer acting on behalf of Mr McGrail, wrote to the GPA with representations about the flaws in the GPA's process, describing it as "grossly procedurally unfair", for example because Dr Britto had told Mr McGrail that if he refused to comply with invitation to retire, then the Governor would use his powers under section 13 of the 2006 Act, and representations had not been sought before the process was followed. As to substantive matters, the letter queried why there had been no reference to the search warrants in a second letter, and accused the Attorney General and the Chief |
| 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 | note records that Dr Britto read out the file note to the meeting which the Inquiry understands to be the record prepared by the chief minister that I have just referred to. The note states that the collision at sea was a major factor in the GPA's decision but Dr Britto's evidence is that the search warrants were discussed and that he did I understand that he did refer to Mr Levy by name at the meeting. The note records that Dr Britto would consult with the members who were not in attendance and if they were in agreement the GPA would proceed with section 34. Dr Britto and Mr McGrail met in person the next day. The meeting was secretly recorded by Mr McGrail so the Inquiry has a complete picture of what was said. At the meeting, Dr Britto relayed that the chief minister and Mr Pyle had lost confidence, complete | 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 | clarify in questioning because it does appear impliedly to that it may impliedly refer to it in the sense that it refers to dealings with the chief minister previously. (16.11) On 29 May 2020, Charles Gomez, the lawyer acting on behalf of Mr McGrail, wrote to the GPA with representations about the flaws in the GPA's process, describing it as "grossly procedurally unfair", for example because Dr Britto had told Mr McGrail that if he refused to comply with invitation to retire, then the Governor would use his powers under section 13 of the 2006 Act, and representations had not been sought before the process was followed. As to substantive matters, the letter queried why there had been no reference to the search warrants in a second letter, and accused the Attorney General and the Chief Minister of grossly inappropriate interference |
| 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24 | note records that Dr Britto read out the file note to the meeting which the Inquiry understands to be the record prepared by the chief minister that I have just referred to. The note states that the collision at sea was a major factor in the GPA's decision but Dr Britto's evidence is that the search warrants were discussed and that he did I understand that he did refer to Mr Levy by name at the meeting. The note records that Dr Britto would consult with the members who were not in attendance and if they were in agreement the GPA would proceed with section 34. Dr Britto and Mr McGrail met in person the next day. The meeting was secretly recorded by Mr McGrail so the Inquiry has a complete picture of what was said. At the meeting, Dr Britto relayed that the chief minister and Mr Pyle had lost confidence, complete confidence in Mr McGrail's leadership and management style. Dr Britto referred to the | 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24 | clarify in questioning because it does appear impliedly to that it may impliedly refer to it in the sense that it refers to dealings with the chief minister previously. (16.11) On 29 May 2020, Charles Gomez, the lawyer acting on behalf of Mr McGrail, wrote to the GPA with representations about the flaws in the GPA's process, describing it as "grossly procedurally unfair", for example because Dr Britto had told Mr McGrail that if he refused to comply with invitation to retire, then the Governor would use his powers under section 13 of the 2006 Act, and representations had not been sought before the process was followed. As to substantive matters, the letter queried why there had been no reference to the search warrants in a second letter, and accused the Attorney General and the Chief Minister of grossly inappropriate interference with a live criminal investigation. It argued that the incident at sea and the HMIC report |
| 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24 | note records that Dr Britto read out the file note to the meeting which the Inquiry understands to be the record prepared by the chief minister that I have just referred to. The note states that the collision at sea was a major factor in the GPA's decision but Dr Britto's evidence is that the search warrants were discussed and that he did I understand that he did refer to Mr Levy by name at the meeting. The note records that Dr Britto would consult with the members who were not in attendance and if they were in agreement the GPA would proceed with section 34. Dr Britto and Mr McGrail met in person the next day. The meeting was secretly recorded by Mr McGrail so the Inquiry has a complete picture of what was said. At the meeting, Dr Britto relayed that the chief minister and Mr Pyle had lost confidence, complete confidence in Mr McGrail's leadership and | 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24 | clarify in questioning because it does appear impliedly to that it may impliedly refer to it in the sense that it refers to dealings with the chief minister previously. (16.11) On 29 May 2020, Charles Gomez, the lawyer acting on behalf of Mr McGrail, wrote to the GPA with representations about the flaws in the GPA's process, describing it as "grossly procedurally unfair", for example because Dr Britto had told Mr McGrail that if he refused to comply with invitation to retire, then the Governor would use his powers under section 13 of the 2006 Act, and representations had not been sought before the process was followed. As to substantive matters, the letter queried why there had been no reference to the search warrants in a second letter, and accused the Attorney General and the Chief Minister of grossly inappropriate interference with a live criminal investigation. It argued |

| 1 | were fig leaves for this real reason, that Mr | 1 | of the invitation for Mr McGrail to retire. It |
|--|---|--|---|
| 2 | McGrail was being requested to retire. Each | 2 | seems beyond dispute that this was a |
| 3 | of Mr Pyle, the Chief Minister and the | 3 | circumstance leading to Mr McGrail's |
| 4 | Attorney General responded to the GPA | 4 | retirement, but was it also a reason. On Mr |
| 5 | about 29 May letter. We refer to those three | 5 | Pyle's case, the GPA's failure to complete the |
| 6 | letters as "the three letters" and when I come | 6 | process in a procedurally fair manner amount |
| 7 | to examine each of those witnesses, we will | 7 | to a failure to perform its statutory |
| 8 | need to go through those letters in detail, as | 8 | responsibility which allowed Mr Pyle to |
| 9 | they set out each of Mr Pyle's, the Chief | 9 | exercise his power under section 13. We will |
| 10 | Minister's and the Attorney General's | 10 | hear submissions from CPs on this point. |
| 11 | position on why they lost confidence in Mr | 11 | On 5 June the GPA also informed Charles |
| 12 | McGrail. | 12 | Gomez & Co of their decision to withdraw |
| 13 | Issue 8 requires you to consider that letter | 13 | the section 34 process. That is at C4801. |
| 14 | because each of Mr Pyle, the Chief Minister | 14 | Sorry, I am corrected, the response from |
| 15 | and the Attorney General refer to it as either | 15 | Charles Gomez & Co is at C4801, but it is |
| 16 | cementing or deepening their loss of | 16 | worth looking at. In response to being |
| 17 | confidence in Mr McGrail. If that evidence | 17 | informed that the process was being |
| 18 | is accepted, then it is certainly only to the | 18 | withdrawn, Mr Gomez addressed some of the |
| 19 | Inquiry to conclude that 29 May letter was a | 19 | matters that were raised in the letter. In the |
| 20 | reason leading to Mr McGrail's early | 20 | final paragraph or the final substantive |
| 21 | retirement, but it is clear that the letter was | 21 | paragraph, that email reads as follows: |
| 22 | sent once events were already in motion and | 22 | "Our client is gravely concerned by how he |
| 23 | Mr Pyle and the Chief Minister had already | 23 | has been treated during this process and I |
| 24 | determined that they had lost confidence in | 24 | welcome your frank acknowledgement that |
| 25 | Mr McGrail, so the Inquiry will therefore | 25 | there have been procedural flaws. He is an |
| 25 | win we drain, so the inquiry win therefore | 25 | there have been procedural haws. The is an |
| | Page 249 | | Page 251 |
| | | | |
| | | | |
| 1 | need to consider whether it truly did play a | 1 | officer of the highest standing with an |
| 1 2 | need to consider whether it truly did play a causative role. | 1 2 | officer of the highest standing with an impeccable record over the past 36 years. In |
| | causative role. Turning back to the events of May and June, | 2 3 | impeccable record over the past 36 years. In these circumstances, given how unfairly he |
| 2 | causative role. Turning back to the events of May and June, on 3 June 2020 the GPA instructed Mr Neish | 2 3 4 | impeccable record over the past 36 years. In these circumstances, given how unfairly he has been treated and the improper pressure |
| 2 3 4 5 | causative role. Turning back to the events of May and June, on 3 June 2020 the GPA instructed Mr Neish KC of TSN to provide legal advice. Mr | 2 3 4 5 | impeccable record over the past 36 years. In these circumstances, given how unfairly he has been treated and the improper pressure put upon him to alter the course of a live |
| 2 3 4 | causative role. Turning back to the events of May and June, on 3 June 2020 the GPA instructed Mr Neish | 2 3 4 | impeccable record over the past 36 years. In these circumstances, given how unfairly he has been treated and the improper pressure |
| 2 3 4 5 | causative role. Turning back to the events of May and June, on 3 June 2020 the GPA instructed Mr Neish KC of TSN to provide legal advice. Mr | 2 3 4 5 | impeccable record over the past 36 years. In these circumstances, given how unfairly he has been treated and the improper pressure put upon him to alter the course of a live criminal investigation, our client feels he must apply for early retirement from the |
| 2 3 4 5 6 | causative role. Turning back to the events of May and June, on 3 June 2020 the GPA instructed Mr Neish KC of TSN to provide legal advice. Mr Neish KC advised that the GPA process was | 2 3 4 5 6 | impeccable record over the past 36 years. In these circumstances, given how unfairly he has been treated and the improper pressure put upon him to alter the course of a live criminal investigation, our client feels he |
| 2 3 4 5 6 7 | causative role. Turning back to the events of May and June, on 3 June 2020 the GPA instructed Mr Neish KC of TSN to provide legal advice. Mr Neish KC advised that the GPA process was flawed because the GPA's invitation to retire | 2 3 4 5 6 7 | impeccable record over the past 36 years. In these circumstances, given how unfairly he has been treated and the improper pressure put upon him to alter the course of a live criminal investigation, our client feels he must apply for early retirement from the |
| 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 | causative role. Turning back to the events of May and June, on 3 June 2020 the GPA instructed Mr Neish KC of TSN to provide legal advice. Mr Neish KC advised that the GPA process was flawed because the GPA's invitation to retire could only be made after affording Mr | 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 | impeccable record over the past 36 years. In these circumstances, given how unfairly he has been treated and the improper pressure put upon him to alter the course of a live criminal investigation, our client feels he must apply for early retirement from the Royal Gibraltar Police." |
| 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 | causative role. Turning back to the events of May and June, on 3 June 2020 the GPA instructed Mr Neish KC of TSN to provide legal advice. Mr Neish KC advised that the GPA process was flawed because the GPA's invitation to retire could only be made after affording Mr McGrail reasonable opportunity to make | 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 | impeccable record over the past 36 years. In these circumstances, given how unfairly he has been treated and the improper pressure put upon him to alter the course of a live criminal investigation, our client feels he must apply for early retirement from the Royal Gibraltar Police." That afternoon, on 5 June Mr Pyle met with |
| 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 | causative role. Turning back to the events of May and June, on 3 June 2020 the GPA instructed Mr Neish KC of TSN to provide legal advice. Mr Neish KC advised that the GPA process was flawed because the GPA's invitation to retire could only be made after affording Mr McGrail reasonable opportunity to make representations and giving due consideration | 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 | impeccable record over the past 36 years. In these circumstances, given how unfairly he has been treated and the improper pressure put upon him to alter the course of a live criminal investigation, our client feels he must apply for early retirement from the Royal Gibraltar Police." That afternoon, on 5 June Mr Pyle met with Mr McGrail and Mr McGrail handed Mr Pyle |
| 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 | causative role. Turning back to the events of May and June, on 3 June 2020 the GPA instructed Mr Neish KC of TSN to provide legal advice. Mr Neish KC advised that the GPA process was flawed because the GPA's invitation to retire could only be made after affording Mr McGrail reasonable opportunity to make representations and giving due consideration to those representations. On 5 June, Dr Britto advised Mr Pyle that the section 34 process had been fundamentally flawed and | 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 | impeccable record over the past 36 years. In these circumstances, given how unfairly he has been treated and the improper pressure put upon him to alter the course of a live criminal investigation, our client feels he must apply for early retirement from the Royal Gibraltar Police." That afternoon, on 5 June Mr Pyle met with Mr McGrail and Mr McGrail handed Mr Pyle a copy of that email. There is conflicting evidence of what was said at that meeting, which the Inquiry will explore in |
| 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 | causative role. Turning back to the events of May and June, on 3 June 2020 the GPA instructed Mr Neish KC of TSN to provide legal advice. Mr Neish KC advised that the GPA process was flawed because the GPA's invitation to retire could only be made after affording Mr McGrail reasonable opportunity to make representations and giving due consideration to those representations. On 5 June, Dr Britto advised Mr Pyle that the section 34 | 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 | impeccable record over the past 36 years. In these circumstances, given how unfairly he has been treated and the improper pressure put upon him to alter the course of a live criminal investigation, our client feels he must apply for early retirement from the Royal Gibraltar Police." That afternoon, on 5 June Mr Pyle met with Mr McGrail and Mr McGrail handed Mr Pyle a copy of that email. There is conflicting evidence of what was said at that meeting, |
| 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 | causative role. Turning back to the events of May and June, on 3 June 2020 the GPA instructed Mr Neish KC of TSN to provide legal advice. Mr Neish KC advised that the GPA process was flawed because the GPA's invitation to retire could only be made after affording Mr McGrail reasonable opportunity to make representations and giving due consideration to those representations. On 5 June, Dr Britto advised Mr Pyle that the section 34 process had been fundamentally flawed and | 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 | impeccable record over the past 36 years. In these circumstances, given how unfairly he has been treated and the improper pressure put upon him to alter the course of a live criminal investigation, our client feels he must apply for early retirement from the Royal Gibraltar Police." That afternoon, on 5 June Mr Pyle met with Mr McGrail and Mr McGrail handed Mr Pyle a copy of that email. There is conflicting evidence of what was said at that meeting, which the Inquiry will explore in |
| 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 | causative role. Turning back to the events of May and June, on 3 June 2020 the GPA instructed Mr Neish KC of TSN to provide legal advice. Mr Neish KC advised that the GPA process was flawed because the GPA's invitation to retire could only be made after affording Mr McGrail reasonable opportunity to make representations and giving due consideration to those representations. On 5 June, Dr Britto advised Mr Pyle that the section 34 process had been fundamentally flawed and should be withdrawn. Mr Pyle took advice | 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 | impeccable record over the past 36 years. In these circumstances, given how unfairly he has been treated and the improper pressure put upon him to alter the course of a live criminal investigation, our client feels he must apply for early retirement from the Royal Gibraltar Police." That afternoon, on 5 June Mr Pyle met with Mr McGrail and Mr McGrail handed Mr Pyle a copy of that email. There is conflicting evidence of what was said at that meeting, which the Inquiry will explore in questioning, but what is undisputed is that |
| 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 | causative role. Turning back to the events of May and June, on 3 June 2020 the GPA instructed Mr Neish KC of TSN to provide legal advice. Mr Neish KC advised that the GPA process was flawed because the GPA's invitation to retire could only be made after affording Mr McGrail reasonable opportunity to make representations and giving due consideration to those representations. On 5 June, Dr Britto advised Mr Pyle that the section 34 process had been fundamentally flawed and should be withdrawn. Mr Pyle took advice from the Attorney General on how to respond | 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 | impeccable record over the past 36 years. In these circumstances, given how unfairly he has been treated and the improper pressure put upon him to alter the course of a live criminal investigation, our client feels he must apply for early retirement from the Royal Gibraltar Police." That afternoon, on 5 June Mr Pyle met with Mr McGrail and Mr McGrail handed Mr Pyle a copy of that email. There is conflicting evidence of what was said at that meeting, which the Inquiry will explore in questioning, but what is undisputed is that Mr Pyle said he would be reading all the |
| 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 | causative role. Turning back to the events of May and June, on 3 June 2020 the GPA instructed Mr Neish KC of TSN to provide legal advice. Mr Neish KC advised that the GPA process was flawed because the GPA's invitation to retire could only be made after affording Mr McGrail reasonable opportunity to make representations and giving due consideration to those representations. On 5 June, Dr Britto advised Mr Pyle that the section 34 process had been fundamentally flawed and should be withdrawn. Mr Pyle took advice from the Attorney General on how to respond and the Attorney General advised that due to | 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 | impeccable record over the past 36 years. In these circumstances, given how unfairly he has been treated and the improper pressure put upon him to alter the course of a live criminal investigation, our client feels he must apply for early retirement from the Royal Gibraltar Police." That afternoon, on 5 June Mr Pyle met with Mr McGrail and Mr McGrail handed Mr Pyle a copy of that email. There is conflicting evidence of what was said at that meeting, which the Inquiry will explore in questioning, but what is undisputed is that Mr Pyle said he would be reading all the correspondence over the weekend and they |
| 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 | causative role. Turning back to the events of May and June, on 3 June 2020 the GPA instructed Mr Neish KC of TSN to provide legal advice. Mr Neish KC advised that the GPA process was flawed because the GPA's invitation to retire could only be made after affording Mr McGrail reasonable opportunity to make representations and giving due consideration to those representations. On 5 June, Dr Britto advised Mr Pyle that the section 34 process had been fundamentally flawed and should be withdrawn. Mr Pyle took advice from the Attorney General on how to respond and the Attorney General advised that due to the GPA's inability to perform its | 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 | impeccable record over the past 36 years. In these circumstances, given how unfairly he has been treated and the improper pressure put upon him to alter the course of a live criminal investigation, our client feels he must apply for early retirement from the Royal Gibraltar Police." That afternoon, on 5 June Mr Pyle met with Mr McGrail and Mr McGrail handed Mr Pyle a copy of that email. There is conflicting evidence of what was said at that meeting, which the Inquiry will explore in questioning, but what is undisputed is that Mr Pyle said he would be reading all the correspondence over the weekend and they would meet again on the Monday. One |
| 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 | causative role. Turning back to the events of May and June, on 3 June 2020 the GPA instructed Mr Neish KC of TSN to provide legal advice. Mr Neish KC advised that the GPA process was flawed because the GPA's invitation to retire could only be made after affording Mr McGrail reasonable opportunity to make representations and giving due consideration to those representations. On 5 June, Dr Britto advised Mr Pyle that the section 34 process had been fundamentally flawed and should be withdrawn. Mr Pyle took advice from the Attorney General on how to respond and the Attorney General advised that due to the GPA's inability to perform its responsibility under section 34 of the Act, the | 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 | impeccable record over the past 36 years. In these circumstances, given how unfairly he has been treated and the improper pressure put upon him to alter the course of a live criminal investigation, our client feels he must apply for early retirement from the Royal Gibraltar Police." That afternoon, on 5 June Mr Pyle met with Mr McGrail and Mr McGrail handed Mr Pyle a copy of that email. There is conflicting evidence of what was said at that meeting, which the Inquiry will explore in questioning, but what is undisputed is that Mr Pyle said he would be reading all the correspondence over the weekend and they would meet again on the Monday. One matter of disagreement is whether at that |
| 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 | causative role. Turning back to the events of May and June, on 3 June 2020 the GPA instructed Mr Neish KC of TSN to provide legal advice. Mr Neish KC advised that the GPA process was flawed because the GPA's invitation to retire could only be made after affording Mr McGrail reasonable opportunity to make representations and giving due consideration to those representations. On 5 June, Dr Britto advised Mr Pyle that the section 34 process had been fundamentally flawed and should be withdrawn. Mr Pyle took advice from the Attorney General on how to respond and the Attorney General advised that due to the GPA's inability to perform its responsibility under section 34 of the Act, the current situation is one which falls within the | 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 | impeccable record over the past 36 years. In these circumstances, given how unfairly he has been treated and the improper pressure put upon him to alter the course of a live criminal investigation, our client feels he must apply for early retirement from the Royal Gibraltar Police." That afternoon, on 5 June Mr Pyle met with Mr McGrail and Mr McGrail handed Mr Pyle a copy of that email. There is conflicting evidence of what was said at that meeting, which the Inquiry will explore in questioning, but what is undisputed is that Mr Pyle said he would be reading all the correspondence over the weekend and they would meet again on the Monday. One matter of disagreement is whether at that stage Mr Pyle told Mr McGrail that he would |
| 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 | causative role. Turning back to the events of May and June, on 3 June 2020 the GPA instructed Mr Neish KC of TSN to provide legal advice. Mr Neish KC advised that the GPA process was flawed because the GPA's invitation to retire could only be made after affording Mr McGrail reasonable opportunity to make representations and giving due consideration to those representations. On 5 June, Dr Britto advised Mr Pyle that the section 34 process had been fundamentally flawed and should be withdrawn. Mr Pyle took advice from the Attorney General on how to respond and the Attorney General advised that due to the GPA's inability to perform its responsibility under section 34 of the Act, the current situation is one which falls within the section 13 of the Police Act and my advice is | 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 | impeccable record over the past 36 years. In these circumstances, given how unfairly he has been treated and the improper pressure put upon him to alter the course of a live criminal investigation, our client feels he must apply for early retirement from the Royal Gibraltar Police." That afternoon, on 5 June Mr Pyle met with Mr McGrail and Mr McGrail handed Mr Pyle a copy of that email. There is conflicting evidence of what was said at that meeting, which the Inquiry will explore in questioning, but what is undisputed is that Mr Pyle said he would be reading all the correspondence over the weekend and they would meet again on the Monday. One matter of disagreement is whether at that stage Mr Pyle told Mr McGrail that he would be exercising his section 13 powers on the |
| 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 | causative role. Turning back to the events of May and June, on 3 June 2020 the GPA instructed Mr Neish KC of TSN to provide legal advice. Mr Neish KC advised that the GPA process was flawed because the GPA's invitation to retire could only be made after affording Mr McGrail reasonable opportunity to make representations and giving due consideration to those representations. On 5 June, Dr Britto advised Mr Pyle that the section 34 process had been fundamentally flawed and should be withdrawn. Mr Pyle took advice from the Attorney General on how to respond and the Attorney General advised that due to the GPA's inability to perform its responsibility under section 34 of the Act, the current situation is one which falls within the section 13 of the Police Act and my advice is that in the circumstances of the case, that | 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 | impeccable record over the past 36 years. In these circumstances, given how unfairly he has been treated and the improper pressure put upon him to alter the course of a live criminal investigation, our client feels he must apply for early retirement from the Royal Gibraltar Police." That afternoon, on 5 June Mr Pyle met with Mr McGrail and Mr McGrail handed Mr Pyle a copy of that email. There is conflicting evidence of what was said at that meeting, which the Inquiry will explore in questioning, but what is undisputed is that Mr Pyle said he would be reading all the correspondence over the weekend and they would meet again on the Monday. One matter of disagreement is whether at that stage Mr Pyle told Mr McGrail that he would be exercising his section 13 powers on the Monday. |
| 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 | causative role. Turning back to the events of May and June, on 3 June 2020 the GPA instructed Mr Neish KC of TSN to provide legal advice. Mr Neish KC advised that the GPA process was flawed because the GPA's invitation to retire could only be made after affording Mr McGrail reasonable opportunity to make representations and giving due consideration to those representations. On 5 June, Dr Britto advised Mr Pyle that the section 34 process had been fundamentally flawed and should be withdrawn. Mr Pyle took advice from the Attorney General on how to respond and the Attorney General advised that due to the GPA's inability to perform its responsibility under section 34 of the Act, the current situation is one which falls within the section 13 of the Police Act and my advice is that in the circumstances of the case, that power is available to you if you were to | 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 | impeccable record over the past 36 years. In these circumstances, given how unfairly he has been treated and the improper pressure put upon him to alter the course of a live criminal investigation, our client feels he must apply for early retirement from the Royal Gibraltar Police." That afternoon, on 5 June Mr Pyle met with Mr McGrail and Mr McGrail handed Mr Pyle a copy of that email. There is conflicting evidence of what was said at that meeting, which the Inquiry will explore in questioning, but what is undisputed is that Mr Pyle said he would be reading all the correspondence over the weekend and they would meet again on the Monday. One matter of disagreement is whether at that stage Mr Pyle told Mr McGrail that he would be exercising his section 13 powers on the Monday. On the Saturday, 6 June, Mr Pyle wrote to |
| 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 | causative role. Turning back to the events of May and June, on 3 June 2020 the GPA instructed Mr Neish KC of TSN to provide legal advice. Mr Neish KC advised that the GPA process was flawed because the GPA's invitation to retire could only be made after affording Mr McGrail reasonable opportunity to make representations and giving due consideration to those representations. On 5 June, Dr Britto advised Mr Pyle that the section 34 process had been fundamentally flawed and should be withdrawn. Mr Pyle took advice from the Attorney General on how to respond and the Attorney General advised that due to the GPA's inability to perform its responsibility under section 34 of the Act, the current situation is one which falls within the section 13 of the Police Act and my advice is that in the circumstances of the case, that power is available to you if you were to decide to avail yourself of it. | 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 | impeccable record over the past 36 years. In these circumstances, given how unfairly he has been treated and the improper pressure put upon him to alter the course of a live criminal investigation, our client feels he must apply for early retirement from the Royal Gibraltar Police." That afternoon, on 5 June Mr Pyle met with Mr McGrail and Mr McGrail handed Mr Pyle a copy of that email. There is conflicting evidence of what was said at that meeting, which the Inquiry will explore in questioning, but what is undisputed is that Mr Pyle said he would be reading all the correspondence over the weekend and they would meet again on the Monday. One matter of disagreement is whether at that stage Mr Pyle told Mr McGrail that he would be exercising his section 13 powers on the Monday. On the Saturday, 6 June, Mr Pyle wrote to Mr McGrail asking him to confirm by |
| 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24 | causative role. Turning back to the events of May and June, on 3 June 2020 the GPA instructed Mr Neish KC of TSN to provide legal advice. Mr Neish KC advised that the GPA process was flawed because the GPA's invitation to retire could only be made after affording Mr McGrail reasonable opportunity to make representations and giving due consideration to those representations. On 5 June, Dr Britto advised Mr Pyle that the section 34 process had been fundamentally flawed and should be withdrawn. Mr Pyle took advice from the Attorney General on how to respond and the Attorney General advised that due to the GPA's inability to perform its responsibility under section 34 of the Act, the current situation is one which falls within the section 13 of the Police Act and my advice is that in the circumstances of the case, that power is available to you if you were to decide to avail yourself of it. Issue 10 requires the Inquiry to consider the GPA's processes, including their withdrawal | 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24 | impeccable record over the past 36 years. In these circumstances, given how unfairly he has been treated and the improper pressure put upon him to alter the course of a live criminal investigation, our client feels he must apply for early retirement from the Royal Gibraltar Police." That afternoon, on 5 June Mr Pyle met with Mr McGrail and Mr McGrail handed Mr Pyle a copy of that email. There is conflicting evidence of what was said at that meeting, which the Inquiry will explore in questioning, but what is undisputed is that Mr Pyle said he would be reading all the correspondence over the weekend and they would meet again on the Monday. One matter of disagreement is whether at that stage Mr Pyle told Mr McGrail that he would be exercising his section 13 powers on the Monday. On the Saturday, 6 June, Mr Pyle wrote to Mr McGrail asking him to confirm by midday on Sunday whether it was in fact his decision to take early retirement given what |
| 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24 | causative role. Turning back to the events of May and June, on 3 June 2020 the GPA instructed Mr Neish KC of TSN to provide legal advice. Mr Neish KC advised that the GPA process was flawed because the GPA's invitation to retire could only be made after affording Mr McGrail reasonable opportunity to make representations and giving due consideration to those representations. On 5 June, Dr Britto advised Mr Pyle that the section 34 process had been fundamentally flawed and should be withdrawn. Mr Pyle took advice from the Attorney General on how to respond and the Attorney General advised that due to the GPA's inability to perform its responsibility under section 34 of the Act, the current situation is one which falls within the section 13 of the Police Act and my advice is that in the circumstances of the case, that power is available to you if you were to decide to avail yourself of it. Issue 10 requires the Inquiry to consider the | 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24 | impeccable record over the past 36 years. In these circumstances, given how unfairly he has been treated and the improper pressure put upon him to alter the course of a live criminal investigation, our client feels he must apply for early retirement from the Royal Gibraltar Police." That afternoon, on 5 June Mr Pyle met with Mr McGrail and Mr McGrail handed Mr Pyle a copy of that email. There is conflicting evidence of what was said at that meeting, which the Inquiry will explore in questioning, but what is undisputed is that Mr Pyle said he would be reading all the correspondence over the weekend and they would meet again on the Monday. One matter of disagreement is whether at that stage Mr Pyle told Mr McGrail that he would be exercising his section 13 powers on the Monday. On the Saturday, 6 June, Mr Pyle wrote to Mr McGrail asking him to confirm by midday on Sunday whether it was in fact his |

| 1 had been said in the small of S Town and 1 | 1 subsection was trianged but a court of |
|---|---|
| 1 had been said in the email of 5 June which | 1 subsection was triggered, both as a matter of |
| 2 McGrail had passed him during the meeting | 2 law and fact during May 2020. |
| of the previous day. He asked Mr McGrail | 3 That concludes 8 to 10, so in conclusion, Sir, |
| 4 "whether you will be tendering your letter of | 4 we have plenty of to address over the coming |
| 5 resignation on Monday". On Monday, 8 | 5 weeks. I think I have said more than enough |
| 6 June, Mr McGrail and Mr Pyle met twice | 6 now and you will hear opening statements |
| 7 during the course of the day where Mr 8 McGrail confirmed he would be seeking | 7 from the counsel representing core 8 participants over the next two days. |
| e | 1 1 |
| 9 early retirement, subject to certain personal terms. Mr McGrail's evidence is that, "By | |
| | 10 counsel, Mr Cruz(?), former Superintendent |
| , 1 | 11 Richardson's counsel, Patrick Gibbs KC, the 12 GPA's counsel, James Neish KC, and the |
| was to find the best way out before I was made to suffer even more. My mental health | 13 Operation Delhi defendants' counsel, Ben |
| was very badly affected. I had completed 36 | 14 Cooper, KC. I do not believe the Gibraltar |
| 15 years of service and did not want to put in | 15 Police Federation will be giving opening |
| 16 jeopardy my pension entitlements." | 16 statements. Then on Wednesday, you will |
| 17 After correspondence between the parties | hear from Mr McGrail's counsel, Caoilfhionn |
| 18 over the course of the day which involved | 18 Gallagher KC, and then the Government |
| 19 discussion of Mr McGrail's terms of | 19 parties' counsel, Sir Peter Caruana KC in the |
| 20 retirement, an agreement was eventually | 20 afternoon. |
| 21 reached on Monday evening and Mr McGrail | 21 That concludes my opening statement. |
| 22 handed in his formal letter requesting early | 22 THE CHAIRMAN: Yes, thank you very |
| 23 retirement on the Tuesday morning. | 23 much indeed. Mr Cruz, perhaps I could ask |
| 24 Issue 9 requires the Chairman to consider Mr | you, are you happy with the order of |
| 25 Pyle's actions in those final days. There is no | 25 addresses as has just been set out by Mr |
| 25 Tyle's actions in those final days. There is no | addresses as has just been set out by Wi |
| Page 253 | Page 255 |
| 1 dispute that Mr Pyle stated he was willing to | 1 Santos? |
| 2 use his powers under section 13 if Mr | 2 MD CDUZ. Vos. thoule voy. Thoule voy. Mr. |
| 3 McGrail did not offer to retire, nor is there a | 2 MR CRUZ: Yes, thank you. Thank you, Mr |
| 4 dispute that Mr Pyle was keen to resolve the | 3 Chairman. |
| 5 matter before the new Governor, Sir David | 4 THE CHAIRMAN: Does anybody else have |
| 6 Steel, arrived in Gibraltar. That much is | |
| 7 clear from Mr Pyle's communications with | 5 any problem with that? |
| 8 the FCDO. | 6 MR GIBBS: No problem at all. |
| 9 While the new Governor's arrival may not 10 have been a reason in its own right for Mr | 7 THE CHAIRMAN: If I allow you about an |
| 11 McGrail's retirement, the Inquiry will need to | 8 hour each, is that going to suffice? |
| explore whether it expedited the timing of Mr | |
| Pyle's actions. An important consideration | 9 MR CRUZ: I would hope so, Mr Chairman. |
| here is section 22(3) of the constitution which applies when a person is performing | 10 I am on notice. |
| the role of Governor while the office is | 11 THE CHAIRMAN: I am sure we will finish |
| absent, as Mr Pyle was as interim Governor | 12 tomorrow, one way or another. I will see you |
| in May 2020. Section 22(3) states that "Any | 13 tomorrow. Many thanks. |
| such person shall not continue to perform the functions of the office of Governor after the | · |
| 21 Governor or some other person having a | |
| 22 prior right to perform the functions of that | 15 2024) |
| 23 office has notified him that he is about to | 16 (16.21) |
| assume or resume those functions." The | |
| 25 Inquiry will need to consider whether this | 17 |
| | |
| Page 254 | Page 256 |

| A | 215:25 238:17 | 137:25 138:19 | actors 243:10 | admitted 21:20 |
|---|--------------------|---------------------|--------------------------|---------------------|
| A186 64:11 | access 53:22 144:5 | 150:12 156:11 | acts 116:5 153:25 | advance 8:12 |
| A190 144:15 | 177:20,24 178:3 | 187:24 192:3,5 | actual 181:6 | 14:12,16 180:4 |
| A224 204:12 | 208:18 | 216:19 231:24 | acute 212:22 | 189:9,16 |
| A230 131:7 | accessing 182:6 | 232:22 233:24 | add 41:23 56:6 | advantage 185:24 |
| A240 28:17 | accommodating | 235:3 241:2,5 | 174:4 | adversarial 11:23 |
| A240 28:17 A249 229:10 | 71:9 | 242:20 244:9 | added 23:20 35:23 | 14:11 |
| A251 78:13 | accompanied | 245:6 246:2 | 97:11 148:3 | adverse 236:23 |
| A264 100:18 | 56:18 | 247:24 248:16 | 247:19 | advice 13:24 24:22 |
| A274 152:14 | account 5:12 7:22 | 250:18,20 | adding 60:3 81:9 | 38:10,13 47:24 |
| A289 217:11 | 8:1 10:23 54:15 | acted 12:9 17:15 | addition 94:5 | 66:11 90:15 |
| A310 202:12 | 128:4 152:14 | 24:22 38:7,21 | 172:15 183:10 | 102:1 137:8 |
| A9 163:6 | 169:1 171:11 | 57:11 146:19 | 208:16 | 148:13,17,21,24 |
| AAP 224:9 | 192:9 225:8 | 149:18,19 162:3 | additional 89:16 | 149:1,3,8 150:4 |
| abetting 144:5 | 237:12 238:11 | 167:22 206:4 | 116:18 122:12 | 159:3 161:6,16 |
| abilities 78:21 | 239:10 | 208:10 | 206:20 225:5 | 161:21 162:10 |
| ability 36:12 41:13 | accountability | acting 11:2 18:1,3 | additionally 138:5 | 168:19 172:2 |
| 226:18 231:20 | 10:25 92:23 | 18:5 59:2 85:3 | 207:18 | 173:16 174:9 |
| abject 92:14 | accountable | 177:1 241:6 | address 14:25 | 181:11,25 183:1 |
| able 6:17 19:20 | 173:25 | 248:9 | 20:22 21:6 24:7 | 183:11 184:3 |
| 53:2 65:13 81:24 | accounts 7:16 9:9 | action 17:2,11 | 36:15 39:9 75:22 | 192:15 194:8 |
| 101:4 113:25 | 28:7 43:14,16 | 18:11 38:19 | 139:4 160:23 | 199:20 211:9 |
| 115:5 129:8 | 163:6 195:21 | 49:23 85:24 | 164:25 166:22 | 212:18 250:5,14 |
| 150:16 208:13 | accusations 156:6 | 110:23 137:6 | 220:21 223:8 | 250:20 |
| 211:6 242:24 | accused 63:25 | 153:3 158:11 | 226:14 231:23 | advise 120:11,12 |
| aboard 77:16 | 248:22 | 159:20 161:8,25 | 237:16 255:4 | 120:14 137:12 |
| abolished 192:2 | achieve 89:11 | 166:18 192:20 | addressed 16:17 | 153:7 165:17 |
| absence 179:19 | 122:8 | 223:9 226:6 | 23:18 102:15 | 174:6 190:24 |
| absent 254:17 | achieved 65:1 | actions 11:2 15:2 | 169:8 194:14 | advised 34:8 48:1 |
| absolute 8:23 | 229:2,2 | 25:1 37:14 48:10 | 213:10 223:3 | 55:5,12 83:1,22 |
| absolutely 196:15 | acknowledge | 52:23,24 54:24 | 230:21 240:20 | 129:18 132:14 |
| absurd 75:18 | 230:23 | 55:16 59:21 60:4 | 251:18 | 151:1,4 156:21 |
| abundantly 3:5 | acknowledgement | 62:9,17 66:1,10 | addresses 74:24 | 161:17 162:7 |
| 12:7 162:20 | 251:24 | 69:2 70:17,24 | 171:20 196:6 | 165:1,9 168:23 |
| 168:25 | acknowledges | 71:16 106:1 | 202:11 255:25 | 175:1 193:22 |
| abuse 7:23 196:10 | 71:12 215:5 | 111:23 120:8,18 | addressing 10:15 | 194:8 203:12 |
| 225:21 | 217:10 | 147:15 149:10,13 | 19:23 224:22 | 211:18 250:6,12 |
| abusive 75:4 | acknowledging | 165:19 169:17 | adds 40:3 | 250:16 |
| accept 20:19 | 120:12 | 173:5 190:6,12 | adhered 103:14 | adviser 100:22 |
| 143:16 193:24 | act 2:5,6,8 3:3,6 | 190:16 197:20 | adjourn 6:12 26:4 | 101:25 |
| 214:14 215:4 | 8:20 11:24 12:2 | 211:19 226:9 | Adjourned 73:3 | advises 119:11 |
| 219:10 | 19:13 21:2,6,7,14 | 253:25 254:13 | 203:22 256:14 | 121:2 |
| accepted 32:25 | 21:16,23 22:20 | activated 106:13 | adjournment | advising 166:25 |
| 58:1 62:24 | 23:9,12,14 25:3 | 116:14 | 140:3 | 215:17 |
| 111:10 139:10 | 28:6 31:5 32:20 | activities 77:10 | administration | advisor 156:13 |
| 190:3 200:22 | 33:9 34:6 36:6 | activity 29:20 71:1 | 12:22 53:18 | affairs 79:14 82:14 |
| 240:8 249:18 | 36:16 42:17 46:5 | 103:24 124:5 | Admiral 57:24 | affidavit 24:9,21 |
| accepting 59:1 | 47:19 52:1 97:23 | 131:13,22 191:24 | | 44:4 74:8 131:8 |
| accepts 195:1 | 98:1 134:2 | 197:8 | admissible 23:7 | 169:20,21 171:21 |
| | | | | |
| L | | | | |

| | | | | 1 age 230 |
|---------------------------|-----------------------|-----------------------|-------------------|-----------------------|
| 204:8,12 205:19 | 80:17 89:15 | 221:11 | amounted 169:24 | 214:21 215:13 |
| 210:3 217:13 | 102:16 107:3 | alerted 87:3 227:4 | 190:16 205:5 | 219:10 248:3 |
| affidavits 46:25 | 122:11 143:8,15 | alive 132:17 226:5 | 230:10 | appeared 44:11 |
| 204:8 211:8 | 149:9,14 150:21 | allaying 11:5 | amounts 93:25 | 52:23 58:13 90:4 |
| afford 88:15 92:20 | 156:3,18 158:19 | allegation 41:3 | 196:11 | 90:12 91:13 |
| afforded 25:10 | 159:18,22 160:1 | 141:24 181:1 | analyse 226:23 | 133:5,9 167:5 |
| affording 250:8 | 160:5 162:4,21 | 193:13 198:24 | analysed 247:23 | 170:24 171:22 |
| afoot 155:16 | 166:19 167:7 | 202:11 204:2 | analysis 113:5 | 170:24 171:22 |
| 175:14 | 195:1,14 199:14 | allegations 11:9 | 184:10 187:18 | appears 75:13,24 |
| aforesaid 156:11 | 199:23 207:15 | 15:1 21:3 24:7 | anarchic 10:12 | 105:23 112:8 |
| African 124:7 | 218:8 241:21 | 25:4,16,20,22 | and/or 26:24 | 113:10 121:11 |
| aftermath 52:2 | 242:14 | 26:3 27:19,24 | 183:15 194:7 | 123:23 204:19 |
| 61:3 195:22 | agreeing 90:21 | 28:12 30:20 41:5 | 232:18 241:16 | 207:19 215:9 |
| afternoon 4:9 5:19 | agreement 20:13 | 45:1 144:11 | anecdotal 31:3 | 216:12 |
| 140:5,13 174:16 | 38:22 40:6,8 | 232:17 233:3,17 | 107:6 235:1 | appendix 177:9 |
| 252:9 255:20 | 43:7 167:2 | 234:16 235:17 | anecdotes 233:22 | application 7:3 |
| AG 84:2 89:13 | 168:22 177:11 | 237:4 239:18,23 | 234:20 | 16:4 68:9 72:16 |
| 95:18,25 100:22 | 192:17 194:25 | alleged 24:16 | angry 147:13 | 223:5 |
| 100:23,25 101:20 | 241:8 246:16 | 37:10 108:18 | 149:20 160:11 | applied 7:17 49:17 |
| 101:24 102:4,7 | 253:20 | 140:19 141:2,5 | 165:10 | 142:15 185:2 |
| 121:7,9 122:10 | ahead 61:17 70:1 | 187:3,7 190:21 | answer 7:9 21:17 | applies 68:13 |
| 127:4,11,20 | 98:5 118:10 | 192:22 | 22:3 118:15 | 254:15 |
| 129:20 132:14 | 122:20 177:10 | allegedly 60:17 | 217:18 | apply 3:24 15:22 |
| 134:21 135:3 | aid 116:1 130:8 | alleges 39:21 | answered 195:17 | 16:1 34:20 42:10 |
| 162:18 163:11,13 | aiding 144:4 | 70:25 71:9 193:8 | answering 67:3 | 43:6 85:19 112:9 |
| 163:15,17 166:14 | aim 5:25 10:13 | allow 4:5 6:12 | 82:5 | 188:10 216:15 |
| 166:16,20,21 | 22:10 56:19 | 10:17 22:11 26:5 | answers 21:19 | 252:7 |
| 167:2,5,11,15,19 | aircraft 49:12,14 | 68:5,12 179:21 | anticipate 24:3 | applying 7:2 |
| 169:16,18,22 | 50:9,10,22,24 | 199:23 256:7 | 168:8 | 243:13 |
| 170:2,5,9,16,18 | 51:1,13 57:4 | allowed 104:10 | anybody 12:9 | appoint 132:15 |
| 170:21,24 171:2 | aired 25:4 | 251:8 | 15:25 102:6 | appointed 1:11 |
| 193:2,5 194:7,17 | airport 29:11,22 | allowing 103:15 | 158:23 256:4 | 8:22 57:20 71:21 |
| 195:2 215:13 | 35:17 41:6 43:21 | allude 96:17 | anybody's 191:19 | appointment |
| 216:2 221:1 | 47:5 54:15 57:4 | alongside 26:11 | anything.' 159:24 | 73:11 92:13 |
| AG's 125:4 170:12 | 59:16 61:4 64:13 | alter 34:18 35:7 | apart 222:5 | apportion 231:2 |
| 171:1 221:3 | 72:12 74:1 108:7 | 42:9 53:4 186:14 | apologies 66:12 | appreciate 97:15 |
| agencies 115:1 | 108:9 | 252:5 | 123:11 | apprehended |
| 126:21 156:1 | AIS 77:23 81:3 | altercations 58:4 | apologise 159:7 | 110:24 |
| agency 49:22,23 | 104:17 105:21 | alternative 187:22 | apologising 57:25 | approach 22:16 |
| 154:14 | 106:13,20 108:20 | Alternatively | Apology 58:5 | 27:9 36:23 48:23 |
| ago 21:8 96:13 | 113:1,6 128:6 | 172:14 | apparent 64:16 | 65:16 67:5 159:2 |
| 135:16 146:11 | Alan 58:10 | amenable 129:22 | 196:9 | 184:23 226:16 |
| 210:13 | albeit 86:1 233:18 | amended 41:22 | apparently 109:14 | 235:14 |
| agree 48:22 92:12 | Albert 103:10 | 107:12 108:25 | 230:12 | approached 67:22 |
| 137:7 163:4 | 182:20 | Amendment 192:5 | appeal 60:21 | approaches 170:4 |
| agreed 26:4 29:1,3 | Alcaidesa 73:8,18 | amicable 158:8 | 117:19 | approaching |
| 32:16 33:6,15,16 | 75:23 76:8 | amount 24:4 | appear 72:11,15 | 19:12 180:5 |
| 38:18 40:13 | Alcaressa 45:5,13 | 176:25 184:16 | 116:6 157:21 | appropriate 8:24 |
| 54:18 55:9 79:11 | alert 44:19 91:21 | 251:6 | 180:14 193:20 | 11:18 39:21 43:7 |
| | | | | |
| | = | - | - | - |

| | | | | 1 450 207 |
|------------------------------------|---------------------------------------|---------------------------|--------------------------|--------------------------|
| 51:14 54:8 86:17 | armed 47:19 56:8 | 195:4 196:13 | Astelon 141:13 | 150:20,24 152:13 |
| 97:17 137:12 | 68:8 | 210:2 237:16,23 | 185:20 | 160:4 169:20 |
| 159:3 164:23 | arose 78:19 142:2 | 253:3 | attack 30:14 74:23 | 171:14,20 172:1 |
| 174:11 190:9 | 191:24 | asking 42:12 45:6 | attack 30.14 74.23 | 173:16 174:17 |
| 197:18 207:11 | arrange 176:22 | 81:15 83:19 | attempt 182:13 | 175:4,15 189:20 |
| 209:16 | arranged 77:24 | 88:10 92:3 102:9 | attempt 182.13 | 190:1,6 192:18 |
| | 133:21 167:6 | 129:15 163:11 | 1 0 | 190.1,6 192.18 |
| appropriately 157:10 167:22 | 215:7 245:20 | 200:19 201:15 | attempts 48:20 226:2 | 194:22,25 195:3 |
| appropriateness | arrangements | 216:9 217:7 | attend 50:2 103:7 | 194.22,23 193.3 |
| 211:10 | 112:20 114:23 | 252:23 | 184:8 214:1 | 193.24 190.3 |
| approval 107:9,13 | arranging 23:24 | aspect 193:12 | 244:4 | 198:15,19,25 |
| 241:15 242:7,10 | arranging 23.24 arrest 29:25 47:18 | aspects 45:2 72:9 | attendance 179:18 | 198.13,19,23 |
| · · | | 95:1 153:22 | | * |
| approved 7:4 | 48:1 55:14 56:19 | | 179:21 196:5,14 | 202:9,10 203:11 |
| 33:20 89:17 | 57:2 59:4 179:16 | 172:14 | 198:7 237:23 | 204:3 213:18,23 |
| 122:12 161:7 | 179:20 | assault 25:5 30:4 | 245:25 246:15 | 214:4,12,15,19 |
| approximate | arrested 47:15 | 41:8 43:22 73:8 | attended 37:25 | 214:22 215:2,3 |
| 119:3 123:2,6 | 55:10,17,25 57:3 | 73:23 | 120:1 142:22 | 215:12,16,23,25 |
| approximately | 58:6 61:22,25 | assaulted 30:6 | 198:3 239:8 | 220:14,16 222:3 |
| 83:4,14 88:4,21 | 74:5 142:14 | 74:3,13 | attending 57:15 | 248:22 249:4,10 |
| 89:4 118:16 | 179:13 | asserted 169:14 | 170:17 238:22 | 249:15 250:15,16 |
| 119:5,13 120:4,7 | arrests 56:6,16 | asserting 67:17 | attention 4:23 | attributed 128:7 |
| 121:4 122:2 | 57:8 62:2 69:6 | 74:25 | 20:25 151:24 | attributes 37:22 |
| 129:2 | 74:1 183:3 | assertions 151:10 | 153:19 156:10 | August 60:13 76:7 |
| April 1:1 31:11 | 184:17 188:16 | asserts 71:4 | 203:8 231:15 | 223:11 236:17 |
| 85:13 105:20 | arrival 254:9 | assessed 13:13 | attest 48:19 | authorise 95:2 |
| 106:7 112:2 | arrivals 57:3 | assessment 18:24 | attitude 149:21 | authorised 5:1 |
| 114:6,7 132:10 | arrive 191:12,15 | 56:22 175:22 | Attorney 7:21 8:8 | 104:23 105:7 |
| 153:17 156:12 | arrived 52:12 | 226:4 | 16:9 22:7,18,20 | 117:7 |
| 159:19 161:12,24 | 254:6 | assets 86:22 | 33:5 37:24 38:10 | authorises 188:1 |
| 181:11 182:6,8 | arriving 77:25 | assist 4:4 13:18,25 | 38:15,17 39:7 | authorising |
| 182:19 194:20 | 114:10 | 14:13 137:13 | 40:2,4,10,12,20 | 188:23 |
| 195:12 222:25 | arrogantly 165:6 | 150:16 158:5 | 40:23 41:4,12 | authoritarian |
| 224:25 226:20 | article 44:11 90:3 | 177:8 | 42:24 46:1 47:24 | 237:20 |
| 227:3,5,7 228:22 | 90:11,12,19 | assistance 20:15 | 55:10 58:9,19 | authorities 51:15 |
| 229:18,21 256:14 | 91:13 92:10 | 80:8,9 125:16,17 | 65:10 66:12 | 80:9 105:12 |
| area 107:20 108:5 | 132:19 133:8 | 159:3 | 67:14 69:5 70:13 | 115:11 117:9 |
| 108:12 109:25 | 220:16 | assistant 68:20 | 72:1 80:16,24 | 125:17 |
| 115:1 | ASAP 120:17 | 223:22,23 236:1 | 83:6,17,25 84:12 | authority 8:10 |
| areas 223:2 225:2 | ascertain 9:4 | assisted 3:9 13:16 | 93:6,14 95:10 | 16:10 30:22 |
| 225:2,4,5 227:12 | aside 197:6 | 210:14 | 100:13,15 102:24 | 103:18,22 104:2 |
| 229:3 | asked 4:21 34:4 | assisting 77:10 | 103:2 123:13,14 | 104:15 117:11 |
| argue 184:15 | 79:6,20 81:1,6 | Associates 224:9 | 123:22 124:15 | 130:8 169:15 |
| argued 248:24 | 88:9 101:3,9 | assume 102:6 | 126:25 129:14 | 211:24 232:14 |
| argues 189:13 | 124:24 126:19 | 217:20 254:24 | 132:4,11,16 | 242:21 |
| arises 73:19 89:8 | 131:5 134:5 | assumed 100:23 | 133:1,6,23 134:6 | automated 116:12 |
| 94:6 122:5 | 146:4 150:20 | 217:24 223:9 | 134:7,9 136:12 | automatic 77:22 |
| arising 37:9 68:1 | 162:5 163:19 | assurances 25:8 | 137:11 144:6 | avail 250:23 |
| 89:22 93:12 | 164:20 165:15 | assured 24:11 | 146:6 148:13,23 | available 21:10 |
| | | | | |
| 98:19 103:4 | 170:16 184:9 | Astalon 37:21 | 149:5,11 150:2 | 75:13 84:17 |
| 98:19 103:4 | 170:16 184:9 | Astalon 37:21 | 149:5,11 150:2 | 75:13 84:17 |

| | | | | Page 200 |
|---------------------------------|---------------------------------|---|-----------------------------------|--------------------------|
| 96:16 101:11 | 46:19 76:6 139:1 | 236:12 | beneficial 141:14 | biggest 164:7 |
| 109:19 113:6 | 140:25 175:20 | beach 83:15 89:6 | 201:4 | bind 191:10 |
| 147:24 154:6 | 233:9 | 119:6 122:4 | benefit 9:13 15:10 | bit 91:11 140:16 |
| 192:10 215:21 | backlight 113:24 | 123:8 | 16:19 27:3 | 219:17 |
| 250:22 | bad 17:18 31:3 | bedside 10:8 | 216:12 | bizarre 51:23 |
| avoid 56:19 | 145:15 226:24 | Beer 10:6 | Berrera 50:15 | 52:11 |
| 110:23 181:5 | 227:20 233:22 | beginning 240:10 | Berres 181:20 | blame 231:2 |
| 209:21 | 234:18,20 235:23 | 243:5 | Berris 37:12 | blanche 233:5 |
| awaiting 200:12 | badly 43:11 | begun 150:8 | best 2:1 43:9,10 | Bland 37:10,19 |
| aware 40:3 76:21 | 253:14 | behalf 5:18,21 | 45:11 70:7 77:10 | 141:8 142:5,11 |
| 91:6 111:10,14 | Baglietto 193:16 | 23:10 133:14 | 89:9 92:8,18 | 151:23 152:7 |
| 114:18 144:24 | 195:25 197:16 | 185:21 195:25 | 101:11 122:6 | 151.25 152.7 |
| 149:6 152:24 | 200:1 204:5 | 196:3 237:11 | | |
| | | 248:9 | 129:12 130:20,24 140:11 183:25 | 177:12,19,23 |
| 153:15 166:7,14 177:17,20,24 | 209:25 210:5,10 | behave 230:13 | 211:15 218:22 | 185:14,17 |
| ′ ′ | 210:18 211:3,14 211:22 212:5 | | | Blands 176:6,8 |
| 178:22 184:17 | | behaved 53:5,8,13 | 220:11 253:11,12 | 178:19 186:2 |
| 186:4 188:16 | 213:8,12,16 | 57:16 68:1 226:3 behaviour 29:14 | betrayed 40:5 166:17 | blind 234:23 |
| 204:9 206:21,25 | 214:2,3 216:6,9 | | | blocking 70:4 |
| 235:23 239:17 | 216:17,22 217:6 | 51:22 52:9 57:7 | better 82:2 96:2 | blunder 163:25 |
| awkward 170:18 | 217:6,10 218:18 | 177:4 209:13 | 112:19 129:11 | board 50:6,9 60:12 |
| B | 218:21 219:7,8 | behaviours 30:25 | 135:5 153:8 | 62:7 87:10 |
| b 85:18 104:3 | 219:10,24 220:2 | 31:4 62:13,18,23 | Bevis 201:13 | 115:18 116:8 |
| 105:1,4 120:11 | 220:14 221:3,5 | 230:9 233:20,23 | beyond 94:14 | 237:16,22 238:4 |
| 174:20 178:21 | Baglietto's 214:9 | 234:21 | 108:2 158:18 | 238:7,13 |
| 181:13 196:1 | bail 153:4 | belief 30:12 74:21 | 208:2 213:9 | boarded 29:24 |
| 216:5 218:15 | bar 30:6 74:13 | believe 64:20 | 251:2 DCTW/44:22 | boardroom 142:24 |
| B100 130:11 | Barbara 83:5,15 | 74:17 82:20 | BGTW 44:22 | boat 31:23 |
| B1249 136:14 | 89:6 119:6,14 | 146:7,12 148:23 | 79:21 81:18,25 | boats 87:8 |
| B1303 118:18 | 121:5 123:7 | 148:25 149:16 | 83:13,24 84:4 | bodies 9:8 173:23 |
| B1345 123:21 | barely 90:12 | 152:23 161:9,20 | 85:7 86:18,24 | body 44:4 60:8 |
| B1417 133:2 | barrage 163:22 | 180:11 209:14,14 | 88:1,11 89:3 | 181:7 232:20 |
| B1692 106:9 | barrier 50:14 | 210:17 211:20 | 91:24 99:6 | 234:9 |
| B2891 113:20 | Base 62:4 | 212:6 213:4 | 101:16,17 103:7 | body-worn 142:25 |
| B3453 175:25 | based 43:16 75:12 | 219:11 221:21 | 103:16,20,23,25 | bone 30:7 |
| B3455 177:10 | 100:12 114:17 | 227:21 231:7 | 104:11,23 105:7 | book 10:6 |
| B7 171:5 | 121:18 177:15 | 245:17 255:14 | 107:21,23 108:2 | Boom 219:18 |
| B86 118:7 | 183:12 184:3 | believed 47:17 | 108:3,6,13 110:1 | border 141:4 |
| B87 121:21 | 203:7 231:11 | 56:20 59:2 | 112:1,5 113:5 | borderline 207:16 |
| back 12:15 52:12 | bases 137:10 | 117:13 120:7 | 114:9,19 115:8 | Borders 154:14 |
| 54:7 57:5 73:5 | basis 21:17 22:3 | 128:2 145:17 | 117:14 118:14 | bottom 44:8 54:1 |
| 76:6 121:21 | 22:13 23:5 84:15 | 148:3 149:19 | 120:8 121:18 | 63:6 86:2 87:23 |
| 123:11 124:14 | 101:2 137:10 | 150:1,11 165:14 | 122:2 123:16 | 93:4 108:14 |
| 128:21 136:20 | 142:17 147:25 | 194:3 211:7 | 124:10,12,25 | 115:13 123:21 |
| 140:12 174:18 | 154:5 184:5 | 212:17 224:20 | 126:7 128:3,16 | 130:17 133:2,3 |
| 175:10 176:11 | 187:21 189:12,24 | 245:5 | 129:2,9,12,20 | 175:14 183:4 |
| 218:15 222:19 | 191:1,10 197:21 | believes 51:16 | 130:20 | 186:7 217:4 |
| 250:3 | 236:22 | 214:25 | BGTW.' 82:3 | 218:17 227:25 |
| backdrop 94:18 | bat 45:2 72:8 | belonging 76:10 | biased 71:6 | bound 2:7 186:10 |
| background 20:14 | Bautista 235:20 | Ben 255:13 | bid 176:23 | boundaries 111:18 |
| | | | | |

| | | | | 1 480 201 |
|---------------------------|--------------------------|-----------------------|--------------------|----------------------------|
| bravado 69:11 | 247:10,13 248:13 | Cabinet 163:13 | 183:3 224:9 | caveat 127:25 |
| Bravo 120:5 | 250:12 | 168:4 | carries 11:6 | CBE 144:20 |
| breach 48:6 51:8 | Britto's 246:10 | cacophony 10:1 | carrying 66:6 | CBF 51:17,21 52:5 |
| 162:2 163:1,3 | bro 218:18 219:20 | cahoots 204:20 | 110:21 167:3 | 54:19 55:2 56:3 |
| 210:25 | broad 243:17 | Caine 16:16 141:6 | 173:24 | 57:14,19,23 67:2 |
| breaches 5:3,5 | broadcast 4:18 | Cajero 181:16,18 | carte 233:4 | 67:6,6 70:21 |
| 137:25 147:18 | broader 18:13,23 | call 8:3 28:19 30:3 | Caruana 5:20 | 74:24 75:19 |
| break 4:4,6,8 | brought 21:11 | 33:8 42:17 46:6 | 255:19 | CBF's 57:21 |
| 72:20,23,25 | 23:8 69:17 90:9 | 54:14 67:7 79:10 | case 8:9,12 14:12 | CCTV 74:5,17 |
| 139:20,21 202:4 | 147:9 151:24 | 118:25 153:20 | 14:16 15:6,7 | cease 242:19 |
| breaking 40:6 | 152:5 153:18 | 200:21 217:7 | 35:12 44:22 | ceased 240:23 |
| brief 5:12 9:16,20 | 181:16 203:8 | 218:23,24 241:8 | 91:24 104:14 | ceasing 1:14 9:1 |
| 96:2 120:3 135:5 | 231:14 | 242:8 243:1 | 107:14 112:4 | 17:7 18:21,25 |
| 153:7 170:12,21 | Buhagiar 103:10 | called 96:5 103:7 | 144:16 145:6,11 | 28:9 139:13 |
| briefed 83:6 121:8 | 104:6 | 135:8 141:9,12 | 145:20 155:24 | 240:13 |
| 122:15 | bulk 9:22 | 154:2 156:10 | 159:11 166:25 | cemented 45:24 |
| briefest 7:22 | bullying 30:21 | 163:9 169:16 | 168:20 170:10,22 | cementing 249:16 |
| briefing 80:3 95:3 | 44:25 223:21 | 175:9 214:15 | 177:15 179:14 | censure 60:6 |
| 118:5 120:24 | 230:11,17,18,24 | 215:23 229:12 | 184:24 186:11 | cent 92:21 178:21 |
| 123:13 124:18,18 | 232:18 233:3,17 | 241:18 | 199:1 200:9 | 185:19,21 |
| 125:11 126:2 | 234:17 235:16 | calling 67:2 | 202:5 221:3,22 | Centralised |
| 224:13,16 | 236:19 237:24 | 120:10 164:24 | 244:14 250:21 | 140:20 |
| briefly 4:21 73:10 | 238:8 239:14,23 | 217:9 241:24 | 251:5 | centre 141:25 |
| 140:16 200:4 | bundle 28:17 44:5 | calls 39:15 48:11 | cases 15:21,22 | centred 60:14 |
| 215:22 236:15 | 44:7 52:6 56:4 | 208:24 209:4 | 28:11 153:25 | certain 21:4 27:12 |
| briefs 121:6 | 66:23 69:3 74:9 | 215:13 219:4 | 169:25 230:10 | 60:5 84:3 124:10 |
| bright 113:24 | 103:9 104:3 | 242:12 | categorical 174:23 | 125:5 153:22 |
| brightness 108:17 | 106:9 | camera 142:25 | Cathal 93:8 | 172:14 210:3 |
| brilliant 13:17 | bundles 13:10 | candidly 101:11 | catharsis 11:7 | 242:24 253:9 |
| bring 184:9 220:6 | 23:23 | candour 98:17 | catholic 10:11 | certainly 5:5 94:12 |
| bringing 193:9 | bunker 160:6 | Caoilfhionn | causative 250:2 | 167:8 175:5 |
| brings 17:20 | burden 23:21 | 255:17 | cause 17:1 35:2 | 189:6 192:3 |
| British 32:7 47:12 | business 176:10 | capabilities 63:8 | 36:20 44:15 | 200:17 217:17,23 |
| 48:20 55:24 | 177:16 180:15 | Captain 78:5 | 91:17 131:17 | 221:2 222:12 |
| 61:23 74:2 84:24 | businesses 177:18 | 122:24 | 154:2 155:13 | 232:8 249:18 |
| 116:25 128:12 | | care 156:25 | 235:11 | cetera 63:12 |
| 131:15 | C | 212:25 213:6 | caused 37:6 40:20 | chain 52:18 78:20 |
| Britto 19:18 32:17 | c 66:23 85:21 | career 39:17 | 42:14 53:17 | chair 33:24 229:18 |
| 33:24 34:8,21 | 103:9 217:4 | 141:23 163:19 | 61:11 78:23 | chaired 83:1 |
| 41:10,14 71:22 | 220:4 | careful 207:19 | 82:20 84:14 86:7 | chairman 1:2 7:5 |
| 73:13 130:12 | C142 67:9 | 227:10 229:22 | 164:14 | 10:19 12:1,13 |
| 132:9 224:5,17 | C207 69:3 | carefully 164:15 | causes 17:6,14 | 13:19 14:7 16:2 |
| 227:2 228:18 | C3344 227:6 | 190:19 | 18:14,25 | 19:4,18 23:13 |
| 235:22 236:8,9 | C3988 244:22 | Carnival 177:18 | causing 31:1,1 | 26:12 27:14,21 |
| 237:15,25 238:17 | C4090 134:11 | carried 27:24 | 76:2 233:20 | 32:17 72:22,25 |
| 239:5 244:3,16 | C4282 247:17,17 | 85:20 108:1 | caution 40:25 | 73:2,4,6 139:19 |
| 245:1,20,24 | C4801 251:13,15 | 110:25 111:11 | 143:6 179:12 | 139:24 140:6 |
| 246:4,14,18,22 | C5251 104:19 | 112:10 113:12,17 | 183:21 198:22 | 142:11 153:1 |
| 246:25 247:5,6 | C5871 200:4 | 153:2 166:18 | 218:12 | 203:24 204:1 |
| | C6728 186:17 | | | |
| | - | • | - | · |

| | | | | 1 age 202 |
|---------------------------------|------------------|------------------|----------------------------------|---------------------|
| 232:24 253:24 | 109:10 113:23 | 121:23,25 122:8 | children 47:13 | 45:5,9,13 73:9 |
| 255:22 256:3,4,7 | chase 77:8,19 | 122:16 123:24 | 48:5 59:12 | 75:20,23 76:21 |
| 256:9,11 | 102:25 107:25 | 124:1,16 130:12 | Chipolina 118:23 | 89:21 90:6 91:2 |
| chairmanship | 110:5 112:3 | 130:14 131:1,5 | 118:25 122:15,25 | 91:18 92:6 93:11 |
| 213:6 | 114:8 117:20 | 130:14 131:1,3 | 123:3,9 | 94:14 96:21,23 |
| Chairperson | 120:6,20 123:16 | 134:10,12,16 | choice 43:6 97:22 | 97:1 99:1 103:3 |
| 212:25 | 124:12 128:16 | 135:22 136:3,7 | choice 43.0 77.22 choose 12:4 | 132:2,5 135:25 |
| challenge 14:20 | 130:6 | 136:12,15,18 | chose 8:2 | 136:1 138:1 |
| 15:3 205:8 | chases 111:23 | 139:6,9 141:19 | Chris 48:13 | 139:3 147:17,19 |
| challenges 228:9 | 114:5,10,12,16 | 141:20 144:12 | Christian 38:14 | 180:8 204:24 |
| challenging 166:9 | 114:3,10,12,10 | 151:15 152:18,19 | 153:21 174:5 | 205:7 245:11 |
| chances 75:11 | chasing 126:15 | 154:13 157:13 | chronological 47:2 | clarification 2:24 |
| change 21:14 | chastisement | 159:15 160:10,22 | chronology 20:18 | clarified 127:2 |
| 22:15 23:8 78:18 | 168:8 | 161:18 162:5,10 | circles 30:12 74:21 | 136:23 158:12 |
| 159:1 | check 30:7 | 168:15 169:6,10 | circulated 244:21 | 203:12 |
| changed 5:14 | cheek 74:15 | 173:1 174:18 | circumstance | clarifies 12:2 |
| 21:24 53:9 | chest 170:13 | 175.1174.18 | 71:19 139:12 | clarify 77:2 80:14 |
| 111:19 | chief 7:20 8:1,6 | 180:19 185:24 | 232:5 240:6,9 | 125:20 210:3 |
| changes 21:11 | 16:8 19:17 24:18 | 189:19,25 190:5 | 251:3 | 248:3 |
| changes 21.11 changing 78:17 | 24:20 25:1 26:23 | 190:11,13,20 | circumstances | clarity 80:19 82:21 |
| Chappel 110:16 | 28:20,25 29:2 | 192:23 193:3,4,9 | 1:13 3:1 7:6,15 | Clarke 185:2,8 |
| Chapple 106:16 | 32:16 33:4 34:2 | 193:13 199:5,6 | 8:25 16:23 18:7 | clear 3:5 5:3 12:7 |
| 107:24 108:8 | 34:24 35:4,8,10 | 199:10 202:7,16 | 18:12,20 26:20 | 14:2 38:5 52:3 |
| 109:22 110:12 | 35:14,22,24 36:3 | 202:17 203:6 | 28:8 97:20 98:19 | 65:3 69:8 86:15 |
| characteristic | 36:8,19,24 37:16 | 204:3,7 205:18 | 104:10 147:21 | 87:18 99:16 |
| 189:15 | 37:22 38:4,23 | 213:11,15,22,24 | 148:11 238:4 | 105:23 107:18 |
| charge 12:21 75:9 | 39:7,17,18,22 | 214:1,11,22,24 | 250:21 252:3 | 108:10,20,24 |
| 142:10 200:14 | 40:1 41:11,22 | 215:6,14,16 | cite 173:19 | 109:25 114:17,25 |
| 206:8 | 42:23 44:3,9 | 216:6,9,11,18 | cites 46:9 | 115:9 121:11 |
| charged 58:25 | 45:12,23 48:14 | 217:2 218:20 | citing 43:1 144:10 | 123:25 124:15 |
| 143:19,25 144:2 | 49:20 52:13,16 | 219:5,7,9,12,15 | citizens 245:11 | 126:23 127:8 |
| 144:3 | 52:18,25 55:7 | 219:21 220:1,20 | civil 11:22 12:1,10 | 128:9 146:17 |
| charges 40:15 | 57:1,24 58:8,15 | 220:23 221:1,2,8 | 21:20 22:2 37:14 | 148:9 151:24 |
| 74:17 90:9 152:5 | 58:19 59:15 | 221:20,21 222:2 | 44:11 51:14 | 152:6 154:7 |
| 154:20,23,25 | 60:14 62:15,24 | 222:6 225:21 | 76:22 91:13 | 155:4 157:23 |
| 155:6,8,23 156:5 | 64:12 65:11 66:9 | 227:3,7 229:4,20 | 103:16 107:10,14 | 158:9,18 159:17 |
| 157:5,7,9 158:14 | 66:15,17 67:10 | 231:15 232:7 | 111:17 112:22 | 162:20 166:24 |
| 159:23 161:25 | 68:20,22 69:4 | 233:8 235:5,10 | 115:5 132:5,13 | 168:25 173:2 |
| 167:4,8 181:13 | 70:11,20,23 72:1 | 235:15 236:7,7 | 133:11 148:8 | 190:2 191:7,17 |
| 183:6,11 191:21 | 72:5 75:25 76:4 | 237:2 241:7,16 | 154:12 176:15 | 193:25 197:8 |
| 194:19 195:5 | 76:25 78:4 82:17 | 241:17 242:8,11 | 177:17 | 200:17 205:1 |
| charging 172:2 | 83:11,25 84:2,13 | 243:2,6,21,24 | civilian 61:20 | 217:1 220:22 |
| 181:9,12 185:6 | 85:25 86:14 | 244:4,6,11,17,20 | claim 44:11 73:18 | 237:7 249:21 |
| Charles 12:24 | 87:23 88:6 89:1 | 244:23,24,25 | 91:13 96:12 | 254:7 |
| 45:19 248:8 | 89:12,20 92:17 | 245:4,14 246:7 | 132:13 133:11,15 | cleared 59:9 |
| 251:11,15 | 95:7 99:25 | 246:22 247:4,15 | 133:20,23 135:15 | clearer 81:15 |
| chart 77:20 106:10 | 102:24 103:2 | 247:16,19 248:6 | claimed 166:10 | 128:24 |
| 106:13,16,19 | 105:16 113:19 | 248:22 249:3,9 | 169:4 | clearing 162:18 |
| 108:4,17 109:1,7 | 118:9,12 120:24 | 249:14,23 | claims 35:25 44:16 | clearly 20:11 45:3 |
| | | | | - |
| | I | | I | I |

| | | | | 1 480 200 |
|-------------------------|---------------------------|-------------------|----------------------|------------------|
| 72:9 87:11 88:23 | collective 86:20 | commander 48:20 | 193:18 207:8 | communications |
| 97:2 220:6 221:8 | 227:24 | 50:16 51:10 | 213:21 216:15 | 13:11 66:17 |
| 238:7,8 | Collins 48:13 51:9 | 52:14,20 53:17 | 223:4,6,10,21,22 | 99:17 117:22 |
| client 101:24 | 51:24 55:19 | 55:8,18 61:23,25 | 223:23 228:13,24 | 139:3 147:5 |
| 189:10 251:22 | collision 31:21,22 | Commander's | 230:22 236:1,2 | 176:14 186:4 |
| 252:6 | 32:5 35:20 36:1 | 55:3 | 237:25 239:5 | 189:3 194:11 |
| clients 189:8 | 41:7 43:23 77:5 | commence 12:14 | 240:13,23 241:3 | 200:23 201:20,25 |
| clinical 42:2 | 77:6,12,20 79:2 | 34:5 | 241:9,13,18,24 | 204:2,23 205:4 |
| close 47:22 61:12 | 81:16,22 83:2,13 | commenced 21:7 | 242:3,9,12,13,18 | 215:11,20 243:16 |
| 101:18 110:13 | 83:20 84:21 | 141:1 226:7 | 242:19 243:1 | 254:7 |
| 126:18 141:24 | 85:11 86:4 87:9 | commencement | 245:16,18 | community 11:7 |
| 145:24 146:24 | 88:4 89:3,22 | 46:7 | Commissioner's | 164:5 197:5 |
| 170:13 209:16 | 90:6 93:12 97:24 | commendable | 119:25 | 208:18 212:25 |
| closely 198:13 | 98:24 100:11 | 59:24 | commissioners | 213:6 |
| closest 210:19 | 101:1 102:22 | commended 66:10 | 86:16 | company 37:21 |
| closing 15:19 | 103:1 105:22 | comment 10:2 | commissioning | 141:9,10,12,13 |
| 172:13 | 107:25 110:6 | 11:13 23:19 | 8:21 | 154:9 157:20 |
| clowns 69:24 | 116:1 117:21,23 | 101:2 145:25 | Commissions 2:5 | 178:20 |
| CM 67:5,7 83:22 | 118:16 119:4,11 | 165:17 173:14,17 | 8:19 | compelled 49:3 |
| 87:7 89:2 95:16 | 120:4 121:2 | 182:22 | commitment | 164:18 |
| 118:6 120:11 | 122:1 123:6,18 | commented | 228:10 | compensation |
| 121:25 129:19 | 125:6,21 127:9 | 224:18 | committed 12:10 | 132:6 |
| 134:19 145:3 | 127:15 128:15,19 | commenting 218:3 | 23:1 54:21 | competing 7:16 |
| 163:10,13,15,20 | 128:25 129:6,16 | comments 60:16 | 142:19 164:2 | 50:21 |
| 163:22 164:19,21 | 130:7,19 132:23 | 161:5 163:22 | 179:2 183:14,18 | complain 169:23 |
| 165:6,9,15,21,23 | 139:5,16 244:13 | 236:23 | 186:5 224:22 | complainant 25:8 |
| 166:6,7,13 | 245:12 246:8 | commercial 61:20 | 225:17 234:24 | 142:10 148:10 |
| 168:10,16 169:2 | collision.' 80:15 | commission 59:19 | Commodore 48:21 | complained 60:16 |
| 176:21 178:3,16 | Colonel 48:14 51:8 | 120:23 121:6 | 49:1 50:18 61:24 | 236:9 |
| 178:22 195:5 | 55:17 56:1 61:21 | 173:12 | common 142:20 | complaining |
| 200:13,19 202:1 | coloured 72:13 | commissioned | 170:1 192:1,2 | 218:13 |
| CM's 163:16 | Comandante | 8:17,18 85:10 | 207:1 | complains 134:12 |
| 164:14 | 122:23 | commissioner 1:5 | Commonwealth | complaint 37:9 |
| co-conspirators | combination | 1:11,14 6:25 9:1 | 62:16 | 60:12 132:21,24 |
| 187:3 | 155:10 | 16:6 17:8 18:21 | communicate | 152:25 233:13 |
| Coastguard | come 14:17 27:12 | 19:1 28:9 29:4 | 115:5 179:7 | 237:24 |
| 154:14 | 70:9 91:4 124:14 | 47:7,19,23 48:18 | 213:24 | complaints 32:2 |
| cockswain 85:22 | 140:11 146:5 | 49:6,15,25 50:1,7 | communicated | 44:1 60:12,14,18 |
| cockswains 85:15 | 159:22 160:6 | 53:23 54:19,22 | 84:11 93:11 | 223:20 232:11,12 |
| Code 173:21 183:7 | 219:19 249:6 | 55:5 56:14 57:20 | 193:14 214:4 | 233:1 234:11,14 |
| coffee 4:6 72:25 | comes 70:6 94:17 | 58:15,18,20 | 227:2 | 236:6 237:13 |
| cognisant 167:23 | coming 9:15 46:21 | 66:20,25 67:11 | communicating | 238:20 239:1,14 |
| 223:13 | 68:4 201:11 | 68:20 70:13,21 | 176:3 | 239:21 240:17 |
| coincidence 28:23 | 237:9 255:4 | 71:21 72:16 | communication | complete 20:20 |
| 243:24 | command 33:21 | 73:11 78:22 | 45:16 88:19 93:7 | 162:3 163:25 |
| collaborative 65:1 | 52:17,19 82:25 | 85:12 93:22 | 102:23 103:1 | 174:5 187:2 |
| colleagues 114:15 | 118:3 164:24 | 94:22,25 100:8 | 159:9 176:19 | 212:19 246:20,23 |
| collected 30:10 | 223:25 236:21 | 120:2 125:10 | 185:16 206:16 | 251:5 |
| 74:20 | 237:19 | 126:1 139:13 | 220:25 243:11 | completed 40:16 |
| | | | | |
| | | | | |

| | | | | Page 204 |
|-------------------|-------------------|--------------------|--------------------|-----------------------|
| 51:20 167:9 | 236:19 237:1 | 100:7 136:5 | connected 18:10 | 199:16 241:24 |
| 226:6 253:14 | 243:8,22 244:2 | 139:7 144:13 | 18:16 | considers 135:22 |
| completely 136:17 | conclude 53:18 | 151:13 193:5 | consent 179:19 | 242:5 |
| 153:25 196:19 | 98:21 249:19 | 211:25 212:20 | consents 179:18 | consistent 213:14 |
| complicated 180:7 | concluded 26:16 | 213:3,11 226:18 | consequence 2:19 | 224:16 |
| complications | 74:6 75:10 97:21 | 229:7 231:18 | 87:14 206:8 | consistently 139:9 |
| 126:11 | 112:4 172:25 | 233:21 234:4 | consequences | 205:25 221:16 |
| complied 108:23 | 230:16 | 235:12 240:11 | 39:23 66:2 86:9 | 229:8 |
| complete 100.23 | concludes 222:15 | 246:23,24 247:21 | 147:17 166:3 | conspicuously |
| 248:14 | 255:3,21 | 249:11,17,24 | 212:2 | 160:24 |
| compromised | conclusion 59:20 | confident 2:13 | consequently | conspiracy 43:24 |
| 170:19 178:23 | 178:14 184:23 | 36:14 231:22 | 230:21 | 140:8,17 141:5 |
| computer 48:4 | 185:10 206:6 | confidential | consider 2:15 4:22 | 142:19 144:1 |
| 50:25 51:21 62:6 | 222:1 255:3 | 176:16 181:15 | 8:23 16:2 25:19 | 179:1 183:14 |
| 63:21,24 144:2,5 | conclusions 28:13 | confidentiality | 27:15 41:1 43:20 | 184:5 186:22 |
| 186:5 | 184:22 | 147:19 | 45:16 60:7 71:18 | 187:7 191:23 |
| conceal 186:14 | conclusive 74:20 | confirm 81:24 | 86:16 97:17 | 192:1 200:14 |
| concedes 136:4 | concomitant 94:7 | 101:4 129:8 | 120:10 137:11 | 221:6 222:15 |
| concentrating | condescending | 150:20 196:13 | 155:19 183:19 | conspiring 56:12 |
| 54:6 | 163:20 | 209:3 238:25 | 187:8 197:18 | Constabulary 31:9 |
| concern 1:9 31:1 | condition 18:10 | 239:17 252:23 | 198:23 199:7 | 222:22 |
| 42:15 79:17 | conditions 137:10 | confirmation | 201:15 203:3 | constantly 205:24 |
| 153:6 154:2 | conduct 14:21 | 83:19 119:7 | 209:12 233:11 | constantly 200.21 |
| 156:21 164:14 | 37:10 51:15 | 123:20 127:16 | 241:15 245:5,21 | 61:11 208:9 |
| 199:17 202:1 | 54:23 62:25 63:4 | 129:16 151:3,6 | 249:13 250:1,24 | constituted 139:11 |
| 224:6 233:18 | 64:6 65:22 76:17 | confirmed 24:24 | 253:24 254:25 | constitution 69:20 |
| 244:16 | 172:12 173:8 | 33:14 53:12 | considerable | 69:21 99:24 |
| concerned 86:25 | 178:13 183:19 | 56:16 82:14 | 23:20 61:11 | 102:2 144:10 |
| 90:22 92:19 | 190:1 196:10 | 84:20 88:5 | 65:20 110:15 | 254:14 |
| 116:5 137:3 | conducted 39:24 | 118:17 123:6 | 155:11 181:3 | constitutional |
| 138:7,15,20 | 49:5 52:21 54:17 | 127:22 130:5 | consideration 26:4 | 61:12 |
| 147:14 157:1,6 | 58:22 63:10 75:1 | 131:24 150:25 | 94:13,17 152:11 | constructive |
| 196:7,9 228:5 | 114:4 156:24 | 154:4 162:9 | 207:19 250:10 | 162:19 224:21 |
| 251:22 | 166:4 179:14 | 172:8 215:3 | 254:13 | consult 246:14 |
| concerning 95:22 | 187:17 222:21 | 220:17 235:22 | considered 36:10 | consultancy |
| 96:15 134:25 | 223:18 224:10 | 253:8 | 38:6 43:9 59:23 | 177:22 |
| 135:18 169:3 | conducting 13:7 | confirming 200:1 | 60:23 97:20 | Consultants 78:7 |
| 239:22 | 152:25 179:6 | confirms 33:25 | 115:22 146:18 | consultation 47:22 |
| concerns 28:24 | conferring 179:24 | 34:8 60:22 213:7 | 155:18 156:22 | 99:25 168:22 |
| 29:13 44:18 52:8 | confidence 1:24 | conflict 134:2 | 168:1 173:4 | 241:6 |
| 62:12 71:10 72:3 | 8:5 11:4 26:18 | 170:25 | 174:13 179:12 | consulted 165:6 |
| 73:18 78:17 | 29:4,6 31:2 34:4 | conflicting 252:11 | 183:7 190:19 | 195:2 |
| 90:20 91:20 | 35:11,13 36:21 | confrontation | 191:1,9 195:8 | contact 48:20 89:8 |
| 93:15 137:1 | 37:1,7,23 39:1,3 | 50:14 | 196:21 207:2,10 | 93:17 100:12,15 |
| 138:23 151:16 | 41:12,25 42:22 | confrontational | 220:10 222:14 | 122:5 145:23 |
| 187:6 202:6,8 | 45:11,14,25 46:2 | 64:19 | 232:1 242:6 | 204:18 205:17 |
| 208:17 214:17 | 51:8 57:10 76:3 | confusion 136:11 | 243:23 | contacted 9:8 |
| 222:20 229:10 | 78:11,21,24 90:3 | congratulated | considering 9:24 | 119:9 |
| 230:4,24 231:14 | 92:8 98:9,14,22 | 68:23 70:23 | 165:11 183:25 | contacting 185:25 |
| | | | | |
| | 1 | • | 1 | • |

| contacting/facili | 142:19 149:14 | Cooper 255:14 | correspondence | 117:18 143:13 |
|-------------------------------|-------------------------------------|--------------------------------|---------------------------------------|-----------------------------------|
| 178:3 | 151:11 156:6 | cooperate 145:18 | 27:6 143:11 | 147:21,22 166:1 |
| contained 48:4 | 184:14 206:5 | 147:23 | 189:22 197:23 | 196:21 197:2,24 |
| 189:7 | 209:14 | cooperation 61:2 | 252:16 253:17 | 217:1 |
| contemporaneous | contrast 230:3 | 115:2 124:3,5 | corroborates | courteous 196:14 |
| 45:15 46:23 | 233:23 | 131:12 145:9,20 | 237:11 | courtesy 57:18 |
| 139:5 220:24 | contravening | 145:24 | corrupt 24:10 | 145:14 189:15 |
| 244:19 246:1 | 105:24 | cooperative 48:22 | corruption 148:7 | 218:2 |
| contempt 5:4 | contributed 31:6 | coordinated 104:1 | 225:24 226:5 | courts 91:3 165:22 |
| contends 195:1 | 71:2 102:22 | 117:10 | corruptly 226:3 | cover 9:12 36:2 |
| content 20:23 | 233:25 234:3 | coordinates 77:13 | COS 119:2 | 175:10 233:11 |
| 209:3 226:16 | 235:4 240:12 | 81:21 119:3 | Costa 67:13 | Covid 135:10 |
| contention 39:5 | contributing 240:6 | 121:10,15 122:16 | 228:19 | 184:1 |
| contentious | 243:10 | 123:2 127:22,24 | costs 3:21 | Covid-19 96:7 |
| 235:21 | contrition 69:19 | 128:9,14 129:5 | Council 173:20 | coxswain 108:4 |
| contents 138:13 | control 13:3 141:4 | 130:5 | counsel 5:10 6:20 | 110:2 111:2 |
| 180:6 214:10 | controversial | COP 97:14 120:10 | 13:16 14:5,8,9,18 | coxswain's 109:5 |
| 215:11 | 107:3 | 175:9 | 15:23 47:25 | 110:25 |
| contested 154:16 | controversy 10:11 | copied 58:18 84:1 | 66:11 96:11 | coxswains 111:4 |
| context 35:18 | convened 119:25 | 153:10 201:14 | 132:15 134:1 | CPEA 188:22 |
| 46:20,24 98:12 | 120:22 | copy 95:7 152:22 | 135:13 187:17 | CPO 217:1 |
| 138:9 140:24 | convenience.' | 201:17 252:11 | 190:23 200:9 | CPs 117:23 193:24 |
| 142:3 144:23 | 96:18 | copying 58:8 | 201:13 255:7,10 | 207:2 251:10 |
| 158:2 159:4 | convenient 4:7 | cordial 143:1 | 255:11,12,13,17 | creation 185:18 |
| 184:1 189:24 | 6:18 139:20 | core 5:24 13:11,13 | 255:19 | credibility 228:11 |
| 190:7 191:5 | 203:18 | 15:9,11,14,16,25 | counsel's 3:12 | crew 30:6 74:3,13 |
| 206:19 208:20 | convenor 238:6 | 16:3,5 20:15 | count 43:3 | 87:11 107:24 |
| 211:19 241:1 | convent 24:16 | 102:16 255:7 | counterargument | 109:22 110:11,12 |
| contingencies | 32:21 34:1 39:13 | Cornelio 16:15 | 3:25 | 110:14,15,19 |
| 180:21 | 146:3 | 37:12 141:11 | counterparts | 116:2,19,24 |
| continue 8:7 80:22 | Convention 94:9 | 142:1,13 143:23 | 110:10 131:20 | 120:19 133:15 |
| 110:4 148:6 | conventional 65:2 | 144:1,8 145:7 | 138:11 | crewing 94:15 |
| 209:14,18 218:10 | conversation | 154:21 181:14,21 | couple 14:2 15:9 | crews 103:6,15 |
| 254:19 | 146:11,14 147:13 | 181:24 182:3,6,8 | 53:2 63:15 | 111:9 |
| continued 48:10 | 189:19 215:9 | 186:1,6 201:13 | 136:25 | crime 23:1,4 30:13 |
| 57:19 152:3 | 218:4 | cornered 167:13 | course 19:25 29:16 | 47:9 74:22 |
| 177:20 178:10 | conversations | coroner 92:20 | 33:20 34:7,19 | 132:22 147:11 |
| 213:3 | 171:18 189:21 | Coroner's 117:12 | 35:7 42:9 50:2 | 164:2 165:1 |
| continues 112:6 | 206:15 207:24 | correct 53:2,16 | 55:21 56:13 | 192:4 |
| 124:7 | 214:12,21 | 58:3 80:13 116:7 | 71:19 73:19 | crimes 173:12 |
| continuing 45:4 | conversely 70:14 | 125:19 150:22 | 96:16 106:23 | 192:3 234:24 |
| 153:16 | conveyed 101:23 | 170:3 189:3 | 127:13 147:12 | criminal 7:25 |
| contract 151:22 | 101:24 102:4,5,7 | 227:19 | 148:5 159:1 | 11:21 12:1 14:23 |
| 152:7 154:17 | conveying 128:18 | corrected 53:20 251:14 | 161:7 193:19 | 21:21 22:10 23:7 |
| 177:13 178:19 | convicted 59:13 | | 201:3 245:8 | 29:20 34:19 37:3 |
| 185:14,17 contracted 178:2 | conviction 74:7 75:11 203:15 | correctly 30:13 53:13 74:22 | 252:5 253:7,18 court 5:4 14:9 22:2 | 38:20 39:10,20 42:9 49:4 76:23 |
| 182:4 | convince/influen | 109:4 137:16 | 39:25 49:18,24 | 103:24 115:3 |
| contrary 38:22 | 170:5 | 217:24 | 59:13 76:20 | 141:1,25 150:14 |
| Conti at y 30.22 | 1/0.3 | ∠1/.∠ 1 | J9.13 /U.4U | 171.1,43 130.14 |
| | | | _ | |

| | | | | Page 200 |
|---------------------------------|-------------------|----------------------------------|--|--------------------------------|
| 151:20 152:16 | 230:5 | 39:13 42:11 | dealings 37:2 39:2 | deepening 249:16 |
| 153:14,18,24 | current 25:13 | 49:21 57:8 71:25 | 91:1 151:14 | deeper 226:24 |
| 161:11 164:4,22 | 104:8 141:23 | 73:15 80:18 | 177:2 180:14 | deepest 244:16 |
| 166:25 167:14 | 228:20 250:19 | 81:19 87:18 | 221:20 248:5 | deeply 53:22 157:1 |
| 169:25 172:12 | currently 187:4 | 88:18 95:24 | deals 72:18 89:20 | 212:10 |
| 173:8 183:15 | custodial 64:1 | 99:13 116:4 | 139:16 159:6 | deescalate 66:8 |
| 187:7,24 191:19 | Customs 86:21,23 | 122:20,22 123:10 | 204:12 232:12 | deface 186:14 |
| 191:23 197:8 | Customs 60.21,23 | 126:10 132:8 | dealt 68:24 155:3 | defects 189:23 |
| 213:10 216:22 | D | 133:13 134:4 | 184:14 222:18 | defence 29:17 |
| 248:1,24 252:6 | daily 105:19 | 135:2 151:12 | Dear 95:16 134:19 | 47:17 65:11 |
| criminality 177:5 | damage 54:4 64:5 | 162:13 168:11 | 152:23 196:3 | 133:20 200:9,16 |
| criminally 12:9 | 65:20 155:14 | 173:2 181:20 | death 89:8 122:5 | 200:18,22 201:3 |
| crisis 96:7 135:10 | 167:24 | 182:15 195:12,23 | deaths 44:22 91:24 | defend 161:4 |
| criteria 244:8 | damages 44:15 | 203:20 209:11 | 124:6 | 202:19 |
| 245:6,8 247:23 | 91:17 93:11,25 | 214:23 215:1,10 | debate 2:1 165:18 | defendants 16:15 |
| critical 87:7 120:9 | 96:13,23 97:6 | 214.23 213.1,10 | debrief 52:13 85:3 | 143:25 179:25 |
| 225:12 | 99:1 133:16 | 217:22 218:9 | deceased 44:13 | 191:20 |
| criticise 102:13 | 135:15 138:1 | 243:21 246:19 | | defendants' |
| criticised 173:6 | 147:18 | | 90:5,8 91:15 December 113:20 | 255:13 |
| criticism 100:9 | damages/claims | 253:3,7,18 day-to-day 12:21 | 142:6 | defended 160:17 |
| | 205:1 | | | |
| 173:15,18 199:2 223:17 224:5 | damaging 65:6 | daylight 109:17 days 6:9 10:2 | deception 151:18 decide 17:24 | defending 197:20 202:16 |
| | damning 31:15 | 23:21 32:9 53:1 | | |
| 225:14 | 36:10 227:4,10 | | 165:22 250:23 | defensible 174:14 |
| criticisms 66:15 | 229:17,21 231:17 | 56:16 68:4 69:5 | decided 27:9 79:10 | 194:4 |
| Crome 24:19 | danger 110:15 | 84:8 89:25 96:13 | 140:10 176:23 | defensive 172:7 |
| Crone 25:6 26:24 | dangerous 51:24 | 96:24 99:20 | 223:12 | defiance 188:18 |
| cross 62:19 | 52:11 65:5 94:7 | 101:7 128:19 | decision 7:7 18:15 | deficiencies |
| cross-border | data 106:18,20,21 | 135:16 136:2 | 33:11 39:19 | 187:20 245:23 |
| 131:12 | 113:1,6 119:6 | 143:7,10 188:5 | 45:22 46:10,13 | defined 18:9 |
| cross-examination | 123:5 148:3 | 199:24 240:24 | 46:14 60:20 | defines 17:1 |
| 14:22 | 166:11 187:14 | 253:25 255:8 | 136:9 139:8 | defining 19:23 |
| crossed 111:18 | 208:25 | DCI 83:2 118:4 | 144:18 145:16 | definitely 11:21 |
| crosses 177:5 | database 111:22 | 119:8,11,23 | 151:16 160:13,18 | definitive 191:12 |
| Crown 47:25 | date 6:17 9:21 | 120:3 121:1,8 | 161:4 164:21 | 191:15 |
| 59:13 132:15 | 15:8 27:5 53:9 | 122:15 236:2 | 167:14 175:6,21 | defraud 142:19 |
| 134:1 200:20 | 58:7 112:7 113:9 | de 83:5 106:1 | 203:7 213:21 | 144:1 179:1 |
| crucial 194:20 | 166:24 208:5 | 119:14 121:5 | 217:25 224:1 | 183:15 184:5 |
| Cruises 177:18 | 241:19,20 242:13 | 132:19 194:23 | 246:9 251:12 | 191:23 192:2 |
| crux 193:1 | 242:14 | 195:6 | 252:25 | degree 115:1 |
| Cruz 189:8 255:10 | dated 24:25 53:11 | deal 39:10 73:9 | decision-making | 240:12 |
| 255:23 256:2,9 | 85:12 106:7 | 97:7 106:25 | 14:1 | degrees 83:3,3 |
| CS 176:2,15 | 117:4 119:16 | 107:4 122:21 | decisions 15:3 | 119:12,12 121:3 |
| 178:17 179:15 | dates 194:21 | 140:11,12 165:5 | 206:7 | 121:3 |
| Cueta 80:6 | David 46:8 254:5 | 188:13 193:18 | declared 120:9 | delay 4:15 70:5 |
| culminated 76:15 | Davis 49:8 53:25 | 194:14 200:16 | dedicated 3:10 | delayed 217:8 |
| 234:13 | 60:22 228:20 | 228:7 | deemed 60:20 | delays 63:17 |
| culpability 11:4 | dawned 253:11 | dealing 73:22 87:7 | deep 28:24 58:20 | deleted 111:20 |
| culture 31:16 | day 6:4 7:4 29:1 | 147:11 155:1 | 126:15 231:13 | 112:23 |
| 227:21 229:23 | 34:15 37:25 | 230:14 241:1 | deepened 46:2 | deletion 188:18 |
| | 34.13 37.23 | | | |
| | | | | |

| | ī | i | ī | |
|---|---|-----------------------------------|-------------------------------|---------------------------------|
| Delhi 16:14 37:4,8 | describe 230:9 | 142:8 | differences 231:7 | 162:14 227:14 |
| 39:8 90:2 140:18 | described 10:10 | detectives 145:5 | different 7:13 | disapproved 173:6 |
| 143:25 144:24 | 58:23 62:18 | detention 48:2 | 12:11 14:8 20:2 | disbelief 168:5 |
| 166:8 168:17 | 104:25 105:9 | deteriorated | 86:1 221:25 | 172:21 |
| 169:3 170:19 | 137:17 145:11 | 231:25 | 222:5 | discharge 242:22 |
| 171:4,15,19,20 | 236:10 | deterioration | differing 28:7 | disciplinary 76:16 |
| 175:20 191:20 | describes 31:14 | 31:17 231:3 | 195:20 | 216:13,14,16 |
| 193:16 206:8 | 66:15 75:17 | determination | difficult 36:23 | 236:19 |
| 255:13 | 141:21 | 191:13,16 | 64:3 65:6 79:24 | disclose 48:24 |
| deliberate 5:5 | describing 68:25 | determine 11:25 | 94:10 125:3 | 148:1 176:22 |
| deliberated 59:23 | 248:11 | 17:6 120:16 | 161:20 232:16 | disclosed 2:13 |
| deliberately 32:3 | description 130:23 | 191:18 | 235:14,21 236:14 | 44:3 84:9 130:2 |
| 82:8 | descriptions 209:9 | determined 3:9 | 239:24 | 186:19 206:18 |
| delivered 182:23 | deserve 60:6 | 11:16 90:14 | digital 179:6 180:2 | 208:2 210:10,16 |
| demonising 52:24 | deserved 75:4 | 110:8 126:3 | digitally 187:12 | 236:4 |
| demonstrably | designated 15:14 | 128:15 134:1 | dignity 197:2 | discloses 82:25 |
| 231:24 | designed 141:3 | 249:24 | diligently 66:6 | 207:18 |
| demonstrate | 150:15 | determines 241:23 | dim 109:2 | disclosure 13:8 |
| 185:12 223:15 | desire 202:6 | determining 12:8 | diminished 227:18 | 15:18 22:1 25:2 |
| 229:13 236:5 | despite 45:2 48:11 | 16:4 177:8 | dimming 109:1 | 26:19,24 27:16 |
| demonstrated | 48:23 65:23,23 | detour 123:12 | diplomatic 65:24 | 75:5 206:19 |
| 60:1 | 72:9 74:16 91:6 | detract 71:16 | 79:12 131:18 | discontent 223:19 |
| demonstrates | 99:7 121:15 | detrimental 60:24 | 170:23 180:23 | discontinuance |
| 207:14 | 152:8 178:1,10 | developed 85:15 | direct 18:14,24 | 202:9 203:10 |
| demonstrating | 182:5 | 111:3 244:1 | 101:10 248:1 | discontinue |
| 131:10 | destroy 145:19 | Development | directed 2:10 | 203:17 |
| demonstration | 164:9 186:14 | 62:17 | direction 150:12 | discontinued |
| 36:22 235:13 | 188:8 | device 165:25 | directive 228:2 | 144:7 |
| denied 24:20 | destruction 188:18 | devices 5:6 47:14 | 229:25 | discourteous |
| 38:12 41:3 60:18 | 236:10 | 47:15 48:2 55:15 | directly 66:18 72:2 | 62:21 |
| 198:25 | detail 29:16 34:7 | 56:2 59:6 71:13 | 94:25 101:3 | discovered 31:25 |
| denies 41:5 57:14 | 36:2,8 39:10 | 143:9,14,21 | 102:10 115:6 | 82:15 |
| 71:7 75:18 100:9 | 41:18,20 45:6 | 147:5 161:1 | 131:4 177:17 | discovery 148:2 |
| 151:19 171:14 | 92:4 132:3 | 164:17 166:9 | 197:1 | discreditable |
| 191:22 | 138:22 210:13 | 179:7 180:3 | Director 38:13 | 76:17 |
| denuncia 132:20 | 211:21 236:13 | 184:10 189:6 | 148:17 152:21 | discreet 71:9 |
| deny 191:21 | 249:8 | 204:17 218:10 | Directorate 78:2 | 145:8 |
| department 55:13 | detailed 41:19 | 220:9 | disagree 15:5 | discretion 8:23 |
| departure 176:7 | 87:17 94:21 | DeVincenzi | 149:4 163:4 | discuss 28:20,24 |
| dependent 19:9 | 102:14 161:2 | 156:14 198:3 | 189:17 | 96:17 97:16 98:3 |
| Depending 224:25 | 187:18 192:8 | DI 118:25 122:15 | disagreement | 131:4 132:11 |
| deployed 115:19 | 225:8 239:9 | 122:25,25 123:3 | 20:11 48:8 | 133:20,25 153:21 |
| 116:15 180:25 | 247:11 | 123:9 188:14 | 136:21 252:18 | 153:24 162:22 |
| deployment 109:9 | details 80:18 96:3 | 198:4 199:25 | disagrees 71:3 | 244:18 |
| depression 42:3 | 126:18 129:23 | diagnosed 42:2 | disappointed | discussed 29:5 |
| 1 | | 1 10 4 4 1 01 10 | 94:20 95:20 | 30:22 98:16 |
| deprive 177:12 | 135:6 | dictated 81:10 | 94.20 93.20 | 30.22 30.10 |
| | 135:6 Detective 60:14 | dictated 81:10 dictionary 17:1 | 96:22 134:23 | 127:24 149:2 |
| deprive 177:12 deputy 37:15 53:12 54:10 | Detective 60:14 78:4 85:3 105:16 | dictionary 17:1 18:9 | 96:22 134:23 135:25 149:17 | 127:24 149:2 161:10,13 167:4 |
| deprive 177:12 deputy 37:15 | Detective 60:14 | dictionary 17:1 | 96:22 134:23 | 127:24 149:2 |
| deprive 177:12 deputy 37:15 53:12 54:10 | Detective 60:14 78:4 85:3 105:16 | dictionary 17:1 18:9 | 96:22 134:23 135:25 149:17 | 127:24 149:2 161:10,13 167:4 |

| | I | I | I | I |
|---------------------------|------------------------|-----------------------|------------------------------------|------------------------|
| 206:23 208:22 | distanced 82:2 | 162:6,8 165:6 | dry 217:17 | 124:11 |
| 210:14 211:14,17 | distilled 10:19 | 168:19,23 171:25 | DS 156:14 158:22 | easy 165:7 226:24 |
| 212:13 213:20 | distinctly 163:16 | 172:11,22 173:16 | | 227:23 |
| 232:19 233:4 | distress 104:14 | 174:5,19,23 | due 25:19 29:16 | echoed 235:25 |
| 237:7 246:11 | 116:3 | 175:7,10 181:10 | 33:19 34:7 42:5 | Eddie 47:7 69:7 |
| discussing 178:4 | distressing 196:25 | 182:25 184:4 | 57:17 69:2 75:25 | 70:10 |
| 185:16 215:15 | disturb 218:18 | 188:21 192:16 | 113:23 114:10 | edited 247:16 |
| discussion 132:3 | document 20:16 | 193:3,22,25 | 193:19 217:1 | Edward 49:8 |
| 154:4 158:6,8 | 20:20 183:23 | 194:7,8 195:12 | 250:10,16 | effect 3:18 83:7 |
| 198:14 206:17 | 206:15 239:20 | 195:13 198:2,6 | Duncan 58:10 | 147:14 163:23 |
| 210:17 211:21 | documentary | 199:17,20 200:5 | duration 109:9 | 164:20 167:16 |
| 253:19 | 206:16 | 202:6 203:13 | duties 66:6 147:22 | effective 85:19 |
| discussions 98:20 | documentation | 207:17 216:3 | duty 3:7,21 27:21 | 112:9 113:7,11 |
| 169:25 170:2 | 98:11 | DPP's 151:10 | 103:18 104:16 | 113:16 179:21 |
| 206:10 213:8 | documents 2:11 | DPPP 175:11 | 118:1 190:24 | effectively 27:24 |
| 214:10 | 2:12 8:16 9:10 | Dr 19:18 32:17 | 242:25 | 59:8 64:25 78:22 |
| disgracefully 53:8 | 10:18 13:9 15:1 | 33:24 34:7,21 | dying 77:18 | 171:3 |
| dishonest 177:4 | 15:19 19:6,10 | 41:10,13 71:22 | | effectiveness 36:13 |
| dishonestly 178:16 | 20:6 26:25 46:23 | 73:13 130:12 | E | 59:25 231:21 |
| dishonesty 177:14 | 59:19 139:6 | 132:9 224:5,17 | E 168:14 | 241:10 242:1 |
| dismissal 216:11 | 148:2 160:25 | 227:2 228:18 | EA 176:10 179:14 | 244:10 |
| dismissed 60:19 | 175:19 187:18 | 235:22 236:8,9 | earlier 28:4 72:7 | efficacy 58:21 |
| 117:17 203:2 | 210:24 220:24 | 237:15,25 238:17 | 96:24 127:18 | efficiency 36:12 |
| display 109:2,8 | 236:4 | 239:5 244:3,16 | 135:19 136:2 | 231:20 241:10,25 |
| displayed 69:11 | dog 79:8 124:20 | 245:1,20,23 | 139:22 175:17 | 244:9 |
| 109:10 | doing 1:7 10:24 | 246:4,9,14,18,21 | 196:6 211:8 | effort 65:9 227:24 |
| displaying 57:17 | 21:17 96:1 | 246:25 247:4,6 | 218:9 241:20 | efforts 65:24 66:7 |
| 228:10 | 126:14 135:4 | 247:10,13 248:12 | 242:14 | eight 31:13 223:2 |
| displeased 65:25 | 159:24 162:25 | 250:11 | earliest 48:17 | 227:12 |
| disposal 19:6 | 163:21,24 168:3 | draft 32:9 85:11 | 96:18 | eighth 223:4 |
| dispose 164:10 | 170:7 184:9 | 106:6 224:14 | early 1:15 7:2,7,17 | either 15:22 20:1 |
| disproportionate | 203:3 209:19 | 247:14 | 9:2 18:15 33:18 | 65:4 77:9 85:2 |
| 52:1 56:10 180:2 | 245:8 | drafted 70:20 | 34:20 42:11 43:6 | 98:14 104:15 |
| dispute 18:8 20:13 | domestic 225:21 | 176:10 | 45:23 46:11 47:6 | 109:17 187:25 |
| 29:17,20 41:22 | door 71:15 | drafting 216:24 | 71:4,20 82:18 | 216:1 225:1 |
| 142:2 157:3 | doubt 59:25 78:15 | dragging 92:24 | 86:14 87:2 96:6 | 241:8 242:10 |
| 193:21 194:5 | 174:2 182:2 | drama 61:19 71:8 | 100:10 117:24 | 249:15 |
| 235:20 237:8 | 195:17 | draw 4:22 64:10 | 127:9 135:9 | El 132:19 |
| 251:2 254:1,4 | DPP 38:16 90:16 | drawn 154:20 | 153:17 185:14,17 | elaborate 21:13 |
| disputed 20:21 | 96:15 132:11,14 | 218:4 | 232:5 237:14 | elected 151:8 |
| disputes 139:2 | 133:17,22,25 | draws 171:9 | 240:7 243:14 | 238:6 |
| 194:24 235:25 | 134:1,5 135:17 | dressing-down | 249:20 252:7,25 253:9,22 | electronic 5:6 13:8 |
| 236:24 238:18 | 148:21,24 149:1 | 39:16 163:18 | - | electronically |
| disqualify 209:19 | 149:3,4 150:5,21 | drive 50:12 | easily 64:25 east 44:14 83:4,14 | 187:12 |
| disquiet 11:5 | 151:1,3 153:20 | driven 227:25 | 88:22 89:6 91:16 | elegant 67:22 |
| disregard 162:3 | 153:24 154:4,6 | driving 29:22 | | element 11:6 |
| disruptive 180:23 | 154:19,22 156:3 | drove 46:15 | 119:5,13 121:4 122:2 | 17:20 128:15 |
| distance 129:11 | 156:9 158:14,17 | drug 124:5 137:22 | easterly 88:22 | eleven 16:5 |
| 178:12 | 161:16,16,22 | drunk 75:3 | eastern 84:4 | email 35:4 58:18 |
| | | | (asici ii 04.4 | |
| | | | | |

| | | | | 1 480 207 |
|------------------------|--------------------------|------------------------------------|-------------------------|-------------------|
| 67:9 68:17 69:4 | encouraging 205:5 | 163:15 203:4 | establishing 13:19 | 46:20,24 49:1 |
| 70:19 81:14,19 | encroachment | entering 106:2 | 81:21 129:5 | 50:18 55:6 56:3 |
| 82:23 84:5 93:6 | 51:25 | entering 100:2 entertain 167:17 | et 63:12 | 60:20 63:20 |
| 93:8,13 94:13 | endeavour 24:1 | enthusiastic | Ethics 173:21 | 64:12 72:12 |
| 95:14 97:10,11 | ended 149:17 | 225:17 | EU 80:20 155:16 | 74:19,25 75:11 |
| 99:12 103:10 | 150:7 | entirely 19:8 35:15 | eulogise 52:23 | 75:12,15,17,21 |
| 104:5 119:20,22 | ends 81:23 129:7 | 59:23 93:20 | <u> </u> | 76:5 77:1 101:3 |
| | 160:2 | | Europe 54:15 173:20 | 107:6 108:15 |
| 121:11,13 125:24 | | 134:13 159:2 | | |
| 126:9 134:6,10 | enforcement 38:25 | 209:3,15 222:5 | evasive 85:23 110:23 | 112:7 113:9,18 |
| 134:11,11 136:6 | 39:17 49:21,22 | entirety 4:14 91:9 | | 114:2 115:15 |
| 152:18 171:6 | 87:21 110:1 | 136:24 | eve 66:22 | 118:2 119:21 |
| 195:24 197:20 | 114:25 151:7 | entitled 15:18 | evening 3:16 80:16 | 120:15 121:8,14 |
| 200:3,4 220:17 | 163:19 | 137:1 173:10 | 127:1 171:7,11 | 125:4 130:19,23 |
| 227:7 229:18,20 | enforcements | 207:6 | 219:13 253:21 | 131:22 132:13 |
| 244:12 251:21 | 86:22 | entitlements 43:13 | event 11:6 17:3,11 | 139:10 141:21 |
| 252:11 253:1 | engage 45:8 89:9 | 253:16 | 17:14 18:11,17 | 144:13 145:19 |
| email.' 153:11 | 92:6 122:6 | entity 15:12 37:18 | 40:9 144:21 | 148:6 150:24 |
| emailed 42:12 | 209:20 | entries 112:3 | 161:1 169:8 | 151:4 152:10 |
| 58:8 128:17 | engaged 95:25 | 114:8,8 | 179:17 180:8 | 164:10 166:8 |
| 133:17 171:11 | 135:3 187:9 | entry 118:21 | 183:16 202:23 | 174:6 176:14,18 |
| 200:1 220:15 | engagement | 119:10 120:25 | 203:4 245:13 | 177:1 178:22 |
| emails 57:23 176:9 | 107:25 | 122:19 127:17 | events 1:6 19:5 | 179:5,23 181:23 |
| embarrassed | engaging 77:9 | 188:23 196:17 | 49:9 57:25 58:11 | 183:5,12 184:13 |
| 70:15 212:10 | 158:6 | 197:12 | 61:10 65:15 | 186:19,21 187:1 |
| embarrassing | English 17:1 | Equally 170:10 | 77:25 78:20 | 187:24 188:8 |
| 71:14 | 163:23 175:3 | 200:20 | 88:10 94:23 | 195:7 200:13,20 |
| embarrassment | enjoy 15:16 | equated 173:7 | 98:13 111:25 | 200:21 203:13 |
| 212:23 | 173:22 | 199:3 | 138:8 149:21 | 204:7 207:1,12 |
| Embassy 128:12 | enjoyed 68:15 | equation 17:21 | 198:10 203:9 | 213:7,17 214:3,9 |
| emerge 44:1 | 211:25 | equipment 62:5 | 208:6 212:10 | 220:11,22 221:12 |
| emerges 123:8 | enquiries 40:15 | 63:15 81:11 | 238:5,14 240:24 | 229:9 230:18 |
| Emile 55:12 | 51:20 | 106:12 109:16,20 | 243:13,15,18 | 233:14 234:2 |
| emoji 129:24 | enquiring 40:23 | 115:18 116:8,14 | 247:6 249:22 | 235:19 237:10 |
| emotional 40:5 | 198:20 | erroneous 84:15 | 250:3 | 238:17 239:16 |
| 57:13 166:17 | enquiry 13:10 | erroneously 59:2 | eventually 48:15 | 240:1,8 246:10 |
| emphasis 86:1 | 135:17 | errors 53:2 | 50:19 97:6 | 249:17 252:12 |
| 220:7 | ensuing 189:21 | ES 124:5 | 253:20 | 253:10 |
| emphasise 123:9 | ensure 14:24 | escalation 51:4 | everybody 107:3 | evidenced 115:4 |
| emphasises 65:17 | 24:22 27:23 | 71:2 | evidence 1:23 6:5 | evident 165:9 |
| 89:21 | 65:14 89:14 | especially 137:20 | 6:11 8:15 10:18 | evidential 172:3 |
| emphasising 16:20 | 116:12 122:10 | 145:20 155:14 | 13:4,5,6 15:18 | evidently 95:19 |
| employed 186:2 | 151:22 152:6 | 207:17 | 19:21 21:5,20,22 | 134:22 |
| 210:24 | 170:21 | essence 227:11 | 21:25 22:9,12,14 | ex-Bland 153:3 |
| employee 29:19 | ensuring 10:25 | establish 10:22 | 23:2,5,11 24:5,23 | exacerbate 68:5 |
| employees 37:11 | 92:19 | 79:17 | 25:7 26:19,24 | exact 63:13 80:14 |
| 37:18 153:3 | entails 9:18 | established 38:15 | 27:4,5,12,16 28:5 | 81:21 121:10 |
| Employment 25:3 | enter 115:9 117:7 | 38:24 75:6 85:17 | 28:16 30:10 | 125:20 127:21 |
| enacted 2:3 | 167:2 188:1 | 111:6 150:8,14 | 32:15 35:2,19 | 128:14 129:5 |
| encounters 168:10 | entered 62:4 76:8 | 232:21 | 36:25 39:4 45:13 | Exactly 175:5 |
| | | | | |
| | • | • | • | • |

| exaggerated 209:8 | 196:16 218:1 | 95:3 122:12 | expressing 79:5 | facto 106:2 |
|-------------------------|--------------------------------|------------------------------------|--------------------------------------|---------------------|
| examination 1:22 | executed 51:2 | expenses 13:14 | 231:10 | factor 37:1 246:9 |
| 59:6 63:11,23 | 90:17 143:10 | expensive 3:20 | expressly 200:8 | factors 16:2 |
| 112:15 161:3 | 159:11 168:7,18 | experience 1:17 | 245:9,16 | facts 1:17,21 3:8 |
| 176:1 179:6 | 209:11 | 7:11 107:19 | extended 4:5 | 9:5 10:20,22 |
| 180:6 | executing 38:2 | 108:11 110:25 | extended 1.5 extends 18:16 | 12:3,12 13:19 |
| examine 1:10 | 145:5 163:21 | experienced 111:2 | extension 208:15 | 14:25 16:20 |
| 198:13 220:9 | 208:10 | 168:11 | extensive 143:11 | 18:16 20:14,17 |
| 249:7 | execution 39:14 | expertise 147:10 | extent 24:2 31:20 | 20:21 71:17 |
| example 8:9 13:6 | 55:23 60:15 | experts 59:10 | 35:15 151:21 | 102:16 117:21 |
| 15:17 17:23 52:5 | 146:19 169:13 | experts 35:10 explain 9:25 15:2 | 170:11 242:15 | 126:2 177:8 |
| 66:19 189:25 | 211:10 217:21 | 15:10 131:6 | external 79:14 | 192:9,11,11 |
| 190:10 200:11 | 221:13 | 167:13 | 82:13 99:9,22 | factual 12:15 |
| 226:2 236:8 | executive 49:23 | explained 28:4 | 100:4 230:16 | 20:12 36:4 97:24 |
| 248:12 | 153:2 154:13 | 73:19 156:25 | extract 120:18,19 | 99:11 102:14 |
| examples 225:25 | exempt 173:14 | 221:12 | 123:5 | 129:21 203:25 |
| Excellency 7:2 | exempt 173.14 exercise 13:8 | explaining 21:11 | extraction 119:8 | 237:8 |
| 52:16 53:24 67:4 | 18:24 41:15 | explains 144:21 | extraction 119.8 extradition 94:1 | fail 69:22,22 |
| 120:24 244:23 | 46:15 97:18,22 | explanation 17:2 | extremely 10:6 | 186:10 |
| excellent 68:16 | 98:2,3 242:24 | 131:7 | 62:20 158:15 | failed 48:24 59:7 |
| 219:25 | 243:3 251:9 | explanations 11:1 | 196:7,9 | 69:18 71:13 |
| exception 104:12 | exercising 42:16 | 17:6 97:9 | eye 109:21 234:24 | 88:15 160:24 |
| exception 10 1.12 | 252:20 | explanatory 91:8 | | 231:24 242:22 |
| excessive 154:23 | exhibits 49:13 | expletives 149:24 | F | failing 69:21 100:2 |
| 157:8 | 50:4,6,8 51:2 | explicitly 221:19 | Fabian 16:8 34:25 | failings 102:14,20 |
| exchange 21:4 | exigencies 226:8 | exploration | 45:11 92:9 | 225:18 |
| 27:4 87:17 88:25 | exist 80:20 111:16 | 139:15 | face 69:1 147:16 | failure 35:23 |
| 90:20 91:8 | 112:21 187:13 | explore 233:5 | 226:23 | 36:16 116:6 |
| 128:22 130:9 | 206:20 | 240:3 252:13 | face-to-face | 225:21 251:5,7 |
| 132:7 136:8 | existed 61:15 | 254:12 | 162:16 | failures 154:7 |
| 141:16 159:25 | existence 186:22 | explored 27:11 | faced 7:15 111:13 | 155:25 182:10 |
| 162:11 163:8 | 186:25 | 232:8 237:9 | facility 109:1 | 205:3 |
| 174:20 215:6 | existing 72:3 73:17 | 239:10 | fact 7:15 17:25 | fair 11:15 13:19 |
| 216:5 218:7 | 104:9 | expose 62:23 | 18:9,20 21:9 | 14:25 136:3 |
| 221:4 | exists 230:11 | 184:19 224:4 | 53:2,15 65:9 | 251:6 |
| exchanged 121:22 | exonerate 206:2 | exposed 155:24 | 69:12 85:2 96:24 | fairly 73:10 139:8 |
| 175:16 244:7 | exonerated 63:1 | 202:20 | 101:8,17 115:4 | fairness 200:24 |
| exchanges 8:14 | expected 67:20 | exposure 94:6 | 123:16 138:18 | fall 27:19 155:8 |
| 89:23 129:25 | 91:4 98:18 109:3 | 184:19 | 139:2 145:10 | fall-out 97:8 |
| 136:18 171:19 | 115:23 167:11 | express 5:8 144:17 | 150:6,21 151:1 | falls 250:19 |
| 187:2 191:6 | 168:5 181:1 | 151:11,16 207:7 | 154:1 160:23 | false 66:16 |
| 213:15 | 231:4 | 214:17 225:14 | 161:10 169:10 | familiar 133:10 |
| exclaimed 165:7 | expecting 69:1 | 226:17 | 171:10 178:1 | families 44:13 |
| excused 163:11 | expedited 254:12 | expressed 58:3,14 | 182:5 189:5 | 91:15 96:12 |
| excuses 96:20 | expediting 184:24 | 86:20 136:11 | 193:22 194:6 | 135:14 |
| 135:23 | expeditiously | 160:11 199:17 | 205:21 206:5 | family 43:2 196:25 |
| execute 38:8 55:1 | 96:10 98:9 | 208:8 209:10 | 211:5,22 212:17 | far 36:25 81:18 |
| 142:22 144:18 | 135:12 | 224:6 | 218:7 225:8 | 115:23 129:3 |
| 160:13 188:23 | expenditure 89:16 | expresses 136:9 | 232:9 238:3 | 176:11 206:21 |
| | • | _ | 252:24 255:2 | |
| | <u> </u> | <u> </u> | <u> </u> | <u> </u> |
| Enia Europa I td | | www.eniaglobal.com | L avvan Chavand El | 16 Classas I an |

| | | | | Page 2/1 |
|--------------------------------------|--------------------------------------|-----------------------------------|---|----------------------------------|
| 240:20 | felt 34:20 39:18 | finance 91:7 97:5 | 137:2 140:11 | follow 2:21 5:13 |
| Faro 132:19 | 42:10 49:3 52:3 | 223:5 225:22 | 145:23 156:15 | 116:6 190:10 |
| fashion 49:24 | 57:10 65:24 | finances 12:23 | 157:2 161:5 | followed 22:16 |
| fast 86:6 | 149:12,25 150:4 | financial 86:8 | 163:6 175:12,20 | 32:22 41:19 |
| fatalities 87:11 | 164:20 167:12 | 147:17 152:20 | 180:9 183:23 | 73:24 133:4 |
| fathom 126:14 | 170:3,17 193:7 | 157:15 201:1,5 | 187:22 191:8 | 143:11 150:10 |
| faults 102:20 | 211:4 212:23 | find 3:7,22 6:17 | 193:1 198:4,14 | 205:10 242:15 |
| favour 15:6 | 222:7,9 224:4 | 10:21 43:10 | 204:8 207:3 | 247:13 248:18 |
| 167:23 176:7 | 233:24 235:2 | 71:13 97:5 118:7 | 213:7 216:7 | following 9:14 |
| favourable 228:25 | field 83:2 118:4 | 138:16 176:22 | 217:13 234:4 | 11:5 42:11 43:8 |
| FCDO 125:24 | 119:8,11,24 | 227:9,15 230:18 | 241:4 243:11 | 52:4 57:5 74:5 |
| 128:11,18 132:1 | 120:3 121:1,2 | 253:12 | 245:23 | 77:7 79:25 80:2 |
| 254:8 | 120:3 121:1,2 | finding 1:21 12:3 | firstly 32:2 130:22 | 93:19 103:13 |
| FCO 58:7 80:10 | 236:2,3 239:19 | 117:15 | 160:18 185:19 | 116:1,4 120:6 |
| 125:18 | Field's 121:8 | findings 2:17 | Fischel 132:12 | 122:20,22 123:10 |
| fear 167:23 | fierce 20:11 | 12:16 96:4 106:8 | 133:13 134:4 | 126:9 128:17 |
| feared 42:20 | fiercely 7:13 | 117:3 135:7 | fit 196:11 | 132:8 133:19 |
| 186:11 | fifth 31:21 36:24 | 225:8 | fitted 30:24 106:16 | 146:13 152:23,25 |
| feature 76:25 | 169:5 | fine 129:21 | 233:19 | 159:25 167:21 |
| 192:13 230:2 | fig 249:1 | finish 5:19,22 6:4 | five 9:24 16:3 | 177:15 183:9 |
| features 78:9 | fighting 10:13 | 160:7 221:7 | 29:10 35:14 | 186:3 195:11 |
| February 8:18 | figures 7:24 | 256:11 | 43:20,24 72:24 | 214:23 215:1 |
| 29:12 49:11 | 114:17 | finishes 6:11 92:2 | 76:18 120:1,22 | 223:16 227:8 |
| 51:23 52:2,10 | file 118:22 123:8 | Fire 31:9 222:22 | 121:3 139:18,22 | 241:22 |
| 53:11 55:10 58:1 | 223:20 234:9 | firm 27:19 37:20 | 139:24 203:19 | follows 28:18 35:2 |
| 66:22 67:10 | 237:23 246:4 | 48:7 59:20 | 216:10 222:15 | 44:10 52:7 54:2 |
| 104:6 175:25 | filed 12:17 44:12 | | 247:23 | 56:5 67:14 69:6 |
| 176:12 224:14 | 90:7 91:14 | 141:15,18 145:22 146:17 157:18 | fives 56:25 | 74:10 87:18 91:9 |
| 237:14 238:23 | 152:25 | 164:7 177:7 | fix 227:24 | 95:15 97:12 |
| 237:14 238:23 | | 197:3 230:8 | | 101:2 106:9 |
| fed 109:7 | filing 245:10 | firm's 157:18 | flagged 189:9 flash 236:13 | 118:24 124:1 |
| | final 2:23 6:13,15 | 196:4 | | |
| Federation 16:13 25:15 30:17,17 | 8:14 23:21 | 1,01. | flat 76:8 flavour 201:10 | 126:4 145:14 159:21 162:13 |
| · · | 107:11,16 108:24 109:13 111:19 | firmly 14:19 15:4 | | |
| 36:19 41:8 43:25 | 112:24 113:13 | 41:3 88:1,10 | flawed 33:1 34:10 | 175:8 185:11 |
| 44:25 140:14 | | 118:14 198:25 | 42:5 63:3 250:7 | 204:23 218:6 |
| 232:11,14,17 | 180:20 201:8 203:25 209:1 | 238:15 | 250:13 flaws 189:23 190:3 | 251:21 f acility 60:12 |
| 234:8,14 235:16 | | first 9:13,25 10:5 | | fools 69:12 |
| 236:11 255:15 Federation's | 224:12,24 229:16 240:24 251:20,20 | 12:19 14:3 17:10 | 190:21 248:10 251:25 | foot 131:18 |
| 230:24 231:6 | 253:25 | 19:1 21:1,5,13 24:7 27:10 28:4 | | footage 143:1 181:7 |
| feeding 100:16 | finally 11:14,17 | 28:14 29:11 | flight 50:5 61:20 flimsy 202:21 | force 15:25 49:6 |
| feeds 212:8 | 13:15 18:17 | 35:17 44:4 65:12 | | 52:19,20 53:4 |
| | | | flippant 79:22 | · · |
| feel 31:5 40:21 162:25 217:16 | 31:21 36:24 | 73:22 74:8 78:1 | 125:2 | 68:8 78:23 93:11 |
| | 38:17 46:12 | 78:13 84:7 87:3 | flying 30:8 74:16 | 120:10 225:15,18 |
| feeling 150:11 | 60:22 71:12 85:8 | 88:19 89:1 91:11 | focus 54:10 102:18 | 226:4 230:17,23 |
| 222:10 feelings 52:15 | 113:8 138:19 | 93:22 101:13 | 240:16 | forced 42:20 247:9 |
| feelings 52:15 feels 252:6 | 163:4 182:19 | 104:15 116:1 | focused 192:12 | forces 47:12,19 |
| fell 7:22 | 201:19,24 209:7 240:18 | 117:25 118:8 | focusing 157:9 fold 131:10 | 48:21 55:24 58:4 61:23 |
| 1011 / .22 | 2 4 0.10 | 130:2 131:10 | 1010 131.10 | 01.43 |
| | | | | |

| | | | | 1 age 2/2 |
|-------------------------|-------------------------|--------------------------|---------------------|----------------------|
| fore 201:11 | 109:2 133:2 | fullest 192:10 | Gallagher 5:17 | 204:3 210:16 |
| forefront 222:2 | 134:18 148:6 | fully 69:10 102:15 | 255:18 | 213:19,23 214:4 |
| foreign 58:11 | 161:20 166:3 | 167:23 173:25 | gallery 5:7 14:23 | 214:13,16,19,22 |
| 62:16 91:3 | 177:9 224:19 | 223:13 229:1 | game 175:13 | 215:2,3,12,17,23 |
| foremost 137:2 | 227:11 231:16 | function 10:21 | Garcia 37:17 | 215:25 220:14,16 |
| forensic 30:10 | foundation 1:25 | 155:20 | Gary 78:4 85:4 | 228:20 237:19 |
| 59:10 63:8,11,18 | four 4:8 5:22 | functions 13:4 | gathered 166:8 | 248:22 249:4,15 |
| 63:22 74:19 75:8 | 19:12 43:14,16 | 254:20,22,24 | gathering 13:5 | 250:15,16 |
| 178:6 179:6 | 43:23 87:9 171:5 | fund 137:7 | GBC 4:11 | General's 123:14 |
| 181:16,24 | 210:12 229:2 | fundamental | GC 119:6 123:1 | 134:7 150:3 |
| forensically 176:9 | 245:24 | 93:16,23 94:11 | 127:14 | 169:20 190:1,6 |
| form 7:22 10:11 | four-star 52:20 | fundamentally | general 7:21 8:8 | 202:9 222:3 |
| 183:20 190:7 | fourth 25:17 31:8 | 34:10 250:13 | 16:9 17:9 22:7 | 249:10 |
| formal 59:4 99:23 | 36:18 130:25 | funded 138:2 | 22:18,21 33:5 | generally 39:3 |
| 105:24 112:20 | FP 169:11,16,18 | funding 93:9 97:5 | 37:24 38:11,15 | 108:6 151:14 |
| 114:23 123:19 | fractious 36:22 | 225:23 | 38:17 39:7 40:2 | 168:23 233:6 |
| 154:17 234:10,13 | 149:24 235:13 | further 17:9 19:25 | 40:4,10,12,20,23 | generations 67:20 |
| 237:13 238:20 | fractured 30:15 | 23:19 25:4 27:16 | 41:4,12 42:24 | generic 188:10 |
| 239:1,21 253:22 | 74:15 234:5,7 | 34:21 38:19,21 | 46:1 47:24 49:8 | Gents 67:15 |
| formally 41:15 | fracturing 30:7 | 87:15,16 94:16 | 52:9,20 53:25 | 103:13 |
| 62:14 | framed 240:15 | 97:21 100:7 | 55:11 58:9,19 | genuine 69:19 |
| format 206:17 | frank 48:14 | 112:14,22,24 | 60:22 65:10 | 202:8 |
| formed 37:18 | 238:13 251:24 | 129:7,22,23 | 66:12 67:14 69:5 | genuinely 165:13 |
| 171:2 | free 95:3 174:21 | 134:3,4 138:22 | 70:14 72:2 80:17 | getting 14:13 54:6 |
| former 16:6,11 | freely 22:12 | 144:2 149:5,10 | 80:24 83:6,17,25 | 81:20 82:1 101:8 |
| 25:13 37:11,18 | frenzied 11:12 | 149:11 153:13 | 84:13 93:6,14 | 129:4,10 |
| 74:24 75:19 | frequency 113:4 | 158:11,17 159:9 | 95:10 100:13,16 | Gib 208:23 |
| 255:10 | frequent 207:24 | 161:25 162:11 | 100:20 102:24 | Gibbs 255:11 |
| formerly 65:12 | frequently 206:23 | 166:12 167:3 | 103:3 123:13,23 | 256:6 |
| formulated 43:17 | Friday 3:1 23:17 | 170:22 171:21 | 124:15 126:25 | Gibraltan 131:16 |
| forthright 146:17 | 33:7 | 179:5 183:20,22 | 129:14 131:10 | Gibraltar 1:19 |
| forthwith 103:14 | friend 141:24 | 187:12 192:20,21 | 132:5,11,16 | 7:24 8:10,11 |
| fortune 70:8 | friendly 61:12,14 | 197:22 198:9,14 | 133:1,7,23 134:6 | 11:11 16:10,11 |
| forward 2:2 17:22 | friends 210:20 | 199:22 203:3 | 134:9 136:12 | 16:13 25:14 |
| 24:13 166:15 | friendship 209:17 | 210:2 217:8 | 137:11 144:7 | 29:22 30:6,16,22 |
| 184:6 187:21 | front 44:17 61:22 | 228:23 229:20 | 146:6 148:13,23 | 32:8 36:19 38:25 |
| 228:15 | 61:25 68:18 | 239:10 247:20 | 149:5,11 150:20 | 47:12 48:6,7 |
| forwarded 95:7,11 | 91:19 | further.' 145:25 | 150:25 152:13 | 49:12,14 51:19 |
| 95:19 97:10 | frontline 137:19 | Furthermore | 157:9 160:4 | 54:5,11,21 55:15 |
| 134:9,22 | FRS 94:19 | 83:10 101:20 | 171:14,20 172:1 | 55:22,24 57:4,22 |
| forwarding 93:6 | frustrated 197:15 | 104:17 | 173:16 174:17 | 59:7 61:13,16,21 |
| 97:11 175:17 | FS 178:17 202:1 | future 22:9 67:20 | 175:5,15 189:20 | 61:23 64:5,8 |
| forwards 95:12 | fucking 69:1 | 96:12 135:15 | 192:18,23 193:14 | 65:6 66:3 67:24 |
| 136:8 179:3 | full 10:23 39:10 | 227:18 | 193:22 194:22 | 69:22 70:2,11 |
| found 25:6 31:12 | 52:13 60:7 64:23 | futures 24:12 | 195:1,4,24 | 74:12,14 79:16 |
| 32:11 36:10 | 68:15 84:8 96:3 | | 197:17 198:1,6 | 80:20 84:24 86:9 |
| 39:23 44:5 59:11 | 135:6 138:25 | G | 198:15,19,25 | 88:22 94:6 99:24 |
| 63:25 69:13 | 177:25 213:3 | Gaggero 142:12 | 199:5,9 200:5 | 102:2 103:22 |
| 85:13 91:1 98:25 | 227:2 229:19 | 153:1 | 202:10 203:11 | 104:1 108:7 |
| | | gained 1:19 | | |
| | I | I | I | I |

| | | | | Page 2/3 |
|-------------------------|-------------------------|------------------|--------------------------|-------------------------|
| 114:25 115:14 | 209:16 225:10 | 225:9 256:8 | 242:7,11,24 | 106:10,17,21 |
| 116:11,17,22,25 | 231:24 234:22,25 | Gold 82:25 | 243:2 244:17,24 | 100:10,17,21 |
| 131:11 132:21,25 | 234:25 235:18 | Gomez 34:13 | 245:4 248:15 | 128:6 |
| 137:21 138:2,6,9 | 238:16 239:9 | 45:19 122:24 | 254:5,16,17,20 | GPS(sic) 31:20 |
| 138:17,21 144:9 | 240:14 252:3,25 | 248:8 251:12,15 | 254:21 | Grail 125:19 |
| 151:7,9 152:12 | gives 18:2 36:25 | 251:18 | governor's 101:20 | granted 5:9 27:1 |
| 152:13 154:8 | 44:23 56:3 91:25 | good 1:2 6:23 | 247:22 254:9 | 49:19 55:4 |
| 155:14,17 156:1 | 152:13 193:6 | 17:17 49:21 | GPA 8:11 19:18 | 160:19 161:2 |
| 157:25 162:24 | 201:10 238:10 | 58:13 70:7,8 | 32:17,18,24,24 | 186:6 197:13 |
| 164:7,10 167:11 | 242:3 | 72:23 124:3,4 | 33:2,24 34:5,8,12 | 205:9 |
| 211:23 212:25 | giving 21:5 56:25 | 128:23 140:5 | 35:4 42:4,6 | grapple 189:5 |
| 228:22 231:5 | 199:20 222:5 | 146:12 164:8 | 45:20 59:16,20 | grateful 20:9 |
| 232:13,14 234:8 | 250:10 255:15 | 176:17 218:21 | 60:20 62:15,25 | 23:24 189:14 |
| 236:11 241:12 | glaring 190:22 | 219:25 220:11 | 63:1,1 71:24 | gratitude 58:14,20 |
| 242:2 252:8 | global 116:13 | 225:16 | 104:12 130:13 | grave 43:2 |
| 254:6 255:14 | go 24:12 29:15 | goodbye 70:6,9 | 151:17 168:16 | gravely 251:22 |
| Gibraltar's 43:5 | 32:21 34:6 44:7 | governed 2:6 | 173:4 221:17,18 | gravity 30:24 |
| 62:1 82:13 141:4 | 45:2 53:25 66:23 | government 2:8 | 223:12 224:24 | 233:19 |
| 145:21 177:6 | 67:8,9 72:8 74:9 | 2:20,25 5:21 | 226:9,13,15 | great 42:14 |
| 197:3 | 78:12,18 103:9 | 7:19,23 8:17 9:6 | 229:5,18 232:19 | greater 17:13 |
| Gibraltarian | 104:19 107:16 | 23:10,14 24:19 | 233:2,4,13 | greatly 94:20 |
| 67:15 | 114:3 118:7,18 | 24:24 43:5 70:11 | 234:14,15 237:6 | 149:17 |
| give 5:12,17,20 | 118:20 119:19,24 | 79:16 92:24 | 237:7,13,16,22 | Greck 130:14 |
| 9:15,20 11:1 | 120:21 121:21 | 98:15 137:2,7,13 | 237:22 238:16,22 | Green 48:14 51:9 |
| 21:19,25 22:11 | 122:18 125:7,23 | 137:19 138:15,20 | 238:24,24 239:2 | 55:17 56:1 61:21 |
| 22:14 24:4,23 | 126:8 128:20 | 142:5 147:16 | 239:13,22 240:5 | grew 229:11 |
| 27:12 54:15 | 132:2 135:20 | 148:9 152:2 | 240:17 241:5,12 | grievances 31:20 |
| 137:24 164:13 | 136:7,14,23 | 154:18 205:2 | 241:20,23 242:3 | 231:6 |
| 190:25 192:8 | 163:6,10,25 | 225:19 226:1 | 242:7,11,15 | gross 196:10 |
| 200:19 216:10 | 171:8 175:19 | 255:18 | 245:20 246:16 | grossly 248:11,23 |
| 241:13 | 181:13 183:23 | Governments | 247:5 248:10 | ground 106:22,23 |
| given 20:20 21:22 | 184:6 197:22 | 114:24 | 249:4 250:4,6 | 207:1 |
| 22:9 27:8 33:3 | 199:12 200:4 | governor 1:9 7:1 | 251:11 | grounds 47:11 |
| 34:16 36:16 42:7 | 202:2 205:17 | 7:20,25 8:3,6 | GPA's 41:21 45:20 | 60:19 138:8 |
| 43:10 45:14 49:1 | 209:24 216:5,25 | 16:7 19:16 28:15 | 46:12 66:9 73:14 | 142:18 160:18 |
| 53:11,21 61:11 | 217:4,11 218:15 | 33:4,25 35:10 | 139:8 245:2 | 165:5 177:14 |
| 63:25 66:12 | 225:10 227:6 | 37:6 45:24 46:8 | 246:9 248:11 | 178:15,25 179:9 |
| 79:11 80:19 | 236:12 243:15 | 49:7 51:10 52:16 | 250:7,17,25 | 183:13,17 186:20 |
| 81:12 97:14 | 245:7 249:8 | 53:12,24 54:18 | 251:5 255:12 | 195:15 202:21 |
| 99:20 101:14 | goes 65:19 67:2 | 58:9,17 62:15 | GPF 25:14 223:19 | group 66:21 |
| 105:22 127:6 | 76:6 231:2 | 79:15 82:12 | 232:19 233:2,6,8 | 105:19 120:22 |
| 138:5,13 141:16 | GOG 126:18 | 89:23 90:19 95:8 | 233:16 234:13 | 130:10,11 131:24 |
| 145:24 148:24 | going 9:21 44:15 | 97:11 98:1,15,21 | 235:7,10,18 | 136:19 153:2,3 |
| 162:9 172:2,3 | 45:8 68:3,12 | 99:7,19,23 100:3 | 236:15,16,25 | 223:8 |
| 173:24 180:16,21 | 91:17 92:5 94:14 | 100:6 101:25 | 237:6,11,19 | growing 31:6 |
| 181:25 184:16 | 123:11 140:6 | 102:1,3,5,8 | 239:4,7,24,25 | 78:16 233:25 |
| 186:12 191:4 | 145:18 181:19 | 125:22 136:8 | 240:5 | 235:4 |
| 198:10 201:4 | 182:14 197:21 | 211:24 235:9 | GPP 95:5 | grown- 51:6 |
| 206:2 207:20 | 211:13 219:8 | 237:2 241:6,16 | GPS 77:20 81:3 | GRP 245:3 |
| | | | | |
| | | | | |

| | | | I | I |
|-----------------------------------|----------------------------|---------------------------------|-----------------------------------|-------------------------------|
| Guardia 103:16 | 126:13 130:6 | 154:9 170:21 | 139:17 140:7,12 | 79:9 80:25 118:1 |
| 107:9,14 111:16 | 234:21 | 172:20 186:11 | 219:16,24 220:5 | 123:14 |
| 112:22 115:5 | Hassan 180:18 | 209:18 213:1 | 220:10 222:19 | HQ 55:25 122:23 |
| guidance 109:14 | 181:7 | 237:21 239:7 | 224:18 227:11,14 | huge 44:15,18 |
| 112:16 | Hassans 37:20 | 245:21 | 228:22 229:6,11 | 91:17,20 93:25 |
| guilty 25:6 63:25 | 38:1,3 141:15,16 | helicopter 30:3,5 | 232:4 244:12 | 94:5 131:17 |
| | 142:22,24 143:12 | 41:8 43:22 73:7 | 245:10 247:1,25 | 243:8 |
| <u>H</u> | 143:13 144:20 | 73:23 74:3,12 | 248:25 | hull 31:23 |
| hacked 142:1 | 145:6 154:9 | 75:3 | hold 9:10 209:18 | human 93:23 |
| hacking 140:19 | 157:16 158:3 | help 1:23 42:1 | 218:10 | 211:1 |
| 141:2 | 185:22 197:24 | 79:7 128:24 | holder 202:18 | humiliate 56:23 |
| half 4:8 5:22 24:12 | 201:6 204:16 | 131:9 162:23 | holds 178:20 | hundred 1:19 |
| 88:18 93:14 | 214:17 | 227:17,19 | holidays 6:8 | 92:21 |
| 115:20 | Hassans' 152:8 | helpful 10:3,5,6 | home 38:3 62:8 | hung 217:17 |
| halfway 61:17 | 179:25 181:3 | 131:19 243:17 | 70:3 90:5,17 | hurt 167:18 |
| 121:24 123:1 | head 49:10 145:21 | helping 58:16 | 140:23 142:16 | Hutchison 50:16 |
| 130:15 | 164:5,6 172:20 | helps 131:3 164:6 | 144:19 159:12 | 51:10 55:18 |
| hallmark 92:23 | headed 110:3 | Henry 236:11 | 196:6 207:4 | 61:25 |
| hand 6:19 48:13 | heading 106:22 | hereunder 91:9 | 208:11,13,15 | hypothesis 121:17 |
| 51:20 124:23 | headline 227:20 | hesitate 69:16 | 209:12 212:6,11 | |
| 130:4 143:8 | headlines 126:4 | Hi 44:10 133:8 | homicide 90:9 | 1 . 02.22 00.22 |
| 164:18 165:24 | headquarters 62:2 | high 56:25 77:8 | 132:22 | i.e 83:22 88:23 |
| 221:1 | health 43:11 | 78:9 104:22 | honest 228:8 | 129:19 |
| handed 51:3 63:16 | 137:15 253:13 | 111:10 112:17 | honestly 59:1 | Ian 1:4,13 6:25 |
| 63:21 143:4 | hear 2:15 3:11 | 172:17,20 209:18 | Honourable 34:25 | 8:25 45:6 67:2 |
| 247:7 252:10 | 46:20 128:23 | high-drama 14:22 | 37:16 | 90:24 92:3 |
| 253:22 | 130:21 145:4 | higher 92:25 | hope 13:17 79:5 | 128:23 129:12,21 |
| handing 165:12,14 handled 65:4 | 251:10 255:6,9 | highest 64:9 252:1 | 126:16,20 158:4 | 131:2 145:14 159:22 162:18 |
| handling 65:22 | 255:17 | highlight 136:25 | 201:10 256:9 | 163:24 167:16 |
| 216:3 227:11 | heard 46:8 234:19 | highlighted 200:8 | hoped 10:24 11:17 | ICODE 141:12 |
| 229:22 | hearing 1:4 6:5,14 | 219:17 247:18 | 166:1 | idea 72:23 |
| hands 79:23 125:2 | 13:23,24 15:20 | highlights 230:6 | hopefully 96:2 | ideally 155:1 |
| happen 23:2 | 19:2 20:19 25:18 | highly 32:6 40:4 | 135:5 | ideas 228:6 |
| 158:20 193:24 | 26:10 27:8,14 | 59:24 81:24 | hoping 145:9,20 hostile 234:7 | identical 118:6 |
| 202:19 | 46:18 49:18 190:20 | 83:23 101:12 | | 238:10 |
| happened 1:16 | | 123:17 129:9,19 166:16 188:8 | hot 73:25 107:8 | identification |
| 10:23 45:7 83:23 | hearings 13:15,21 13:22 | 196:25 197:4 | hounded 167:13 hour 5:25 93:14 | 77:22 116:13 |
| 85:6 88:13,17 | hearsay 200:17 | Hill 120:14 | 124:2 256:8 | identified 63:23 |
| 92:5 124:20 | heart 242:16 | historically 107:12 | hours 4:1 80:1 | 74:4 102:19 |
| 126:5,12 129:20 | heat 81:8 128:8 | history 102:14 | 82:19 84:6,10,10 | 113:6 114:7 |
| 214:21 215:9 | heated 165:18 | 117:21 | 87:2,16 88:5,8,17 | 139:5 181:12 |
| happening 170:24 | heavily 140:9 | hits 80:4 125:12 | 88:19 90:12 93:5 | 187:19 223:2 |
| happy 43:18 56:17 | 171:9 | HM 62:4 | 93:15 95:13,14 | 225:6 227:13 |
| 58:12 139:21 | heels 73:25 | HMG 79:7 82:12 | 99:12,18 118:17 | 229:5 |
| 255:24 | Heine 164:1,2,9 | HMGOG 138:1 | 118:22 119:10,17 | identifies 225:18 |
| harassment | held 30:11 32:20 | HMIC 31:10 36:7 | 126:5 143:7 | identify 59:7 |
| 230:19 | 37:20 74:21 | 36:15 41:7 43:24 | 247:13 | 180:20 |
| hard 3:10 23:12 | 90:13 122:23 | 44:24 94:19 | House 56:18 57:16 | identifying 11:3 |
| 62:22 90:24 | 70.13 122.23 | 11.2171.17 | 110456 50.10 57.10 | idiots 69:1 70:7 |
| | <u> </u> | <u> </u> | <u> </u> | <u> </u> |
| | | | | |

| | | | | Page 2/5 |
|--------------------------------------|--------------------------------|---------------------------------------|---------------------------|-----------------------------|
| ignore 234:22 | 159:8 174:3 | incensed 204:25 | 76:13,19 100:25 | inert 71:1 |
| ill-advised 160:15 | 175:19 191:5 | 212:9 | 112:4 189:1 | inevitable 97:5 |
| ill-tempered | 193:12 200:13 | incentives 21:3 | 190:20 204:4 | |
| 150:18 | 219:23 221:8 | incessant 236:10 | 232:15 242:25 | inexplicable 196:19 |
| illicit 77:10 131:21 | 229:15 232:2,22 | incident 29:11 | 250:25 | inferred 12:6,11 |
| | 240:2,25 254:13 | 32:7,10 35:17 | inclusion 17:3 | inflatable 31:23 |
| illogical 17:23 illustrates 69:13 | * | 36:5 41:6 43:21 | 18:11 | influence 176:20 |
| IM 101:3,9,14 | importantly 9:19 14:3 88:17 | 44:13 45:1 47:5 | _ | 178:16 185:23 |
| 102:8 203:1 | | 47:6 52:4 53:1,3 | incomplete 84:15 187:2 | |
| | impose 2:9 | · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · | | influencing 40:25 198:22 |
| image 220:4 | imposed 242:23 | 53:10 54:16 | inconclusive 30:11 | |
| imagery 63:24 | imposes 17:5 | 59:16,22 60:2,6 | incorrect 40:8 | inform 33:7,11 |
| images 47:13 48:5 | impossible 192:8 | 60:10 61:3,4 | 150:9 166:21 | 35:25 145:4 |
| 59:8,11 64:1 | 198:11 | 62:10,23 63:9 | increasingly 11:12 | informal 112:21 |
| 71:13 | impression 69:8 | 64:6,13 65:22 | Incredible 175:13 | 206:14 244:22 |
| imagine 147:16 | 72:14 101:15 | 68:24 71:1,11,17 | incriminate 21:18 | information 1:23 |
| immediate 35:2 153:4 | 175:6 224:12 | 71:19 72:8,12 | 22:4 | 4:18 19:6,9 |
| | impressions 162:17 | 73:24 74:1 76:6 | incriminating 63:20 | 24:14 32:4 41:23 |
| immediately 22:17 | | 76:21 78:15,19 | | 59:18 63:5 77:11 |
| 77:17 99:4 | imprisonment | 79:13,18 80:8,19 | incurring 95:2 | 81:4 82:9,18 |
| 128:11 226:12 | 59:14 | 81:2 82:7,10,19 | indecent 47:13 | 83:12 84:9,16,16 |
| immense 43:1 | improper 24:10 | 82:21 83:8 84:11 | 48:5 59:8,11 | 89:2 96:21 98:10 |
| imminent 46:7 | 34:18 35:6 39:6 | 84:24 85:6 86:10 | 71:13 | 98:23 99:6,20 |
| 105:5 | 40:9 42:8 156:7 | 87:1,4,7,13 88:18 | independence | 100:3,16,24,25 |
| immune 173:5 | 166:23 169:24 | 88:20 91:15 | 173:9,23 241:11 | 101:11,13,23 |
| 199:2 | 170:8 173:7,13 | 95:24 96:3 98:20 | 242:2 244:11 | 102:4,9 121:25 |
| impact 3:3 46:10 | 212:13 252:4 | 99:4,8,18 101:5,7 | independent 1:20 | 126:24 130:3 |
| 77:17 126:22 | improperly 149:19 | 103:4 105:4 | 54:17 60:8,24 | 133:16 134:4 |
| 157:4 170:9 | 171:3,14 193:14 | 107:15 118:10 | 77:24 78:6 89:9 | 135:24 145:15 |
| impacted 245:7 | 210:21 226:3 | 119:3 120:6,9,17 | 96:5 122:6 135:8 | 147:24 148:2 |
| impartiality 43:4 | impropriety 24:20 | 124:9 125:16 | independently | 152:3 154:5 |
| impeccable 252:2 | . 181:2 | 126:2,5,11 | 154:1 173:12 | 162:10 165:3 |
| impending 27:8 | improvement | 130:10 135:2,6 | 244:1 | 176:16 177:23 |
| imperative 223:15 | 223:2 225:3,4,5 | 137:24 139:11 | indicate 14:3 | 178:10 185:5 |
| implemented | 227:13 229:3 | 247:1,25 248:25 | indicated 26:9 | 187:5 188:13 |
| 229:16 | impugned 197:1 | incidentally | 108:6 | 205:14 210:24 |
| implicated 154:15 | impunity 150:13 | 210:19 212:7 | indicates 181:23 | 247:20 |
| implications 138:21 | imputes 156:7 | incidents 29:9 66:23 117:10 | indication 200:18 | informed 2:1 |
| | inability 250:17 | | indications 85:5 | 11:16 25:24 34:3 |
| implicitly 200:8 | inadvertently 4:19 | include 116:20 | indirect 157:19 | 41:11 49:9 83:21 |
| impliedly 248:4,4 | inappropriate | 145:12 147:6 | individual 29:24 | 84:2 98:1 99:2 |
| importance 10:16 | 93:20 134:13 | 176:13 | 50:20 68:10 | 119:9 127:13,21 |
| 17:13 82:11 | 154:24 160:15 | included 37:13 | 77:18 137:8 | 129:17 146:2 |
| 155:12 202:22 | 169:18 190:17 | 111:23 160:3 | 142:13 202:18 | 154:19 159:13 |
| 240:10 | 192:22 207:6 | 234:23 236:16 | 205:14 | 178:8 207:3 |
| important 3:5 | 209:13 210:25 | includes 12:25 | individuals 16:14 | 239:13 243:3 |
| 10:13 13:4 20:21 | 248:23 | 95:17 134:20 | 20:2 27:1 76:18 | 251:11,17 |
| 28:21 32:4 37:1 | inaudible 122:3,24 | including 2:2 13:4 | induce 178:17 | informing 34:13 |
| 65:18 81:12 82:9 | 122:25 130:13 | 13:20,22 19:3 | inducement 25:22 | 79:2 122:16 |
| 93:2 105:25 | 132:19 182:10 | 24:18 40:16 62:6 | inept 164:25 | 133:18 217:7 |
| | | <u> </u> | | |

| | | | | 1 age 270 |
|------------------------------------|---------------------------------|---------------------------------|------------------------------|------------------------------------|
| 220:15 | 207:12 210:2 | 51:18 54:22 | interest 15:13 | 179:11,19 180:5 |
| inhibited 12:3 | 220:18 233:11 | 250:4 | 144:11 145:1 | 183:21 184:1,4 |
| initial 126:4 | 235:19 236:4 | instruction 108:20 | 152:9 154:11 | 184:11 199:16 |
| 226:25 | 238:17 239:20 | 108:23 109:15 | 155:20 157:20 | 218:11 |
| initially 47:15 | 240:14,16 246:5 | 111:8 | 189:3 202:8 | interviewed 40:24 |
| 214:16 226:17 | 246:20 249:19,25 | instructions 66:22 | 203:16 204:11 | 198:21 |
| initiated 152:17 | 250:24 252:13 | 102:21 103:14,15 | 205:18,23 | interviewing 179:5 |
| 177:19 243:12 | 254:11,25 | 104:9,20 105:18 | interests 56:20 | interviews 63:4 |
| injected 185:22 | Inquiry' 13:13 | 109:24 110:6,10 | 241:10,25 | intimated 161:7 |
| injured 77:18 | Inquiry's 9:3 | 110:17 111:12 | interfere 40:10 | intimidation 30:21 |
| 133:15 | 12:16,22 13:3,11 | 112:15 115:8 | 169:11 172:12 | 232:18 233:17 |
| injuries 74:4 77:19 | 15:15 18:13 | 116:23 120:19 | 198:20 | 234:17 239:23 |
| Inquest 117:12,14 | 22:23 23:22 | 121:19 | interfered 108:17 | introduce 6:21 |
| inquire 1:12 6:22 | 27:20,22 28:12 | instrumental | 109:5 | 9:23 10:14 46:17 |
| 7:10 8:22 59:16 | inquisitorial 11:22 | 185:18 | interference | 116:18 |
| inquiries 1:17 2:2 | 14:10 | instruments 81:5 | 158:25 169:25 | introduces 23:9 |
| 2:6 3:20 10:7 | insert 49:3 | 128:6 | 173:7,13 190:17 | introduction 21:1 |
| 11:24 21:2,6 | inside 77:15 79:21 | insufficient 60:19 | 192:24 199:3 | introductory 6:19 |
| 22:6 150:17 | 81:17 82:22 | 75:10 194:13 | 204:1 248:23 | investigate 25:21 |
| 153:5 160:3 | 111:25 114:19 | insulting 75:18 | interfering 151:19 | 30:13 47:20 50:3 |
| 167:3,9 | 124:25 126:13 | integrity 26:17 | 171:3 | 54:20 74:22 |
| inquiring 5:12 7:5 | 129:1 | 29:7 39:2 57:12 | interim 7:1,20,25 | 85:11 120:11 |
| inquiry 1:4,10,20 | insight 10:3 113:2 | 90:25 151:13 | 8:6 16:7 28:15 | 173:11 179:4 |
| 2:4,5,14 3:4,11 | insinuation 204:19 | 172:16,17 181:4 | 33:3,25 95:2 | investigated 28:1 |
| 3:17 4:12 5:10 | insisted 38:12 | 213:4 231:18 | 244:17 247:22 | 45:17 56:12 |
| 6:10,20 7:13 | 63:10 148:16 | 241:11 242:1 | 254:17 | 148:8 |
| 8:16,17,20,21 9:7 | insists 71:8 168:16 | 244:10 | internal 76:13 | investigating |
| 9:16,17,19,20 | insofar 230:3 | intellectual 141:7 | 112:1 237:18 | 25:25 26:2 27:10 |
| 10:1,10,22 11:21 | inspection 44:24 | 142:4 | internally 111:16 | 59:17 89:10 |
| 12:8,19,19,23,24 | 224:8,10,13 | intelligence 57:13 | international | 122:7 142:7 |
| 13:2,14,16 14:6,8 | 227:16 228:23 | 140:20 | 104:22,24 237:17 | 165:1 166:10 |
| 14:13 15:7,13,20 | 230:15 | intemperately | interpretation | 167:25 169:14 |
| 15:24,24 16:5 | inspections 222:20 | 169:16 | 16:21 | 170:4 178:6 |
| 19:2,3,5 20:4,19 | 224:7 | intend 9:12,15 | interpreted 157:16 | investigation 7:25 |
| 21:5,9,10,22,24 | inspector 50:15 | 236:12 | 158:24 217:23 | 11:8 24:10 26:2 |
| 22:9,16,22 23:5 | 60:15 78:4 | intended 50:3 | interrelated 201:7 | 26:5,8,11 30:4 |
| 24:1,8,15,24 | 103:10,18 104:6 | 56:22 97:16 | intervened 152:6 | 34:19 35:7 37:3 |
| 25:10,12,19,20 | 105:16 113:19 | 123:24 176:11 | 156:9 | 37:9,13,17 38:20 |
| 25:21,24 26:3,8 | 118:1,23 142:9 | 204:18 | intervening | 39:9,11 40:22 |
| 26:10,15,17,18 | Inspectorate 31:9 | intention 33:14 | 171:15 226:1 | 41:9 42:10 43:22 |
| 26:22 27:4,6,14 | 222:21 | 46:4,9 95:21 | intervention 64:8 | 43:25 49:5 54:23 |
| 27:18,23 52:21 | instance 27:10 | 115:11 134:24 | 64:9 144:16 | 58:23 63:14 |
| 56:7 60:7 61:5 62:22 75:5 76:12 | 93:22 157:12 instances 46:21 | 184:4 191:15 intentions 40:3 | 151:21 153:5 180:24 181:7 | 64:15,18,22 73:8 |
| 96:14 131:5 | 86:19,23 131:11 | 166:14 184:12 | interventions | 73:23,24 74:6 |
| 167:21 187:17 | institutionally | interaction 193:2 | 169:24 | 75:1,7,14 76:14 76:15 80:5 96:5 |
| 189:12 190:20,24 | 64:19 | intercept 110:4 | interview 52:25 | 102:12 112:22 |
| 191:3,6,17 | instructed 47:20 | intercept 110:4 | 70:22 143:6,17 | 102:12 112:22 |
| 203:25 206:25 | 49:25 50:11 | 200:25 | 165:18 174:24 | 124.7 123.13 |
| 203.23 200.23 | 77.23 30.11 | 200.23 | 103.10 1/4.24 | 120.3 130.10 |
| | | <u> </u> | <u> </u> | <u> </u> |

| | | | | 1 age 211 |
|---------------------|-------------------|------------------|------------------------|------------------------|
| 135:8 140:8,17 | 23:1 24:17 30:14 | 240:15 244:15,18 | jawbone 74:15 | 101:19 106:24 |
| 140:19,24 141:1 | 37:17 55:23 | 245:13,21 247:2 | jeans 163:17 | 126:20 147:3,12 |
| 141:25 142:3,10 | 74:23 76:12 87:8 | 249:13 250:24 | jeopardise 43:12 | 166:12 177:10 |
| 148:5 151:20,25 | 112:3 114:8,12 | 253:24 | jeopardy 253:16 | 179:16 196:8 |
| 152:16,24 153:14 | 114:16,20 147:3 | issued 2:24,25 | Jewish 164:5 | juncture 27:17 |
| 153:16,18,23 | 180:22 185:13 | 21:9 58:5 110:17 | 208:18 | 41:3 |
| 156:20,23 157:12 | 194:16 197:7 | 111:12 117:6 | JF 121:1 | June 1:6,14 6:15 |
| 158:5 159:1 | 214:7 217:25 | 186:21 205:12 | JL 145:6,25 160:3 | 6:24 9:1 19:2 |
| 161:11 164:12 | 253:18 | issues 5:11 6:21 | 163:21 164:1,17 | 33:6,12,13,17,22 |
| 167:15 168:2,18 | involvement 34:22 | 9:23 11:14 19:23 | 165:5,14,16,24 | 34:14,22 35:5 |
| 168:24 169:11 | 75:16 87:20 | 20:7,22 26:5,13 | 168:7,21 174:25 | 39:5 42:4,25 |
| 171:4 172:13 | 152:16 153:13 | 28:3 43:17,19,19 | 176:4,11,15,19 | 43:9 76:24 |
| 173:8 179:11,22 | 171:2 175:22 | 44:15,25 46:17 | 176:20 177:1,6 | 103:11 112:2 |
| 180:13 181:5 | 185:11 187:6 | 47:1,3 51:6 63:8 | 177:15 178:10,15 | 117:4 143:18 |
| 184:18 187:1,4 | 195:18 199:5 | 68:13 72:20 73:7 | 179:6,9,12,17 | 152:1 173:3 |
| 187:15 189:4 | involves 131:12 | 73:9 75:24 77:4 | 180:5,7,11 | 243:14 250:3,4 |
| 190:18 192:25 | involving 79:2 | 91:17 93:23 94:8 | 198:23 220:1 | 250:11 251:11 |
| 198:20 202:20 | 91:5 114:5 | 94:21,24 102:19 | JL's 166:9 176:5 | 252:9,22 253:1,6 |
| 205:23 206:2,9 | 145:21 186:22 | 131:18 138:3 | job 58:24 111:1 | junior 13:17 30:18 |
| 213:10 216:22 | ironic 173:19 | 140:15 151:23 | Joey 19:18 | 60:11 230:25 |
| 221:6 222:11,16 | irrelevant 189:14 | 153:6 156:20 | John 16:15 25:25 | jurisdiction 29:18 |
| 237:18 240:16 | issue 10:15,20 | 157:25 159:4 | 37:12 83:2 | 48:6,9 58:3 |
| 248:2,24 252:6 | 12:13 23:10,15 | 169:2 192:14 | 106:16 107:24 | 67:18 71:6 |
| investigations | 27:10,15 28:21 | 198:9 208:21 | 108:8 109:22 | 202:23 |
| 77:25 183:20 | 35:23 43:20,21 | 211:15 219:22 | 110:12,16 141:6 | jurisdictional |
| 188:17 201:7,8 | 43:22,23,24,25 | 221:13 227:23 | 181:17 | 137:6 |
| investigative 220:7 | 44:1 45:18 46:4 | 228:9 230:5 | joined 124:18 | jurisdictionally |
| investigator 78:6 | 46:12 47:5 61:6 | 233:12 237:5 | joint 47:16 52:19 | 86:17 |
| investigators | 72:18 73:22 | 238:18 240:15,18 | 52:19 55:11 | jury 14:23 |
| 145:1 204:11 | 75:23,24 76:13 | 240:19,21 242:17 | Joseph 37:16 | justice 49:20 55:21 |
| investing 170:6 | 77:5 78:8 81:12 | issuing 52:9 | JP 176:2,8,19 | 56:13 67:13 |
| investment 176:18 | 90:15 94:2,10,16 | 186:23 | 179:14 180:17 | 152:19 180:19 |
| invitation 34:11 | 102:15 108:18 | item 239:3 | judge 160:20 | 226:14,15,20 |
| 41:21 42:5 45:21 | 116:23 139:1,16 | items 226:6 | 165:3 | 228:19,21 |
| 103:16 105:11 | 140:6,8,16,17 | iterative 19:24 | judged 17:18 | justification 17:2 |
| 115:10 117:9 | 144:12,14 150:3 | | judgment 29:14 | 190:5 |
| 126:17 203:3 | 155:2 157:4 | J | 117:18 | justifications 17:7 |
| 248:14 250:7 | 161:13 180:17 | James 34:9 38:4 | judicial 117:17 | justified 17:17 |
| 251:1 | 189:10 192:7,9 | 90:18 140:23 | 143:15,20 174:14 | 186:24 190:11 |
| invite 32:18 45:22 | 192:19 194:19 | 142:12 144:20 | 194:4 | |
| 139:8 191:11 | 196:22,23 201:4 | 153:1 181:15 | judicially 211:18 | K |
| 192:6 213:22 | 201:11 204:22 | 196:4 204:16 | jugular 67:8 | KC 5:17,20 16:9 |
| invited 33:25 | 205:8 206:11,24 | 205:17,20 244:14 | July 25:18 104:20 | 16:10 34:9,25 |
| 244:3 245:3 | 208:20 212:21 | 255:12 | 222:24 | 38:4,14 47:25 |
| inviting 41:16,17 | 221:7,8 222:15 | January 26:7 | jump 70:1 118:10 | 55:12 132:12 |
| 143:5 247:7 | 222:18,19 227:20 | 105:18 144:6 | 168:12 | 140:23 141:21 |
| invoking 87:12 | 227:21 229:23 | 203:11 237:14 | jumped 122:20 | 193:16 195:25 |
| involved 8:14 9:8 | 232:2,3,11,23 | 238:12,22 | jumping 61:17 | 204:5 206:24 |
| 10:17 11:1 19:22 | 235:11 237:4 | Jason 10:6 | 63:6 98:5 99:10 | 207:25 208:16 |
| | | jaw 30:7 | | 209:10 210:1,11 |
| | <u> </u> | <u> </u> | I | <u> </u> |

| | | | | 1 age 270 |
|---------------------------|--------------------|------------------------------|----------------------------|--------------------|
| 210:18 211:3,16 | 176:5 190:21 | 192:1,2,7 197:3 | led 1:7 30:20 41:25 | 96:11 99:14 |
| 210:18 211:3,16 | known 31:10 | 206:5 255:2 | 47:22 64:15,18 | 132:12 133:14,18 |
| 212:5,9,12,22 | 32:10 52:15 | lawfully 59:3 | 65:5 78:3,20 | 133:25 134:3 |
| 213:2 250:5,6 | 55:25 106:5 | lawfulness 189:17 | 98:21 103:21 | 135:13 136:16 |
| | 107:23 110:2 | 191:13 | 104:12 142:21 | |
| 255:11,12,14,18 255:19 | 114:12 115:16 | | | 143:5 168:15,17 |
| | 126:6 156:8 | laws 116:16 | 243:13 | 169:1 171:17 |
| KC's 10:6 174:6 | | lawyer 34:9 101:21 146:20 | left 43:5 96:25 | 172:9 182:12 |
| 207:16 | Kram 86:11 | | 106:11 113:23 | 201:14 210:2 |
| keen 81:17 83:21 | $oxed{ oxed{L} }$ | 164:8 180:9 | 140:13 150:10,17 | 214:25 216:24 |
| 127:6 128:25 | laced 149:23 | 193:15 204:5 | 162:4 165:22 | 217:8 218:14 |
| 129:17 254:4 | lack 20:13 32:11 | 248:8 | 168:3 170:17 | 221:18 247:7,11 |
| keep 3:21 4:1 6:7 | 51:5 225:20 | lawyer/client | 245:14,17 | 247:14,16,23 |
| 51:18 98:1 | 226:17 | 180:12 | legal 8:20 13:14,24 | 248:19,21 249:5 |
| 132:17 170:12 | laid 71:15 165:4 | lawyers 12:25 | 19:8 47:23 86:8 | 249:13,19,21 |
| 243:2 | | 34:13,15 42:6 | 93:9 96:15 | 251:19 253:4,22 |
| keeping 25:1 | 185:5 241:4 | 45:19 147:5 | 100:22 101:25 | letters 58:5 71:24 |
| 137:21,22 | 242:20 | 218:13 | 102:1 103:3 | 71:25 73:14,16 |
| kept 126:18 | landed 49:12 | lawyers' 171:17 | 132:2 135:18 | 221:24 249:6,6,8 |
| key 20:11 40:15 | 61:21 | lay 25:9 | 137:6,7 139:3 | level 30:23 59:12 |
| 46:22 155:5 | landline 218:23 | lead 41:13 78:22 | 141:22 145:22 | 64:9 138:11 |
| 167:9 177:7 | language 124:17 | lead- 194:11 | 147:2 156:13 | 168:8 225:16 |
| 180:10 187:20 | 146:17 149:22 | leader 208:18 | 161:2 180:1,8 | 232:21 |
| 212:21 232:2,3 | 163:24 224:19 | leadership 28:25 | 181:3,11 182:12 | levelled 41:5 |
| 237:3 | Languages 16:25 | 29:7,13 31:16 | 187:8 214:5 | levels 168:11 |
| kicking 92:25 | laptop 63:11 | 66:3 90:23 205:4 | 245:10 250:5 | Levy 38:4,9 40:24 |
| killed 31:25 77:16 | large 13:7 25:15 | 227:22 228:1 | legality 181:2 | 41:1 90:18 |
| 79:4 245:12 | 137:25 185:22 | 229:24,24 230:4 | legally 147:6 | 140:23 141:18,21 |
| killing 117:15 | 205:21 230:12 | 234:13 237:20 | 188:25 189:1 | 142:17,24 143:2 |
| kindly 126:1 189:9 | largely 43:16 | 246:24 | 212:13 | 143:5,8,16,19 |
| 192:14 | largest 145:22 | leadership' 230:8 | legislation 225:20 | 144:20,22,25 |
| King 182:24 | 177:6 197:3 | leading 1:13 7:6 | 235:9 240:25 | 145:12 146:21,25 |
| Kingdom 1:18 | lasted 128:2 160:9 | 8:25 16:23 18:18 | legitimate 155:20 | 147:20 148:19 |
| 138:7,22 | late 3:19 33:16 | 28:8 56:16 | 214:5 | 150:24 151:3,5 |
| knew 35:9 71:4 | 142:6 216:1 | 139:12 232:5 | Leicestershire | 154:10 158:4 |
| 98:24 100:10 | 237:14 | 249:20 251:3 | 47:10 | 159:13 160:14,24 |
| 102:8 106:4,5 | latest 149:14 | learn 19:10 96:22 | length 6:2 98:17 | 161:14 162:8 |
| 115:15 127:9 | launch 86:6 | 136:1 | 211:14 | 174:12 175:23 |
| 148:4 164:17 | law 2:3 3:7 21:15 | learned 34:22 | lengthy 140:9 | 181:14,21,23 |
| 204:17 206:3 | 22:4,6,15 25:11 | 48:15 49:11 50:7 | 146:16 244:11 | 182:2,9,20 |
| 224:1 | 37:20 38:25 | 60:10 85:2 111:1 | Leslie 182:11 | 183:13,17 184:1 |
| know 1:16 81:8,17 | 39:16 48:7 49:21 | learning 11:19 | lessened 188:20 | 184:4,7,12,19 |
| 83:21 87:15,19 | 49:22 67:19 68:7 | 116:9 | lesser 233:18 | 185:12,15,18 |
| 94:17 129:1,17 | 68:8,10 86:22 | learnt 19:21 | 240:9 | 186:22 187:3,4 |
| 164:10 214:17 | 87:20 94:9 102:2 | LEAs 124:3 | lessons 11:19 60:9 | 188:7,15 191:22 |
| 219:6 220:2,5 | 109:25 114:25 | leave 4:21 103:15 | 67:23 | 193:10,15 195:15 |
| 234:25 | 141:15 142:20 | 116:25 162:15 | Let's 126:20 | 195:25 196:4,12 |
| knowing 8:2 22:12 | 149:20 151:7 | 172:19 241:3 | letter 33:19 41:14 | 196:25 198:21 |
| 22:24 | 157:17,18 163:19 | leaves 249:1 | 41:19,23 42:12 | 199:15,23 200:2 |
| knowledge 19:5 | 164:7 170:1 | leaving 7:8 114:21 | 45:18,24 46:1 | 204:4,9,16,20,24 |
| | 177:7 180:18 | | , | |
| | I | I | I | 1 |

| | | | | 1 486 277 |
|--------------------|--------------------|--------------------|---------------------|---------------------------|
| 205:8,13,17,20 | 141:12,13 142:5 | 146:7 148:14 | 78:21,23 92:8 | maintains 51:4 |
| 206:11,23 207:8 | 142:11 152:10 | 217:6,12,18,20 | 231:17 233:21 | 57:16 66:5 199:1 |
| 207:16,24 208:6 | 154:10,18 157:19 | Llamas's 217:13 | 235:12 240:10 | maintenance |
| 208:9,14,16,25 | 177:12 185:20 | Lloyd 156:13 | losing 139:7 193:5 | 176:13 177:13 |
| 209:10,25 210:22 | 225:20 | 194:23 | 229:6 | 178:18 |
| 211:16,17 212:4 | limiting 235:9 | loan 141:16 | loss 29:6 37:1,6,22 | Majesty's 31:8 |
| 212:9,12,22 | limits 104:11 | local 9:14 76:24 | 41:24 42:22 | 79:16 222:21 |
| 213:2,8 215:18 | 107:23 108:2,3 | 96:11 135:13 | 45:14,25 46:2 | major 219:22 |
| 215:23 216:2 | line 44:17 64:10 | 197:4 | 78:11 90:2 100:7 | 246:9 |
| 217:12,14 220:20 | 68:18 80:4 91:19 | location 32:5 | 184:13 212:19 | making 2:17 4:24 |
| 221:3,4,14 | 101:16 125:12 | 79:17,20 81:1 | 213:11 216:11 | 11:19 24:17 |
| 244:14 246:12 | 130:17 177:5 | 82:7,10 83:8 | 234:3 247:21 | 96:19 135:23 |
| Levy's 143:21 | lines 83:22 129:18 | 88:5,10 99:18 | 249:16 | 146:24 147:1 |
| 185:10 189:5 | 167:21 172:18 | 101:1 102:25 | lost 8:5 29:3 34:3 | 161:4 |
| 197:1 200:24 | lingering 195:17 | 117:20 118:17 | 35:10,13 39:1,2 | manage 41:13 |
| 204:4 205:6 | link 18:19 92:10 | 120:17 123:7 | 41:12 57:10 | managed 13:10,12 |
| 207:4 213:17 | 132:25 133:4 | 124:24 128:5,19 | 136:4 144:13 | 13:14 |
| 214:3 218:10,12 | linked 180:13 | 131:2,9 | 151:12 209:1 | |
| Lewis 193:15 | list 43:17,18 47:1 | lockdown 96:8 | 246:23 249:11,24 | management 12:21 25:17 |
| 195:25 204:5 | 75:24 78:10 | 135:11 208:20 | lot 65:9 219:21 | 30:19 31:19 |
| liability 12:2,5 | 102:19 154:20 | log 120:21 | lower 30:23 | 32:12 44:19 |
| 191:19 | 192:14 240:15 | logistics 12:22 | loyal 3:10 | 66:21 67:12 76:3 |
| liaise 89:13 110:9 | listed 29:10 49:18 | logs 208:23 | lunch 4:2 | 85:17 87:14 |
| 122:10 | 183:9 195:5 | London 66:11 | Luncheon 140:3 | 91:21 94:4 |
| liberty 60:3 94:1 | 243:9 | 80:4 81:16 83:20 | lunchtime 5:19 | 102:13 111:5 |
| lied 38:25 68:2 | listened 172:20 | 84:14 125:11 | | 112:12,13 176:6 |
| 90:15 150:6 | listing 76:2 92:2 | 127:7 128:25 | lying 68:3 | 230:4,9 231:9 |
| 151:8 175:4 | litigate 204:21 | 127.7 128.23 | M | 234:6 236:24 |
| 211:8 212:17 | litigation 10:12 | long 70:3 71:20 | machine 67:3 | 243:9 246:25 |
| lieu 143:17 | 204:15 | 158:7 170:6 | Madrid 128:12 | management's |
| Lieutenant 49:8 | little 56:6 162:22 | long-term 54:4 | magistrate 55:4 | 112:18 |
| 53:25 60:22 | 225:10 227:15 | longer 43:3 179:23 | 142:16 185:3,5,9 | managers 85:19 |
| 228:20 | live 34:19 35:7 | 200:2 211:25 | magistrate's | 108:19 112:8 |
| life 62:20 93:24 | 39:19 42:9 46:24 | look 19:11 52:5 | 186:16 | 113:10,15 230:19 |
| 105:5 162:25 | 70:8 151:20 | 106:8 164:2 | magistrates' | managing 12:23 |
| life- 117:1 | 155:3 164:22 | 181:17 186:7 | 143:13 197:24 | 164:11 |
| lifesaving 103:8 | 167:14 200:19 | 190:25 191:3 | main 1:3 9:12 | manifest 50:5 |
| light 9:11 22:5,14 | 212:8 248:24 | 215:22 219:17 | 13:23 15:20 | manner 13:20 |
| 63:9 98:8 183:5 | 252:5 | 240:25 247:16 | 20:18 26:10 27:8 | 42:19 51:7 58:22 |
| 200:15 | lived 10:8 | looked 76:12 | 28:2 32:2 46:18 | 62:2 64:17 66:1 |
| lights 108:7 | lives 70:8 137:21 | looking 18:14,16 | 144:11 190:19 | 68:23 110:8 |
| liked 167:16 | livestream 4:20,25 | 87:22 117:20 | maintain 1:24 | 115:21 149:18 |
| likelihood 12:5 | livestreamed 4:10 | 184:7 189:12 | 14:14 18:23 | 150:22 158:21 |
| 74:7 | livestreaming 4:14 | 208:23 251:16 | 26:17 36:12 | 190:15 206:4 |
| limit 5:25 108:5 | 4:16 | loose 81:23 129:7 | 178:2 182:4 | 230:14 251:6 |
| 114:11 | Liz 50:16 | 160:2 | 231:20 | map 226:12 |
| limited 37:10,19 | Llamas 16:10 | Lord 55:11 65:12 | maintained 111:22 | 228:14 |
| 37:19,21 41:18 | 38:11 65:11 | lose 31:2 36:20 | 117:13 180:11 | March 21:8 24:25 |
| 75:16 141:8,9,10 | 100:21 121:6,7 | 42:21 45:10 76:3 | maintaining | 25:12 26:13 30:1 |
| 75.10 111.0,7,10 | 100.21 121.0,7 | 12.21 13.10 /0.3 | 151:20 | 25.12 20.13 30.1 |
| | | | l | l |

| | | | | 1 480 200 |
|-------------------|------------------|-------------------|-------------------|-------------------|
| 31:22 32:8 55:16 | 47:21 52:22 | 18:25 19:16 24:8 | 135:23 136:5,11 | 250:9 251:1 |
| 57:23 58:17 62:3 | 59:18 65:4 76:14 | 24:14,16 25:16 | 136:16,16 139:13 | 252:10,10,19,23 |
| 69:4 70:22 73:25 | 76:23 78:9 85:25 | 28:9 29:4,15 | 144:17 145:3,10 | 253:2,3,6,8,21 |
| 74:11 77:6 78:25 | 86:4 91:22 93:16 | 30:25 32:3,19 | 146:2,9,18,23 | 254:3 |
| 79:9 80:2,12,16 | 93:21,23 95:1,4 | 33:6,11,13,14,17 | 147:4,15,20 | McGrail's 7:7,21 |
| 80:24 81:14 82:6 | 95:23 96:9 97:15 | 33:21 34:4,12,17 | 148:4,12,16,20 | 18:15 19:15 25:5 |
| 82:18,23 83:10 | 97:21 98:16 | 34:20,23 35:9,13 | 149:7,9,12,16,25 | 29:6 30:15,19 |
| 83:16 84:1,6,10 | 100:2,3 101:22 | 35:24 36:5,14,21 | 150:11,17 151:6 | 31:19 34:13,15 |
| 84:19 85:3 86:5 | 106:25 127:12 | 37:2,7,24 38:6,9 | 151:18 152:17 | 35:3 36:11 39:4 |
| 87:3 101:6 | 132:17 135:1,12 | 38:12,18,21,24 | 156:4,14,16,18 | 39:5 40:11 42:6 |
| 117:24 118:21 | 146:4 148:14 | 39:14 40:5,7,13 | 156:22 157:1,8 | 42:18 45:19 |
| 119:16 120:1 | 149:2,8,15 | 40:21 41:5,10,14 | 157:11,16 158:3 | 54:25 62:13 |
| 122:19 123:11 | 150:10 151:22 | 41:20 42:1,12,14 | 158:16,22 159:5 | 65:15,21 73:11 |
| 125:8,24 126:10 | 156:10 162:15 | 43:9 45:6,25 | 159:10,13,18 | 75:15 84:5 118:2 |
| 128:20 130:9 | 164:22 166:5 | 46:3,6,9 47:8,20 | 160:1,5,12,17 | 118:4,19 121:14 |
| 132:6,8 200:3 | 170:14 171:21 | 47:21 48:12,18 | 161:3,15,19,23 | 131:22 132:13 |
| marine 32:11 78:6 | 179:4 196:12 | 49:17,24 51:4 | 162:1,4,12,13 | 149:21 151:11 |
| 85:16,18 103:6 | 200:2 201:16 | 53:10,15 54:23 | 163:2,8 168:16 | 152:1 156:6 |
| 103:11 104:19 | 203:2 215:18 | 55:5,23 56:15 | 169:6,9 171:6,16 | 163:5 168:13 |
| 105:13,17,21 | 216:3 217:16 | 57:8,14 60:17 | 171:22 172:1,5 | 193:17 202:5 |
| 107:6,7 109:10 | 218:2,5 221:10 | 64:15,17 65:5,25 | 172:16 173:4,19 | 205:3 209:8 |
| 110:19 111:5,8,9 | 221:23,25 222:1 | 66:5 67:11 68:19 | 175:16,24 189:20 | 213:20 215:15 |
| 112:8,13 113:10 | 222:12 243:25 | 70:19 71:21,23 | 190:2 192:17,24 | 222:3,4 223:5 |
| 113:15 114:6 | 252:18 254:5 | 71:24 72:14 | 193:2,5,6,7 194:6 | 231:9,15,20 |
| 115:6,18 116:12 | 255:1 | 73:13,15 75:2 | 194:18,24 197:17 | 232:5 234:6 |
| 116:19,24 | matters 1:10 6:3 | 76:11 78:12 79:1 | 197:19 198:2,7 | 240:7 243:12 |
| mariners 115:15 | 19:11 20:12 21:1 | 79:10,20,25 | 198:16,18 199:1 | 244:13 246:24 |
| 115:24 | 29:10,10 35:14 | 80:11,18,25 81:1 | 204:14,21 209:23 | 249:20 251:3 |
| maritime 86:22 | 37:4,13 40:11 | 81:2,5,7,15,18 | 211:5,25 212:2 | 253:10,19 254:11 |
| 130:10 136:19 | 51:16 68:5 82:11 | 82:5,7,16,17,24 | 212:17 213:12,13 | 255:17 |
| Mark 142:9 | 92:2 99:22 100:4 | 83:1,6,11,16 84:1 | 214:7,20 218:8 | McVea 25:25 |
| Mars 62:20 | 102:2,18 155:9 | 84:8,20 87:4 | 221:19,21 222:8 | McVey 26:7 |
| Marshal 48:13 | 155:11,17,22 | 88:3,9,20 89:1,18 | 224:11,15,25 | MD 56:23 |
| 51:9 52:15 55:19 | 157:11 174:9 | 90:3,14,24 92:3 | 225:11 226:22 | mean 15:5 23:3 |
| Marshal's 55:13 | 190:18 191:7 | 93:16 95:12,12 | 228:17 229:7,13 | 157:16 188:11 |
| Marshall 57:2 | 200:7,10,15 | 96:19 97:10 | 231:9,19,22 | 217:24 |
| 61:18 | 201:11 203:7,15 | 100:2,8,9,13,21 | 232:15,16,18 | meaning 16:22,24 |
| material 2:15 | 205:25 210:3 | 100:23 102:11 | 233:2,3,6,7,16,21 | 18:7 77:21 |
| 109:24 144:6 | 231:25 234:3 | 106:4 118:5 | 234:15,17 235:6 | means 18:13 22:2 |
| 147:7 165:12,15 | 245:9 248:19 | 119:23 121:9,12 | 235:8,12,17,24 | 23:4 92:24 130:7 |
| 180:9 186:8,10 | 251:19 | 121:24 122:13,14 | 236:5,8,14 237:1 | 175:3 180:24 |
| 186:13,14 187:10 | Maurice 12:20 | 123:12,15,23 | 238:9,15 239:2,8 | 187:13 228:8 |
| 187:11,11,14 | maximum 24:2 | 124:21 125:1,4 | 239:12,22,25 | 240:1 |
| 188:2,4,25,25 | May-Day 116:3 | 127:3,7,12,20,20 | 240:4,11,12,22 | meant 170:20 |
| 189:1,7 | May/June 203:9 | 128:4,7,23 129:4 | 243:13 244:2 | measure 216:16 |
| matter 11:11 | McGrail 1:4,13 | 129:14,24 130:2 | 246:18,20 247:2 | mechanic 107:7 |
| 12:11 15:13 | 5:18 6:25 7:17 | 130:3,12,17 | 247:7,8,10,14 | mechanism 210:23 |
| 23:13 24:6 39:20 | 7:18 8:2,5,13,25 | 132:4,9,10 | 248:9,13 249:2 | mechanisms 212:1 |
| 44:20 45:16 | 16:7 17:7 18:21 | 133:14 134:18,19 | 249:12,17,25 | 213:13 |
| | | | | |

| | | | | 1 age 201 |
|------------------|-------------------|-------------------|-------------------|---------------------|
| media 5:2 10:16 | meetings 40:19 | 118:6 121:22 | military 49:12 | 173:1 174:18 |
| 11:13 20:24 | 48:11 176:22 | 125:9 162:12 | 51:13,14 64:9 | 175:2,12,18 |
| 70:22 76:24 99:1 | 194:10,21 197:25 | 163:8 174:20 | 66:14 | 185:24 189:19 |
| 126:19 219:13 | 198:8,12,18 | 175:15 176:2 | mind 53:6,7 57:12 | 190:11,13 192:23 |
| medical 42:1 | 209:25 210:4,5,7 | 185:15 210:10,15 | 72:13 152:11 | 193:3,4,9,13 |
| meet 29:1 44:20 | 210:12,17 222:12 | 214:24 216:8 | 155:12 156:25 | 199:6,10 202:7 |
| 90:21 91:22 | 222:13 234:16 | 217:5,9 220:19 | 202:12,24 218:23 | 202:16,17 203:6 |
| 92:15 153:8,9 | member 30:5 33:1 | 228:17 | minds 222:3 | 204:3 205:19 |
| 158:16 162:15,19 | 47:11 58:7 74:13 | messes 164:3 | minds 222.3 | 213:15,22,24 |
| 163:3 215:7 | 147:2 157:14 | Messrs 154:21 | minimum 3:21 | 214:2,11,23,24 |
| 220:11 224:3 | 197:4 238:7,13 | 201:13 | minister 7:20 8:6 | 215:6,14,16 |
| 252:17 | members 25:14 | met 31:14 33:4,13 | 16:8 19:17 24:18 | 216:6,9,11,19 |
| meeting 29:2 | 43:4 55:22 74:2 | 41:10 80:24 | 24:20 26:23 | 217:2 218:20 |
| 32:16,20 34:1 | 232:20 235:18 | 118:3 125:25 | 28:20,25 29:2 | 219:5,7,9,15,21 |
| 37:23 38:5 39:12 | 238:16,23,24 | 128:24 132:10 | 32:16 33:5 34:2 | 220:1,20,23 |
| 43:8 68:19 71:23 | 245:24 246:14 | 133:25 142:23 | 34:25 35:4,8,10 | 221:1,2,9 222:2,7 |
| 73:13 79:25 | 247:5 | 156:16 158:20 | 35:14,24 36:3,8 | 223:4 225:22,22 |
| 80:23 82:25 | memory 146:13 | 160:21 179:17 | 36:20,24 37:16 | 226:13,15,20 |
| 89:23 90:1,13 | men 74:4 79:6 | 196:23 207:22 | 37:22 38:4 39:7 | 227:3,7 228:19 |
| 105:20 119:24 | Mena 182:20 | 210:10 221:11 | 39:17,18,22 40:1 | 228:21 229:4,20 |
| 122:22 127:19 | mental 43:11 | 225:3 227:12 | 41:11,22 42:23 | 231:16 232:7 |
| 128:14,17 132:6 | 137:3,14 253:13 | 229:3,4 243:21 | 44:3,10 45:12,23 | 233:9 235:5,10 |
| 133:19,21 142:25 | mention 73:15 | 244:18 246:18 | 52:17 53:1 54:14 | 235:15 236:7 |
| 143:1,4 146:10 | 221:19,24 236:15 | 252:9 253:6 | 58:8,12,15,19 | 237:2 241:7,16 |
| 149:16,22,23,25 | mentioned 15:8 | method 208:12 | 59:15 62:15,24 | 241:17 242:8,11 |
| 150:7,18 153:11 | 71:22 72:5 73:12 | 242:18 | 64:12 66:9,17 | 243:3,6,21,25 |
| 156:4,12,17,19 | 114:15 127:25 | methodology 63:2 | 67:10,13 68:20 | 244:4,6,18,20,24 |
| 157:10 159:8,18 | 128:10 229:7 | methods 32:13 | 68:22 69:4 70:20 | 244:25 245:4,15 |
| 160:9 161:12,22 | 233:8 237:3 | 85:14 111:3 | 70:23 72:1,6 | 246:7,22 247:15 |
| 161:24 162:5 | mentor 141:22 | 186:8 | 75:25 76:5 82:17 | 247:16,19 248:6 |
| 163:9,12 170:15 | merely 18:14 66:6 | Metropolitan 78:3 | 83:12 84:1,3,13 | 248:23 249:3,14 |
| 171:24,25 172:23 | meritorious 64:21 | 85:5 102:12 | 85:25 86:15 | 249:23 |
| 173:1 174:16 | message 44:3,6,9 | Michael 16:9 | 87:23 88:6 89:1 | minister's 8:1 25:1 |
| 188:21 192:21 | 66:19,24 73:20 | 24:19 65:10 69:7 | 89:12,20 95:7 | 35:22 38:23 |
| 194:7,20 195:3,7 | 76:1 79:1,5 80:1 | 78:5 121:6,7 | 97:4 100:1 | 66:15 77:1 131:1 |
| 195:9,11,19,21 | 87:5,6,22 88:2,25 | 146:7 162:14 | 102:24 103:2 | 134:16 139:10 |
| 195:23 197:16,18 | 91:10 118:8,11 | Michael's 69:8 | 118:10,12 120:25 | 144:12 168:15 |
| 199:14,17,22 | 118:21 123:22 | mid-February | 121:23,25 122:8 | 169:7 189:25 |
| 202:25 212:12,21 | 125:7 129:13 | 68:21 | 122:17 123:24 | 190:5,21 199:6 |
| 213:2 214:1,19 | 131:1 132:7 | mid-morning 4:3 | 124:1,16 130:12 | 204:7 213:11 |
| 215:8 218:8 | 133:5,10,22 | 72:20 | 131:5 132:17,25 | 219:12 221:20,22 |
| 219:11 221:16,17 | 145:2 159:15 | midday 79:9 | 133:8 134:10,12 | 244:11 247:4 |
| 221:17 237:21 | 174:22 175:9 | 252:24 | 135:22 136:4,7 | 249:10 |
| 238:12,22 239:3 | 217:11 220:13 | Mike 48:21 61:24 | 136:13,15,18 | ministerial 64:7 |
| 239:4,7,9 243:22 | 221:10 224:20 | miles 77:14 83:14 | 139:7 141:19,20 | Ministers 70:11 |
| 244:4,6,20,23 | 243:20 | 85:7 88:21 89:5 | 151:15 152:19,19 | 92:17 |
| 245:20,23 246:1 | messaged 127:3 | 99:5 101:18 | 157:13,13 159:15 | Ministry 29:17 |
| 246:5,13,19,21 | 226:21 | 108:2 119:5 | 160:11,22 161:19 | 47:17 |
| 252:12 253:2 | messages 80:12 | 123:7 126:13 | 162:5,11 169:10 | minor 2:24 |
| | | | | |
| | I | I | I | I |

| | | | | 1 480 202 |
|-----------------------|----------------------------------|---------------------------------------|---|--------------------------------------|
| minority 230:19 | 54:24 55:22 56:1 | motives 156:7 | Navy 74:2 | neutrality 14:14 |
| minute 4:15 23:25 | 58:6 59:10 60:5 | motor 56:2 | Neale 55:12 | never 65:14 71:10 |
| 77:8 217:18 | 60:9,11 61:2,15 | mounted 204:15 | near 202:24 | 74:18 95:21 |
| 218:5 | 62:19 63:4,16,22 | move 73:6 104:3 | nearly 84:8 210:12 | 134:24 149:2 |
| minutes 4:4 72:24 | 63:22 64:4,20 | 107:5 139:17 | necessarily 15:5 | 162:9 168:7 |
| 77:13,14 83:3,4 | 65:3,7,18,21 | 166:15 184:25 | 155:8 190:4,10 | 188:12 205:12 |
| 119:12,13 121:3 | 67:21 68:25 69:9 | moving 179:3 | necessary 2:22 | 211:6 213:19 |
| 121:4 122:14 | 72:11 74:21 | 185:16 210:8 | 3:18,22 11:3 | 226:10 239:12 |
| 128:3 129:13 | MOD's 58:2 71:16 | multi- 137:5 | 14:21 89:16 | nevertheless 8:13 |
| 139:22 145:13 | Model 175:21 | muscled 40:22 | 174:25 179:4 | 174:13 235:3 |
| 159:21 160:10 | modernise 228:4 | 222:11 | 183:19 186:25 | new 2:7 3:3,6 9:24 |
| 163:14 174:21 | 230:1 | mutual 42:24 | 191:3 213:5 | 21:14,23 23:9,14 |
| 203:19 219:4 | module 182:17 | mutually 54:8 | necessity 179:16 | 37:17 56:17 |
| 239:2 | Moffatt 13:1 20:10 | | need 3:1 6:1 18:18 | 57:15 65:13 79:8 |
| mirror 22:15 | Mole 56:18 57:15 | N | 23:19 27:15,25 | 80:25 117:5 |
| Miscellaneous | 79:8 80:25 118:1 | N36 77:13 | 69:18 89:13 | 118:1 123:13 |
| 192:5 | 123:14 124:2 | name 37:8 246:13 | 94:16 120:12,16 | 124:2,4 223:12 |
| misconduct | moment 57:9 66:2 | named 114:17 | 122:9 132:15 | 225:6,24 254:5,9 |
| 105:15 117:4 | 70:5 128:8 146:3 | 141:13 | 135:20 143:10 | news 9:15 130:20 |
| 144:4 | 149:6 203:19 | narcotics 137:23 | 162:17 166:9 | 130:24 154:22 |
| misconstruing | 207:3 | narrative 52:22 | 179:24 190:19 | newspaper 90:4 |
| 181:5 | moment' 81:9 | narrowed 233:1 | 200:21 202:3 | 91:2 97:1 223:18 |
| misfeasance 156:2 | monarch 69:24 | national 80:5 | 227:10 229:22 | newspapers 70:17 |
| mishandled 45:3 | Monday 1:1 33:12 | 140:20 154:8 | 237:8 238:1 | Nic 129:3,4 |
| 72:10 | 244:5,24 252:17 | 155:25 175:21 | 240:16 249:8 | Nick 7:2 16:8 |
| misleading 169:10 | 252:21 253:5,5 | 177:21,25 182:11 | 250:1 254:11,25 | 28:15 83:19 |
| misled 68:6 150:2 | 253:21 | 182:15,21 | needed 16:1 23:23 | 129:15 |
| 245:16 | money 185:22 | nationals 86:7 | 45:17 78:19 79:7 | night 25:23 33:16 |
| misrepresented | monitor 141:3 | 124:6 125:13 | 80:10,17 125:18 | 106:12 108:18 |
| 199:19 | monitoring 109:21 | Nations 94:8 | 128:1 136:10 | 109:5,17,20 |
| missed 174:3 | months 9:7 11:10 | natural 12:16 | 154:25 155:3 | 114:1 125:3 |
| 219:3 | 20:25 44:21 | 209:15 | 164:6,13 166:11 | 127:5 137:5 |
| missiles 111:13 | 63:17 91:23 | naturally 61:10 nature 18:23 32:4 | 195:16 229:25 | night' 79:24 |
| missions 117:1 | 113:2 153:14 | 61:12 82:9 99:8 | 230:1 | nighttime 109:3 |
| mistake 239:6 | monumental 20:8 | 138:23 172:7 | needs 228:1,3 | nine 46:4 77:8 |
| mistaken 17:19 | morello 235:19,24 | 227:4 240:21 | negative 126:22 | 121:3 122:14 |
| 167:19 | 236:6,21 237:10 | nautical 77:14 | 170:9 231:11,13 | 143:7 145:13 |
| misunderstood | 237:14,21 238:2 | 83:14 88:21 89:5 | negotiating 34:23 | 225:5 |
| 40:12 167:6 | 238:21 | 99:5 108:2 | negotiations 80:20 | nm 89:4 120:8 |
| misuse 144:2 186:5 | morning 1:2 2:24 5:16,23 6:24 | Naval 52:18 55:2,7 | 81:13 88:14 | 122:2 Noti 203:4 |
| mitigate 65:9 | 3:16,23 6:24 44:6 117:24 | 62:4 | 131:18 155:15 Neil 67:13 228:19 | Noli 203:4 |
| mobile 165:24 | 118:3 119:20 | navigated 115:21 | Neish 34:9 250:4,6 | nolle 202:11,24 non-existent 74:7 |
| 218:24 | 120:1 123:10 | navigated 113.21 navigating 109:20 | 255:12 | 75:12 |
| Mobiles 5:6 | 120.1 123.10 | navigation 106:18 | neither 45:12 | non-technical |
| MoD 29:19 30:1 | 218:19 253:23 | 106:19 109:3,11 | 50:20 73:12 | 130:7 |
| 30:12 45:4 48:8 | motion 78:20 | 109:15,19,23 | 108:22 235:17 | nonsense 69:11 |
| 48:16,24 50:3 | 249:22 | 116:8 | networks 115:3 | noon 219:3 |
| 52:25 53:5,7 | motive 193:8 | navigational | neutral 14:17 | normally 161:2 |
| 22.25 55.5,7 | | 115:17 | | 101.2 |
| | I | l | I | I |

| | | | | 1 age 203 |
|--|-----------------------|----------------------------------|-------------------------------|----------------------------------|
| north 37:19 50:14 | 176:13,17,24 | 186:8 207:20 | offenders' 220:9 | 117:12 128:8 |
| 83:3 88:22 | 177:3,12 178:4 | 210:21 | offer 57:15 212:24 | 131:21 137:4,9 |
| 107:21 108:8,13 | 178:19,24 182:4 | obvious 67:25 | 254:3 | 137:15,20 138:4 |
| 119:12 121:3 | 185:13 | 157:24 | offered 21:3 27:3 | 138:15 142:21 |
| 124:6 141:9,10 | number 2:21 | obviously 44:14 | 184:3 | 147:21 156:2 |
| 141:19 152:9 | 24:16 25:15 29:9 | 83:7 91:16 139:1 | offering 58:20 | 170:1 187:13 |
| 154:10 157:19 | 39:12 66:16 | 139:14,19 140:14 | 176:17 | 195:4 196:13 |
| 175:23 182:3 | 67:23,25 104:21 | 191:10 221:25 | offers 24:17 | 198:22 213:25 |
| 185:19,21,23,25 | 114:4 116:10 | 222:7,9 | 225:16 | 216:17 220:8 |
| 186:1 | 120:9 154:23 | occasion 153:19 | office 38:2 55:1,3 | 226:2 230:12,13 |
| North's 176:23 | 155:5,7,22 157:7 | 212:5 213:19 | 62:17 86:14 90:1 | 230:25 231:1 |
| northern 108:5 | 167:24 169:2 | 235:7 | 90:13,18 98:15 | 239:16 |
| notable 199:4 | 200:10 204:8 | occasionally 230:8 | 118:4 119:25 | officers' 106:1 |
| note 32:23 80:3 | 205:21 208:14,14 | occasioned 44:22 | 140:22 142:17 | offices 30:18 38:1 |
| 97:12 100:20 | 210:11 218:25 | 91:24 | 144:4,19 146:5 | 159:12 207:5 |
| 118:22 123:8 | 225:13 229:14 | occasions 62:14 | 148:7 151:10 | 237:22 |
| 125:11 128:13 | 230:10,12 | 76:9 101:4 | 160:6 163:16 | official 24:19 |
| 145:10 181:16 | numerous 62:14 | 205:21 206:12 | 170:17 196:6 | 133:18 |
| 182:20 191:20 | 101:4 110:24 | 210:11 | 199:6,10 202:17 | officials 66:14 |
| 202:4 244:19,21 | 101.7 110.27 | occur 81:25 87:25 | 202:18,20,21,22 | 68:25 |
| 245:12 246:1,4,5 | 0 | 118:13 129:9 | 202:16,20,21,22 | OIC 186:13 |
| 245:12 246:1,4,5 | o'clock 4:2,3,7 6:6 | 131:25 | 209:18 212:11 | okay 73:2 79:6 |
| noted 28:11 | o0f 54:10 | occurred 47:6 | 213:25 254:16,20 | 89:13 122:9 |
| 114:13 226:8 | oath 69:25 | 77:12 79:18 | 254:23 | 125:21 129:24 |
| notes 119:16 195:9 | OB 114:7 | 82:22 83:2 87:17 | office.' 94:12 | 219:5,7 |
| 206:10 214:23 | object 26:9 | | officer 25:25,25 | , |
| 244:7 245:1 | objection 213:18 | 88:4,21 99:5,19 100:11 111:24 | 38:25 44:24 | okay?' 182:14 old 21:16 22:20 |
| noteworthy 208:5 | objective 64:24 | 117:24 118:16 | 52:18 62:7 63:18 | 23:12 |
| 230:2 | objective 04.24 | | 75:9 92:1 104:16 | omission 190:23 |
| | objectives 64:21 | 119:11 120:4,7 121:2 123:18 | 104:22 106:11 | 209:21 |
| notice 2:9,10,19 3:19 4:19 8:21 | obligation 17:5 | 121:2 123:18 124:9 125:6 | 104:22 106:11 | omitted 219:14 |
| | 114:18 | | 114:2,11,18 | |
| 19:8 23:18 24:3 | observance 6:9 | 127:10,15 163:1 171:12 204:25 | , , , | once 11:16 38:23 |
| 97:3 186:12 256:10 | obstructed 68:7 | 209:5 210:12 | 142:8,9 147:22 | 50:22 69:17 87:14 96:3 |
| notices 23:11,15 | obstructing 50:23 | | 154:13 188:1,5 197:2 252:1 | 129:22 135:6 |
| notices 23:11,15 notified 136:2 | 51:12 55:19 | occurrence 87:1 | officers 24:9 29:22 | 161:11 171:1 |
| 254:23 | obtain 129:23 | occurring 130:20 245:14 | 40:25 44:17 | 195:5 249:22 |
| | 144:18 145:24 | occurs 140:7 | | 195:5 249:22 one's 108:16 |
| notify 184:11 | 148:18 150:23 | | 48:12 50:11 | |
| notifying 41:15 | 165:7 166:9 | OCNs 115:4 | 52:10 54:24 55:2 | one.' 182:18 |
| 118:9 133:15 | 179:5 181:11 | October 117:6 | 56:8,11,25 57:16 | ones 225:4 |
| notion 197:6 | 186:24 193:23 | 140:25 178:5 | 58:21,25 59:22 | ongoing 27:6 80:5 |
| notwithstanding | 218:1 | 181:14 199:25 | 71:8 76:7,11,17 | 80:21 88:14 |
| 52:8 62:10 | obtained 66:11 | 222:23,24 224:11 | 76:19 81:6 90:10 | 125:13 126:4 |
| 166:20 168:25 | 75:8 126:24 | offence 179:1,10 | 91:19 94:2,15 | 233:15 237:17,18 |
| November 76:18 | 140:22 142:15 | 179:22 183:14,18 | 103:19 105:6,17 | online 9:14 16:25 |
| NSCIS 140:21 | 151:5 165:10 | 192:1 | 107:18 108:10 | onward 4:24 |
| 141:3,8 142:2,4 | 180:4 188:12 | offences 54:21 | 109:11 110:3 | onwards 28:17 |
| 154:16 155:2 | 197:10 242:10 | 94:14 144:3 | 111:9 115:14 | 204:6 |
| 158:13 176:4,6 | obtaining 178:11 | 183:15 186:5 | 116:19,24 117:7 | Op 143:24 166:8 |
| | obtaining 1/8:11 | | | |
| | | | | |

| | | | | 1 age 20+ |
|-------------------|--------------------------|-----------------------------------|------------------------|--------------------|
| 168:17 170:19 | 231:11 | originally 50:20 | P | 160:8 163:7 |
| | opportune 72:19 | OSG 212:7 | - | 166:15 168:3,13 |
| | opportunity 14:25 | ought 60:7 106:4 | p.m 33:21 49:19 | 169:20,21 173:20 |
| open 11:15 56:10 | 48:17 97:15 | 115:16 | PA 242:23 | 180:3 196:8 |
| 187:23 190:12 | 241:14 242:4 | out' 101:14 | pacing 110:20 | 200:11 201:8 |
| 211:23 | 250:9 | outcome 58:13 | page 44:5,7,8 54:1 | 202:13,14 204:13 |
| | opposed 42:18 | 155:7 228:25 | 54:12 56:4 61:8 | 204:14 206:22 |
| 236:20 | 211:11 223:25 | outline 5:10 | 63:6 66:23 74:9 | 209:2,6 217:14 |
| | opposite 84:4 | outrage 210:20 | 85:8 86:2,12 | 227:9 229:16 |
| 9:11,22 15:19 | 124:11 | outraged 212:16 | 88:2 89:20 93:3 | 251:20,21 |
| - | Opposition 157:14 | outset 232:23 | 93:4 103:9 104:3 | paragraphs 64:14 |
| | oppressive 196:24 | outside 32:7 44:22 | 104:4 106:15 | 70:1 112:23 |
| | option 43:10 | 56:25 79:21 | 109:6 110:18 | 138:14 146:13 |
| openness 223:15 | 253:11 | 81:17,25 83:13 | 111:7 112:11 | 185:12 |
| | options 180:21 | 83:23 84:4 86:18 | 113:21 115:20 | parallel 201:7 |
| 103:6,20,23,24 | 183:24,25 188:15 | 86:24 89:3 91:24 | 118:11 120:16 | Parliament 2:3 |
| | oral 3:14 5:17,20 | 99:5 103:6,20,23 | 121:24 124:13 | 69:23 169:4 |
| 113:4 | 6:15 13:21 | 103:24 104:11,23 | 130:15,21,25 | part 9:25 24:21 |
| operating 81:10 | 215:11 | 105.24 104.11,25 | 133:3 138:12 | 28:2 37:7 43:15 |
| | order 5:14 10:14 | 112:5 113:4 | 155:18 159:6,16 | 51:6 73:17 84:23 |
| 107:19 108:11 | 13:25 26:16 | 12:1 124:10,25 | 160:16 168:12 | 118:19 124:12 |
| 113:3 138:16 | 46:19 47:1,2 | 126:7 129:1,20 | 169:21 174:21 | 141:5 157:23 |
| operation 16:14 | 48:22 113:25 | 130:20 138:17 | 176:25 177:11 | 166:16 171:8 |
| 37:4,8 39:8 | 144:10 147:25 | 149:20 | 180:20 183:4,9 | 190:23 191:19 |
| 47:22 66:4 86:11 | 148:1,1,19 | outstanding | 184:6 201:9,18 | 223:9 225:19 |
| 90:1 103:21 | 170:13 174:12 | 225:25 | 217:5 218:17 | 232:6 247:22,22 |
| 104:13 105:3,11 | 170:13 174:12 | overall 13:3 | 219:15 220:5 | part-ownership |
| 104.13 103.3,11 | 188:3,19 190:8 | overall 13.3 overestimate 64:3 | pages 20:5,6 | 152:8 |
| 140:18 144:24 | 194:2 196:17 | overlap 35:15 | 106:24 126:8 | partially 229:2,4 |
| 169:3 171:15,19 | 194:2 196:17 | overriding 3:25 | 134:18 | participant 15:11 |
| 175:20 178:23 | 205:15 207:21 | overriding 3:23 oversee 27:21 | painful 11:11 | 15:15,25 186:23 |
| 193:16 255:13 | 208:21 210:23 | oversight 32:12 | Pannick 55:12 | participant's 15:7 |
| operational 39:19 | 211:12 212:16 | 85:18,19 111:6 | Panorama 223:18 | participants 5:24 |
| 40:11 102:20 | 223:8 233:19 | 112:9,12,17 | 236:24 | 7:12 13:12 15:9 |
| 112:20 138:3 | 241:23 243:18 | 112.9,12,17 | papers 33:10 | 15:16 16:3,5 |
| 164:21 166:21 | 255:24 255:24 | overused 93:2 | 195:19 | 20:15 102:17 |
| | orderly 13:20 | overview 9:16 | paragraph 16:3 | 255:8 |
| | orders 109:15 | 95:24 135:2 | 28:16 52:7 54:2 | participants' |
| 174:9 | 115:17 188:11 | 225:15 | 54:12 56:5 61:7 | 13:13 |
| operations 64:16 | 216:21 | owned 141:10,18 | 65:17 74:9 78:13 | participate 33:2 |
| - | organisation 13:5 | 141:19 142:5 | 84:7,18 85:1 | participated 55.2 |
| 111:17 112:17 | 15:12 | owners 141:14 | 86:3,12 88:6 | 179:10 |
| | organisational | ownership 154:15 | 93:3 98:5 99:10 | participating |
| 77:23 186:17 | 116:9 | 155:2,5,7 157:3 | 99:15,21 101:19 | 105:2,10 |
| | organisations 20:3 | 157:20 158:12 | 104:4,25 105:9 | participation |
| | organisations 20.5 | 192:19 194:19 | 113:22 115:7,25 | 191:22 |
| 134:13 | 236:16 | 201:4 | 131:7 138:12 | participatory |
| | organising 10:10 | owning 185:19 | 144:15 148:11 | 15:17 |
| | original 156:19 | Oxford 16:25 | 150:19 152:15 | particular 16:22 |
| 03.4 443.17 | original 150.17 | OAIUIU 10.43 | 153:12 158:1 | particular 10.22 |
| | | | | l |

| | | | | Page 283 |
|--------------------|------------------------------------|---------------------------|----------------------------------|----------------------------|
| 17:16 20:9 21:12 | nattoung 112.2 | 15:22 | Diagrado 16.0 | 155:2 158:13 |
| 23:22 29:15 | patterns 113:3 Paul 16:12 82:24 | | Picardo 16:9 34:25 118:12 | |
| | 121:9 142:7 | permitted 107:9 107:13 | | 176:4,6,14,24 |
| 44:20 50:14 | | | pick 130:15 218:16 | 177:3,21 178:1,2 |
| 62:13 91:22 | Paulo 122:23 | person 15:11 | | 178:5,12,19,24 |
| 98:14 100:14 | pause 201:22 | 17:14 18:2 36:15 | picked 144:14 | 182:4,11 |
| 117:22 124:22 | 203:19 | 50:25 80:6 | picking 163:7 | Platinum 92:16,18 |
| 137:23 139:2 | paused 4:20 | 125:14 145:17,23 | 176:1 219:8 | play 14:23 250:1 |
| 189:18 207:13 | pay 24:12 | 146:22 154:11 | picture 109:12 246:21 | Playa 83:5 119:14 121:5 |
| 210:5 222:7 | payment 27:2 | 180:13 188:3 | - | |
| 235:7 236:13 | 93:24 97:6 | 199:11 205:18,23 | pieced 171:1 | played 19:14 |
| particularly 61:6 | PC 236:21 | 231:23 246:18 | pilot 30:4,5,7 41:8 | PLC 162:24 |
| 138:24 140:9 | peers 230:20 | 254:15,19,21 | 43:22 73:7,23 | please 66:24 67:9 |
| 155:24 200:15 | pending 26:13 | person's 12:1 | 74:12,14 75:3 | 68:17 74:10 95:4 |
| 220:22 240:2 | 117:18 223:14 | 17:25 | pity 67:21 | 97:13 106:24 |
| parties 5:22 6:12 | pension 42:21 | personal 56:1 | place 22:19 24:17 | 108:14 114:22 |
| 7:19 19:12 43:14 | 43:13 216:12 | 58:14 62:8 | 32:1,7 39:13 | 119:19 122:18 |
| 54:7 120:13 | 253:16 | 141:24 143:21 | 48:16 56:23 60:4 | 125:23 153:7 |
| 140:10 174:2 | penultimate | 145:24 178:21 | 65:13 70:7 71:20 | 163:7 169:5 |
| 179:8 237:5 | 113:22 | 210:19 219:1 | 77:6 80:8 81:16 | 171:5 185:1 |
| 253:17 | people 19:21 62:19 | 220:9 253:9 | 81:22 83:13,20 | 209:24 218:15 |
| parties' 6:15 | 68:1,2,6 70:3,12 | personally 56:14 | 84:21,24 85:18 | 238:1 |
| 255:19 | 79:4 151:9 | 56:24 57:6 | 89:3 94:3 101:5 | pleased 207:9 |
| partner 38:3 177:6 | 152:12 234:24 | 196:14 | 110:14 111:6,17 | plenty 20:12 |
| 196:4 197:3 | peradventure | personnel 30:1 | 114:5 121:17,19 | 139:14 255:4 |
| 201:5 | 158:18 | 53:6 58:6 60:5 | 122:1 125:16 | plot 130:6 |
| partners 37:20 | perceive 230:25 | 60:11 62:5 | 126:6 127:19 | plotted 82:1 |
| 141:14 157:15 | perceived 39:25 | persons 9:8 31:24 | 128:25 129:6,16 | 129:10 |
| partnership | percent 141:11,18 | 77:16 104:14 | 146:3 153:11 | plotter 77:21 |
| 141:17 | 141:20 | 144:25 145:11 | 184:2 194:11 | 106:11,13,17,18 |
| partnerships | perception 230:11 | 148:8 157:19 | 195:11 203:10 | 106:19 108:5,17 |
| 157:17 | Pereira 122:25 | 178:18 180:22 | 210:4,6 219:11 | 109:1,7,10 |
| parts 45:4 72:10 | Perez 141:6,12 | 194:15 204:10 | 238:12 | 113:23 |
| 146:15 166:7 | 142:12 143:23 | perspective 35:22 | placed 39:6 43:2 | PM 51:24 |
| 174:1,3 186:18 | 144:8 145:7 | pertaining 189:7 | 57:2 64:5 83:7 | PMB 103:22,24 |
| pass 68:17 | 154:21 186:1 | pertinent 188:14 | 110:12 | PNB 120:19 |
| passed 128:11 | 238:14 | pervert 55:20 | places 208:19 | point 27:7 35:9 |
| 143:11 162:10 | Perfect 218:24 | 56:13 | 225:12 | 38:18 42:22 |
| 253:2 | perform 242:22 | Peter 5:20 255:19 | plain 139:11 222:1 | 58:16 78:16 |
| passing 100:25 | 250:17 251:7 | petty 70:8 | plainly 190:12 | 89:21 92:18 |
| 176:16 | 254:19,22 | Pezez 16:16 | plan 176:5 185:13 | 100:14 102:11 |
| path 236:10 | performance | PH4 25:23 | 223:9 225:23 | 124:24 130:8 |
| Patrick 255:11 | 226:10 | phone 50:17 62:9 | 226:7,8,11 | 146:24 147:1 |
| patrol 104:11 | performed 177:25 | 63:12 219:4 | plane 29:24 48:17 | 149:5 153:23 |
| 109:16 117:5 | performing | 237:15 | 70:5 | 188:14,20 189:11 |
| patrols 32:13 | 254:15 | phoned 50:19 | planned 48:16 | 191:4 204:12 |
| 85:20 112:10,17 | period 29:8 54:13 | phones 220:10 | planning 87:13 | 233:10 238:6 |
| 113:12,16 | 99:13 113:1 | phrase 15:9 16:22 | plans 48:24 | 240:2 251:10 |
| pattern 30:24 | 210:12 243:17 | 230:8 | platform 13:9 | pointed 186:21 |
| 233:19 | permission 5:8 | physical 137:3,14 | 141:3 154:16 | 238:2 |
| | | | | |
| | | | | |

| | | | | 1 480 200 |
|--------------------|--------------------------|--------------------|---------------------------|--------------------------|
| pointing 171:15 | 236:11 239:5 | possession 47:13 | practice 31:3 89:9 | pressure 34:18 |
| points 17:9 21:12 | 240:13,24 241:2 | 62:8 188:4 | 106:2,5,6 122:6 | 35:6 39:6 41:25 |
| 35:8 57:18 96:17 | 241:3,4 242:19 | possibility 12:7 | 141:22 180:18 | 42:8 43:1 158:25 |
| 130:19 136:25 | 242:19,20 244:9 | 79:12 | 220:11 233:22 | 192:22 252:4 |
| 146:21 190:14,14 | 245:6 246:2 | possible 24:2 31:5 | 234:19,20 | presumably 56:7 |
| 202:3 224:22 | 247:24 250:20 | 54:9 56:24 | practices 24:11 | prevent 4:15 10:16 |
| 225:13 236:13 | 252:8 255:15 | 114:15 132:5 | practised 109:23 | 29:23 50:13 |
| police 1:5,14 6:25 | polices 93:1 | 155:7 156:2 | pragmatic 27:9 | 51:12 179:24 |
| 8:10,12 9:1 16:6 | policies 13:13 | 157:22 158:15 | 67:5 | prevented 74:16 |
| 16:10,11,13 17:8 | policing 60:1 | 170:12 173:11 | preceded 84:23 | 192:20 |
| 18:22 19:1,13 | 64:20 241:11 | 181:12 200:16 | precise 208:12 | preventing 30:8 |
| 24:9 25:14 28:6 | 242:2 | 233:24 235:3 | 211:20 218:12 | previous 103:15 |
| 28:10 29:5 30:16 | policy 15:16 16:3 | possibly 78:10 | precision 129:22 | 111:17 114:3 |
| 30:22 32:20 33:9 | 105:24 117:5 | 85:7 141:6 158:2 | preconditions | 127:1,4 141:22 |
| 34:5 36:6,19 | political 44:16 | 172:25 178:17 | 196:22 | 166:24 168:9 |
| 41:7 42:17 44:24 | 65:23 79:12 86:8 | 214:18 244:15 | predate 73:10 | 173:2 217:22 |
| 46:5 47:7,10 | 91:18 94:5 97:7 | post 5:2 7:3,8 | predates 176:7 | 228:19 253:3 |
| 49:6 50:1,12,23 | 138:11 141:23 | 153:5 168:6 | predominantly | previously 108:19 |
| 53:4,23 55:20 | 180:16,22 | 171:16 172:19 | 185:6 | 123:3 167:1 |
| 56:15 58:16 | poor 109:22 | 213:1 214:7 | prefer 216:25 | 183:3 248:6 |
| 60:12 70:12 71:5 | poorly 53:14 | post- 87:12 | preferred 194:1 | primarily 115:2 |
| 72:17 73:12 78:3 | port 103:22 104:1 | post-dated 171:18 | prejudice 137:9 | primary 79:17 |
| 78:22 80:9 85:5 | 108:9 117:11 | posting 57:21 | prejudiced 197:15 | prime 82:11 |
| 85:12 89:8 92:1 | 120:14 130:8 | potential 54:3 | preliminary 13:22 | principally 151:17 |
| 93:1 94:1 97:23 | Portuguese 80:7 | 93:24,25 94:5 | 19:2 25:18 51:20 | principle 189:12 |
| 98:1 100:8 | 125:15,20 | 97:1 137:5,25 | 113:5 244:8 | principles 150:14 |
| 102:12 104:10 | Portuguese,' 80:13 | 155:13 157:24 | premises 180:1 | prior 5:8 31:13 |
| 111:22 116:11,12 | posed 165:13 | 167:24 180:17 | 188:2,24 197:12 | 82:6 114:20 |
| 116:17,19,22,23 | position 8:8 14:6 | potentially 51:23 | preparation 23:22 | 198:17 254:22 |
| 117:5 120:2,24 | 21:15,24 22:19 | 52:11 154:11 | prepare 247:12 | priority 110:11 |
| 121:6 122:5 | 22:24 33:3 38:23 | 170:25 | prepared 20:16 | privacy 147:18 |
| 125:10,17 126:1 | 40:11 48:3 50:11 | power 2:8 7:23 | 33:7 75:9 82:16 | private 2:16,18 |
| 131:12,13,15,21 | 69:10 77:2 80:15 | 11:25 23:10,15 | 105:15 113:18 | 23:12 24:5 26:13 |
| 132:22 137:19 | 96:2 105:22,24 | 41:16 46:5,16 | 118:19 197:19 | 37:15 107:1 |
| 139:14 140:14 | 106:22 109:21 | 47:18 97:22 98:2 | 226:12 244:21 | 224:8 |
| 143:6 150:16 | 122:17 125:21 | 98:3 188:22 | 245:1 246:3,6 | privilege 180:8 |
| 152:4 153:4 | 134:16 135:5 | 191:18 196:10 | 247:13 | 187:8 |
| 170:1 173:9,21 | 148:4 149:14 | 216:20 243:4 | preparing 13:9,20 | privileged 147:6 |
| 173:22,24 179:18 | 150:3 167:20 | 250:22 251:9 | 182:9,12 | 188:25 189:1,4,7 |
| 180:24 181:6 | 169:7 170:19,25 | powerful 7:24 | present 32:23 | probable 81:25 |
| 183:18 184:8,17 | 172:3 174:14 | powers 12:13 | 40:25 146:9 | 83:23 129:9,19 |
| 186:25 188:1,5 | 176:20 189:17 | 42:16 55:14 | 172:2 185:4 | probably 3:15 |
| 195:4 196:17 | 193:18 199:19 | 97:19 138:18 | 194:24 198:23 | probe 14:19 |
| 206:6 207:8 | 208:17 213:20 | 196:18 235:10 | presented 186:19 | probing 81:23 |
| 208:10 211:23 | 215:15 222:6 | 242:25 245:2 | preserve 186:25 | 129:7 |
| 213:21 216:15,19 | 241:3 243:12 | 248:15 252:20 | press 2:25 11:13 | probity 29:7 39:1 |
| 216:21 223:6,10 | 244:8 249:11 | 254:2 | 24:25 80:4 124:4 | 60:1 78:24 90:25 |
| 231:5 232:13,14 | positioning 116:13 | PPE 111:13 | 124:8 125:12 | 151:13 231:18 |
| 232:22 234:8 | positive 224:14 | PR 124:7 | pressed 74:18 | 241:10 242:1 |
| | | | | |
| | | | | |

| | | | | 1 age 207 |
|--------------------------|---|--|-------------------------------------|-------------------------------|
| 244:10 | 250:13 251:6,13 | 27:23 38:7 39:24 | 113:7 129:10 | 155:11,20 156:1 |
| problem 238:8 | 251:17,23 | 67:17,18 146:19 | 138:8 140:24 | 156:2 202:8 |
| 256:5,6 | processes 112:19 | 158:24 166:4 | 147:23 152:3 | 219:24 223:1 |
| problems 44:16 | 250:25 | 197:10,11 242:15 | 186:12 199:15,24 | 228:13 |
| 86:8 91:18 | produce 6:13 | property 56:1 | 247:20 250:5 | publication 36:9 |
| 200:17 | 160:25 188:4 | 76:10 141:8 | provided 22:21 | 228:5,18 |
| procedural 20:22 | produced 108:15 | 142:4 216:21 | 41:14 95:23 | published 6:6 |
| 24:6 189:23 | 152:22 197:13 | proportional | 96:20 98:10,12 | 26:14 31:11 |
| 245:22 251:25 | producing 13:8 | 59:24 | 98:23 99:13 | 104:20 219:16 |
| procedurally | product 174:12 | proposal 176:10 | 103:5 106:17 | 227:1 228:7,16 |
| 32:25 248:12 | production 147:25 | proposals 176:18 | 111:8 112:16 | 229:19 |
| 251:6 | 148:19 188:3,11 | proposals/infor | 116:2 118:4 | publishing 228:14 |
| procedure 27:22 | 188:19 190:8 | 177:16 | 130:16 131:6 | pure 18:24 |
| 32:22 34:6,7,10 | 194:2 197:9 | propose 171:8,10 | 135:1 138:19 | purely 19:7 23:13 |
| 150:9,14 187:10 | 205:15 207:21 | 235:9 | 180:10 182:20 | purpose 9:17 10:4 |
| 187:16,24 190:4 | 210:22 211:11 | proposed 39:13 | 188:6 201:17 | 11:18 197:14 |
| 205:10 240:22 | 212:16 | 40:14 143:17 | 206:20 212:7 | purposes 10:25 |
| procedures 5:13 | profession 147:2 | 155:6,8,23 157:5 | 220:19 225:7 | 26:1 32:23 |
| 65:13 81:10 | professional 75:14 | 157:6 167:8 | 239:16 | 188:24 |
| 87:13 94:3 | 78:2 110:20 | 183:6,10 184:24 | provides 90:11 | pursue 110:7 |
| 102:21 103:5 | 115:2 144:19 | 197:16 228:6 | 92:10 102:1 | pursuit 32:13 |
| 116:7 187:22 | 187:8 225:17 | prosecuted 23:3 | 195:7 241:5 | 64:21 84:23 |
| proceed 2:14 4:22 | professionally | prosecution 22:13 | providing 13:24 | 85:14,22 103:17 |
| 26:6 55:7 143:20 | 57:17 66:7 | 23:6 152:4 | 41:18 100:5 | 103:23 105:23 |
| 148:22 151:2 | proffered 167:5 | 199:21 202:10 | 135:24 225:19 | 111:3 115:22 |
| 156:23 161:17 | 183:5 | Prosecutions | provision 216:13 | 116:20 117:5 |
| 162:7 196:12 | progress 26:8 | 38:14 148:18 | 216:25 | 121:17 128:2 |
| 201:16 218:11 | 31:18 60:25 96:9 | 152:21 | provisional 43:17 | 130:19 |
| 246:16 | 128:23 135:12 | Prosecutors 183:8 | 121:16 127:23 | pursuits 32:14 |
| proceeded 194:2 | 223:16 224:2 | prospect 203:14 | provisions 25:2 | 106:3 107:8 |
| 212:15 | 227:15 229:13 | protect 7:24 30:13 | 192:5 | 110:22,24 111:1 |
| proceeding 26:10 | 231:4 | 74:23 150:15 | Provost 47:16 | 111:11,14 112:18 |
| 50:10 157:2 | progressed 170:22 | 162:24 181:4 | 48:13 51:9 52:15 | 114:3 |
| proceedings 4:10 | 243:19 | 202:7 | 55:2,8,13,18 57:2 | pushed 62:21 |
| 12:15 14:9 21:21 | progressing 40:22 | protected 25:2 | 61:18 | 222:19 |
| 22:10 23:7 76:16 | progressive 29:8 | protecting 193:10 | prudently 156:24 | put 17:22 31:15 |
| 76:23 144:7 236:20 | prohibition 4:23 | 203:6 | public 1:9,10,15 | 34:18 35:6 42:8 |
| process 9:9,11,18 | promoting 205:6 prompt 4:2 179:21 | protection 25:10 protections 138:18 | 1:17,22,24 2:1 3:12 4:20 5:7 6:8 | 65:13 167:20 187:21 192:14 |
| 9:21 10:4,14 | prompted 36:4 | protections 138.18 | 9:13 10:2,7,15 | 219:25 228:10 |
| 11:15,23 14:11 | 130:23 | protest 214:16 | 11:4,5,8,16 15:11 | 247:10 252:5 |
| 15:8 19:4,22,24 | pronounced 63:19 | protest 214.16 protocol 4:11 5:3 | 16:19 24:1 26:14 | 253:15 |
| 32:24 33:3 42:5 | proper 32:14 | proud 67:16,24 | 26:18 27:18 | puts 30:18 |
| 43:15 46:13 69:2 | 69:19 85:17,21 | 70:12 | 38:14 56:19,23 | Putting 197:6 |
| 72:16 92:14 | 111:6 130:18 | proved 7:11 | 61:10 64:23 | Pyle 7:2,4 16:8 |
| 96:25 182:13 | 165:20 167:21 | provide 8:16 10:3 | 66:18 91:7 97:4 | 28:15,16,19 29:3 |
| 214:8 229:8 | 196:20 209:15 | 10:23 22:7 45:6 | 97:8 131:11 | 29:12 30:4,18,23 |
| 241:21 242:16 | 214:6 | 46:19 81:4 82:1 | 144:4,10 148:7 | 31:2,12,14 33:2,4 |
| 248:11,18 250:6 | properly 2:14 | 92:4 100:2 113:2 | 148:17 152:21 | 33:13,17,20 |
| | 1 -1 | | | |
| | I | I | I | I |

| | | | | 1 age 200 |
|----------------------|--------------------|------------------------|--------------------|--------------------|
| 35:22 37:6 42:12 | quantity 156:5 | 58:1 65:12 66:13 | reacted 136:13 | 178:25 179:9 |
| 42:16,23 43:1,8 | quarters 167:25 | radar 106:10,18 | 172:22 | 183:13,17 195:15 |
| 44:10 45:12 | quarters 107.23 | 109:8,12 119:2 | reaction 49:2 | 250:9 |
| 46:15 54:10 58:9 | 248:19 | RAF 29:23 49:12 | 172:24,25 247:4 | reasonably 67:18 |
| 61:6,7 70:25 | query 124:22 | 50:2 52:14 53:17 | reactions 97:8 | 102:6 158:24 |
| 71:3,4,10 72:1,2 | question 7:9 11:10 | 55:3,8 62:1 | 168:6 | reasons 1:12 5:14 |
| 74:8 75:20 76:5 | 14:19 15:21,22 | raise 62:12 124:22 | read 4:12,13 33:9 | 7:6,14 8:24 11:2 |
| 85:8 92:11 95:8 | 64:16,22 68:4 | 156:20 201:4 | 36:8 69:7 91:10 | 16:23 17:10 18:2 |
| 100:10,13 102:25 | 70:3 94:23 98:13 | 211:15 | 91:11 96:25 | 18:5,19 28:8 |
| 103:3 118:7 | 101:10 105:25 | raised 24:8 25:15 | 97:12 108:25 | 29:5 41:21,24 |
| 119:21 124:18,22 | 137:4,15 138:8 | 37:5 71:10 72:15 | 111:21 118:9 | 67:19 78:11 |
| 124:23 125:5,9 | 145:18 150:2 | 93:21 134:14 | 135:19 158:1 | 134:2 186:16 |
| 125:24 126:10,24 | 158:12 165:13 | 155:11 157:11 | 174:1 185:8 | 203:4 219:1 |
| 127:3,9,10,20 | 169:1 177:3,8,11 | 169:2 190:13,15 | 246:4 | 222:6 247:11,21 |
| 128:9,17,22 | 182:5 191:24 | 191:21 200:15 | reading 66:24 | reassure 27:18 |
| 130:1 131:23,24 | 195:15 232:4 | 201:12 202:6 | 78:14 89:24 98:5 | 95:20 134:23 |
| 133:12 139:7,9 | 237:3 | 203:2 205:24 | 119:1 159:7 | reassured 219:20 |
| 221:11 222:5 | questionable 88:1 | 206:12 219:22 | 170:23 225:1 | rebrand 43:18 |
| 226:17 227:5,6 | 88:11 118:14 | 224:23 233:10 | 226:23 252:15 | rebuked 169:17 |
| 229:5,8 231:10 | questioning 3:24 | 236:6,19 237:1 | reads 44:10 67:14 | recall 127:23 |
| 232:2,7 233:8,10 | 13:23 14:19 | 238:18 243:25 | 69:6 87:6,24 | 147:4 158:2,6 |
| 233:24 235:16 | 27:11 39:19 | 247:2 251:19 | 106:9 124:1 | 163:16 172:7 |
| 240:10 243:7,21 | 75:22 77:3 | raises 93:23 138:3 | 128:14 185:11 | 204:23 205:20 |
| 243:23 244:3,6 | 105:25 127:2 | 200:10 | 251:21 | 208:5,7,11,15,21 |
| 244:17 246:23 | 130:1,25 136:23 | raising 189:15 | ready 231:1 | 210:13,16 212:4 |
| 249:3,14,23 | 139:4,15 164:21 | 190:14 | real 17:20,25 18:5 | 212:8 214:20 |
| 250:12,14 251:8 | 172:15 179:23 | rank 68:10 223:20 | 232:9 249:1 | 215:8,10,15 |
| 252:9,10,15,19 | 194:15 195:8 | 234:9 | realisation 43:3 | 238:21 |
| 252:22 253:6 | 198:13 199:8 | ranking 66:14 | realised 135:19 | recalls 214:12 |
| 254:1,4,17 | 220:21 221:23 | ranks 70:15 | realistic 203:14 | 215:1 |
| Pyle's 28:22 29:6 | 222:14 232:9 | rapid 243:12 | realistically 8:7 | receipt 19:19 |
| 31:16 32:2,15 | 239:11 248:3 | rarely 153:24 | reality 173:9 | 220:17 226:11 |
| 35:16,19 41:24 | 252:14 | rate 121:13 | really 167:18 | receive 15:18 96:4 |
| 46:4,9 71:1 | questions 14:5 | rationalisation | realms 177:5 | 135:7 |
| 72:11 73:17 | 15:23 21:17 22:3 | 156:5 159:23 | Rear 57:24 58:1 | received 10:18 |
| 75:17 77:1 78:9 | 50:21 67:25 82:6 | 194:18 | 66:13 | 20:4 23:17 25:12 |
| 100:18 128:3 | 87:19 195:16 | rationalisations | reason 16:24 17:4 | 27:5 28:14,19 |
| 226:25 233:14 | quick 80:3 125:11 | 192:18 | 17:11,12,15,17 | 33:23 34:24 39:4 |
| 234:2 237:12 | quickly 64:25 | rationalised 155:1 | 17:19,19,20,22 | 39:15 52:13 |
| 240:8 249:9 | 126:21 | 158:13 162:1 | 17:23,25 18:2,4,4 | 55:11 72:13 |
| 251:5 253:25 | quite 3:2 61:19 | re-read 134:15 | 29:9 45:14 71:18 | 78:25 84:19 |
| 254:7,13 | 126:14 168:4 | reach 127:6 | 131:8 139:6,12 | 86:25 90:16 |
| | 224:19 227:4,10 | 208:13 | 187:9 188:5 | 96:13,23 97:3,9 |
| Q | 228:2 229:21 | reached 22:24 | 193:4,6 229:6 | 97:13 99:11 |
| QC 10:9 65:11 | quotation 98:6 | 40:7,9 51:16 | 232:6,10 240:6,9 | 118:25 134:3 |
| 144:20 146:7 | quote 10:5 146:15 | 58:13 158:8 | 249:1,20 251:4 | 135:15 136:1,22 |
| 153:21 196:5 | quoting 64:13 | 161:23 168:11 | 254:10 | 145:2 146:8 |
| qualified 110:19 | | 198:17 206:6 | reasonable 47:10 | 153:20 161:21 |
| 115:14 | R | 253:21 | 82:21 178:8,15 | 163:18 195:24 |
| qualify 60:21 | Radakin 57:25 | | | |
| L | · | 1 | 1 | • |

| | | | | 1 age 207 |
|-------------------|-------------------|------------------------|--------------------|--------------------|
| 211:9 215:19 | 111:15 120:18 | 175:17 180:3 | reiterating 117:6 | released 59:3,9 |
| 220:18 223:17 | 123:1 206:20 | 221:15 223:19 | rejected 238:15 | relevance 25:19 |
| 224:17 228:18 | 208:3,24 239:21 | 234:2,10,18 | rejects 226:4 | relevant 1:22 8:15 |
| 239:20 | 246:4,13 | 243:6,7 244:12 | relate 214:25 | 10:20 15:2 17:24 |
| receiving 19:9 | recourse 238:3 | 245:1 246:7,25 | related 124:5 | 18:10,17 20:6 |
| 75:16 177:16 | recovered 64:2 | 247:24 | 155:17 234:2 | 26:25 33:10 |
| reckless 132:22 | 106:20 176:9 | referring 35:5 | relates 29:16 | 59:22 68:3 90:10 |
| 209:22 | recruitment 92:14 | 132:20 133:11,23 | 204:1 206:17 | 101:12 106:8 |
| recognise 3:20 | red 219:17 | 168:20 199:10 | relating 9:5 37:10 | 116:5,16 150:23 |
| 69:18 | redacted 23:23 | 217:21 221:12 | 37:13 102:14 | 160:21 174:1 |
| recognised 225:12 | 107:4 218:25 | refers 30:4,8 31:3 | 117:21 157:12 | 178:18 179:8 |
| recognises 235:11 | redaction 107:1 | 35:14 45:12 66:8 | 189:22 192:9 | 187:15 189:18,24 |
| recognising 78:17 | redactions 2:22 | 66:16,19 68:19 | relation 20:14 | 190:7 193:24 |
| recollect 63:12 | 3:18 | 69:3 70:19 72:7 | 35:21 39:8 64:7 | 207:2 216:8 |
| 172:16 | redeployment | 74:8 82:23 85:8 | 64:12 71:1 75:6 | 233:9 |
| recollection 71:6 | 27:2 | 86:1 91:11 | 76:20 78:19 | relevantly 91:11 |
| 123:15 146:12 | reduced 106:12 | 118:12 156:12 | 90:16 132:23 | reliance 78:8 |
| 158:8 160:8,17 | reduction 216:12 | 216:19 220:8 | 140:22 144:12,14 | reliant 109:11 |
| 211:20 214:10 | refer 8:11 9:3 | 221:10,20 225:25 | 144:16 145:6 | relied 61:5,6 76:4 |
| 238:25 | 16:14 20:16 | 228:17 229:9 | 155:17,24 186:1 | 140:9 221:7 |
| recommend 54:16 | 29:11 46:22 | 235:5,16 245:8 | 196:5 200:14 | religious 6:9 |
| recommendation | 69:12 72:2,3 | 245:13 248:5 | 201:20,25 204:16 | relinquished 33:21 |
| 225:24 | 95:4,17 113:21 | reflect 14:6 231:19 | 204:20,22 237:3 | reluctance 180:17 |
| recommendations | 134:19 143:24 | reflected 31:17 | 237:17 | remain 99:22 |
| 11:20 12:4 31:13 | 171:10 233:1 | 36:11 106:1 | relations 54:4 | 114:19 155:16 |
| 36:16 116:10 | 239:3 246:12 | 231:8 | 61:14 99:9,22 | 170:16 171:16 |
| 223:14 224:3 | 248:4 249:5,15 | refuse 21:16 22:3 | 100:4 235:23 | 207:6 |
| 225:7 226:14,19 | reference 9:4,5 | refused 248:13 | relationship 30:16 | remained 151:23 |
| 229:1,15 230:22 | 16:21 17:4 18:12 | refute 163:3 | 36:18 61:1,13 | 152:7 225:4 |
| 231:23 | 19:7 27:20 45:15 | refuted 161:14 | 64:4 65:7,18,21 | remaining 225:3 |
| recommended | 72:4 75:25 83:24 | regard 114:9 | 101:22 138:6,10 | remains 3:4 232:8 |
| 52:21 116:11,17 | 108:6 120:23 | 150:13 154:19 | 144:22 145:25 | remark 131:6 |
| 116:22 | 121:1 124:8 | 166:22 173:18 | 180:12,15 209:17 | remarkable 28:23 |
| recommending | 127:17 158:3,4 | 176:4,23 | 232:16 233:5,7 | 243:24 |
| 76:16 | 168:15 171:24 | regarding 115:2,8 | 233:15 234:5,7 | remarks 6:19 |
| reconstructions | 183:2 201:1 | 175:22 177:2 | 235:6,22 236:14 | remedies 12:14 |
| 77:11 | 204:18 216:13 | 192:18 | 237:19 239:24 | remember 63:13 |
| record 50:5 | 219:2,10 221:22 | regards 129:3,12 | 240:4 | 212:12 219:23 |
| 105:19 137:18 | 223:7 245:19 | 182:10 | relationships | 238:20 |
| 195:18 208:2 | 248:1,20 | Regards.' 145:9 | 36:23 235:14 | remind 92:13 |
| 239:1 244:22 | references 199:4 | regional 90:4 | relatively 2:11,23 | 104:8 |
| 246:6 252:2 | 200:23 202:15,16 | regret 6:16 10:7 | 227:23 | reminded 105:17 |
| recorded 106:23 | 210:15 | 58:4 | relatives 245:11 | 157:8 |
| 111:24 114:16 | referred 21:7 | regular 4:1 100:15 | relatives/depend | remit 18:13 |
| 142:25 186:16 | 35:18,21 84:6 | 220:25 | 90:8 | 166:21 |
| 198:7 206:16 | 86:10 119:21 | regularly 30:21 | relayed 246:22 | remorseful 66:2 |
| 246:19 | 121:20 123:15 | 185:25 234:15 | relaying 100:24 | remove 50:4 176:5 |
| recording 4:23 | 125:8 132:24 | regulations 216:14 | release 2:25 24:25 | 185:13 214:6 |
| records 104:5 | 161:22 172:17 | reinforce 18:18 | 124:4,8 | removed 49:14 |
| | | | | |

| | | | | 1 age 270 |
|-------------------------------------|-----------------------------------|----------------------------------|---------------------------------------|-----------------------------------|
| 61:19 62:5 76:9 | 140:7 181:9 | 167:24 | 65:24 192:6 | 197:19 201:17 |
| 212:2 213:13 | 182:9,16,21,23 | request 19:20 | 254:4 | 219:18 225:13 |
| remuneration | 182:25 183:1,24 | 26:24 36:4 41:20 | resolved 62:11 | 226:25 231:10 |
| 236:25 | 185:7 188:15 | 54:25 98:6 99:14 | 126:21 | 247:2,12 251:14 |
| renewed 116:23 | 219:16,24 220:5 | 102:3 107:2 | resolving 157:2 | 251:16 |
| 224:5 | 219.10,24 220.3 | 137:17 153:9 | 192:19 | |
| | 7 7 | 223:12 | resources 181:4 | responsibilities 91:7 |
| reoccurrence 65:14 | 223:1,7,8,13 | | 225:20 | |
| | 224:14,23,24 225:1,2,12,18 | requested 22:6,17 59:15 99:11 | | responsibility 79:15 82:13 97:4 |
| repeat 16:18 repeated 48:23 | 226:11,22 227:5 | 127:5 156:11 | respect 36:1 37:3 38:8 41:6 48:25 | 99:8,23 155:21 |
| 146:21 | 227:9 228:6,13 | 163:10 176:21 | 57:18 60:2,5 | 242:23 250:18 |
| - | , | 180:19 183:6 | 64:19,24 69:20 | 251:8 |
| repeatedly 101:9 102:8 143:2 | 228:16 229:6,9 | | · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · | |
| | 229:11,14,21 | 184:8 247:10 249:2 | 69:21,22,23 86:21 90:1 93:10 | responsible 47:8 |
| 211:3 247:8 | 230:2,3,6 231:16 | | 94:23 98:19,23 | 156:1 |
| replaced 111:20 | 244:12 245:10 | requesting 33:18 | · · | rest 5:9 |
| 113:13 | 247:1,25 248:25 | 253:22 | 99:9 100:1 137:14 146:20 | restore 1:24 |
| replied 79:4,22 | reported 76:24 | requests 13:6 20:1 | | restoring 11:4 restraint 59:21 |
| 80:11 81:5,7 | 86:23 108:19 117:25 174:18 | 28:4 48:23 | 148:4 149:8,10 | |
| 87:16 125:1 | | require 21:25 24:3 | 149:15 151:2,18 | restricted 2:15 |
| 160:22 175:5 | 230:21 237:6 | 65:8 137:9 | 155:21 163:2 | 180:14 |
| 206:1 218:2,5 | reporting 12:12 | 147:23 153:7 | 173:17 205:11,13 | restriction 2:9,19 |
| 237:25 | 244:13 | 209:20 | 206:24 207:4 | 3:19 4:19 23:17 |
| replies 89:18 | reports 70:16 | required 7:10 | 210:22 211:19 | restrictions 23:11 |
| 122:13 129:20 | 72:12 97:2 | 13:25 19:11 22:1 | 212:19 221:14,15 | 184:2 |
| 160:4 163:2 | 112:24 114:14 | 64:7 65:24 85:23 | respected 197:4 | result 5:15 31:18 |
| 172:8 175:13 | 222:20 225:10 | 97:25 137:14 | respectfully | 31:24 39:3 79:3 |
| 216:17,23 218:20 220:3 | 231:8 240:5 | 173:11 203:16 | 189:16 | 90:25 94:6 97:7 |
| | representation 93:10 96:16 | 229:15 241:12,21 243:2 246:2 | respond 204:22 250:15 | 98:8 149:13 |
| reply 89:12 101:10 | | | | 151:15 153:20 |
| 129:23 146:22 | 134:8 135:18 137:8 211:16 | requirement 45:9 92:7 99:25 | responded 81:19 | 212:22 227:18 resulted 29:21 |
| 173:3 | | | 93:13 95:13 | |
| report 2:17,23 3:8 | representations 41:17 241:14 | requires 69:15 | 145:12 148:25 159:20 249:4 | 65:16 66:4 90:2 |
| 9:6 10:20 12:17 31:8,10,13,15,17 | | 112:14,22 188:3 249:13 250:24 | | 90:21 117:15 234:6 |
| | 242:4,5,6 248:10 | 253:24 | responding 104:24 | |
| 32:9,11 36:4,7,11 | 248:17 250:10,11 | | 105:4,8 164:16 | resulting 63:17,24 |
| 41:7 43:24 47:21 53:3,9,14,20 | representative 151:9 214:5 | requiring 11:1 19:23 23:11 | responds 88:3 92:17 122:8 | 234:12 results 236:18 |
| 56:17 63:1 66:9 | 232:20 234:9 | rescue 31:10 | 162:18 175:2 | resume 254:24 |
| 75:8 76:15 82:16 | | 103:21,25 104:13 | response 28:22 | retain 26:18 |
| 84:14 85:9,10,11 | represented 30:17 165:16 231:3 | 105:2,10 115:12 | 34:15 41:19 | retain 20:18 retained 59:10 |
| 85:13 86:25 | representing | 117:1,8 222:22 | 45:20 66:5 69:8 | retire 8:2 32:19 |
| 94:19 96:4 97:24 | 96:11 135:14 | residence 219:12 | 70:25 92:11 95:6 | 33:15 34:12 |
| 99:11 104:5 | 255:7 | resign 42:20 213:5 | 95:8,10,18 97:16 | 41:16 193:7 |
| 105:15 106:7 | reprimanded 40:1 | resign 42:20 213:3 | 97:18 100:18 | 213:22 241:9,18 |
| 103:13 106:7 | 166:13 | 33:8 42:14,18 | 101:13 112:16 | 241:19,25 242:9 |
| 112:6 117:4 | reputation 164:8 | 46:6 212:24 | 125:18 129:3 | 241:19,23 242:9 |
| 118:20 135:7 | 197:1 202:23 | 243:1 253:5 | 131:2 133:6 | 248:14 249:2 |
| 136:10,15,20,24 | reputational | resignations 186:3 | 131:2 133:0 | 250:7 251:1 |
| 137:17,18 139:17 | 155:13 157:24 | resolve 3:6 51:6 | 163:5 169:6,19 | 254:3 |
| 137.17,10 137.17 | 133.13 13/.44 | 1680176 3.0 31.0 | 103.3 103.0,13 | 257.5 |
| | <u> </u> | <u> </u> | <u> </u> | l |

| | | | | 1 agc 271 |
|---------------------|-------------------|----------------------------------|-------------------------|--------------------------------------|
| retired 1:5 8:13 | 28:21 29:8,14,18 | 174:7,8,10,24 | 119:16 195:19 | ruled 26:12 232:25 |
| 207:13 | 29:22 30:9,12,18 | 187:23 188:6 | 255:11 | rules 21:23 |
| retirement 1:15 | 31:4,18,23 36:1 | 189:2,8 192:21 | Ricky 47:25 | ruling 26:13,15,21 |
| 7:3,8,18 9:2 | 36:13 37:25 38:7 | 194:1 196:5,11 | riddance 70:9 | rumours 233:22 |
| 18:15 19:15 | 39:23 41:13 | 196:19 197:23 | ridiculous 197:6 | 234:18 235:1 |
| 33:18 34:21,23 | 44:14,19 45:3 | 200:12 205:22 | right 52:4 57:20 | running 20:5 |
| 35:3 42:11,19 | 48:8,15,25 49:2 | 210:20 212:14 | 67:19 92:20 | 100:20 |
| 43:6 45:23 46:11 | 49:11 50:11 51:3 | 214:14 215:3 | 93:24 165:23 | runway 29:21,23 |
| 139:8 152:2 | 51:12,19,21 | 218:9 222:23 | 166:1,3 170:7 | 50:12 51:12 52:1 |
| 193:9 222:4 | 52:10,24 53:6,13 | 223:3,17,25 | 205:7 207:10 | 72:7 83:15 84:4 |
| 232:6 240:7 | 53:18 54:20 | 224:4 227:11,17 | 228:10 254:10,22 | 88:23 89:6 122:3 |
| 243:14 249:21 | 55:17 56:22,24 | 227:25 228:3,12 | rights 15:17 42:21 | 124:11 |
| 251:4 252:7,25 | 58:22 59:1,4,7,22 | 228:24 229:12,24 | 93:24 211:1 | Rupert 13:1 |
| 253:9,20,23 | 60:2,9 61:2 62:3 | 230:1,5 231:21 | rigid 31:23 | |
| 254:11 | 62:9,23 63:9,10 | 232:20 234:10,11 | rise 1:8 4:2,7 48:7 | S |
| retires 242:13 | 63:14,18,19 64:6 | 234:12,21,23 | 137:24 202:9 | sabotage 141:2 |
| retorted 148:12 | 64:23 65:5 66:18 | 235:25 236:20,23 | risk 22:13 105:5 | 178:24 |
| retribution 193:11 | 66:20 68:7 69:20 | 239:16 243:9 | 137:20 184:13,19 | sabotaged 142:1 |
| retrieved 187:15 | 71:12 72:10 74:6 | RGP's 25:17 28:24 | 188:18 228:12 | sabotaging 178:9 |
| retrospective | 74:18,22 75:5 | 48:3 51:6,22 | rival 154:9 | Sacramento |
| 246:3 | 76:4,7,11,19 77:7 | 53:3 62:12 66:10 | road 226:12 | 226:21 228:21 |
| return 50:24 54:11 | 77:20,24 79:3 | 70:23 76:13 | 228:14 | sadly 219:19 |
| 59:9 96:6 135:9 | 80:8 85:10,16 | 112:13 128:5 | Robert 132:12 | safe 110:8 137:21 |
| 143:14 216:21 | 86:6,10,17 90:10 | 140:18 147:14 | robust 149:22 | safeguard 27:22 |
| 217:1 | 90:23 91:5,16,21 | 149:13 153:22 | 160:12 | 198:9 |
| returned 143:22 | 92:25 93:10 | 160:13 164:24 | robustly 146:22 | safeguarded 24:13 |
| 228:22 | 94:11 96:23 97:2 | 174:13 197:20 | Rocca 38:14 | safer 113:24 |
| revealed 4:19 | 97:24 99:2 | 205:3 211:18 | 153:21 174:6 | safety 110:11 |
| 153:6 | 102:21,23 103:2 | 213:25 226:1 | rock 52:13,23 | saga 45:5 |
| reveals 22:25 | 103:19 105:23 | 255:9 | 70:16 78:1 | Samantha 226:21 |
| revenue 176:12 | 106:2 107:2,6 | rib 31:24,25 77:7 | Rolder 47:25 | 228:21 |
| revert 40:14 167:7 | 111:5,22 112:1 | 77:16 87:9,10 | role 13:15,18 14:2 | Sanchez 16:16 |
| 195:4 | 112:21 114:6 | 108:1 110:4,5,13 | 14:7,8,11,12,17 | 37:14 141:6 |
| review 6:7 54:17 | 115:6,8,9,14 | 110:15 115:22 | 14:21,24 19:15 | 142:13 143:24 |
| 60:24 62:22,25 | 117:25 120:5 | 116:2 | 28:6 54:6 155:20 | 144:3,8 145:7 |
| 112:1,18 114:4 | 124:3,4 125:16 | Richard 49:25 | 190:24 223:10 | 154:12,21 185:15 |
| 117:17 143:15,20 | 126:14 130:5 | 78:5 | 250:2 254:16 | 200:25 |
| 174:15 177:25 | 137:4 138:4,16 | Richardson 16:12 | roles 12:18 | sanctioned 54:25 |
| 182:12 194:4 | 140:22 141:1 | 82:24 119:22 | room 4:21 148:14 | 106:6 175:7 sanctions 12:14 |
| 211:18 226:9 | 142:14,21 143:12 | 120:3 121:9 | 163:14,15 168:4 | |
| 229:11 230:16 | 143:15 146:18 | 128:13 142:7,22 | rooted 231:13 | Santa 83:5,15 89:6 119:5,14 121:5 |
| reviewed 112:7 | 147:8,10 149:18 | 142:23 143:3,4 | route 65:2 | 122:3 123:7 |
| 113:9 180:9 | 150:12,23 151:1 | 156:15 158:23 | routes 241:2 | Santos 5:10 6:20 |
| 226:10 | 154:20 156:16 | 172:10 175:24 | routinely 111:11 | 6:23 72:24 73:1 |
| reviewing 182:17 | 157:2 158:10,23 | 181:10 185:4 | Royal 8:11 16:11 | 73:5,6 139:21 |
| revised 103:13 | 159:10,11 160:23 | 194:23 195:10,13 | 74:2 116:11,17 | 140:1,5 203:25 |
| revoked 103:19 | 161:8,17 162:7 | 198:3 199:18 | 116:22 252:8 | 256:1 |
| revolves 140:17 | 164:6,25 165:25 | 207:13,15 Richardson's | rule 11:24 191:11 | SAR 104:12 |
| RGP 26:1,3,9 | 167:20 173:10 | Kicharuson's | 191:18 | satisfied 160:21 |
| | | | | 5 |
| | | | | |

| | | | | Page 292 |
|------------------------------|------------------|------------------------------|--------------------------------|--|
| 165:3 170:8 | 198:18 200:6 | 180:4 183:2,20 | 34:5 36:5 41:16 | 136:10 150:23 |
| 186:18 187:13 | 201:9 202:13 | 187:16,21,25 | 42:17 45:22 46:5 | 156:4 174:8,11 |
| | 201.9 202.13 | 188:2,23 190:9 | 46:16 57:3 82:15 | 194:9 210:24 |
| Saturday 244:3 252:22 | 204.14 203.19 | 191:4,25 192:16 | 85:16,18 97:19 | 214:6 |
| save 23:20 | 210:8 216:10 | , | 97:23,25 98:6 | |
| save 25.20 saved 53:7 | | 193:11,17,23 194:3 196:18 | 103:11 104:20 | seeking 38:7 59:18 80:8 93:9 125:16 |
| saveu 33.7 saving 117:2 | 217:2,20,20 | 194.3 190.18 | | |
| U | 219:3,5,7,15 | | 105:13,21 111:5 111:9 112:8 | 131:21 133:16,19 |
| saw 35:24 54:6 212:6 | 223:13 225:14,23 | 206:24 207:4,21 | | 134:4,6 172:11 187:25 188:6 |
| | 226:5,16 228:8 | 207:25 208:10 | 113:10,15 115:6 | |
| saying 12:17 28:20 | 229:10 237:21 | 209:11 210:21 | 115:18 116:19,24 | 193:10 214:18 |
| 83:17 127:4,5 | 238:19 239:8 | 211:11 212:15 | 118:20 133:3 | 241:15 253:8 |
| 148:25 165:20,21 | 242:21 | 213:9 217:15,21 | 136:10,14 137:1 | seeks 153:24 242:7 |
| 172:23 181:15 | scenarios 116:20 | 218:1 221:13 | 144:9 192:3 | seemingly 166:7 |
| 198:8 216:18,23 | schedule 187:23 | 244:14 245:19 | 197:9 216:19 | 170:21 |
| 227:8 229:19,21 | 225:9 | 246:10 247:3 | 220:7 241:4,17 | seen 3:4 14:22 |
| 234:11 | scheduled 80:22 | 248:21 | 241:19,22 242:20 | 17:22 70:16 |
| says 21:24 29:13 | 244:5 | searched 212:11 | 244:8 245:2 | 121:12 132:18 |
| 30:11,20,23 31:4 | screaming 92:25 | searches 179:13 | 246:17 247:24 | 134:11 163:13 |
| 31:12 36:3,8,20 | screen 192:15 | 180:10 | 248:16 250:12,18 | 185:7 196:11 |
| 38:4 39:15 40:7 | screenshots 5:1 | seas 104:22 | 250:20 251:9,13 | 201:20,25 210:9 |
| 42:21 46:1,15 | screw 69:16 | Sebastian 13:1 | 252:20 254:2,14 | 221:9 |
| 52:7 54:2,12 | sea 31:21 35:20 | second 9:19 14:7 | 254:18 | sees 220:2 |
| 56:5 61:9 63:7 | 41:7 43:23 65:12 | 17:14 21:2 24:6 | section's 112:13 | seize 55:15 188:2 |
| 64:14 70:20 | 77:5 79:2 86:4 | 24:21 30:3 33:23 | sections 105:17 | seized 47:15 56:2 |
| 71:14 74:10 88:7 | 89:22 93:12 94:9 | 35:20 41:18,23 | 247:18 | 62:4 180:7 |
| 89:12 91:12 | 97:25 98:24 | 52:18 61:9 77:17 | secure 120:14 | seizure 48:2 180:2 |
| 92:11 95:9 100:9 | 114:5,9 115:19 | 78:5 104:4 | 179:20,22 196:17 | 188:24 |
| 100:19 103:12 | 116:15 120:4,20 | 112:25 131:8 | security 47:16 | self- 91:7 |
| 104:7,21 105:20 | 132:23 137:21 | 171:21 188:22 | 140:20 152:11 | self-incrimination |
| 107:17 113:22 | 138:4 139:11,16 | 191:11 196:8 | 154:8 155:25 | 21:15 |
| 116:10 118:23 | 244:13 245:12 | 198:4,17 199:8 | 170:14 177:21 | self-interest 57:11 |
| 119:24 120:21 | 246:8 247:1,25 | 199:14 204:11 | 178:1 182:11,15 | self-serving 66:16 |
| 121:1 122:4 | 248:25 | 205:19 227:8 | 182:21 212:6 | 209:8 |
| 124:15,19,21,23 | search 38:2,8 | 234:10 242:18 | Sedley 10:9 | Selta 44:12 |
| 125:19,25 126:10 | 39:14 40:16 | 247:14 248:21 | see 44:8 79:10,11 | send 70:21 |
| 127:21 129:15 | 49:17 51:1 55:1 | secondly 32:9 | 80:17 88:25 | sending 13:6 146:1 |
| 130:4,17 133:5 | 90:17 103:21,25 | 131:16 161:3 | 97:13 99:3 | sends 227:6 |
| 134:19 136:16 | 104:13 105:2,10 | 245:25 | 113:25 139:18 | senior 25:17,24 |
| 144:15,23 146:16 | 115:12 117:1,8 | secret 56:11 | 146:5 163:10,11 | 30:1 38:3,24 |
| 147:3 151:17 | 140:21 142:16 | 151:16 | 163:12 182:16 | 43:4 44:19 47:24 |
| 152:15 156:15,17 | 143:20 144:18 | secretary 12:20 | 205:11 212:1,23 | 48:12 54:24 |
| 159:8,16 160:1,5 | 145:5,16 146:20 | 37:15 58:11 | 213:13 226:18 | 55:22 62:19 |
| 160:8,16 162:13 | 148:18,22 150:3 | 130:14 152:20,20 | 228:3 247:17,18 | 66:14,20 67:12 |
| 163:9 168:16 | 150:22 151:2,5 | 157:15 201:1,5 | 256:12 | 68:25 70:15 76:3 |
| 169:9,22 171:22 | 159:12 160:14 | 236:7 | seeing 212:4 | 91:21 103:18 |
| 172:5 175:7,9 | 161:13,18 162:8 | secretly 246:19 | seek 26:19 32:16 | 107:7 111:9 |
| 176:1 179:3 | 165:8 168:6,18 | section 2:7 8:19 | 42:1 45:22 46:11 | 142:7 145:21 |
| 180:6 184:3,7 | 169:8 174:7 | 11:23 21:23 23:9 | 46:15 63:5 77:2 | 146:20 147:1,5 |
| 185:8 196:3 | 175:1 179:25 | 32:12,19 33:8 | 97:23 104:15 | 151:7,8 154:11 |
| | | | | |
| | • | • | • | • |

| | | | | Page 293 |
|--------------------|--------------------|--------------------------|---------------------|---------------------------|
| 156:13 164:5,24 | Sergeant 104:16 | setback 138:9 | 152:22 176:3,15 | 105:9 147:8 |
| 177:6 196:4 | 105:14 236:21 | sets 138:25 216:11 | shows 101:3 | 182:1 245:15 |
| 197:3 230:7,13 | 237:10 238:2 | 216:20 | 115:15 203:1 | 250:19 |
| 231:1 236:23 | serious 51:7 59:12 | setting 10:20 | shred 57:12 | SIV 119:8 |
| 239:15 243:8 | 63:23 78:15 86:8 | 46:18 93:15 | side 44:14 84:4 | SIVE 123:4 |
| sense 31:6 40:17 | 95:23 98:25 | 223:7 | 91:16 124:11 | six 43:25 120:11 |
| 54:2 76:22 82:4 | 100:1 105:5 | seven 44:1 47:3 | 172:4 | 126:12 143:7 |
| 101:21,25 167:10 | 135:1 138:3,9 | 72:21 73:7 75:23 | sides 52:3 238:19 | 181:17 229:1 |
| 172:13 227:14 | 153:6 154:7 | 76:17 77:4 99:13 | sifted 147:7 | SJC 115:21 116:8 |
| 234:1 248:5 | 155:13,25 156:21 | 171:5 188:5 | Sifting 20:7 | sketch 243:17 |
| senses 228:4 | 163:1 164:14 | 199:24 223:3 | sight 82:15 | skewed 231:11 |
| sensitive 88:13 | 170:25 197:8 | severely 74:14 | signal 116:3 | skills 110:20 |
| 138:24 149:15 | seriously 63:3 | sexual 25:5 54:20 | signed 165:2 | skip 93:3 |
| 150:10 | 77:18 147:13 | shaken 87:12 | significance 17:13 | skipping 86:12 |
| sensitivities | 149:12 154:3 | 168:4 | significant 15:12 | 115:7 148:11 |
| 180:16,22 | 197:15 230:25 | shame 227:17 | 20:24 21:14 23:8 | 153:12 157:25 |
| sensitivity 138:5 | seriousness 97:14 | share 209:7 | 46:10 54:4 60:25 | 160:7,16 168:3 |
| 143:3 | 98:13 | 243:22 | 107:19 108:11 | slightly 18:23 |
| sent 28:5 44:6 | servant 37:14 | shared 153:9 | 176:25 | 79:22 125:1 |
| 45:18 57:23 | 148:9 154:12 | 210:18 211:22 | significantly 108:8 | sloppy 53:19 |
| 58:17 80:1 81:14 | 176:15 177:17 | 224:17 | silk 145:21 164:5 | Slower 120:18 |
| 83:11,16,25 93:5 | serve 10:24 11:18 | shareholding | similar 86:20 | small 3:10 24:4 |
| 104:6 105:13 | service 3:19 62:5 | 141:15 157:18 | 117:3 159:14 | 230:10 |
| 116:3 118:5 | 108:22 225:16 | shares 37:20 154:9 | 188:20 205:13 | Smith 78:4 85:4 |
| 121:14 123:22,25 | 253:15 | 185:19,21 | similarly 12:12 | 105:16 113:19 |
| 124:16 132:9,25 | serviceman 47:14 | sharp 230:3 | 191:2,22 239:15 | SMT 70:13 |
| 133:4,11,12,13 | 48:16,25 49:13 | sharp 230.3 shed 9:10 | simple 7:11 16:24 | smuggling 87:9,10 |
| 133:22,24 136:15 | 50:4,6,8 51:19 | sheet 21:9 | 101:8,9 | social 5:2 11:13 |
| 136:20 152:18 | 55:14 | shifted 187:14 | simply 6:17 228:3 | 126:19 |
| 159:15 171:6 | serviceman's 48:1 | shocked 87:12 | Simpson 12:24 | SOLAS 32:10 |
| 175:23 181:9 | 48:4,10 59:6 | 167:18 | 13:2 235:20 | sole 152:10 |
| 182:25 214:25 | services 31:10 | shocking 219:18 | 236:22 237:11 | solely 110:1 |
| 219:14 220:1,4 | 47:9 71:5 222:22 | 226:22 | 238:10 | solicitor 12:24 |
| 224:24 229:17,20 | serving 47:11 74:2 | shoes 70:18 | single 182:17 | 13:2 20:3 22:22 |
| 235:15 243:6 | 76:19 90:10 94:1 | short 4:8 6:14,18 | 213:19 | 26:22 42:25 |
| 247:15 249:22 | session 203:20 | 57:5 72:23 73:3 | SIO 26:7 | 56:18 101:23 |
| sentence 10:5 61:9 | set 1:9 2:4 3:23 | 150:18 203:22 | sir 5:19 6:23 16:15 | solicitor/client |
| 64:1 107:17 | 6:10 19:7 33:18 | shorthand 93:2 | 17:5 21:6 46:7 | 101:21 |
| 109:13 111:19,21 | 47:1 78:20 80:23 | shortly 22:22 | 58:10 106:16 | Solis 78:6 85:9,10 |
| 112:25 126:20 | 86:19 88:11 90:6 | 50:24 97:9 122:9 | 107:24 108:7 | 104:5 106:7 |
| 209:1 | 90:19 91:8 99:21 | 124:14 230:15 | 109:22 110:12,15 | 108:24 |
| sentenced 59:14 | 109:4 146:12 | show 69:19 92:22 | 191:11 254:5 | solutions 226:25 |
| 76:20 | 155:9 192:11 | 124:17 176:10 | 255:3,19 | somewhat 170:18 |
| sentiments 68:17 | 200:7 204:7 | 185:15 186:4 | sit 6:8 24:1 | soon 3:17 54:9 |
| 86:20 | 217:12,19 225:22 | 243:18 | sits 222:5 | 61:21 70:6,9 |
| September 59:17 | 226:2 236:12 | showed 109:22 | situation 41:25 | 81:24 129:8 |
| 105:14 143:23 | 244:7 249:9 | 112:2 187:1 | 65:6 66:8 69:15 | 160:7 |
| 223:11 236:17 | 255:25 | showing 131:20 | 79:13 88:15 | sooner 153:8 |
| sequence 1:6 | set-up 176:8 | shown 59:21 | 103:8 104:25 | sorry 121:7 133:2 |
| | _ | | | - |
| | I | I | I | I |

| | | | | Page 294 |
|-------------------------|--------------------|-------------------------------|--------------------|-------------------------------------|
| 134:16 137:16 | 33:6 67:6 215:25 | stand 50:24 | 167:1 168:13 | stood 123:3 167:25 |
| 138:12 171:5 | 216:2 218:19 | stand 50.24 standard 81:10 | 169:5,9 171:9 | stop 12:12 158:25 |
| 201:22 202:4 | speaking 38:20 | 93:1 94:2 103:4 | 199:8,15,25 | stop 12.12 138.23 stopover 74:11 |
| 218:18 236:2 | 149:11 174:19 | 109:23 115:23 | 200:12 207:14,18 | stored 187:12 |
| 237:17 238:21 | 175:12 208:16 | standards 32:12 | 214:14 215:4 | stories 31:3 234:20 |
| 247:17 250:21 | 215:1 | 78:3 85:17 111:5 | 217:10,13,23 | 234:23 |
| sort 166:5 | speaks 175:2 | 172:17 220:12 | 255:21 | STP 177:18 |
| Sotha 90:4 91:14 | special 187:10 | standing 115:17 | statements 15:20 | straddled 123:16 |
| sought 9:9 38:13 | specific 159:4 | 120:19 121:19 | 19:19 20:5 25:13 | strain 64:3 |
| 47:23 56:7 75:5 | 223:6 | 252:1 | 26:20 44:2 56:6 | strategic 228:2 |
| 143:13 145:17,23 | specifically 4:25 | standoff 29:21 | 75:8 151:11 | 229:25 |
| 148:17 149:7 | 39:21 88:9,12 | stands 75:20 | 152:4 172:9 | stray 131:13,15 |
| 161:3 183:11 | 93:19 137:18 | start 4:1,6 6:5 | 255:6,16 | strayed 111:15 |
| 186:10,15,20 | 148:20 | 19:22 23:19 76:2 | states 17:15 98:7 | streams 176:12 |
| 187:6,10,11 | specified 241:19 | 96:25 139:22,24 | 105:16 127:12 | street 10:12 |
| 198:19 205:15 | 242:14 | 184:22 | 173:21 204:8 | strengthening |
| 218:6 248:17 | specifies 238:11 | started 19:4,12 | 225:15 227:3 | 61:1 |
| soundest 1:25 | speculation 126:19 | 29:15 | 231:10 239:12 | stress 42:15 63:19 |
| source 118:22 | speculative 209:22 | starting 44:18 | 246:8 254:18 | stresses 199:9 |
| sovereignty 94:8 | speeches 5:14 | 45:10 61:8 91:20 | stating 24:21 30:9 | strict 3:23 |
| 138:21 | speed 77:8 106:22 | 92:8 | 34:16 42:6 58:10 | strong 82:4 |
| Spain 44:12 76:8 | 110:20 111:10 | startled 161:5 | 80:12,14 81:20 | strongly 175:1 |
| 79:13 80:20 | 112:18 182:13 | starts 152:14 | 83:12 119:1 | 222:8,9 |
| 81:13 88:14 | 199:13 | 216:7 | 152:23 226:22 | structure 10:15 |
| 91:14 114:24 | spell 57:5 | state 74:19 81:13 | station 50:2,15 | 112:14 236:25 |
| 127:6 131:19 | spelling 53:16 | 173:23 | 51:9 52:14 53:17 | struggling 166:6 |
| 132:21 138:6 | spent 162:25 | stated 25:7 40:4 | 55:3,8,18 61:24 | studied 227:9 |
| 141:4 155:16 | spoke 50:16 178:5 | 46:4 50:20,23 | 62:1 124:21 | study 113:1,7 |
| 245:11 | 205:24 206:13 | 93:19 95:14 | 184:8 | studying 89:10 |
| Spanish 32:1 | 208:6,8,12 211:3 | 106:11 107:7 | stationed 47:12 | 122:7 |
| 76:20 77:15 | 230:7 234:16 | 110:6,10 119:6 | status 16:1 27:2 | style 30:19 31:19 |
| 79:19 80:5 82:22 | 237:15 238:13 | 123:2 127:8 | 44:23 91:25 | 230:4 231:9 |
| 83:8 84:22 85:6 | spoken 56:13 | 148:15 150:5 | 168:21 207:16 | 234:6 237:20 |
| 86:4,7 87:1,20 | 174:23 181:21 | 160:18 163:22 | statute 44:23 | 246:25 |
| 88:23 100:11 | 209:9 | 164:23 165:21 | 91:25 | sub-issue 193:3,12 |
| 101:6 105:6,8,11 | staff 48:14 52:14 | 166:16,20 167:1 | statutory 19:15 | sub-issues 192:13 |
| 106:3 107:8,20 | 52:19 55:7,22 | 181:21 194:6 | 28:6 43:15 | 193:1 |
| 108:3,9,12 110:3 | 57:1,24 58:7 | 202:15 210:7 | 196:22 251:7 | subject 2:3 3:25 |
| 110:5,9 111:15 | 65:12 116:19,24 | 211:7 223:24 | Steel 46:8 254:6 | 4:11,14,18 11:12 |
| 115:9,11 117:8,9 | 230:7,15 | 231:6,16 232:6 | steer 170:2 | 15:13 24:9 27:16 |
| 122:3,24 123:17 | stage 51:17 54:13 | 238:7 245:3 | steering 166:24 | 33:15 43:7 94:21 |
| 123:19 124:3,6 | 68:16 90:22 95:4 | 247:3,5,8 254:1 | step 3:11 | 99:24 117:16 |
| 125:13 126:13,15 | 125:18 132:16 | statement 9:12,22 | Stephen 10:9 | 119:7 129:25 |
| 126:17,23 127:10 | 169:22 170:10 | 9:25 20:24 25:9 | stepped 57:4 | 168:22 186:11,12 |
| 127:15 130:13 | 185:14 187:5 | 28:3,14 33:23 | steps 158:17 | 186:13 233:12 |
| 131:14,15,20 | 241:23 242:2,5,9 | 34:24 36:3 52:6 | Stipendiary 55:4 | 253:9 |
| 132:20 138:10 | 242:12 252:19 | 53:22 78:13 | 142:15 185:3 | subjected 34:17 |
| 163:24 175:3 | stage.' 80:10 | 108:16 124:19 | Stone 104:16 | 56:9 168:9 |
| speak 6:2 8:12 | stake 94:2 178:21 | 143:16,18 151:25 | 105:14 | subjectivity 17:21 |
| | | | | |
| | | | | |

| | | | | Page 295 |
|-------------------|-------------------------------|-------------------------------------|-----------------------------------|---------------------------|
| submission 27:25 | 178:8 202:4 | support 44:17 | suspended 247:9 | talks 126:23 127:7 |
| 94:22 187:20 | suggested 53:20 | 64:23 68:15 | suspicion 55:19 | 208:23 |
| 188:9 190:22 | 82:19 197:11 | 69:16 91:19 | 56:12 82:4 | tamper 181:18 |
| submissions 3:12 | 205:22 | 103:20,25 107:7 | suspicions 82:14 | tamper 181.18 |
| 3:13,14,16,23 | suggesting 96:12 | 103.20,23 107.7 | 209:22 | tampering 178.7 |
| 5:18,21,24 6:3,4 | 132:12 135:14 | 178:11 220:8 | suss 170:11 | task 9:4 20:8 |
| 6:13,15 13:21 | 164:9 | 228:17 | sustained 100:7 | tasked 7:5 62:25 |
| 14:4,15 16:18 | suggestion 95:25 | supported 192:4 | SW 175:6 | taskings 105:19 |
| 27:17 45:21 | 135:3 157:22 | supported 192.4 supporter 141:23 | Sweeney 62:20 | tasks 173:24 |
| 102:18 189:11 | suggestions 170:8 | supporting 205:6 | switched 81:6 | taught 67:23 68:11 |
| 191:8,9 192:12 | suggests 83:12 | supportive 54:8 | 104:18 128:7 | taxpayers 138:2 |
| 194:13 243:5 | 89:2 122:1 | 136:20 152:14 | sworn 69:25 | TC 176:2,7,19 |
| 251:10 | 176:20 177:1 | supports 8:8 | system 77:22 | 177:20,21,24 |
| submit 15:23 | 215:6 227:21 | 137:19 | 108:21 116:13,14 | 178:5,8,11,23 |
| 18:22 184:10 | 228:12 | Supreme 49:18 | 119:8 140:21 | 179:14 |
| 191:2 | suitable 174:11 | sure 80:7 81:3 | 142:2 154:8 | team 3:11 9:7 |
| submitted 143:18 | sum 185:22 | 125:15 128:5 | 177:24 178:7,9 | 12:19,25 15:24 |
| 226:13 | sum 183.22 summarise 28:10 | 139:23 150:4 | 181:18 182:6,21 | 19:3 21:9 23:21 |
| submitting 224:6 | 28:18 35:1 39:11 | 206:1,3 218:20 | systematic 230:17 | 27:18 62:1 66:21 |
| suboptimal 53:19 | 198:11 | 219:25 256:11 | systematic 230.17 systems 81:3 | 67:1,12 78:1 |
| subparagraph | summarised 71:17 | surely 81:9 | systems of .5 | 89:10 96:5,6 |
| 168:14 | 144:23 194:10 | surname 53:16 | T | 102:12 118:3 |
| subsection 241:13 | 195:20 | surprise 91:4 | t-shirt 163:17 | 122:7 135:8,9 |
| 243:4 255:1 | summary 9:20 | 159:17 219:19 | table 10:8 | 142:20 164:16,24 |
| subsequent 22:13 | 26:14,16 103:22 | surprised 94:20 | tackling 115:3 | 165:19 166:10,18 |
| 29:25 40:19 | 113:18 177:7 | 247:6 | tactical 167:14 | 167:22,25 168:18 |
| 46:13 126:9 | 238:5 | surrounding 28:21 | taint 199:21 | 168:23 169:14 |
| 171:24 190:6 | Sunday 78:25 | survey 223:18 | take 5:1 7:7 18:15 | 170:4,7 178:6 |
| 212:19 222:13 | 252:24 | surveys 236:16 | 27:9 46:25 47:3 | 181:16,24 223:25 |
| subsequently 58:5 | superintendent | survivors 90:7 | 49:22 60:3 62:8 | 224:18 |
| 65:8 75:2 117:16 | 16:12 47:8 53:10 | suspect 32:14 41:2 | 63:14 84:21 | team's 40:3 166:14 |
| 150:19,25 193:25 | 53:15 56:15 57:7 | 47:11 63:11,20 | 85:23 130:24 | 169:17 |
| 244:20 | 85:4 93:8 95:5 | 85:22 86:6 108:1 | 134:17 158:11 | teams 112:16 |
| substance 39:11 | 119:15,22 120:2 | 110:4,7,13,14,22 | 161:25 171:22 | technical 119:7 |
| substantial 98:25 | 128:13 133:17,24 | 111:24 120:6 | 172:5 176:24 | 123:20 |
| substantive 20:23 | 134:5,8 142:6,21 | 142:18 164:1 | 227:24 232:23 | technicians 123:4 |
| 197:19 237:4 | 142:23 143:2,4 | 168:21 177:14 | 240:18 252:25 | 127:16 |
| 240:20 245:9 | 175:24 181:10 | 178:15,25 179:9 | take-off 50:10 | Telecom 208:23 |
| 248:19 251:20 | 185:4 194:23 | 183:13,17 187:5 | taken 15:4 32:1 | telephone 28:19 |
| successive 86:15 | 195:10,13 198:2 | 188:7 198:24 | 38:10 50:9 51:1 | 54:14 206:14 |
| suffer 253:13 | 199:18 207:13,15 | 200:2 207:16 | 62:9 70:17 84:24 | 208:7 215:8 |
| suffered 74:4 | 223:24 232:21 | suspected 29:19 | 101:5 121:17 | telephoned 49:7 |
| suffering 42:2 | 236:3 255:10 | 77:9 121:10 | 140:16 148:12 | 51:17 |
| suffice 256:8 | superior 61:22 | 197:7 | 161:8 177:19 | telephonic 208:1 |
| suffices 32:23 | supervisors | suspects 150:15 | 181:8 185:6 | tell 70:2,10 79:24 |
| 191:20 | 230:20 | 154:13 166:12 | 211:9 216:21 | 92:13 125:3 |
| sufficient 55:6 | supplement 3:13 | 184:15 188:11,12 | takes 189:10 | telling 32:6 101:7 |
| 173:22 186:19 | 6:2 | suspend 68:9 | 230:23 | 147:4 171:25 |
| suggest 159:5 | supplied 123:3 | 167:3 242:25 | talk 68:12 216:9 | ten 4:2,4 6:6 46:12 |
| | | | talking 38:16 | |
| | 1 | 1 | 1 | 1 |

| | | | | 1 age 270 |
|--------------------|-----------------------|--------------------|--------------------|---------------------|
| 123:10,12,12 | 256:2,2 | 164:15 196:20 | 130:2 131:19 | 157:5 158:14 |
| 128:2 141:18 | thanked 68:22 | 229:23,24 | 133:12 136:5 | 161:19 162:1 |
| 225:6 226:8 | 143:2 | thoughts 170:13 | 139:18,20 140:13 | 168:17 170:20 |
| 228:25 | thanking 79:4 | thousands 2:12 | 146:8 154:6 | 174:24 175:11 |
| ten- 4:14 | thanks 80:2 89:19 | thread 95:17 | 155:14 156:15 | 181:22 199:13 |
| tenant 76:10 | 122:13 125:10,21 | 134:20 | 175:8 184:2,16 | 213:2 215:21 |
| tendered 173:15 | 216:18,23 218:21 | threat 39:25 166:5 | 188:17 192:10 | 216:2 230:7 |
| tendering 42:13 | 218:24 219:19 | 204:15,20 | 194:13 197:22 | 231:12 248:13 |
| 253:4 | 256:13 | threatened 143:14 | 199:12 202:12,24 | 252:19 |
| tenor 210:16 | theirs 70:18 | 196:16 | 203:12,22 208:8 | tomorrow 5:23 |
| tension 30:20 51:5 | theme 100:20 | three 9:12 16:13 | 212:4,9 213:7 | 68:14 92:15 |
| 233:15 | thereof 94:4,7 | 17:8 30:1 32:9 | 215:20 218:19,20 | 218:19 255:9 |
| tensions 234:12 | 212:3 221:15 | 43:23 55:21 56:8 | 218:22 219:20 | 256:12,13 |
| tenure 86:14 | thing 18:1 70:10 | 56:11,17 58:6 | 222:4 223:22,24 | tone 40:5 163:20 |
| terminals 62:6 | 99:17 169:18 | 66:13 68:25 | 224:8 225:10,11 | 164:14 166:17 |
| terminated 114:10 | 170:7 | 71:25 73:16 77:5 | 228:14 243:15 | 224:22 |
| 114:20 177:22 | things 14:2 38:9 | 84:8 85:7 87:22 | time-consuming | Tony 65:12 66:13 |
| terms 9:3,5 14:18 | 49:10 76:2 78:17 | 99:20 101:6,18 | 4:13 | top 52:11 78:10 |
| 16:21 17:4 18:12 | 85:14 164:3 | 102:18 141:20 | timed 82:23 | 174:20 177:10 |
| 19:7 22:18 27:20 | 172:4 218:12 | 153:3 158:15 | timeframe 63:13 | topic 243:11 |
| 33:15,16,18 43:7 | 228:10 233:23 | 191:7 192:13,13 | timeline 99:16 | topics 9:12 |
| 44:21 52:2 57:15 | 235:2 | 221:24 234:2 | 118:19 127:18 | total 216:11 |
| 61:4 65:7 73:18 | think 2:21 6:1 10:3 | 240:21 245:9 | 128:21 243:18 | totally 44:16 91:18 |
| 78:8,10 80:2 | 45:5 51:11 72:22 | 249:5,6 | timely 96:21 98:17 | 113:25 150:9 |
| 82:2,12 91:23 | 90:24 92:3 93:20 | threshold 160:21 | 101:1 135:24 | 151:10 161:8 |
| 129:11 130:18 | 94:10 145:15 | 207:20 | times 15:9 104:18 | 163:3 167:12 |
| 159:14 160:12 | 146:23 172:10 | thrown 111:13 | 117:13 196:15 | 169:10,18 |
| 183:25 187:16 | 174:2 184:25 | thumbs 129:24 | timetable 6:6 | tough 58:24 |
| 193:20 194:25 | 205:7 216:24 | 220:3 | timetables 3:23 | tower 55:25 57:1 |
| 195:22 199:19 | 219:20,21 225:9 | Thurday 6:11 | timing 254:12 | tracing 119:2 |
| 207:10 253:10,19 | 227:1,20 228:11 | Thursday 6:5 | tipping 78:16 | traffickers 137:22 |
| territorial 32:8 | 255:5 | Thursday's 126:22 | tireless 13:17 | trained 111:2 |
| 77:15 79:19 83:9 | thinking 199:2 | tied 160:2 | today 5:9 9:13 | 115:23 |
| 84:25 86:5 87:2 | thinks 127:24 | time 4:15 6:2 | 67:17,24 68:2,15 | training 32:14 |
| 88:23 105:6 | third 9:21 18:1 | 11:14 16:7 19:17 | 68:18 120:5 | 85:21 110:19,21 |
| 110:9 114:11,21 | 24:9 28:2 30:15 | 28:16 29:9 36:9 | 124:4 133:6 | 116:18 120:18 |
| 115:10 116:25 | 36:7 88:2 168:13 | 47:10 48:21 49:7 | 138:25 167:17 | transcribed 3:14 |
| 131:16 | 191:14 198:5 | 49:16 51:11 | 189:9 192:10 | transcribers 4:5,9 |
| territoriality | 199:3 207:14 | 53:25 54:3 58:2 | 194:14 196:7 | transcript 202:25 |
| 138:14 | 245:13 | 58:17 65:9 66:18 | 219:20 225:11 | transfer 141:7 |
| territory 138:17 | Thirdly 234:18 | 68:21 70:5 72:6 | 243:5 | 178:18 |
| tested 109:2 | Thomas 16:15 | 72:19 73:3,5 | told 20:3 53:21 | tranship 137:23 |
| text 72:6 181:20 | 37:11 142:1 | 82:4 84:7,12 | 63:13 67:3 75:2 | translation 90:11 |
| 243:6 | thorny 208:19 | 87:25 92:12 | 88:20 96:24 99:3 | transmission 4:24 |
| texted 67:6 | thorough 54:23 | 94:12 99:13 | 99:17 121:12 | transmitted |
| thank 6:22,23 | 75:14 168:1 | 103:5 107:15 | 125:4 137:16 | 106:21 |
| 131:2 140:1 | thoroughly 28:1 | 109:24 110:6 | 146:23,25 147:15 | transparency |
| 145:14 171:5 | thought 7:9 49:16 | 118:13 120:18 | 147:19 148:20 | 98:18 223:16 |
| 203:20 255:22 | 92:12 131:17 | 121:19 124:21 | 149:12,16 154:22 | transparent 1:21 |
| | | | | |
| | | | | |

| | | | | Page 297 |
|--------------------------------|----------------------------------|-------------------------------------|---------------------------------------|---------------------------------|
| 00.12 16 00.14 | 69:15 71:18 | 17.10 10.17 51.5 | 104.17 100.16 | 207.5 |
| 88:12,16 89:14 92:22 122:11 | | 47:18 48:17 54:5 56:8 57:5 59:10 | 194:17 198:16 | 207:5 |
| | 72:20 86:2 140:6 149:21 171:5 | 61:13,20 64:8,10 | understands 246:6 understood 69:10 | unpleasant 62:3 69:14 168:10 |
| transpired 49:10 238:5 | | 68:11 69:23 | 85:15 111:4 | |
| treat 41:1 198:23 | 183:22 185:1,20 turned 77:21 | 70:14 71:5 80:9 | 112:19 167:12 | unprofessional 57:9 |
| treated 5:4 42:7 | 106:10,14,19 | 96:6,8 120:10 | undertaken 60:8 | unrelated 146:4 |
| 251:23 252:4 | 108:21 109:8 | 125:17 135:9 | undertaking 22:8 | |
| treatment 34:16 | turning 11:20 15:7 | 238:3 | 22:11,17,21 | unsatisfactory 188:9 |
| 35:6 56:10 | 16:20 56:5 77:5 | Ullger 50:1,17 | undertook 132:16 | unstated 18:6 |
| 200:24 213:18 | 132:2 156:11 | 68:21 119:23 | undisputed 20:17 | unsuccessful 48:19 |
| tremendous | 163:5 234:23 | 223:21 224:12,15 | 102:16 192:11 | unsuccessfully |
| 156:24 | 240:18 250:3 | 228:24 236:1 | 245:18 252:14 | 215:24 |
| trial 10:16 11:22 | Turnock 12:20 | 239:18 | undoubtedly | untrue 161:9 |
| 25:5,7 200:20 | twice 128:18 | ultimate 18:20 | 173:10 | unwieldy 155:22 |
| 203:15 | 215:23 253:6 | ultimately 29:20 | unease 31:7 234:1 | update 84:19 |
| trials 14:23 | two 4:7 7:16 10:9 | 32:25 34:11 | 235:4 | 127:5 130:16 |
| Triay 12:25 13:1 | 19:25 20:22,25 | 58:25 59:13 | unethical 177:4 | updated 26:7 |
| 20:9 23:24 | 21:8,12 24:9 | 60:23 75:9 | unethically 177:2 | 58:10 116:18 |
| 192:15 | 26:5 31:12,24 | 143:19 237:12 | unfair 34:16 | 122:17 131:23 |
| tried 6:16 67:2 | 37:11 43:21 47:3 | 239:19 240:23 | 248:12 | 132:1 |
| 162:23 170:2 | 60:11,13 63:16 | ultra 42:19 | unfairly 42:7 | updates 75:17 |
| 174:1 186:9 | 63:22 69:5 70:1 | umbrage 171:23 | 252:3 | 87:15 |
| trigger 97:17 | 72:21 73:7,9,22 | 172:6 | unfairness 35:5 | upfront 228:8 |
| triggered 96:14 | 74:1,4 76:8,19 | unable 96:9 | unfavourable | uphold 170:14 |
| 135:16 247:4 | 77:4,24 79:3 | 135:11 245:17 | 236:18 | uploaded 3:15,17 |
| 255:1 | 80:11 86:7 87:10 | unacceptable | unflattering 94:18 | uploading 22:23 |
| trouble 184:20 | 88:18 89:25 | 49:16 230:14 | unfortunate 71:2 | upshot 146:14 |
| true 17:16 18:3 | 106:24 108:23 | unauthorised | 224:20 | upwards 52:17 |
| 38:16 126:13 | 109:10 110:2,19 | 144:5 | Unfortunately | 100:17 |
| 148:16 162:6 | 112:4 120:9 | unbecoming 51:24 | 201:3 | urgency 52:22 |
| 193:8 | 124:6 126:8 | 52:12 | unidentified 18:6 | urgently 245:20 |
| truly 250:1 | 128:19 129:13 | Unbeknownst | uniform 68:9 | use 22:8 53:15 |
| trust 51:8 162:2 | 139:25 146:11 | 198:5 | 69:24 | 86:21 105:21 |
| 163:1,3 211:6 | 158:13 159:20 | uncertain 160:12 | uninjured 87:11 | 109:3 111:12 |
| 213:1,6 | 160:18 161:4 | uncertainty | Unit's 107:7 | 115:17 174:7 |
| truth 3:22 11:15 | 174:21 175:15 | 128:18 | United 1:18 94:8 | 219:25 248:15 |
| 14:13 100:5 | 187:20,22 193:1 | unclear 130:22 | 138:7,22 | 254:2 |
| try 4:1 141:7 | 198:4 202:3 | unconscionable | units 47:16 109:7 | utter 168:4 |
| 145:19 | 203:5 216:7 | 196:15 | unlawful 48:3 | utterly 57:9 |
| trying 14:16 80:14 | 222:20 224:7 | uncover 102:13 | 55:16 71:16 | |
| 125:20 130:6 | 225:1 227:12 | uncovered 195:6 | 117:15 | V |
| 170:11 175:10 | 241:2 245:9,22 | understand 86:9 | unlawfulness | valid 190:13 |
| TSN 250:5 | 255:8 | 166:6 172:21 | 217:2 | validate 123:5 |
| Tuesday 5:15,23 | two- 131:9 | 191:14 217:3 | unnatural 209:21 | validated 31:20 |
| 6:24 253:23 | tying 81:22 129:6 | 246:12 | unnecessarily 49:4 | validating 231:5 |
| 256:14 | type 147:8 148:1 | understanding | 62:21 64:18 | variance 136:17 |
| Tunbridge's 60:15 | typically 153:25 | 32:5 69:9 82:2 | unnecessary 56:9 | varied 25:16 |
| turn 20:23 28:2 | | 82:10 129:11 | 57:6 61:19 69:14 | various 5:13 6:8 |
| 33:19 61:7 64:11 | U | 158:9 161:23 | 71:7 196:24 | 194:15 |
| | UK 22:5,5,15,16 | | | vastly 52:1 |
| | I | I | I | I |

| vehicles 29:23 | 173:9 | warned 50:22 | watch 232:1 | weekend 33:10 |
|---------------------------|----------------------------------|------------------|------------------|------------------------|
| 50:12 56:2 | vires 42:19 | warnings 59:5 | watching 9:14 | 252:16 |
| vein 131:23 | virtually 84:3 | warrant 38:8 | 111:1 | weeks 9:15,24 10:2 |
| ventilate 11:14 | 124:10 | 49:17,19 51:1 | waters 32:1,8 | 11:10 20:25 21:8 |
| ventilation 11:8 | virtue 208:6 | 52:9 55:24 60:16 | 77:15 79:19 80:7 | 27:13 30:9 43:20 |
| verbal 118:5 | virus 184:20 | 76:9 90:17 145:5 | 82:22 83:9 84:22 | 46:21 63:15,22 |
| verification 128:1 | visible 108:4 | 145:16 146:20 | 84:25 85:6 86:5 | 74:19 237:9 |
| version 100:5 | vision 106:12 | 147:8 148:19,22 | 87:2 88:24 | 240:3 255:5 |
| 107:11 111:20 | 108:18 109:5 | 150:4,22 151:2,6 | 100:12 101:6 | welcome 1:3 2:23 |
| 113:13 238:14 | visual 109:11 | 161:14,18 162:8 | 104:22,24 105:6 | 251:24 |
| vessel 31:23 77:7,8 | vital 155:17 | 163:21 164:1,19 | 105:8 106:3 | welfare 137:4 |
| 79:3 86:6 94:15 | 156:22 202:22 | 165:2,8,11,15 | 107:8,20 108:3 | 138:4 |
| 103:17 104:13,17 | vitally 65:17 81:12 | 168:19 169:8,12 | 108:12 110:3,5,9 | well-being 152:12 |
| 105:23 106:20 | voiced 213:17 | 169:15 174:7 | 111:15 114:11,21 | went 163:12 |
| 117:5 120:6 | volume 234:22 | 175:1 180:4,18 | 115:10 116:25 | 182:14 213:9 |
| 126:15 128:6 | voluntarily 1:8 | 180:18 187:16,25 | 117:8 123:17,19 | 231:4 243:16 |
| vessel's 77:20,22 | 51:3 143:9 | 188:6,23 189:18 | 125:15 126:7,13 | west 83:4 119:13 |
| 106:13 108:20 | 160:25 | 189:22,24 190:9 | 126:15 127:10,15 | 121:4 |
| 116:12 | voluntary 143:5 | 191:10 193:23 | 131:14,16 137:23 | WhatsApp 44:2,9 |
| vessels 32:15 | 165:11 179:18 | 194:9 196:17,20 | wave 70:6 | 66:21 73:20 76:1 |
| 85:22 103:19 | 199:24 214:14 | 196:23,24 197:13 | waving 79:22 | 79:1 80:1,11 |
| 105:21 106:2 | 215:4 | 197:21 199:20 | 125:2 | 83:11,17,24 87:5 |
| 110:7,22 111:24 | | 204:17,22 205:8 | way 2:1 14:15 | 87:17 88:8 90:20 |
| 113:3 114:6 | <u>W</u> | 205:12 206:24 | 17:16 41:1 43:10 | 91:8 118:6 |
| 115:9,18 116:15 | W5 77:13 | 207:4,21 208:11 | 51:14 54:8 67:22 | 121:22 130:10,11 |
| viability 155:5,23 | wait 182:16 | 209:11 210:21 | 68:16 115:20 | 131:24 132:7 |
| victim 7:23 | waited 163:14 | 211:11 212:15 | 131:3,14 148:22 | 133:22 136:18 |
| video 195:11 212:8 | waiting 67:7 | 221:14 226:9 | 151:2 161:18 | 145:2,13 146:8 |
| view 27:19 31:16 | 123:19 127:16 | 245:19 | 162:7 172:22 | 146:22 159:14,21 |
| 38:1 49:4 51:25 | walking 79:8 | warrant's 168:6 | 184:14 194:2 | 159:25 162:12 |
| 53:4,13 58:2 | 124:20 | warranted 172:24 | 198:23 205:5,15 | 210:9,15 213:14 |
| 65:3 90:24 92:18 | Walliker 48:22 | warrants 38:2 | 212:15 218:22 | 215:5,19 217:14 |
| 94:16 127:14 | 49:1 50:18 51:18 | 39:14 40:17 55:1 | 219:6 222:8,10 | 218:23 220:19 |
| 136:9 145:22 | 51:22 54:19 56:3 | 140:21 142:16,23 | 228:15 231:5 | 243:20 |
| 154:25 160:13 | 57:14,19,24 | 143:9,21 144:19 | 240:14 253:12 | whatsoever 75:1 |
| 163:2 171:2 | 61:24 74:24 | 151:19 159:12 | 256:12 | whilst 52:24 79:8 |
| 174:10 178:4 | 75:19 Walliker's 52:5 | 160:14,19 161:1 | ways 41:1 145:8 | 99:3 103:17 |
| 180:1 190:8 | | 183:2,21 185:3 | 198:23 221:25 | 115:22 129:21 |
| 191:1,9 205:1 | want 1:16,16 14:1 43:12 67:15 | 186:6,20,24 | We'll 163:4 | 174:24 186:2 |
| 207:7,17 209:8 | 95:20 134:23 | 187:21 189:13 | we're 145:9 | whistleblower |
| 210:20,23 212:14 | 137:18 145:4 | 191:2,4,14,25 | wearing 163:17 | 27:1 |
| views 7:14 28:13 | 253:15 | 192:16 193:11,17 | website 3:15,17 | whistleblowers |
| 134:7 144:17 | wanted 28:23 | 194:3 205:16 | 4:12 6:10 21:10 | 24:23 |
| 172:3 209:10 | 87:19 96:10 | 207:25 208:17 | 22:23 26:15 | whistleblowing |
| 212:1 221:14 | 130:21 135:13 | 213:9 214:11,13 | Wednesday 5:15 | 25:11 |
| vigorously 181:2 | 171:16 195:2 | 217:16,22 218:1 | 5:16 255:16 | white 62:6 |
| Vincenzi 194:24 | 212:23 218:3 | 244:14 246:10 | week 80:22 127:7 | white-collar |
| 195:6 | 221:10 | 247:3 248:21 | 133:19 219:16,23 | 147:11 165:1 |
| violation 159:17 | wants 67:5,7 | wasn't 230:16 | 245:14 | wholly 57:6 |
| | | <u> </u> | | <u> </u> |

| | | | | Page 299 |
|----------------------------|----------------------|-----------------------------------|--|---|
| 154:24 157:8 | witnesses' 28:11 | 231:3 | 0400 126:5 | 169:21 182:8 |
| 160:14 166:23 | 46:25 | | 06.05 87:5 | 207:23 |
| WHSS 81:23 | wonder 49:2 72:18 | wrongdoing 11:3 157:23 | 06.05 120:22 | 11.03 195:23 |
| 129:7 130:4 | 202:2 203:18 | wrongly 164:12 | 07.24 87:16 | 11.05 193.23 11.10 56:21 |
| widely 30:11 74:21 | word 16:24 17:3 | 165:9 | 07.41 87:23 88:8 | 11.40 84:2 |
| 232:24 | 18:7,8,11 180:10 | wrote 7:1 33:17 | 07.43 88:2 | 11.40 84.2 1105 121:10 |
| widen 19:20 | 228:4 | 34:12,15 42:6,25 | 07.43 88.2 0757 126:9 | 1139 133:16 |
| widen 13.20 wider 141:5 | wording 232:25 | 90:18 181:14 | 09.40 83:1 84:10 | 119 168:12 |
| 179:13,25 203:16 | words 17:18 18:18 | 182:8,19 235:8,8 | 09.49 83:10 88:17 | 12 37:24 39:12 |
| widespread 1:8 | 119:1 163:23 | 248:9 252:22 | 88:25 | 83:3 84:19 |
| wilful 116:6 | 164:19 167:15 | Wyan 142:9 | 09.51 219:2 | 119:12 121:3 |
| Williams 13:18 | 181:6 | 188:14 198:4 | 09.31 219.2 0935 118:21 | 130:9 142:20 |
| willing 254:1 | work 57:19 63:18 | 199:25 239:19 | 0936 133:1,4 | 145:1 151:12 |
| willingness 227:17 | 67:16 68:16 | 177.23 237.17 | 0940 119:10 | 159:6,11 171:7 |
| Windmill 120:14 | 162:16 184:23 | X | 120:25 121:13 | 174:17 189:20 |
| wisdom 157:9 | 225:18 226:7 | X 17:15 | 0949 121:23 122:4 | 190:12,16 194:6 |
| wish 24:6 27:17 | worked 167:16 | | 0953 122:4 | 194:12 195:21,22 |
| 209:7 | workforce 224:7 | Y | | 198:10,17 204:5 |
| wished 25:9 28:20 | working 3:10 | yards 101:17 | 1 | 208:4,7 210:6 |
| 153:21 | 20:18 54:7 65:10 | year 25:5 26:14 | 1 28:16 30:1 44:21 | 211:2 214:2,16 |
| wishes 45:11 92:8 | 121:16 127:11 | 152:1 203:8 | 55:16 61:7 62:3 | 215:24 216:7 |
| withdraw 251:12 | 223:8 235:21 | years 1:19 10:9 | 91:23 103:14 | 218:14 219:3 |
| withdrawal 46:14 | worn 181:7 | 19:25 60:13 | 112:2,2 113:19 | 222:13 |
| 250:25 | worried 42:15 | 146:11 203:5 | 114:6,7 120:9 | 12.00 93:18 |
| withdrawn 250:14 | worry 131:3 | 210:13 213:1 | 181:10 187:23,25 | 12.30 119:18 |
| 251:18 | 181:22 | 252:2 253:15 | 200:11 241:23 | 174:22 |
| withdrew 34:11 | worry.' 218:6 | Yeats 93:8,9 95:5 | 1,000 64:1 | 12.51 77:13 |
| 42:4 | worrying 53:22 | 95:11 133:17,24 | 1,600 20:5 | 12.55 140:2 |
| withheld 32:3 99:7 | 169:13 | 134:6,8 223:23 | 1.5 108:1 | 1210 127:19 |
| 101:12 177:23 | worse 100:5 150:7 | 236:2 239:18 | 1.8.6 106:9 | 1215 124:18 |
| withhold 95:21 | worship 208:19 | yellow 247:18 | 10 53:11 58:16 | 125 118:21 |
| 134:24 | worth 12:17 16:19 | yesterday 96:15 | 122:19 140:15 | 1253 136:25 |
| withholding 82:8 | 251:16 | 135:17 153:2 | 143:6 204:13 | 13 28:16,18 33:8 |
| witness 15:4,6 | worthwhile 168:2 | yesterday's 126:11 | 240:18 250:24 | 40:19 42:17 46:5 |
| 17:22 20:4 21:25 | Worthy 145:10 | Yome 47:7,20,23 | 255:3 256:14 | 46:16 78:1 |
| 22:25 25:13,22 | write 196:3 | 48:18,19 49:6,15 | 10.05 171:7 | 120:16 153:11 |
| 28:7 75:7 78:12 | writing 45:7 92:4 | 49:25 50:7,22 | 10.10 83:5 | 166:15 170:15 |
| 200:12 201:2 | 93:13 94:25 | 54:19,22 55:6 | 10.11 82:24 | 186:16 197:9,25 |
| 240:1 | 214:18 247:11 | 58:18,21 59:19 | 10.15 127:3 | 202:25 216:8 |
| witnessed 56:24 | written 3:13,16 | 66:20,25 67:11 | 10.30 23:16 | 217:15 219:15 |
| 57:7 | 6:3,13 13:21 | 69:5 70:21 Yome's 50:17 | 10.56 178:20 | 242:20 248:16 |
| witnesses 3:24 6:7 | 16:17 26:22 | 1 ome \$ 50:1/ | 100 101:16 | 250:20 251:9 |
| 13:7,12,23 14:20 | 53:14 102:17 | $\overline{\mathbf{z}}$ | 1010 121:5 | 252:20 254:2 |
| 14:24 15:21,23 | 143:16 154:17 | | 1011 119:17,20 | 13.33 80:1 |
| 19:10 20:2 21:4 | 189:10 192:12 | 0 | 121:13 | 13.46 80:12 |
| 21:16,21 22:2,11 | 194:12 199:24 | 0209 125:25 | 11 32:8 73:25 | 13.47 80:14 |
| 22:19 24:4 26:23 | wrong 12:10 92:12 | 0240 120:5 | 81:14 82:6 83:16 | 13.48 93:5 |
| 27:7,12 74:17 | 154:3 162:17 | 03.40 88:4 | 84:6 101:6 | 13.57 140:4 |
| 235:25 249:7 | 165:23 166:2 | 0340 118:16 | 128:20 152:17 | 1319 118:20 |
| | | | 153:14 156:19 | |
| | | | | |

| | | | | 1 486 300 |
|--------------------------|--|--------------------------|---------------------------|--|
| 132 181:14 | 1613 130:16 | 160:10 184:24 | 84:19 85:13 86:5 | 22 21:23 41:10 |
| 1321 122:18 | 1621 99:12 136:21 | 198:1 199:22 | 87:3 89:25 101:6 | 71:23 73:14 74:9 |
| 133 124:13 181:20 | 165 169:4 | 215:14 217:9 | 105:18 106:7 | 132:10 221:18 |
| 134 181:23 | 1680 119:19 | 20.57 217:14 | 112:3 113:20 | 22(3) 254:14,18 |
| 1346 125:8 | 17 54:12 104:6 | 2006 19:13 36:6 | 114:7 117:6,25 | 23 24:25 117:6 |
| 135 103:9 182:2 | 132:6 209:6 | 47:19 144:10 | 119:16 125:9 | 182:19 |
| 1351 128:20 | 215:7 219:2 | 241:2,5 242:21 | 132:6,8,10,18 | 233 205:17 |
| 136 182:8 | 221:16 | 242:24 248:16 | 133:9 142:14,20 | 24 65:17 |
| 137 182:19 204:14 | 1700 106:15 | 2010 76:7 | 143:7,18,23 | 24.1 229:9 |
| 1386 52:6 | 1702 106:24 | 2011 187:24 192:3 | 145:2 151:12 | 24.5 230:6 |
| 1387 56:4 | 1703 104:3 | 2015 103:11 | 153:17 159:6,11 | 24.7 84:7 |
| 14 44:6 54:2 72:6 | 1705 107:5 | 222:23 | 159:19 161:12,24 | 246 61:8 |
| 73:20 76:1 89:25 | 1713 107:16 | 2016 31:14 104:7 | 173:3 174:17 | 248 74:10 |
| 120:17 132:18 | 1716 107:22 | 104:20 105:14 | 175:25 181:11 | 24A 178:14 |
| 133:9,13 144:2 | 1731 108:14 | 222:24 223:1 | 185:2 186:17 | 25 6:14 65:19 |
| 214:24 216:10 | 1738 113:8 | 227:13 229:14 | 188:21 189:21 | 78:14 151:25 |
| 221:9 224:10 | 1746 125:23 | 230:3 231:8 | 190:12,16 194:6 | 175:25 |
| 229:3 235:14 | 1748 126:8 | 2017 29:12 30:2 | 194:12 198:10,17 | 25A 179:3 |
| 243:7,20 | 1753 95:13 | 47:6 49:11 51:23 | 199:25 203:1,9 | 25B 180:3 |
| 14.14 93:14 | 179 169:19 | 52:2 53:11 55:10 | 204:6 214:2 | 26 6:14 9:7 35:1 |
| 14.30 171:13 | 18 32:21 34:2 75:7 | 55:17 58:17 | 215:24 218:14 | 76:18 155:18 |
| 1410 54:1 | 85:2 114:12 | 59:15,17 66:22 | 222:25 223:1 | 26-year 39:16 |
| 1417 174:20 | 132:8 133:21 | 67:10 68:21 | 224:15,25 226:20 | 28 21:8 55:10 |
| 1422 216:5 218:15 | 143:7 184:22 | 70:22 71:20 | 227:5 229:11 | 99:12 136:20 |
| 1447 209:24 | 202:14 221:17 | 73:25 74:11 | 230:2,6 231:8 | 199:25 |
| 145 122:18 | 224:10 244:16,25 | 105:20 112:2 | 235:15 237:15 | 285 171:21 |
| 15 29:1 40:19 | 18.58 81:14 | 114:6 | 238:12,23 239:3 | 29 45:18 156:17 |
| 82:16 98:6 | 180 169:21 | 2018 36:17 72:17 | 243:7 244:3,16 | 171:17 172:9 |
| 118:20 136:10,15 | 1858 128:20 | 76:18 140:25 | 244:25 248:8 | 220:13 226:20 |
| 140:25 173:20 | 1888 2:5 8:20 | 142:6 176:12 | 250:4 254:18 | 227:3 229:18 |
| 176:1 184:7 | 19 2:7 23:9 25:12 | 178:5 185:17 | 255:2 | 248:8 249:5,19 |
| 188:21 197:25 | 25:18 26:23 85:2 | 223:10,11 231:25 | 2021 117:4 152:1 | 2910 114:3 |
| 215:2 229:3 | 100:19 105:20 | 236:17 | 200:3 | 2915 114:22 |
| 15(1)(a) 97:23 | 133:21,24 181:14 | 2019 60:13 76:24 | 2022 8:18 19:3 | 2919 115:13 |
| 15(1)(a).' 97:19 | 19.07 81:19 | 142:8,12 152:18 | 35:1 39:5 144:6 | 2920 115:20 |
| 15(2) 97:25 | 1902 196:1 | 153:12 156:19 | 203:11 228:22 | 2921 116:4 |
| 15.01 196:2 | 192 114:7 | 182:2,7,8,19 | 2023 24:25 25:12 | 2924 116:9 |
| 15.09 203:21 | 1932 25:3 | 222:24 224:11 | 25:18 192:6 | 3 |
| 15.1(a) 36:6 | 194 86:2 | 236:17 | 2024 1:1 2:6 11:24 | |
| 15.18 203:23 | 198 44:5,8 | 202 93:3 | 21:2,6,8 26:7 | 3 8:19 44:25 49:18 |
| 15.31 216:4 | | 2020 1:6,15 6:24 | 256:15 | 69:4 100:21 |
| 15.41 174:23 | | 9:2 28:18 29:2 | 21 64:14 105:18 | 104:21 116:10 |
| 222:17 | 2 44:24 188:2 | 31:11,22 32:21 | 144:6 153:16 | 120:7 139:16 |
| 16 105:14 152:15 | 241:13 242:3 | 33:22 34:2,14,22 | 203:10 221:17 | 242:5 250:4 |
| 218:16 226:6 | 243:4 2.10.7 107:5 | 35:5 37:25 42:4 | 245:21 | 3(a) 104:25 3.12.1 109:6 |
| 244:2 | 2.3.1 106:15 | 42:25 44:7 45:18 | 21.10 63:6 | 3.12.1 109:0 3.12.3 109:18 |
| 16,000 20:6 | 2.3.1 100:13 20 39:4 40:19 93:5 | 73:14,21 76:1 | 21.11 61:8 | 3.12.3 109:18 3.15.1 110:18 |
| 16.11 248:7 | 95:14 131:7 | 77:6 78:1,25 | 21.4 61:7,8 | 3.17.5 111:7 |
| 16.21 256:16 | 134:5 153:12 | 81:14 83:16 | 21.5 61:17 | 3.2.3 107:16 |
| | 137.3 133.12 | <u> </u> | <u> </u> | 0.2.0 10/.10 |
| | | | | |

| | | | | 1 486 341 |
|--------------------------|--------------------------|-----------------------------------|-------------------|-----------|
| 3.20 49:19 | 4 | 239:3 252:22 | 33:22 59:15 | |
| 3.38 77:12 | | 6.05 78:25 118:5 | 80:24 83:3 | |
| 3.43 174:16 | 48:18 11:23 45:1 | 6.5 123:7 | 119:12 122:19 | |
| 3.48 118:2 | 105:6 116:17 | 6.54 83:4 119:5,13 | 126:10 140:15 | |
| 30 85:12 106:7 | 117:4 194:20 | 121:4 | 143:18 210:8 | |
| 179:16 213:1 | 222:18 242:9 | 605 118:8 | 224:25 243:14 | |
| 227:5,7 229:21 | 4(a) 105:9 | 6761 220:4 | 253:24 256:14 | |
| 31 238:12 | 4.2 112:11 | 68 217:14 | 9.25 79:4 | |
| 319 185:11 | 4.3.1 112:24 | 6883 217:4 | 9.49 44:6 | |
| 32 163:7 | 40,000 59:11 | | 9.96 77:13 | |
| 324 186:7 | 4100 134:19 | 7 | 94 20:4 | |
| 3278 183:23 | 4117 136:7 | 7 42:25 66:22 | 7120.1 | |
| 3280 183:22 184:6 | 42 160:16 | 120:13 142:14 | | |
| 33 141:10 180:6 | 43 166:15 | 156:12 159:19 | | |
| 185:19,20 | 44 146:16 | 161:12,24 185:2 | | |
| 338 183:10 | 45 147:3 | 194:20 220:5 | | |
| 339 183:16 | 47 147:12 202:13 | 223:1 228:16 | | |
| 34 32:19 34:5 | 476,000 141:17 | 7.07 84:6 | | |
| 45:22 241:4,22 | 48 90:12 | 7.09 83:16 | | |
| 245:2 246:17 | 5 | 75 93:4 | | |
| 247:24 250:12,18 | 5 33:6 34:14 35:5 | 757 66:24 | | |
| 251:13 | 42:4 45:4 59:17 | 76 154:20 157:7 | | |
| 34(1) 241:17,19 | 70:21 83:3 118:3 | 181:12 183:6 | | |
| 244:9 | 119:12 140:8,16 | 216:19 | | |
| 34.1 41:16 | 173:3 239:4 | 77 95:9 | | |
| 3457 180:20 | 242:13 250:11 | 7th 156:12 | | |
| 35 166:12 180:16 | 251:11 252:9 | | | |
| 192:3 | 253:1 | 8 | | |
| 36 37:19 83:3 | 5.1 77:14 193:20 | 8 1:1 29:12 31:22 | | |
| 119:12 121:2 | 5.11 113:8 | 33:12,13 34:22 | | |
| 141:9,9,19 152:9 | 5.2 193:20 | 43:8 45:18 49:10 | | |
| 154:9 157:18 | 5.3 193:4 | 51:23 52:2,10 | | |
| 175:23 176:23 | 512W 119:4 | 56:5 57:23,25 | | |
| 182:3 185:18,21 | 56 86:3 | 67:10 77:6 78:25 | | |
| 185:23,25 186:1 | 57 114:9 | 79:9 80:2,12,16 | | |
| 252:2 253:14 | 58 86:13 171:22 | 82:18,23 83:10 | | |
| 36-year 163:18 | 172:5 | 84:1,10 86:5 | | |
| 362 183:1 | 5872 201:22 | 87:2 103:10 | | |
| 3630 181:13 | 59 112:3 114:8 | 104:20 117:24 | | |
| 3665 183:4 | 59(2)(c) 144:9 | 118:21 119:16,25 | | |
| 36N 176:7,9,11 | | 123:11 125:8,24 | | |
| 177:19 178:1,4 | 6 | 140:15 195:12 | | |
| 178:11,20 | 6 24:16 33:21 | 200:3 206:22 | | |
| 36O9N 119:4 | 39:12 52:7 57:23 | 240:18 249:13 | | |
| 37 144:15 226:6 | 83:14 88:21 89:4 | 253:5 255:3 | | |
| 38 144:21 | 99:21 116:22 | 82 98:5 85 99:10 | | |
| 3808 185:1,10 | 122:2 123:7 | 03 77.10 | | |
| 3809 186:7 | 146:3 169:21 | 9 | | |
| 39 144:23 181:1 | 185:1 232:11 | 9 1:5 6:11,24 33:16 | | |
| | | 2 1.5 5.11,2 1 55.10 | | |
| | | | | |